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 This thesis is an examination of the ways in which, in what Bourdieu theorises as the 
‘space of literary or artistic position-takings’, Gertrude Stein has been continually 
positioned and repositioned, constructed and reconstructed: by writers in her own 
period, in modernism scholarship, and, particularly, by writers staking their claim as 
the literary avant-garde of the late 20
th




 Since her 
recuperation by the Language Poets in the 1970s, and in the literary histories proposed 
by Marjorie Perloff and others, Stein has been positioned as the originator of an 
alternative avant-garde genealogy which has resisted the ‘institutionalised’ 
modernism of the New Critics. This legacy continues to the present day in claims by 
writers like Kenneth Goldsmith that she is a precursor for Conceptual Writing. 
Because they are predicated on Stein’s resistance to the institution of modernism, and 
hinge on her removal from its history, none of these arguments discuss in any detail 
Stein’s relationship to the historical movement which is the immediate context for her 
work  to the institution of modernism itself or to the institutions with which it 
engages. My thesis challenges the removal of Stein from her milieu by showing how 
her textual production must be read alongside her activity on her contemporary scene 
and her representation of and by other modernists. In the thesis, I re-read Stein’s work 
as a series of explicit interventions in the institutions which form the context of the 
cultural production of the early 20
th
 Century. In doing so, I consider the motivations 
for the reconstructions and repositionings of Stein, tracing the historiography of her 
presentation as an exceptional figure dislocated from her context.   
 
  
                                                           
1 Pierre Bourdieu ‘The Field of Cultural Production, or: The Economic World Reversed’, in The Field of 
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An avant-garde genealogy 
Since her recuperation by the Language poets in the late 1970s, and in the literary 
histories proposed by Charles Bernstein, Peter Quartermain, Marjorie Perloff and 
others, Gertrude Stein has been situated as the early-twentieth-century originator of an 
avant-garde genealogy.
2
 This genealogy is identified as the alternative to the 
‘institutionalised’ modernism which culminated in the canon endorsed by the New 
Critics. The argument for her status as an avant-garde anomaly continues to the 
present day in claims by Kenneth Goldsmith, Craig Dworkin and associated writers 
and scholars that Stein is a precursor for conceptual writing, a contemporary 
‘tendency’ in poetry which is explicitly characterised as the twenty-first century 
inheritor of the avant-garde.
3
 The claim for Stein’s place in the genealogies these 
scholars and poets write is predicated on a distinction between her work and the 
cultural production associated with the ‘institution’ of modernism, and it hinges on 
the view that her writing stands apart from canonical modernism and its legacy. 
Because of their basis in Stein’s distinctiveness, none of these arguments discuss in 
any detail the relationship of her literary practice to its immediate cultural context, 
often explicitly detaching the work from the historical moment in which it was 
produced and reading it as a sealed and self-reflexive entity. In reading Stein’s oeuvre 
as divorced from the history of literary modernism, these arguments find an escape 
                                                           
2 See Charles Bernstein, Contents Dream: Essays 1975-1984 (Los Angeles: Sun and Moon Press, 1986); 
Peter Quartermain, Disjunctive Poetics: From Gertrude Stein and Louis Zukofsky to Susan Howe 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992); Marjorie Perloff, Twenty-First Century Modernism: 
The “New” Poetics (Hoboken: Wiley-Blackwell, 2002). All of these texts are discussed in detail in 
Chapter 1. See also Juliana Spahr and Joan Retallack, discussed later in the introduction. For other 
references, see Chapter 1. Stein is also often cited in introductions to collections of ‘innovative’ 
poetry through the 1980s and 90s. See, for example, In The American Tree: Language, Poetry, 
Realism, ed. by Ron Siliman (Orono: National Poetry Foundation, 1986), Out of Everywhere: 
Linguistically Innovative Poetry by Women in North America and the UK, ed. by Maggie O’Sullivan 
(London: Reality Street Editions, 1996) and Moving Borders: Three Decades of Innovative Writing by 
Women, ed. by Mary Sloan (Jersey City: Talisman Publishers, 1998).  
3Craig Dworkin, ‘The Fate of Echo’, in Against Expression: An Anthology of Conceptual Writing, ed. by 
Craig Dworkin and Kenneth Goldsmith (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 2011), p.xliv. For 
Stein as a precursor to conceptual writing beyond her discussion in Dworkin and Goldsmith’s 
anthology and in their other works and texts, see also Marjorie Perloff, Vanessa Place and Robert 
Fitterman, as discussed in Chapter 5. This genealogy is also traced in Paul Stephens’s 2015 study, 
which puts Stein and conceptual writing at either end of a lineage defined as avant-garde. In 
Stephens’s argument, the avant-garde is defined as a particular kind of response to developments in 
technology. See Paul Stephens, The Poetics of Information Overload: From Gertrude Stein to 
Conceptual Writing (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2015). 
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route out of the sanctioned form of modernism which was bound to the cultural 
hegemony of its own time and assimilated as doctrine into the New Critical academy.  
An alternative literary history can spring from Stein’s corpus, both because it was 
always a disturbing presence in modernism, even in its early-twentieth-century phase, 
and because it has not been absorbed into the literary history written by the New 
Critics in the post-war period.  
The contention of this thesis is that Stein’s work is not a peculiar practice distinct 
from the bulk of modernist cultural production: that, on the contrary, her texts make 
their meaning in specific engagements with the context from which the arguments for 
her avant-garde difference presume they stand aloof. In my reading, her texts are a 
series of conscious and explicit interventions on the cultural field, and this is an 
argument which inevitably troubles the histories which set her work purely in 
resistance to the cultural landscape of her period. In returning the texts to their milieu, 
I engage directly with those histories, thinking through Stein’s work in its relation to 
‘modernism’ and probing the subsequent writing of its history as ‘avant-garde’ as 
opposed to ‘modernist’. I will be examining her particular and shifting relations to her 
cultural context, mapping both the positions she takes and the positions she is 
assigned by her contemporaries in the network Pierre Bourdieu theorises as the ‘space 
of literary or artistic position-takings’.
4
   
One of the major motivations for an exceptional avant-garde Stein is the desire to 
fully distinguish ‘experimental’ contemporary poetry from the ‘mainstream’ writing 
viewed as, at various moments, ‘academic’, ‘normative’, ‘tepid’, or ‘what passes as… 
poetry’.
5
 Put very broadly, in these arguments, ‘Establishment poetry’ is the legacy of 
institutionalised modernism, and experimental poetry is the descendant of the avant-
garde.
6
 This story of a schism in poetry has its roots in Peter Bürger’s classic 1974 
text Theory of the Avant-Garde, and for many years, up until the late 1990s, that story 
was highly significant in the discourse of modernism studies.
7
 Since the turn of this 
century, however, modernism scholarship has moved away from this kind of account 
and toward an understanding of the period as much more multilinear and composite, 
                                                           
4 Pierre Bourdieu, The Field of Cultural Production: Essays on Art and Literature, p.30. 
5 Dworkin, p.xlv; Bernstein, p.155; Quartermain, p.19; Perloff, p.4; Dworkin, p.xlv. 
6
 Perloff, p.4. 
7 Peter Bürger, Theorie der Avantgarde (Berlin: Suhrkamp Verlag, 1974). Published in English as Theory 
of the Avant-Garde (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1984). 
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more a series of intersecting configurations than a story about the success of 
mainstream institutionalised modernism at the expense of the failure of the radical 
anti-bourgeois avant-garde. The shift in modernism studies away from this narrative, 
however, has not been replicated in the discussion of Stein’s legacy for contemporary 
poetry. In the significant current of scholarship linked to contemporary experimental 
poetry, Stein has long been and is still inserted into literary history in ways which 
follow the logic of Bürger’s account. 
Field, concepts, institutions 
The introduction to the Cambridge History of Literary Criticism Volume VII: 
Modernism and the New Criticism (2000) provides, in brief, a picture of the 
millennial contest over the historiography of modernism with which this thesis 
engages in its critical assessment of the historiography of ‘Gertrude Stein’. Menand 
and Rainey’s introduction exemplifies the debate over the relations of three key 
historical concepts which scholarship of the period had employed since the 1980s: 
avant-garde, modernism and postmodernism.
8
 Focusing on the institutionalisation of 
modernism as the central issue around which these concepts and their narratives turn, 
the introduction delineates what it sees as the two opposing positions in modernism 
studies at that point. The first position follows the story of modernism first posited in 
the work of Peter Bürger and Andreas Huyssen: 
In conformity with the opposition paradigm that informs the work of Bürger and Huyssen is a narrative 
that increasingly structures current accounts of modernism… it is urged that the twentieth century has 
witnessed two distinct revolutions in the field of culture, the first a ‘real’ revolution, in which artistic 
activity was urgently politicised and innovation swept through all the arts, the second an equally 
important if less noted revolution in which universities and other institutions appropriated modernism’s 
formal repertory, canonised its works and artists, and sapped its political energies.9  
This version of modernism’s history and legacy, proposed by Bürger and Huyssen but 
also by other scholars such as Raymond Williams, is seen by Menand and Rainey at 
this point, in 2000, as the dominant narrative. The second position is the emerging 
approach which Menand and Rainey both represent and support. They reject the 
Bürger/Huyssen understanding of modernism because it ‘rests upon a conception of 
                                                           
8 See also Jean-François Lyotard, La Condition Postmoderne: Rapport sur le Savoir (Paris: Les Éditions 
de Minuit, 1979). Published in English as The Postmodern Condition: A Report on Knowledge 
(Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1984). 
9 Louis Menand and Lawrence Rainey, ‘Introduction’, The Cambridge History of Literary Criticism: 
Volume 7 Modernism and the New Criticism, ed. by A. Walton Litz, Louis Menand and Lawrence 
Rainey (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), pp.1-14 (pp.5-6). Further references to the 
Introduction are given after quotations in the text. 
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the arts that has been distilled of material complexity and bears no relation to the 
realities of cultural production within complex, modern societies’. In its place, they 
postulate a history which would be written in the act of seeking and engaging with 
those complexities. Arguing that ‘there is little ground for sustaining a programmatic 
distinction between the avant-garde and modernism’, they also offer a vision of the 
relation between modernism and the avant-garde not as a divide but as a similarly 
ambiguous complex of intersections and configurations (6). In countering the 
conception of modernism which they see as exemplified by Bürger and Huyssen, 
Menand and Rainey simultaneously reflect and effect a shift in modernist studies by 
alluding to the new frameworks through which the history of the period is beginning 
to be written.  
The debate over the historiography of modernism I am outlining has at its heart the 
identification of a range of forms, practices and structures under the sign of the 
‘institution’. The different categorisations of the institution by these two schools of 
thought have formed the theoretical bases for their distinctive conceptualisations of 
the complex of positions on the field of cultural production. The initial sparse field 
which the discourses of Bürger, Huyssen and Williams invoke is structured as an 
oppositional space, and it is this vision of the field which in turn structures the 
arguments for Stein’s avant-garde position and its legacy. On the one side, there is the 
bourgeois hegemony which engenders and controls the socially sanctioned institutions 
of the market and the academy, and which needs to institutionalise art as a category 
separate from life in order to neutralise its power as social critique. On the other, there 
is the radical anti-bourgeois avant-garde which wants to return art to life and destroy 
or evade those hegemonic institutions which mediate and regulate social relations 
including the relation of art to life. Three institutions emerge from this delineation: the 
market, the academy, and the institution ‘art’, which is at different points in the 
arguments identified with the institution of modernism. In relation to this model, 
Stein’s work is ascribed the avant-garde position on the field, a position which resists 
all these institutions: the institutionalisation of art as modernism, the academy which 
sanctions it, and the commodifying logic of the market.  
In the arguments of Bürger, Williams and Huyssen which underlie the avant-garde 
genealogy, the institutionalisation of modernism is configured in slightly different 
ways. For Bürger, the institution of art equates with late-nineteenth-century Aesthetic 
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movements, characterised by the concept of ‘art for art’s sake’. In declaring the 
position of ‘art for art’s sake’, Aestheticism not only emphasises the 
institutionalisation of art as a separate sphere, it makes ‘the distance from the praxis 
of life the content of the works’. In Bürger’s description the avant-garde is formed in 
resistance to this move, as an ‘attempt to organize a new life praxis from a basis in 
art’.
 10
 The two strands, Aestheticism and its continuation, and the avant-garde which 
resists it, therefore exist side-by-side in an antagonistic relation. Although he defines 
the institution of art, Bürger avoids the term ‘modernism’ in order to distinguish the 
avant-garde as a historically specific rupture. When Theory of the Avant-Garde was 
written, ‘modernism’ was beginning to be used to identify the whole period including 
Aestheticism, its development into the twentieth century, and the movements 
designated as avant-garde. For Bürger, the avant-garde is a reaction to Aestheticism 
rather than an aspect of its development, and so the term ‘modernism’, which 
encompasses both Aestheticism and its development and the avant-garde, is for him 
misleading. The use of the concept of modernism to designate the ‘institutionalised’ 
practices of the period as opposed to the avant-garde is developed later, and Bürger’s 
initial avoidance of the term clearly has a theoretical function in relation to the 
historiographies he challenges. Bürger’s distinction between the institution of art and 
the avant-garde is therefore the basis of the distinction between the avant-garde and 
modernism in the accounts of Stein as avant-garde origin.  
In Williams’s later account, modernism is initially identical to the avant-garde, and 
for him the institutionalisation of modernism comes after its avant-garde phase, 
created in the suppression or mutation of this avant-garde by or into the bourgeois 
establishment through the procedure of academic canonisation. Williams outlines the 
historiographical consequences of this move in his 1987 lecture ‘When Was 
Modernism?’ 
After modernism is canonised, however, by the post-war settlement and its accompanying, complicit 
academic endorsements… ‘Modernism’ is confined to this highly selective field and denied to 
everything else in an act of pure ideology, whose first, unconscious irony is that, absurdly, it stops 
history dead. Modernism being the terminus, everything afterwards is counted out of the development. 
It is after; stuck in the post.
11
  
                                                           
10
 Bürger, p.49. 
11 Raymond Williams, ‘When Was Modernism?’ in The Politics of Modernism, ed. by Tony Pinkney 
(London: Verso 1989), pp. 31-35, (pp.34-35). 
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In this analysis, the New Critical canonisation of modernism neutralises its avant-
garde critique, subsumes it into the bourgeois worldview and in doing so precludes 
any further challenge. Indeed, in appropriating the category of the modern it denies 
the possibility of any new position outside that worldview. In many of the avant-garde 
histories written by and for experimental poetry, Stein’s work, excluded from the 
canon, also avoids this later phase of institutionalisation, enables an escape from the 
termination of history Williams delineates, and therefore offers a possible continuity 
for the avant-garde. 
In After the Great Divide: Modernism, Mass Culture, Postmodernism, Andreas 
Huyssen integrates both these positions by defining modernism over and against the 
avant-garde from the outset and equating it directly with the institution of art Bürger 
conceptualises. In his argument, modernism is always the sanctioned form and the 
avant-garde from the start exists in opposition to it, and so ‘the traditional way in 
which art and literature were produced, disseminated, and received, is never 
challenged by modernism, but remained intact whereas ‘the avant-garde…attempted 
to subvert art’s autonomy, its artificial separation from life, and its institutionalization 
as “high art”’.
12
 On the field hypothesized by this history, modernism is the 
institutionalised art which exists in the separate sphere required by bourgeois 
hegemony, and the avant-garde stands in opposition to this as it stands in opposition 
to all bourgeois institutions. This model means that modernism, because it exists in a 
rarefied sphere, and the avant-garde, because it rejects all bourgeois institutions, both 
stand in antagonistic positions in relation to the market and all it entails as an 
apparatus: commodification, consumerism, and mass culture. It is this integrated 
model which fully enables the argument for a genealogy which begins with Stein. Her 
work is originally avant-garde, and so never occupied the autonomous sphere Bürger 
delineates, and it also continues to resist the process of academic institutionalisation 
Williams postulates. Thus, Stein is never subsumed into the bourgeois paradigm and 
she continues to inhabit the avant-garde position Huyssen articulates, which holds at 
bay the academy, the market, and the institution of modernism. 
The new historiography indicated by Menand and Rainey produces a denser, thickly 
occupied field in which a range of more provisional, temporary and both practically 
                                                           
12 Andreas Huyssen, After the Great Divide: Modernism, Mass Culture, Postmodernism (Bloomington, 
Indiana University Press, 1986). Quoted in Menand and Rainey, p.4. 
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and conceptually unstable institutions operate alongside, intersect or disclose 
themselves out of the apparently monolithic institutions. These, Menand and Rainey 
identify as the ‘particular set of institutions which were essential to modernist 
production  the little reviews, the deluxe editions, a corpus of patron-collectors and 
investors, and specific groups of smaller publishers’ (4). This model enables Menand 
and Rainey to argue that modernism, the avant-garde, the market, the academy and all 
the ‘particular’ institutions of modernism are intersecting forces on the field, that 
‘[t]he avant-garde was not located outside of or against the institution of modernism, 
but was firmly situated within it  just as the institution of modernism was not poised 
wholly outside or against the changing economy of the new consumerist and 
professionalist society which surrounded it, but was engaged in a more complex and 
ambiguous dialogue with it’ (6). In this charting of the socio-cultural scene, the 
institution of modernism is retained, but the concept of the institution of art is 
dissolved. As a result, the distance between art (whether considered modernist or 
avant-garde) and social and economic life is collapsed. This reconfigures both 
modernism and the avant-garde as engaged with the activity of the whole field: with 
the market, with the academy, with the other particular means of production and 
reception, and with each other. The positing of these more porous categories 
complicates the story of an avant-garde in opposition to establishment modernism and 
destabilises the argument that has twentieth-century literary history as the history of 
the suppression or subsuming of the avant-garde by the institution of modernism. This 
evidently has implications for the narrative of Stein’s originary and persistent avant-
garde line. If the avant-garde does not stand in opposition to modernism, and if the 
avant-garde engages with the market and the academy, then it is hard to see how Stein 
can be distinguished as the genesis of a resistant line which remains separate from all 
these institutions across time. 
Menand and Rainey identify another important strand of the narrative they counter: 
that, for Bürger and Huyssen, ‘[t]he avant-garde and postmodernism share a genuine 
historical and ideological continuity’ (4). This also complicates the story which has 
Stein as an originator of that continuity. Her work has been claimed straightforwardly 
as the first manifestation of what became the postmodern mode, and, importantly, the 
12 
 
poets who take her up in the late 1970s are identified as ‘postmodern’.
13
  Postmodern 
poetry, looking back, conceived in hindsight its own roots in Stein’s work, became the 
legitimate inheritor of the avant-garde, and so escaped the institution of modernism 
altogether. Menand and Rainey’s approach challenges this narrative of the re-
emergence of a new anti-modernist avant-garde in the shape of postmodernism 
because it is predicated on that opposition of modernism and the avant-garde which 
they bring into question. The Stein genealogy up to and including its present 
reworking as conceptual writing in fact depends on the institutionalisation of 
modernism because it works from the premise that modernism is marked off by its 
institutionalisation and so can be productively separated from both the historical 
avant-garde and from postmodernism and its successors. Postmodernism therefore 
becomes not just the revival of the avant-garde but the other end of a separate, 
discrete and unbroken strand of history. The story of Stein’s postmodernism reflects 
the desire of a succession of poets and scholars to find that continuity with what is 
perceived of as the avant-garde in order to codify a practice which sustains or resumes 
its original challenge.   
The new historicism defined in Menand and Rainey’s introduction is exemplified by 
Rainey’s own highly influential 1998 book Institutions of Modernism: Literary Elites 
and Public Culture. Rainey’s new characterisation has modernism’s milieu as ‘an 
institutional field of cultural production being rapidly and radically transformed into 
one more variegated and complex than the rigid dichotomy between “high” and “low” 
allows’. For Rainey, ‘Modernism’s ambiguous achievement …was to probe the 
interstices dividing that variegated field and to forge within it a strange and 
unprecedented space for cultural production’.
14
  Rainey’s 1998 study and the 2000 
Cambridge History of Literary Criticism signal that move to a form of modernist 
studies which is more rigorously and minutely historicized and which continues to 
challenge, complicate and dissolve the perceived stability of institutional borders, 
particularly those which might sustain the dichotomy between ‘high’ and ‘low’ 
                                                           
13 For examples of work on Stein’s ‘postmodernism’ see Neil Schmitz, ‘Gertrude Stein as Post-
Modernist: The Rhetoric of “Tender Buttons”’, Journal of Modern Literature 3: 5 (1974), 203–18; 
Renée Riese Hubert, ‘Gertrude Stein, Cubism, and the Postmodern Book’, Genre 20 (1987), 329-358; 
Ellen E. Berry, Curved Thought and Textual Wandering: Gertrude Stein's Postmodernism (Ann Arbor: 
University of Michigan Press, 1992); Nicola Pitchford, ‘Unlikely Modernism, Unlikely Postmodernism: 
Stein's Tender Buttons’, American Literary History 11: 4 (1999), 642-667. 
14 Lawrence Rainey, Institutions of Modernism: Literary Elites and Public Culture (New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 1998), p.3. 
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culture which Rainey indicates. Thus, the ‘institution’ of modernism previously seen 
as the ‘high’ culture elite ratified by the academy and separate from the market, 
becomes the ‘institutions’ of modernism, and the cultural production of the period is 
not seen as occupying an autonomous sphere but rather realised in its dynamic and 
fluctuating relationships with all the institutions which form, regulate and sustain 
cultural and social life.  
Two Steins 
The blurring or collapsing of the dividing line between what had been previously 
conceived in scholarly historiography as the autonomous sphere of ‘high’ art 
sanctioned by the academy and the range of ‘low’ culture forms tied to the commodity 
culture of the market has been taken up by many scholars since, and has become an 
established and productive area of research, perhaps exemplified in Aaron Jaffe’s 
statement in Modernism and the Culture of Celebrity that ‘modernist culture is 
ordinary’.
15
 In the arguments for Gertrude Stein’s avant-garde status, however, this 
distinction has not been relinquished or fully problematized, and the opposition 
between high and low culture still troubles the narrative which has Stein as avant-
garde anomaly. This in turn brings into relief the inherent problem of the distinction 
between high and low culture for the identification of the avant-garde as such. For 
many of the arguments which put Stein in this position, most notably Peter 
Quartermain’s Disjunctive Poetics, but also Juliana Spahr’s book  Everybody’s 
Autonomy (2001), Stein’s work returns art to life because it engages with the 
vernacular and with mass culture as well as with the personal intimacies of everyday 
life.
16
 Rather than existing in the separate sphere of high culture, Stein’s work is very 
often read as, unlike the ‘elitist’ work of other modernists, offering a more authentic, 
more personal and less selective engagement with the modern world, including with 
the sphere of mass culture. Thus, Stein is on the other side of the divide, with TS Eliot 
                                                           
15 Aaron Jaffe Modernism and the Culture of Celebrity, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 
p.7. See also Loren Glass, Authors Inc.: Literary Celebrity in the Modern United States, 1880-1980 
(New York: NYU Press, 2004) and Jonathan Goldman, Modernism is the Literature of Celebrity (Austin: 
University of Texas Press, 2011). 
16 In Disjunctive Poetics, Quartermain claims that ‘Stein wants her writing to be available to any 
speaker or reader of English, no matter how “alien” she or he may be, no matter how ignorant of 
cultural matters or conventions’ (Quartermain, p.42). For Spahr, Stein ‘turns populist speech patterns 
into art’ and she argues that ‘this art which appears strange and unusual to some can have roots in 
the common, the everyday, can include everybody’. See Juliana Spahr, Everybody’s Autonomy: 
Connective Reading and Collective Identity (Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press, 2001), p.49. 
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in particular often posited as her elitist antagonist. Indeed, across the range of Stein 
scholarship, from Ulla Dydo’s Gertrude Stein: The Language that Rises through 
Spahr’s book to Barbara Will’s Gertrude Stein, Modernism and the Problem of 
‘Genius’ the contention is often maintained that her work is more inherently 
‘democratic’ than that of other modernist writers, and in this sense she is again 
distinguished from modernism in terms of the high/low divide which pits the elitist 
‘academic’ or ‘classical’ modernism against its mass culture nemesis.
17
 This aspect of 
Stein’s historiography, however, complicates the conceptualisation of her work as 
avant-garde because, in seeing her as engaging with mass culture forms and with the 
democratic discourse which underpins the capitalist economy, it brings her into the 
sphere of commodity culture which the avant-garde exists to critique. 
The problem of Stein’s position vis-à-vis commodity culture has created a divide in 
Stein studies, one which becomes particularly acute in the arguments which 
characterise her as avant-garde.
18
  This divide is between studies which read Stein’s 
activity as collector, salonniere and modernist persona immersed in the logic of the 
market and those which read Stein’s writing as a radical practice explicitly resistant to 
capitalism and to all the bourgeois institutions which shore it up. The arguments for 
the ‘avant-garde’ Stein, in order to read her writing as avant-garde, tend almost 
without exception to discuss it as a separate entity outside or resistant to her cultural 
context, or to see that context as largely irrelevant to its meaning.
19
 The problematic 
nature of this account of Stein’s work and motivations is illustrated by Ulla Dydo’s 
introduction to A Stein Reader (1993), a collection that consolidates the view of 
Stein’s work, first articulated in the work of the Language poets, as resistant to 
commodity culture.
20
 The late-twentieth-century reassessment initiated by the 
Language poets in the 1970s and which gained momentum through the 1980s and 90s 
places its emphasis on the identification of ‘Gertrude Stein’ as an experimental writer, 
and explicitly opposes this to an identification of her as a persona or celebrity. This 
opposition exists because the celebrity Stein is bound up with the modernism they 
                                                           
17 Ulla Dydo, Gertrude Stein: the Language that Rises 1923-1934 (Evanston: Northwestern University 
Press, 2003); Barbara Will, Gertrude Stein, Modernism and the Problem of ‘Genius’ (Edinburgh: 
Edinburgh University Press, 2000). 
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want to distinguish her from and the commodity culture which, for them, her 
experimental work resists.  
This divided Stein is reflected in the introduction to A Stein Reader and forms the 
explicit curatorial stance which defines the content of the collection. Dydo declares 
that the collection aims to ‘chang[e] the balance of Stein work in print’, in order to 
promote ‘the subversive experimental work of Gertrude Stein’ and offer ‘an 
introduction to her language experiments’.
21
 Arguing that it ‘differs from other widely 
used collections in print’, Dydo goes on to construct two versions of Stein in her 
critique of extant collections, ‘chief of [which] is Selected Writings of Gertrude Stein, 
edited by Carl Van Vechten’. Dydo argues that this 1946 collection ‘was planned 
from the start to include… late “public” works in conventional English’ and includes 
only ‘a limited number of experimental pieces’. Pointing out that Van Vechten’s 
collection ‘begins with the popular Autobiography of Alice B Toklas’, she suggests 
that it ‘followed the personality publicized and familiar from the American lecture 
tour’ (4). This view divides Stein into the public, popular icon constructed through the 
Autobiography and the lectures in ‘conventional English’, and the ‘subversive 
experimental’ writer whose work is neither popular nor public. This is emphasised 
when Dydo outlines the ‘larger aims’ of A Stein Reader: ‘it presents Stein the 
modernist innovator, not the personality. It concentrates on experimental work written 
“from inside” and excludes her later public works written “from outside” in 
conventional English’ (5).  
This presents a picture of two distinctive ‘Steins’ and sets up a series of binary 
oppositions: the ‘inside’ Stein associated with the private, the experimental and the 
unconventional, and the ‘outside’ Stein associated with the public, the popular and the 
conventional. The representation of the ‘publicized’ face of Stein as ‘familiar’ and 
‘popular’ presents Stein the personality as a figure who is known, understood and 
assimilated. This implies that the public Stein is therefore in many ways an 
institutionalised figure, constructed in and for the legitimising organs which govern 
the production and reception of the author and her work. Stein the experimenter is, in 
contrast, ‘subversive’, ‘unconventional’ and so definitely anti-institutional. This in 
turn implies a distinction in value between the real or authentic Stein of the private 
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experiment and the less authentic Stein of the public persona. Thus, the emphasis on 
the private versus the public and the related division of Stein into the experimental 
writer and the modernist persona enables Stein to be the avant-garde writer 
experimental poetry needs by sealing the work off both aesthetically and temporally 
from her activity on the cultural field. The function of this divide for the writers who 
claim Stein as an origin is here brought into sharp relief: in order for Stein’s work to 
be authentically avant-garde, it must be read as separate from the institutions at play 
on the field of cultural production. When this view of Stein is unsustainable in 
relation to the market popularity of The Autobiography of Alice B Toklas, the work 
and the ‘Gertrude Stein’ who wrote it are not valid precursors.  
For many years, Stein’s art collection and her salon had overshadowed her writing, 
and so the view expressed by Ulla Dydo is also prompted by a desire to ‘chang[e] the 
balance’: to challenge and rectify the historical tendency to engage with Stein only on 
these terms. This tendency first appeared in Stein’s own lifetime, as articulated in 
Edmund Wilson’s 1931 declaration:  
Gertrude Stein is a singular case in this respect. Widely ridiculed and seldom enjoyed, she has yet 
played an important role in connection with other writers who have become popular…Most of us balk 
at her soporific rigmaroles, her echolaliac incantations, her half-witted sounding catalogues of 
numbers; most of us read her less and less. Yet, remembering especially her early work, we are still 
always aware of her presence in the background of contemporary literature.
22
 
This view was still dominant in the 1970s, when the Language poets picked up Stein’s 
early work, with a particular emphasis on Tender Buttons, and began to study the 
writing itself in earnest. The approach which the Language poets initially countered is 
exemplified by James R. Mellow’s Charmed Circle: Gertrude Stein & Company 
(1974), which tends to valorise her social activity and her ‘services in exposing 
modern art to a continuous stream of international visitors’ above her literary 
practice.
23
 This still remains a tendency in Stein studies, and many other studies since 
have taken a biographical approach, for example Linda Wagner-Martin’s Favored 
Strangers (1995) and Brenda Wineapple’s Sister Brother (1996).
24
 Indeed, the reading 
of Stein as a personality is still a prevalent current in recent research, for example in 
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Karen Leick’s study Gertrude Stein and the Making of an American Celebrity (2009), 
which, although it provides much detailed and interesting work on the contexts of 
production and reception for Stein’s work, barely discusses the writing itself.
25
   
A particularly problematic practice in this kind of reading of Stein is to use the 
‘autobiographical’ works as documentary evidence. This is common in the stories of 
Stein the personality written through the late twentieth century, but it also occurs in 
Leick’s more recent and explicitly historicist study. In her discussion of the criticisms 
and mockeries of Tender Buttons in American newspapers after its publication in 
1914, she argues that ‘Stein did not seem to mind the book’s reception’ and uses, as 
evidence for this, the fact that: 
Alice reports in The Autobiography of Alice B Toklas: ‘[Tender Buttons] was a very charming little 
book and Gertrude Stein was enormously pleased, and it, as everyone knows, had an enormous 
influence on all young writers and started off columnists in the newspapers of the whole country on 
their long campaign of ridicule. I must say that when the columnists are really funny, and they quite 
often are, Gertrude Stein chuckles and reads them aloud to me’.26 
Not only does this comment suggest that Alice B Toklas’s narrative voice is authentic 
rather than Stein’s genre-bending construct, it also fails to take account of the specific 
function of the text in writing a history of the period which, amongst other things, 
valorises Stein and gives her a significant position in it. It is important to see all 
Stein’s texts as products of a particular cultural moment and to understand their 
function in her self-presentation and in the corresponding presentation of her position 
in relation to the other gestures, practices and position-takings with which they 
intersect. This example reveals the potential danger of seeing the text as a historical 
document rather than reading it as an example of an aesthetic practice which is itself 
an interpolation in the writing of that history.  
The divide between Stein the persona and Stein the experimental writer also exists in 
scholarship beyond the arguments which claim Stein as avant-garde. Among scholars 
who pay close attention to Stein’s work, there is a tendency to read it as a discrete 
entity and as, however experimental, an esoteric engagement primarily with the 
personal and the quotidian.  Marianne DeKoven’s A Different Language, Harriet Scott 
Chessman’s The Public is Invited to Dance, Lisa Ruddick’s Body, Text, Gnosis and 
Ulla Dydo’s The Language that Rises all do important work in reading Stein’s work 
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in its emphasis on the significance of the domestic world and the world of sexuality 
and intimate relationships.
27
 Seeing Stein’s private experimental language as an 
alternative to the patriarchal discourse of public culture, these readings have put the 
argument for Stein’s importance for feminism, and, indeed the related interest in the 
‘everyday’ of modernism has been and remains a productive strand of research.
28
  
Yet I would maintain that reading the work as a personal project isolates it from the 
cultural scene with which it intersects and therefore sees only half the story. The 
recent move to a rigorous historicising of modernist cultural production speaks 
convincingly of the necessity of seeing the whole picture. Since the mid-2000s, some 
scholars have developed culturally contextualised readings in studies which deal with 
Stein. These include Alex Goody’s Modernist Articulations, and Timothy W Galow’s 
Writing Celebrity, both of which begin to situate Stein in her cultural scene and read 
her work as a response to it.
29
 The reading of Stein’s work as a discrete experimental 
practice, however, still represents the prevailing approach in the arguments about the 
legacy of her work for contemporary poetry. Even the poet Joan Retallack, in the 
introduction to her Selections (2008), which so carefully looks at Stein’s work from a 
variety of contextual angles, does not situate her writing in the context of literary 
modernism and does not examine its engagements with the cultural and institutional 
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  Instead, the work’s relationship to the personal context is once again 
emphasised when she suggests that ‘the objects and rhythms of everyday life in the 
present would become the primary inspiration and source for her work’ and notes, as 
an aside, that ‘(she didn’t seem to care about the experiments of her peers)’.
31
 On the 
contrary, I will show that, in the range of inspirations for her work, the situation it 
occupies on the field and its relation to the other forces which structure that field are 
primary inspirations, and that these include not only the experiments but also the 
positions of her peers in that ‘space of position-takings’.  
Reading Stein on the field of cultural production   
This thesis, returning to the scene in which Stein’s practice engages, theorises her 
writing itself as actively invested and intervening in the cultural field and the 
institutions which shape it. The method I use is an integrated approach which puts the 
work into context as the product of its engagements with the institutions of the 
market, the academy, and ‘modernism’ and reads it as both formal and gestural action 
on the field. As is the case in Karen Leick’s book on Stein, the reduced emphasis on 
the aesthetic properties of modernist works in favour of the contexts of production 
and reception is a significant consequence of the socio-cultural approach. In 
approaching Stein in this way, Leick follows Rainey, who discusses the sociology of 
modernist cultural production rather than the texts themselves. Rainey himself makes 
this clear in his defence of this practice: 
One omission of this study needs to be acknowledged. Some readers, especially those with literary 
critical training, will find far too little of the detailed examination of actual works that is sometimes 
held to be the only important or worthwhile form of critical activity. I reject the idea that history or 
theory are acceptable only if they take on the role of humble handmaiden to the aesthetic artefact. 
Further, juxtaposing the analysis of specific works with discussion of institutional networks would 
encourage, however inadvertently, a vulgar materialism that I also disclaim.32 
This commitment follows the integrity of a rigorous historical approach, but it leaves 
open the question of how the text itself is to be read. Indeed, if the scholarship which 
situates the range of practices conceptualised as ‘modernism’ back into their socio-
cultural specificity does not discuss the writing, it also produces, to some extent, the 
binary between the literary text and its context that we have seen in the work on Stein. 
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Whilst avoiding ‘vulgar materialism’, I think it is possible to read the text as a whole 
engagement with a rich and complex literary, artistic and institutional context and 
with the literary history within which it situates itself. I would also argue that this is 
particularly relevant to the works of this period, because, as I hope to show, they are 
explicitly engaged with the reformation or the construction of the contexts of 
production and reception which mediate, even designate, the function and value of the 
work of art. The reading I am advocating provides an integration of socio-cultural 
mapping and close textual analysis to read the texts as engagements with the field 
which work in multiple ways and forms. This has the potential to both counter the 
view that Stein’s work is avant-garde because it is exceptional, disjunctive or 
productively untimely, and to add to the body of Stein scholarship which, like the 
work of Goody and Galow, is developing a historicist approach which encounters the 
texts as aesthetic interventions operating in a specific socio-cultural context. 
The series of arguments which position Stein as avant-garde represents one of the 
historical constellations with which this thesis engages. The accounts which write 
Stein into their history of the avant-garde are primary texts in my theorising of Stein’s 
historiography and its relations to the historiography of modernism. I will probe these 
arguments by taking Stein’s work back to her contemporary scene. Both 
institutionalised modernist icon and avant-garde post-modern precursor, Stein 
represents a pressure point in the articulation of the historical concepts of avant-garde, 
modernist, postmodern and in our view of the relations of the literary production of 
her period to the institutions which frame these concepts. In order to see the whole 
picture, I approach Stein’s work as a practice which is in itself both an engagement 
with and a record of the pursuit of a new set of relations on the field of cultural 
production. To this end, I will also discuss in detail not just Stein’s work as integrated 
with her activities and gestures, but also the practices, activities and performances of 
other figures and groups on that scene.   
As I have indicated, the primary theoretical underpinning for my discussion is Pierre 
Bourdieu’s notion of the field of cultural production. The model Bourdieu develops to 
express the nature of the literary field in late 19
th
 Century France becomes in my 
discussion of Stein the basis for an understanding of the structure of the rather more 
international field modernism both occupies and constructs in the first half of the 




Figure 1: Bourdieu’s model of the French literary field.
33
 
The basic precept of my study of Stein in her milieu, in Bourdieu’s terms, is that the 
scene upon which she acts and into which her work enters must be read as ‘the 
network of objective relations’ in which ‘every position, even the dominant one, 
depends for its very existence, and for the determinations it imposes on its occupants, 
on the other positions constituting the field’.
34
 Thus, I read Stein’s literary production, 
and her related activity as an agent on the field, as engaging with and engaged by the 
other products, agents, and forces which make it up. An important adjunct to this is 
Bourdieu’s characterisation of ‘the literary or artistic field’  as ‘a field of forces’ and 
‘a field of struggles tending to transform or conserve this field of forces’ in which ‘the 
generative, unifying principle of this “system” is the struggle’ (30; 34). With this in 
mind, I also read Stein’s works as purposeful deployments on the field of forces and 
as, explicitly, products of that struggle. The field is understood here as constituted by 
the position-takings, of and in relation to the apparatuses  the institutions, groups, 
networks, publication contexts and so on  which construct it. I am also interested in 
the explicit ways in which the field is consciously engaged with in the representations 
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and conceptualisations of the scene itself which are so prevalent in modernist literary 
and critical production. The desire to grasp the field itself which is revealed in 
modernist literary production is, likewise, a substantial stimulus for Stein’s work. The 
aim of my method is to disclose the field by tracing the contexts of production and 
reception, the paratexts, the interactions, activities, gestures, and performances which 
surround the texts, but always in relation to the texts themselves, viewing the work as 
generating meaning in its interaction with these elements.  Again, this follows 
Bourdieu’s understanding of the work ‘as a manifestation of the field as a whole, in 
which all the powers of the field, and all the determinisms inherent in its structure and 
functioning, are concentrated’ (37). This method necessarily begs the question of how 
far the texts themselves corroborate the view of Stein as an isolate or exception in the 
history of literary modernism. 
Another significant issue motivating this study is the question of what the signifier 
‘Gertrude Stein’ denotes. Bourdieu begins his delineation of the field of cultural 
production with the reproach ‘most analysts uncritically accept the division of the 
corpus that is imposed on them by the names of the authors’ (29). The further 
contemporary scholarship moves from the approach Bourdieu critiques, in which the 
name of an author had signified a body of work as a discrete and coherent entity 
which could be analysed as such, the less satisfactory it is that ‘Gertrude Stein’ is 
deployed to name something fixed, authentic and distinct. For Bourdieu ‘every 
literary field is the site of a struggle over the definition of the writer’, and the struggle 
over what ‘Gertrude Stein’ names is just that (42). The wrangle over what her name 
denotes began in her own time and continues now, showing us how the battle over the 
definition of a writer has unfolded across time. The question of what constitutes a 
writer, and what constitutes poetry is, as we shall see in the final chapter, still very 
much a live debate, and one in which ‘Gertrude Stein’ is still a significant object. 
The arguments for an avant-garde genealogy with an origin in Stein’s work have a 
history of their own, and this history frames the thesis: it opens with an account of the 
arguments from Language poetry onwards, and closes with their present incarnation 
in conceptual writing. The examination of Stein’s work and action in her milieu tests 
the hypothesis of the original historiography set out in Chapter 1, and runs through 
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Chapters 2, 3 and 4. The current form of the argument is then considered in Chapter 5, 
in the light of the evidence provided by this ‘return to the scene of the modern’.
35
  
Chapter 1, ‘The Real Gertrude Stein’, outlines and analyses the concepts, approaches 
and methodologies which have, since the late 1970s, shaped the arguments for the 
‘avant-garde’ Stein and her legacy for experimental poetry. The chapter begins with 
the late 1970s readings of Stein’s Tender Buttons by the Language poets, and traces 
the development of the narrative of an avant-garde genealogy through Charles 
Bernstein’s 1980s essays, Peter Quartermain’s 1992 Disjunctive Poetics and to 
Marjorie Perloff’s 2002 Twenty-First Century Modernism. This chapter focuses in 
particular on the ways in which Stein’s work is displaced from its cultural context in 
order for it to be read as avant-garde. It also considers Jennifer Ashton’s counter-
argument, presented in her 2005 book From Modernism to Postmodernism: American 
Poetry and Theory in the Twentieth Century, and argues that this text also maintains a 
conceptual approach which effaces the work’s specific cultural engagement. In the 
course of the chapter, I read two of Stein’s works, ‘Business in Baltimore’ and ‘What 
are Masterpieces and Why Are There so Few of Them’ as, contrary to the arguments I 
discuss, predicated on and formed by an acute awareness of and preoccupation with 
their cultural contexts. 
Chapter 2, ‘Modernist Persona’ turns to the scene of Stein’s early experiments in the 
1900s and 1910s in order to counter the claims that the work of this period is avant-
garde because it is resistant to its cultural context. I discuss Stein’s portraits ‘Matisse’, 
‘Picasso’, Mabel Dodge at the Villa Curonia’ and ‘M. Cezanne et Vollard’ and their 
particular contexts of production and reception in order to show that, on the contrary, 
these texts operate as dynamic engagements with that context. With an emphasis on 
the institution of the market, the chapter considers the construction and 
commodification of Stein’s persona in relation to those figures she portrays. I argue 
that the portraits are active participations in their cultural milieu in their content, in 
their form and in their mode as interventions in an explicitly conceptualised ‘post-
impressionist’ or ‘modernist’ marketplace. Thus, the early work seen in the avant-
garde genealogy as resistant to commodity culture in its form and mode is re-read in 
context as an explicit engagement with the issue of the work of art as commodity. 
                                                           
35 See Michael North, Reading 1922: A Return to the Scene of the Modern (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1999). 
24 
 
Chapter 3, ‘Stein in the Academy’, considers Stein’s relationship to the academy, the 
institution which receives the most intense attention in the arguments for her 
exceptionalism. This chapter focuses on the lecture Stein gave in June 1926 at 
Cambridge and Oxford Universities respectively, and argues that this lecture, seen in 
context, problematizes the arguments which position Stein in direct and unequivocal 
opposition to the academy. I compare Stein’s talk, published by the Hogarth Press as 
‘Composition as Explanation’ later that year, with TS Eliot’s 1919 ‘Tradition and the 
Individual Talent’. Stein has so often been positioned in a dichotomous relationship to 
Eliot because he is seen as the representative of the ‘academic’ modernism against 
which her work is defined. I argue that, rather than demonstrating utterly antithetical 
positions, both texts in fact represent interventions into an institution which was 
beginning to take account of the changes in literary culture of the period. In the 
discussion, I draw on student reviews of Stein’s lecture in order to show that it was an 
attempt, however provocative, to influence and shape the academic response to the 
new literary and artistic scene. Rather than representing a resistance to the academy, I 
contend that the lecture offers a new literary history, a ‘history of the refused in the 
arts’ which would enable that institution to engage positively and productively with 
contemporary innovation. 
Chapter 4, ‘Stein and the Death of Modernism’, considers the crystallisation in the 
late 1920s of the ‘institution’ of modernism, and considers both the position Stein is 
ascribed and the position she takes in relation to that developing institution. It 
contextualises the writing of a literary history and a literary canon, by a number of 
writers in the period, for what is alternately termed ‘revolutionary art’, ‘futurism’ or 
‘modernism’ and examines the place Stein is attributed in it. This chapter argues that, 
in the move to historicise and therefore conceptualise the movement in the late 1920s, 
Stein is configured as exemplary of the problems many writers felt they had to excise. 
This can be seen in a debate about the validity of Stein’s work in a series of texts 
between 1926 and 1928: an anonymous review of ‘Composition as Explanation’ in 
the New Criterion, two articles written by TS Eliot, Wyndham Lewis’s book Time 
and Western Man, John Rodker’s essay ‘The Future of Futurism’, Laura Riding and 
Robert Graves’s book A Survey of Modernist Poetry and a lecture on Stein given by 
Mina Loy at Natalie Barney’s Paris salon. Whilst the initial review, Riding and 
Graves’s book, and Loy’s lecture are ostensibly positive about Stein’s work, all of 
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these texts ultimately seek to conceptualise ‘revolutionary art’, ‘futurism’ or 
‘modernism’ as something finished, and they all use Stein as the example of the 
movement which has ended or should end. In this chapter, I argue that Stein is 
presented as a cypher for those practices which might be deemed illegitimate or 
unacceptable in order to construct a legitimate face for the new art differentiated from 
the shocking or provocative forms so often mocked in the popular press. The chapter 
ends with a reading of Stein’s ‘The Fifteenth of November’, published in the New 
Criterion, as an expression of her sense of exclusion and as her attempt to intervene in 
order, once again, to participate in and influence a developing institution.  
Chapter 5, ‘Gertrude Stein: Conceptual Writer’ returns to the arguments for Stein’s 
avant-garde legacy and considers their current manifestation in the proponents and 
scholars of conceptual writing. After examining the ways in which the avant-garde 
genealogy which includes Stein is reformulated in this recent incarnation, I focus my 
attention on Against Expression: An Anthology of Conceptual Writing. Using data 
analysis techniques to visualise the field of cultural production evoked in the 
paratextual apparatus of the anthology, I consider the way in which Stein is positioned 
and the way in which a developmental model, a literary history and a canon are 
constructed for a movement which predicates its avant-garde position on a resistance 
to the traditional notions of development, period and canon. This chapter then 
problematizes the underlying evolutionary logic constructed in the narrative which is 
indicated in the paratext and made explicit in Kenneth Goldsmith and Craig 
Dworkin’s introductory essays, of a development through a historically proliferating 
literary canon. It does so primarily by reading it against the troubling of this paradigm 
in Stein’s 1926 text ‘Natural Phenomena’ and in the 2008 book re:evolution written 
by Kim Rosenfield, a poet who is included in the anthology. The chapter ends with an 
exploration of the relevance of Bourdieu’s notion of ‘degree specific consecration’, 
and argues that the anthology legitimises the works it includes through a process of 
mutual recognition which creates its own terms of validation chief of which is the 
opposition to mainstream or establishment legitimisation. In the light of my 
discussion of Stein in her context, I consider how far both conceptual writing and the 
earlier arguments for Stein’s avant-garde legacy need to read Stein through the late 
1920s rewriting of her practice as illegitimate and exceptional in order to write a 




The Real Gertrude Stein 
 
Postmodern Stein: an origin for Language poetry 
 
Since the late 1970s Gertrude Stein has been situated as the significant precursor for 
the forms of radical, innovative, experimental poetry which proclaim an opposition to 
the establishment lyric seen as the inheritance of modernism in its institutionalised 
form. It is Stein’s work itself, read closely and directly, rather than her roles as 
collector and salonniere, that has provided the material upon which this claim is 
founded. Stein’s revival as a writer whose practice is important rather than a 
personality whose social activity makes her significant was initially undertaken by the 
Language poets, who read Stein’s work as an origin for their politically engaged 
‘resistant’ writing. This loose group of writers, often seen as ‘postmodern’, and 
working through the late 1970s and into the 1990s, actively emphasised the reading of 
her work as opposed to the reading of her personality or connections, taking Stein out 
of the modernist scene and adopting her as their own.
1
     
 
The introduction to the 1984 text The L=A=N=G=U=A=G=E Book, which reprinted 
a selection from the journal L=A=N=G=U=A=G=E, published between 1978 and 
1982, defines Language poetry as a resistance to the ‘commodity fetishism’ in which 
words ‘cease to be valued for what they are themselves but only for their properties as 
instrumentalities leading us to a world outside or beyond them’ and in which language 
is therefore used to create ‘a picture of a physical world that the reader can then 
consume as if it were a commodity’.
2
 Influenced by Marxist literary theory and Post-
structuralist theories of signification, reflected in the many references in The 
L=A=N=G=U=A=G=E Book to Marx’s writings and those of Marxist theorists such 
as Gramsci, Jameson, and Althusser, and to the theories of Derrida, Barthes and 
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Lacan, the work of Language poetry ‘does not involve turning language into a 
commodity for consumption; instead, it involves repossessing the sign through close 
attention to, and active participation in, its production’.
3
 Language poetry is presented 
as an alternative to the cultural hegemony which instrumentalises and commodifies 
language, and Stein’s work is read through this lens as an early example of a practice 
which resists the logic of commodification and enables the repossession of the sign. 
Thus, for the Language poets, Stein is ahead of her time because she anticipates their 
language-centred resistance to the institution of the market. 
 
The primary text for this group is Stein’s Tender Buttons, written in 1912 and 
published in book form in 1914. In The L=A=N=G=U=A=G=E Book, Tender 
Buttons is assigned a prominent position. The book is divided into three sections: 
‘Poetics and Language’, ‘Writing and Politics’, and ‘Readings’. The third section 
consists mainly of contemporary poets responding to each other’s work, but it opens 
with three poems from Tender Buttons, ‘A Carafe, that is a Blind Glass’, ‘Glazed 
Glitter’, and ‘Roastbeef’. This selection is followed with ‘readings’ by the poets 
Michael Davidson, Larry Eigner, Bob Perelman, Steve McCaffery, Peter Seaton, 
Jackson Mac Low and Robert Grenier. Stein’s work is the only example of poetry in 
the collection not written by a contemporary writer. Situated like this, together with 
the Language poets’ subsequent reciprocal readings of each other’s work – Charles 
Bernstein reads Johanna Drucker, Johanna Drucker reads Marshall Reese, Barrett 
Watten reads Robert Grenier, Steve McCaffery reads Michael Palmer, and so on – the 
responses to Stein’s poems, I would argue, perform the action of drawing her into a 
contemporary network of mutual validation. Their location at the opening of this 
section, however, also hints at a chronology, one which moves directly from Tender 
                                                           
3 Ibid. For Marxist and Post-structuralist theory in The L=A=N=G=U=A=G=E Book, see, for example, 
Ron Silliman ,‘Disappearance of the Word, Appearance of the World’, pp. 121-133; Bruce Andrews, 
‘Writing Social Work & Political practice’, pp. 133-136; Bruce Boone, ‘Writing, Power and Activity’, 
pp.140-145, John Leo; ‘/CAPITAL/ /WRITING/’, pp. 156-157, etc. The political project of 
L=A=N=G=U=A=G=E writing is perhaps exemplified in Silliman’s closing paragraph:  ‘By recognising 
itself as the philosophy of practice in language, poetry can work to search out the preconditions of 
post-referential language within the existing social fact. This requires (1) recognition of the historic 
nature and structure of referentiality, (2) placing the issue of language, the repressed element at the 
center of the program, and (3) placing the program into the context of conscious class struggle. Such 
poetry will take as its motto the words of Marx’s The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte: “The 
social revolution…cannot draw its poetry from the past, but only from the future”’ (131). 
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Buttons to the contemporary texts, and this arrangement assigns another position to 




The poets’ responses to the Tender Buttons texts in themselves also direct their 
attention to the contemporary situation from which they are read by offering 
apparently unmediated engagements in the form of either narrowly focused close 
readings, poems which respond directly to the experience of reading the texts, or 
generically indeterminate essay-poems which function in both ways. The sense of 
Stein’s inclusion in this contemporary network is also heightened because the later 
readings of the contemporary writers’ work deploy the same variety of forms as the 
reading of Tender Buttons. As well as including her in a mutually affirming network 
of authors and practices, therefore, this also serves to flatten the historical distance 
which divides them by eliding any distinction between a text written in 1912 and one 
written in 1979. Stein therefore becomes both precursor and contemporary, suggesting 
that the time between her work and theirs can be collapsed; in short, that Language 
poetry picks up directly where Stein left off. As we will see later, this reflects their 
view that the literary history which did not emerge out of Stein’s experimental work is 
a history they want to reject. 
 
The foregrounding in these readings of the contemporary value of Stein’s work is 
achieved in two ways: first, in that heightened sense of a direct engagement with the 
text in which it is seen as an immediate experience, and, second, in an emphasis on 
the loss of the context in which Tender Buttons was originally written. Indeed, in 
many of the readings, both of these attitudes to the work are invoked simultaneously. 
The readings therefore construct a relation between the disappearance of that 
historical time and the immediate contemporary presence of the text. The significance 
of this can be seen in Bob Perelman’s reading: ‘in places I wonder if she 
hears/sees/thinks the word just before or as she writes it – or only after’.
5
 Perelman’s 
use of the present tense to consider the mystery of Stein’s writing process at once 
precipitates that writing process into the present and indicates the permanent absence 
of the moment in which it was written – he can never know how she wrote the text. 
                                                           
4
 The section ends with four responses to Zukovsky, situating Stein and Zukovsky, as Peter 
Quartermain later does, as the significant modernist originators of this poetic. 
5 Bob Perelman’s untitled response to Stein in The L=A=N=G=U=A=G=E Book pp.199-200 (p.200). 
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Thus, the immediate experience of engaging with the text and its processes is 
prioritised, and Stein is, in this way, pulled into the present of Language poetry. Both 
these aspects serve to weight the reading of Stein’s works in terms of their 
contemporary recuperation. This practice points to a crucial aspect of Stein’s value as 
a precursor for Language poetry: the idea that Stein’s work answers to such direct and 
unmediated contact and can therefore relinquish its historical situatedness. The kind 
of primary access Stein’s writing seems to enable supports the conviction that the 
meaning of the work is not determined by its context. For the Language poets it is the 
originating example of a resistance to the logic of ‘commodity fetishism’ and its 
‘instrumentalities’. Tender Buttons is read as a discrete object which enables and 
rewards a direct and decontextualized engagement because its meanings are not fixed 
by this instrumentalised, commodifying relationship to language. It is therefore 
exemplary of the resistant and decommodified writing to which their poetic aspires. 
 
The first mode, of engaging with the poem as a direct experience in the present 
moment, is perhaps most apparent in Larry Eigner’s ‘A Carafe…Glazed Glitter 
Roastbeef (through a glass darkly)’. Its oblique references to the Stein text offer a 
reading of her work as something encountered as a facet of his own moment in 
contemporary America. This is exemplified in Eigner’s opening line, ‘Ok murky in 
after all end, unpredictable day, with rain shine any degree night, the sun kin warm 
and hot’, which reworks the Tender Buttons poem printed on the first page of the 
‘readings’ section ‘A Carafe, that is a Blind Glass’: 
 
A kind in glass and a cousin, a spectacle and nothing strange a single hurt color and an arrangement in 
a system to pointing. All this and not ordinary, not unordered in not resembling. The difference is 
spreading.6 
 
Eigner’s text has the quality of a palimpsest in which his immediate experiences – in 
this instance, of the weather and the everyday discourse of the weather report – lie 
across the time of reading Stein, and it is through them that her language, her syntax 
and her processes emerge. These are expressed in the relation between Stein’s ‘the 
difference is spreading’ and Eigner’s ‘unpredictable’ difference between ‘murky’ and 
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 Larry Eigner ‘A Carafe…Glazed Glitter Roastbeef (through a glass darkly)’, in The L=A=N=G=U=A=G=E 




‘shine’. His references to ‘sun’ and to ‘hot’ evoke the shine of Stein’s ‘system to 
pointing’ and the heat of her ‘single hurt color’ and his elision of ‘kinda’ to ‘kin’ 
draws together the relations between her ‘kind’ and ‘cousin’. This draws our attention 
to the system of relations to which both texts allude: that of language itself. Thus, 
Stein’s text is embedded in the context of Eigner’s experience, which is treated as an 
experience of and in language, and her work is confronted as an aspect of that 
experience.  
 
This kind of immediacy is a characteristic of all the responses to Stein assembled in 
The L=A=N=G=U=A=G=E Book, and it is often accompanied by the sense that 
these are provisional readings, for example in Jackson Mac Low’s opening ‘I start 
reading “A Carafe, That is a Blind Glass.” I go from word to word’, which sees the 
text as the direct experience of a particular moment whose meaning is pieced together 
in real time. Mac Low’s exclamation, ‘The whole poem suddenly seems to be about 
seeing!’ implies a temporary response in which what the poem is about alters rapidly 
from one moment to the next.
7
 Bob Perelman’s cautious ‘I can hook up my intuition 
with what I guess was hers’ has the reader in an uncertain search for meaning, a 
tentative groping for  common ground based on guesswork and remaining 
conditional.
8
 The reading of Stein is conceived of as a process of present-tense and 
contingent rumination, an immersion in the text with a strong sense of the 
contemporary context in which that immersion takes place. This occurs across all the 
readings, from Robert Grenier’s note-form ‘Ok, “tender” because new-born – & all 
right, word-buds, tenderly regarded’ to Michael Davidson’s urgent question ‘What’s 
the good of all this?’, which uses the interrogative form that occurs in many of the 
other responses.
9
 Seemingly enabling such a decontextualisation because of their 
resistance to interpretation, Stein’s texts float, unbound and undefined, in the moment 
of the reader’s engagement, objects which interact temporarily with the context of 
each reading. Stein’s work, read this way, is never subsumed, and continues to have 
an afterlife which is predicated precisely on its escape from its context, its resistance 
to meanings which can be fixed to any time.  
                                                           
7 Jackson Mac Low, ‘Reading a Selection from Tender Buttons’, in The L=A=N=G=U=A=G=E Book, 
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8
 Perelman, p.200. 
9 Robert Grenier, ‘Tender Buttons’, in The L=A=N=G=U=A=G=E Book, pp.204-207, (p.205); Michael 




This sense that Stein’s own context is irrecoverable is a significant aspect of 
Language poetry’s claim on Stein, as expressed in Robert Grenier’s contribution, 
simply titled ‘Tender Buttons’. The second paragraph opens with: ‘Sad story, now, 
apparently. Real im Traum, “before the war.” Today, a hearkening back, as longing, 
not the reality of the word, not the faith that makes composition of the world, riding 
on that everything, permission given. She could say anything’.
10
 This reading 
emphasises the contemporary moment in its attention to the act of looking back to 
Stein’s lost context. The present time of reading is accentuated because the ‘sad story’ 
of the text has occurred after its composition, and, therefore has only become 
‘apparent’ from the point of view of the present which now reads it as loss. The 
current ‘hearkening back’ or ‘longing’ for the early-twentieth-century context of 
Tender Buttons, in which everything was cast into doubt and therefore anything 
seemed possible, (‘she could say anything’) is presented as evidence of its utter loss. 
Grenier’s emphasis is therefore on the present moment, the ‘now’, the ‘today’, in 
which the texts remain as the residue of that loss, crystallising a moment whose 
promise was never fulfilled. In this sense Stein’s text is betrayed by history. As in all 
these readings, I would argue, it is therefore the story of her recuperation, the drawing 
of Stein into a present which understands what was lost, which is valorised.  
 
These readings reveal that, for the Language poets, the historical context for Stein’s 
work is inadequate to it, and that it is the contemporary knowledge of that inadequacy 
which means that Stein is read in that present moment, and by these writers, with a 
greater force than in her own period. This position on Stein enables the Language 
poets to move what they see as the radical early history of modernism, in which 
‘permission’ was given to challenge the ‘faith that makes composition of the world’, 
forward to their time, which in turn enables Language poetry to be conceived as a 
continuation of that radical project. This narrative, as I will show in this chapter, has 
been sustained and developed by the proponents of ‘experimental’ or ‘innovative’ 
poetry throughout the 1980s and 1990s and into the twenty-first century.  
 
                                                           
10 Grenier, p.204. 
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The notion of a history which has read Stein inadequately is articulated as a key 
argument for the value of the kind of experimental writing represented in Language 
poetry by Charles Bernstein, the editor, along with Bruce Andrews, of The 
L=A=N=G=U=A=G=E Book and a significant figure in the group. In much of his 
theoretical writing of the 1980s, he explicitly posits Stein as an originator for a poetic 
whose promise had thus far remained unfulfilled. In his 1983 essay ‘Words and 
Pictures’, he offers a comparison of the relative development of poetry and visual art 
and suggests that visual art has followed a meaningful trajectory from modernism 
which poetry has not. He adds: 
 
This is not to say that on individual terms Tender Buttons is not fully comparable to Les Demoiselles 
d’Avignon or Wassily Kandinsky’s abstract compositions. But work such as Stein’s remained largely 
unknown in comparison to work such as Picasso’s or Kandinsky’s. While a dominant practice in 
painting eventually followed in directions related to the work of these two painters, this is not as true 
for writing in respect to the work of Stein’.11 
 
The direct parallel Bernstein draws between Stein’s work and that of Picasso and 
Kandinsky – it is ‘fully comparable’ – serves to underscore what is in his view the 
inadequacy of the development of poetry and provides the basis of an argument for an 
alternative writing which has a greater validity than the ‘dominant practice’ that has 
not followed the direction of Stein’s work. This notion of the unfulfilled legacy of 
Stein’s modernism (and, again, Tender Buttons is the key text for him) as the 
unrecognised ‘largely unknown’ but authentic strand in the development from 
modernism is set against what he later calls ‘the vapid intellectualisation of the 
academic verse of the period’ which he attributes to ‘Eliot’s influence (the “great 
disaster of our letters” as [William Carlos] Williams called it) and the rise of the New 
Criticism’.
12
 In another essay in the same collection, Bernstein calls this the ‘schism 
in American literary culture’, arguing that what ‘characterises the officially 
sanctioned verse of our time, no less than Williams’s, is a restricted vocabulary, 
neutral and univocal tone in the guise of voice or persona, grammar-book syntax, 
received conceits, static and unitary form’.
13
 The claim on Stein, therefore, means that 
Language poetry is not the formation of a new alternative poetic but an assertion that 
one already exists, one which has suffered a marginalisation in favour of the 
                                                           
11 Charles Bernstein, ‘Words and Pictures’, in Content’s Dream: Essays 1975-1984, pp.114-165 
(pp.132-33). 
12
 Bernstein, p.155. 
13 Charles Bernstein, ‘The Academy in Peril: William Carlos Williams Meets the MLA’ ,in Content’s 
Dream: Essays 1975-1984, pp.244-252 (p.246; p.245). 
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‘officially sanctioned’ poetry which does not represent a development out of the 
experimental origins of modernism. The mainstream tradition, for which this 
argument locates an origin in Eliot and the New Critics, is presented as the product of 
institutionalisation in many forms: the ‘academic’ the ‘official’, that which is 
‘sanctioned;’ the ‘restricted vocabulary’ and ‘univocal tone’ which imply a doctrine 
for language use and narrative perspective; the rules of the ‘grammar-book’ of 
childhood education and the ‘received conceits’ which indicate the handing down of 
models for mimesis. Indeed, it is its institutionalisation which invalidates this writing, 
in that it precludes any attempt at the radical experimentation with form which 
Bernstein sees as the inheritance of Stein’s modernism.  
 
The argument for alternative modernisms gained currency through the 1990s and has 
formed an important basis for the development of the New Modernist Studies in the 
last 30 years in the expansion of modernism’s temporal and cultural boundaries, and 
in the recuperation of marginalised works, authors and, indeed, geographies for 
modernism.
14
 This future for modernism studies is advocated perhaps most vigorously 
in Raymond Williams’s 1987 injunction: 
 
If we are to break out of the non-historical fixity of post-modernism, then we must search out and 
counterpose an alternative tradition taken from the neglected works left in the wide margin of the 
century, a tradition which may address itself not to this by now exploitable because quite inhuman 
rewriting of the past but, for all our sakes, to a modern future in which community may be imagined 
again. 15 
 
The solution to the historical bind created by post-war modernism, as he says earlier, 
that of being ‘stuck in the post’, has in this argument a chance of resolution in the act 
of reaching back into the past to find an alternative tradition which can tell history 
differently in order to free western literary culture from the ‘non-historical fixity’ 
created by modernism’s hegemony. Much of this impulse can already be seen in 
Charles Bernstein’s claims on Stein as the origin for such an alternative tradition. In 
Bernstein’s argument, this alternative tradition seems to have avoided that ‘non-
historical fixity’ because it can simultaneously call itself ‘post-modern’ and claim an 
origin in the history of modernism.  
                                                           
14 For a discussion of this development, see Douglas Mao and Rebecca L Walkowitz, ‘Introduction: 
Modernisms Bad and New’, in Bad Modernisms, ed. by Douglas Mao and Rebecca Walkowitz 
(Durham: Duke University Press) 2006, pp.1-17. 




I would argue, however, that over the course of the next two decades the development 
of this narrative for Stein, and for a post-modernism rooted in the modernism left in 
the margins, throws up more problems than it resolves. In particular, as we shall see, 
the arguments which remove Stein from the sanctioned version of literary history and 
recuperate her for the purposes of contemporary experimental poetry begin to 
contradict a Marxist project of literary history which would, in Williams’s injunction, 
serve to relocate those ‘neglected’ works in their historical moment and thus assign to 
them a validity for a literary history not overshadowed by the ‘post-war settlement’. 
The indications of this contradiction can already be seen in the way in which the 
Language poets appear to precipitate Stein into the late twentieth century in order to 
posit her writing as a direct experience which requires no contextualisation. Indeed, 
the way Stein is brought into the present implies that her work could not properly be 
read in its original context; that, rather than belonging to the time of its writing, it 
belongs, in fact, to the future.  
 
Disjunctive Stein: tracing an alternative ‘tradition’ 
 
This problematic methodology of decontextualisation as a resistance to the legacy of 
what is perceived as a hegemonic modernism is fully theorised as an argument for an 
alternative poetics with its origins in Stein’s work in Peter Quartermain’s 1992 book 
Disjunctive Poetics: From Gertrude Stein and Louis Zukofsky to Susan Howe. The 
position set out by Bernstein in 1983 and indicated in Williams’s 1987 exhortation is 
taken as the basis for an alternative literary history. In Quartermain’s argument, the 
line he traces from Stein stands permanently outside history as a resistant mode which 
cannot be assimilated into any cultural hegemony. The necessity of contesting the 
perceived modernist institution evoked in Raymond Williams’s discussion, and of 
escaping the ‘historical fixity’ it has engendered, becomes a defining principle in 
Quartermain’s poetry of resistance, which is read as a challenge to any form of 
institutionalisation. For him, Stein’s writing exemplifies a ‘sort of modernism’ 
characterised by ‘disjunctive writing’ which is ‘recalcitrant to description’.  He reads 
Stein’s practice as disjunctive because it produces poems which attain the status of the 
‘decontextualized object’. This presents her work as resistant because ‘such objects 
are difficult to read’, in that they ‘challenge our assumptions about the processes of 
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reading, about what constitutes “value”, about “knowledge” and about “knowing”’.
16
 
Thus, Stein’s poems are radically disjunctive because they cannot be translated into 
existing frames of reference. The resistant text presents itself at each reading as if it 
were read for the first time, and because it cannot be resolved by being interpreted 
through established ways of making meaning, it challenges the ways meaning is 
sought and made each time it is read. As Quartermain says: 
 
In thinking of poems as objects, not only does the writer have no control over what the poem might 
mean to its reader, but the ground of meaning is shifted from what perhaps had best be called a series 
of cultural imperatives…to the very act of reading itself. Value is thus shifted from artefact to process. 
 
Quartermain goes on to add that ‘cultural baggage seriously impedes the act of 
reading…by fostering confusion between historical (or economic or whatever) fact 
and “poetic fact”’ (16). This calls for a reading of Stein which deals only with the fact 
of the text itself and therefore divorces it from its historical context. The culture 
within which the text was originally produced thus becomes unnecessary ‘baggage’ 
which stands between the reader and the work rather than enabling an understanding 
of it as a product of its own historical moment. The problem with this, beyond the 
simple impossibility of a text produced in such a rarefied manner, is that it comes 
dangerously close to the separation of poetry into the kind of elite sphere these 
arguments seek to critique when they reject the literary history of institutionalised 
modernism. 
 
This understanding of Stein’s poetry and of the work of other poets Quartermain 
includes in the genealogy he traces proposes that the kind of reading they demand 
creates a cultural and historical vacuum in which the engagement with the poem is the 
experience of a stripping away of enculturated ways of reading and making meaning. 
The writer is also, in this paradigm, detached from the meaning of the poem because 
the poem has become an autonomous entity in the historical vacuum it creates. This is 
problematic in that it cuts the poem adrift from both the historical moment of its 
making and the historical moment in which it is read. The poem, in Quartermain’s 
argument, embodies a resistance to any context because it creates a sealed world of 
‘“poetic fact,”’ standing outside human time in its eternal refusal to be interpreted as 
something which has a finite meaning for a particular moment. For Quartermain, 
                                                           
16 Quartermain, p.2. Further references are given after quotations in the text. 
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Stein’s work cannot be synthesised because it defies interpretation, and it is therefore 
resistant to the cultural hegemony which would assimilate it. This ascribes to Stein’s 
work a permanent characteristic of resistance which, whilst it acts as a way of 
recuperating her work out of the hegemonic narrative which has apparently erased it, 
still sustains the erasure it contests. This, I would argue, leaves the real work of 
recuperation undone, because instead of following the logic of Williams’s mandate by 
putting Stein back into a literary history in which her work has been marginalised, 
Quartermain’s approach removes her from history altogether. 
 
Quartermain’s concept of resistance is therefore predicated on a Stein removed from 
her historical context, and this is reflected in his approach to her work. In his readings 
of Stein, he moves across her work from Tender Buttons (1912) to Lifting Belly 
(1917) to Patriarchal Poetry (1927), and from ‘Four Dishonest Ones’ (1911) to ‘A 
Little Novel’ (1927) in order to develop his argument about Stein’s techniques and 
processes. This method, along with the assertion that the ‘indeterminacy of meaning’ 
which he proposes as the central function of Stein’s work ‘is as true of her work of 
1912 as it is of that of 1928 and later’ is problematic in that it presents the work in a 
self-referential vacuum which bears no relation to the cultural context in which each 
individual text was produced (23). What makes this all the more contradictory is that 
it has more in common with the emphasis on the purity of the text urged by IA 
Richards and other proponents of Practical Criticism and, later, the New Criticism of 
Williams’s ‘post-war settlement’, than with Williams’s own desire to reassert  or to 
reinsert  the texts which have been erased from history by that hegemony. Indeed, 
this escape from literary history by binding the text to an abstract notion of a 
permanent set of values  here, disjunctiveness  replicates the problematic logic 
Williams decries in his condemnation of the canonisation of a particular form of 
modernism and ‘its accompanying, complicit academic endorsements’ in which  
‘Modernism’ has come to denote a ‘highly selective field’.  
 
This notion of Stein’s work as a sealed and disjunctive entity is also articulated in the 
conclusions Quartermain comes to, that ‘the writing…demands very little 
acculturation of its readers’ a quality which he characterises as a ‘marked contrast to 
the practice of Stein’s contemporaries like Joyce, say, or Eliot’. For Quartermain, 
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Stein is exceptional because she, unlike her contemporaries, ‘deliberately excludes 
such cultural apparatus’ (41). This view of Stein’s oeuvre suggests that the work is 
indeterminate because it resists any engagement with culture as such at all. This view 
is a highly questionable one, and one which is directly contradicted by the work itself, 
which I would argue is often predicated on a critical participation in the mechanisms 
of culture in its explorations of the relationship between culture, language and 
consciousness.  
 
Stein’s 1925 text ‘Business in Baltimore’, for example, presents a significant 
engagement with the cultural context of the mercantile Baltimore cousins on whom 
Stein, rather uncomfortably, relied for financial support. As Ulla Dydo points out, as 
the site of the family business, run by the Stein men, ‘Baltimore spells business and 
business spells money’.
17
 The text is a negative representation of the male-dominated 
business world as a system which accounts for and creates an understanding of all 
aspects of life, of time and space, of individuals and relationships. As such, ‘Business 
in Baltimore’ is a direct engagement with a cultural context and this is its function as 
poetry: as an investigative embodiment of its logic. Stein is indeed critical of this 
example of capitalist culture, but, rather than emerging as a by-product of a linguistic 
practice of indeterminacy resistant to historical fixity, it is achieved in a precise 
engagement with a very specific instance. 
 
In the Baltimore culture Stein’s work embodies, time is controlled and circumscribed, 
as exemplified in the lines “This is why they have every reason to be arranged and 
every morning to be morning and every evening to be evening. This is the reason why 
they have every Sunday and Tuesday and Monday”.
18
 Here, the tedious pace of time 
bounded by rules and routine, measured and accounted for, is emphasised in the 
repetition of ‘every’ and the relentless use of simple conjunctions. Similarly, ‘How 
may days pay, how much of a day pays and how differently from thinking’ presents 
time divided and measured more explicitly in terms of monetary value. The carping 
rhyme of ‘how may days pay’ leaves an impression of the nagging emptiness of a 
culture engaged with life on a primarily mercenary level, and it contrasts with the 
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 Ulla Dydo A Stein Reader, p.479. 
18 Gertrude Stein, ‘Business in Baltimore’, in A Stein Reader pp.479-490 (p.480). Further references 
are given after quotations in the text.  
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variety of sound and the syllabic complexity of the wry criticism ‘and how differently 
from thinking’(481). The sense of restriction and confinement is also conferred on 
notions of space, which is ‘divided’ or ‘connected’, serving a purpose, providing 
constrained channels  of movement hedged around with ‘doors and floors’. Similarly, 
the question ‘How many places for scales are there in it’ gives the impression that 
space is valued for its business use (480). The constant use of quantifiers: ‘more’; 
‘many’; ‘much’ and numbers ‘two kinds finds’; ‘he did and three he did and see he 
did and three’; ‘how many generations make five’ suggest that matter, objects, the 
stuff of the world is understood, in the terms of the counting house, as that which can 
be quantified (480; 481). This impression is compounded by a repetitive section 
which dwells on the paperwork of the business transaction, beginning: ‘How many 
papers can make more papers’. Individuals are also subjected to the system ‘if another 
marries her brother, if another marries their brother, if their brother marries another’ 
and so on, which arranges individuals and their relationships in order to pursue its 
own ends, asking another quantitative question: ‘how many pairs are there of it’(481).  
 
As the text progresses it becomes more repetitive, more insistent and less varied, 
almost as if Stein is being drawn in to the essence of the system, finding its rhythm 
and its core components. The paragraph of repetitive variations on ‘Business in 
Baltimore makes a wedding at first’ suggests generations of family connections 
engendered by and engendering business (482). The structures of intimate social 
relationships are governed by a business model of consolidation and production, 
moving ever onward but without change through a series of reproductions. At times 
the text is overwhelmed by the repetition of the title ‘Business in Baltimore’, with 
minute shifts and variations in the use of conjunctions, determiners and verb tenses, 
each of which prescribes another area of control (484). The effect is of a web, a skein, 
or a field of meaning which covers all possibilities. Stein’s text feels what it is like to 
inhabit this worldview, and the continuum of space and time is signified by this 
accounting more and more insistently as the text progresses in the accretion of 
references to the city as a mapped space of ‘streets, corners, places’ and ‘streets, 
corners, connections’ and the repetitive return to the question ‘How many’ (488). The 
processes of mapping, counting and accumulation come to overtly dominate the text 





Towards the end of the text this totalising categorisation becomes more and more 
insistent. Having written it through to its innermost structure and reduced it to its 
essential features, Stein’s text appears to find the base processes which determine the 
map of meaning which constructs the culture of her Baltimore cousins. These 
processes, reduced and denuded, Stein presents in the final section of the text as the 
repetition of the words ‘yes’, ‘and’, ‘better’, ‘best’, ‘more’ and ‘most’ (489-490). It is 
a model of meaning whose points of reference are acceptance (‘yes’), continuation 
(‘and’), competition (‘better’, ‘best’) and increase (‘more’, ‘most’). The 
predominance of the phrase ‘and yes’ foregrounds the processes of agreement, 
affirmation, and acceptance, and this emphasises the basic nature of the system as one 
which refuses nothing and subsumes everything. It is, therefore inherently a system of 
accumulation, and it is this factor which is articulated through all of its processes. 
What Stein’s text discovers in its sustained attention to those processes is that 
accumulation is the machine which drives this culture. 
 
Far from being detached or aloof from her cultural context, Stein, as this work shows, 
is critically engaged with it, both on the micro level of individual voices and 
experiences and on the macro level of the functioning of a cultural system and the 
field of meaning it creates. Indeed, as we have seen here, her writing is directly 
concerned with the relations between individual consciousness and culture and, as we 
shall see later, Stein, far from being an exception, is in this and in many other respects 
in line with her contemporary scene. 
 
Quartermain’s approach to Stein’s work makes her into the exception from 
modernism and in itself creates the conditions for her work to stand outside the 
cultural contexts in which it was written and in which it is read. The methodology 
Quartermain chooses has his argument, that Stein’s work can never be legitimised or 
accepted because it will always remain disjunctive, that it is ‘resistant to 
institutionalised power and meaning’ already presupposed (Quartermain, 43). In this 
way, the decontextualisation of Stein’s work is claimed as a mechanism internal to the 
work itself, derived from its defining property of encoding a perpetual challenge to 
hegemony. For Quartermain, and for the Language poets, what they see as this 
inherent function of Stein’s work is raised to the level of an ideological principle. 
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Because this function is posited as inherent to the work, however, the 
decontextualized reading is also construed as the appropriate way to read Stein, 
making Quartermain’s approach and the Language poets’ readings, not simply 
political acts predicated on their desire for a resistant poetic, but, in sympathy with 
Dydo’s 1993 argument, the authentic mode in which to respond to her work.  
 
Much rests upon this method, because it presents Stein as the originator for an 
alternative poetic which follows the same practice of disjunction and which, therefore, 
can never be either subsumed by or replace the institution it resists. Indeed, in 
Quartermain’s presentation this alternative practice is predicated upon a resistance to 
any form or process of institutionalisation. Following that premise, to posit a 
mainstream hegemonic poetry in opposition to this alternative strand, as both 
Bernstein and Quartermain do, is to define a poetry which has as its very mode the 
resistance to the norms such hegemony imposes. The problem here is that the 
alternative strand or ‘“line”’ in this sense depends upon the institution for its 
existence. This aspect of the argument also determines the ways in which the 
alternative is defined – as a line or strand rather than a tradition. It becomes necessary 
that it is described as such because tradition is a central instrument of 
institutionalisation in that it represents a set of established ideas and norms which are 
handed down. Quartermain’s argument, that ‘it is extremely difficult to talk of Stein’s 
“disciples” or even of her “imitators”…It is not even a tradition of forms, or of formal 
concerns. Even with the wisdom of hindsight, one cannot predict, say, a Susan Howe 
from a Gertrude Stein’, posits a tradition which resists the normal processes (8). 
Indeed, Quartermain makes a resistance to tradition itself an explicit necessity for its 
alterity. When he says, ‘I hesitate to call this a tradition; that word usually refers to a 
set of beliefs informing social or political programmes, or even adherence to sets of 
formal principles’ and ‘above all else it refuses to be programmatic’, he posits a 
mechanical, imitative or derivative version of tradition which emphasises its 
institutionalising role (3). Thus, Quartermain’s ‘line’ occupies in the awkward and 
contradictory position of a tradition which is defined by being antagonistic to the very 
concept of tradition. 
 
In an echo of both Bernstein’s argument and Grenier’s presentation of the mourning 
of a lost opportunity, the establishment poetry Quartermain decries, defined as 
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characterised by ‘semantic singularity’, transmits a model for imitation which does 
not reflect the break with tradition which Stein’s modernism seemed to promise. In 
setting Stein’s legacy against this, he predicates the whole value of her work on the 
resistance to institutionalisation. Following the logic of the Language poets’ political 
project, the decontextualisation of the work and the reading of it as resistant to 
institutionalising forms and processes go hand in hand as representations of the main 
functions of Stein’s practice. Once again, according to this argument, to understand 




I would argue that the act of removing Stein’s work from its context has, therefore, 
several values for Language poetry. First, it protests against the reductive tendency to 
see Stein purely in terms of her salon, her collections and her personality, thus 
returning the reader to the work itself. Second, it has a political function of 
determining the meaning of Stein’s work in terms of its resistance to the 
institutionalised, establishment meanings of its context. Third, it provides a way of 
counterposing an alternative ‘tradition’ founded on a methodology of experimentation 
which resists the institutionalising function of the mainstream tradition. Finally, 
without being explicit, it confers the status of ‘avant-garde’ on Stein’s work and the 
work of those ‘postmodern’ poets who follow her example. If Stein is not appreciated 
in her time, it is because she is ahead of her time. The act of recuperation therefore in 
itself confers this status: Stein can come into her own in the future which has become 
the present of Language poetry. This reveals the significance of the present-tense 
recuperative readings of Stein’s texts in The L=A=N=G=U=A=G=E Book.  
 
Like the Language poets, however, Quartermain must avoid the term ‘avant-garde’ 
which, since Peter Bürger’s Theory of the Avant-Garde had, for them, come to signify 
a fixed historical moment in the development of art. In Quartermain’s discussion the 
category of the disjunctive text is essentially invented to stand in for the category of 
the avant-garde, in that it signifies a work whose meaning comes directly from its 
                                                           
19 Quartermain also distinguishes the personal from the cultural provenance of Stein’s work, stressing 
the significance of the immediate personal context as evidence of the way in which the work restores 
the connection between art and life: ‘As an act of testimony the poem is anchored firmly in the 
compositional moment of the poet’s life, including accidentals immediately to hand, and it 
incorporates into itself its surrounding events…If the poem is true to its own history (the history of its 
own composition) then necessarily the poem is error free’ (8).  
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overt disruption of the norms of meaning-making it confronts. Like Bernstein, 
Quartermain also juxtaposes a contemporary establishment with the alternative strand 
he proposes, describing it as ‘the recurrent collision in twentieth-century American 
poetics’, which he conceptualises as a conflict between ‘semantic singularity and 
multiplicity’ (9). Indeed, Quartermain’s elaboration of this category brings it even 
closer to Bürger’s classic definition of the avant-garde. Quartermain’s characterisation 
of this disjunctive function as that which can ‘open the poem to registering and 
attending to areas of experience hitherto deemed unworthy of literary 
attention…denying traditional distinctions between poetry and “life”’ significantly 
echoes Bürger’s argument that project of the historical avant-garde movements was to 




Quartermain’s complication of tradition, however, gives the notion of a resistant 
current another historical form. Whereas Bernstein proposes a marginalised 
alternative tradition, Quartermain is able to use the category of disjunctiveness to 
posit an ahistorical poetic which can be characterised not so much in terms of 
development, but rather in terms of resurgence. His use of the word ‘recurrent’ 
reflects this position, as does his description of the poems he discusses as 
‘manifestation(s) of a mode’. This argument, in which the decontextualisation which 
is a matter of principle is also a mechanism of the work itself (its mode), is put 
forward to enable a poetic freed from history in which the text always functions in the 
present because it is an experience of language which can never dissolve into any 
culturally constructed hegemonic meanings. I would argue, therefore, that this shift in 
attention away from Stein’s ‘international visitors’ (Mellow), her ‘personality’ or her 
‘presence’ (Wilson) in her own period and towards the reading of her work alone and 
in a historical vacuum thus has an ideological function: it is the basis of the 
construction of an alternative literary history. As a way out of Raymond Williams’s 
postmodern bind, Stein’s work is presented as eternally disruptive, and this literary 
history is constructed as that tradition which is an escape from tradition, a disjunctive 
poetry which escapes history. This argument for the experimental poetic Quartermain 
champions thus enables the Stein it requires: a decontextualised Stein out of which a 
dehistoricised version of literary history can be originated.  
                                                           




Avant-garde Stein: the origin for an unfinished modernism 
 
This vision of Stein’s legacy has continued into the twenty-first century. Marjorie 
Perloff’s 2002 book Twenty-First Century Modernism traces a lineage, as 
Quartermain does, from Stein through Objectivism to Charles Bernstein, Susan Howe, 
Lyn Hejinian and Steve McCaffery. The position is developed, however, in a way 
which simultaneously makes a more explicit use of the category of the avant-garde, 
offers a more historically located claim for an alternative tradition, and is able to 
eliminate altogether what Perloff calls the ‘tired dichotomy’  expressed in the 
category of postmodernism. As the title intimates, Perloff shifts the argument and 
reconfigures the terms in order to claim that modernism is not a finished project. In 
Perloff’s version, the postmodernism of the Language poets and those who have since 
claimed allegiance to what she calls the ‘“experimental” or “innovative” or 
“oppositional” or “alternative” poetries in the US and other Anglophone nations’ is 
simply the authentic inheritance of modernism’s original avant-garde intent.
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The book opens by setting out a premise which once again reproduces the logic of 
Raymond Williams’s argument in order to frame a rereading of literary history against 
the grain. Perloff declares ‘What strikes us when we reread the poetries of the early 
twentieth century is that the real fate of first-stage modernism was one of deferral’ 
and she asks ‘what if, despite the predominance of a tepid and unambitious 
Establishment poetry, there were a powerful avant-garde that takes up, once again, the 
experimentation of the early twentieth century?’. Like Quartermain, Perloff finds an 
origin for contemporary experimental writing in the ‘sort of’ modernism exemplified 
for her by Stein, a ‘materialist poetic which is increasingly our own – a poetic that 
seems much more attuned…to the non-generic, non-representational texts of Gertrude 
Stein’ (3-4).
22
 Perloff’s conception proposes a narrative which does indeed offer what 
Williams calls an ‘alternative tradition’ which circumvents the ‘post-war settlement’ 
in order to claim this contemporary experimental poetics as the direct inheritor of 
                                                           
21 Perloff, Twenty-First Century Modernism, p.1. Further references are given after quotations in the 
text. 




what Perloff defines as a ‘short-lived’ radical modernism largely killed, stifled or 
repressed soon after its advent in the early twentieth century (3).   
 
In Perloff’s argument, the suppression of the modernist avant-garde by the New 
Critical ‘orthodoxy’ has led to the ‘unambitious’ stuff that ‘passes for poetry today’ 
(2; 4; 5).
23
 Dealing more directly with the categories which trouble Raymond 
Williams and which underlie Quartermain’s discussion, Perloff explicitly challenges 
the validity of the  term ‘postmodern’ and uses ‘avant-garde’ throughout her text in 
order to differentiate one strain of modernism from another. Her alternative tradition, 
which subsumes the postmodern category, is presented as the authentic tradition out 
of the ‘avant-garde phase’ of modernism, a tradition which exists in opposition to the 
orthodox establishment poetry characterised as the legacy of the New Critical version 
of modernism (3).  After a long period in abeyance, she argues, this modernism re-
emerged in the 1950s ‘in somewhat diluted form’ with, among others, Frank O’Hara, 
Robert Creeley, Robert Duncan, and Allen Ginsberg – those poets who have been 
considered ‘postmodern’ – and has seen, since Language poetry, a full resurgence 
which represents the ‘powerful avant-garde’ who have, indeed, taken up the 
‘experimentation of the early twentieth century’ (3; 5).  
 
This is a potent reworking of the argument which posits the establishment form as the 
departure from authentic modernism, and therefore has the resistant anti-
establishment mode of the avant-garde as modernism’s real inheritance. This means 
that Stein is the ultimate originator of a literary modernism which has been at various 
points ‘cut off’ by one or another form of suppression: ‘between the two world wars 
(and well beyond the second one) it almost seems as if poems and art works made a 
conscious effort to repress the technological and formal inventions of modernism at 
its origins’ (3). This Freudian metaphor of repression, alongside the organic images of 
embryos and seeds Perloff deploys, shores up an argument that Bürger’s historical 
avant-garde can make a return because, rather than failing in its revolutionary aims, as 
Bürger suggests, it has simply lain dormant, the ‘unfulfilled promise of the 
revolutionary poetic impulse’ (5). This solves some of the problems posed by 
Quartermain’s argument because it enables a historically grounded account of the 
                                                           
23 It is interesting that a similar phrase is used by Craig Dworkin in his introduction to Against 
Expression: An Anthology of Conceptual Writing, p.xlv ‘what passes for mainstream poetry’. 
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resurgence of the avant-garde which means that Perloff can reassert that category as 
deferred rather than dead. Rather than inventing a new term for this poetic, as 
Quartermain does, in order to avoid the complication of reviving the avant-garde 
which Bürger had insisted upon as a finished historical category, Perloff can thus 
propose a repressed originary avant-garde whose moments of recurrence can be 
historically accounted for.  
 
I would also argue that, in Perloff’s new configuration, the notion of tradition is 
reconstituted in a way which encompasses both Raymond Williams’s call to seek out 
marginalised modernisms and the activity of recuperation represented in the Language 
poets’ response to Stein. When Perloff says ‘It is this particular legacy of early 
modernism that the new poetics has sought to recover’, she seeks to resolve the 
problem of tradition as institutionalisation by drawing on those two methods (6). First, 
the new poetics consciously picks up a particular strand of modernism which, 
although perhaps presented as the authentically avant-garde strain, is not a way of 
eliding or usurping the establishment tradition in order to become the new 
mainstream. In this way, it keeps its marginal position whilst having as great a 
significance as the accepted tradition. Second, the act of seeking to ‘recover’ a lost 
legacy makes this an active formation of tradition rather than the passive reception of 
something handed down. The new poetics looks back to find a history for itself.  
 
Perloff’s argument takes a broad sweep of history which has the avant-garde 
suppressed early in the twentieth century. Read in this way, the lack of a development 
out of Stein’s poetic, which Perloff categorises as avant-garde alongside the pre-war 
works of TS Eliot ‘the American avant-gardist of 1910-11’, the ‘conceptual poetics’ 
of Marcel Duchamp, and the work of zaum poet Velimir Khlebnikov, is situated 
historically as an event in line with a more generalised suppression of this early avant-
garde ‘phase’ of modernism. Her claim for Eliot’s early avant-gardism therefore takes 
on a synecdochical relation to the move her argument describes, in that his 
experiences of the war seem to lead him to ‘repress’ his earlier more radical poetry in 
order to produce the ‘late 1920s’ Eliot who has ‘transformed himself into the self-
proclaimed “classical” Anglo-Catholic, Royalist poet and the conservative critic and 




What Perloff suggests here, therefore, is that, just as Eliot repressed his own avant-
garde practices, so modernism as a whole repressed the radically experimental poetic 
of the pre-war period. What is significant about this argument for my discussion of 
Stein’s place in the history of the avant-garde is the fact that Perloff isolates Stein as 
the poet who resists that repression. Indeed, Perloff sees the lack of recognition and 
development that Stein’s poetic receives as a result of the broader cultural process of 
repression, implying that Stein’s work in fact exemplifies that which is repressed. In 
this representation, Eliot is an agent of that repression, and Stein an agent of the 
resistance to it. Moreover, Khelbnikov, the other poet Perloff equates with the ‘avant-
garde’ modernism, dies in 1922 and is thus removed from the scene at the point 
Perloff identifies roughly as the moment of institutionalisation, and in that sense he 
becomes irrelevant to the discussion of later developments. The proposal that 
Duchamp represents a resistance to this suppression of avant-garde poetry is also 
problematic. As a visual artist rather than a writer, Duchamp is widely regarded as an 
originator of the radicalism in visual art which, as Bernstein suggests, far from being 
repressed or suppressed, has developed in a clear line out of the experimentation of 
early modernism. This makes the suggestion that his work either suffered or resisted 
the kind of repression Perloff outlines difficult to sustain. What we are left with, then, 
is once again the argument that it is Stein alone who has continued the avant-garde 
line in poetry even in the face of its apparent historical elimination. This reasserts the 
claim that Stein is the exception, the only early modernist writer who maintains the 
avant-garde mode and who is therefore the authentic precursor for a contemporary 
avant-garde. 
 
At first, Perloff clearly situates Stein’s aesthetic in relation to the other cultural 
developments around her, challenging the prevailing view of ‘the irreconcilable 
difference between Eliot and Stein’, and suggesting that ‘it may be more accurate to 
think of their aesthetic as two sides of the same coin’. This she names as ‘the 
modernist aesthetic, shared by Eliot and Stein, even as it was shared by Pound and 
Joyce, and the other central figures of the period’ (45). In Perloff’s account, this 
aesthetic, following Eliot’s formulation, has poetry as the ‘escape from personality’, 
sees the work as an end in itself, articulated as a ‘demand for autonomy’, and is 
interested in form rather than subject matter, being, as she puts it, ‘disinterested’ (47; 
49; 50). She argues that Stein’s work is also driven by the modernist commitment to 
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innovation, that ‘Pound’s “No good poetry is ever written in a manner twenty years 
old” might have been Stein’s own credo’, and that she offered ‘a thoroughly 
modernist endorsement of genius theory’ (52; 53). Indeed, Perloff draws very direct 
parallels between Stein’s work and that of ‘the early Eliot’, offering a range of 
technical similarities and ending with the claim that ‘she shares Eliot’s Mallarmean 
conviction that the poet begins, not with ideas to be embodied in words, but with 
words themselves’ (74).  
 
Whilst, however, Eliot came to represent – indeed, to usher in – the new hegemony, 
Stein remains ‘difficult’, characterised by ‘unreadability’ and included in the 
catalogue of avant-garde works not published in Eliot’s 1923 Criterion, which Perloff 
lists to indicate how conservative he had become: ‘no Dada, no Surrealism, no 
discussion of the visual arts, no Gertrude Stein or William Carlos Williams, no 
Picasso or Picabia’ (41). The historical trajectory of a repressed early avant-garde is 
also further muddied because, although Perloff focuses on two of Stein’s pre-war 
texts, ‘Miss Furr and Miss Skeene’ (1911) and Tender Buttons (1912), the discussion 
is very often supported by evidence from much later works, such as The 
Autobiography of Alice B Toklas (1933), ‘Poetry and Grammar’ (1935) ‘What are 
Masterpieces and Why are There so Few of Them’ (1936) and Everybody’s 
Autobiography (1937). Thus, although Perloff grounds the argument in a broad 
historical conception of some changes in modernism in relation to historical events 
and cultural shifts, Stein once again appears to escape the history in which the avant-
garde is repressed. Read like this, her oeuvre, as it does in Quartermain’s argument, 
again takes on the quality of a hermetically sealed, self-reflexive and self-determining 
entity. She remains, in the end, in the problematic position of the exception. In 
quoting Duchamp’s own comparison of himself and Stein: ‘“I had no position. I’ve 
been a little like Gertrude Stein…there are people in every period who aren’t ‘in’”’, 
Perloff attempts to draw attention, as Quartermain does, to her difference, reinforcing 
the claim that she is exceptional and making this a marker of Stein’s avant-garde 
status (77). I would argue, however, that the very notion that Duchamp occupied ‘no 
position’ is so patently untrue, as we shall clearly see in Chapter 2, that it more 
reasonably reveals the fact, as Bourdieu shows, that an artist or writer must occupy a 
position, and that such a position is determined in relation to the other positions taken 




Because Perloff claims that their aesthetic had so much in common, however, she 
cannot resolve the relation of the dissolution of Eliot’s ‘avant-garde’ period and the 
apparent maintenance of Stein’s reputation as sustainedly avant-garde in terms of an 
argument about aesthetics. For Perloff, Stein’s work shares the forms and techniques 
of her modernist peers, albeit with different emphases. Nor does Stein seem to 
challenge modernist ideas about the role and status of the poet and the work, because, 
in Perloff’s view, she both endorses the notion of the creative genius and sees the text 
as an end in itself, the result of an autonomous creative act.
24
 The nature of Perloff’s 
‘authentic’ avant-garde modernism whose legacy is picked up in the twenty-first 
century is thus not defined either by aesthetic choices or by aesthetic theories. 
 
Perloff makes the ground for her distinction clear in this statement: ‘The difference 
between Eliot and Stein can thus be understood as epistemological rather than 
aesthetic…Eliot – and this would also be true of Pound or Stevens – believes that 
words have a naming function, that they mean individually, whereas Stein believes 
that meaning is only conveyed by use, and hence by the larger context of the 
sentence’ (56). This difference for Perloff is crucial, in that it correlates with the 
fundamental distinction in mode, similar to that put forward in Quartermain’s 
argument, underpinned by the view that ‘language, far from being a vehicle or conduit 
for thoughts and feelings outside and prior to it, is itself the site of meaning-making’ 
(9). Although she imputes this quality to Eliot’s early work, much of the chapter on 
him shows how and suggests why he moved away from this position to produce work 
which, in the case of ‘Gerontion’, has an ‘emphasis on the need for knowledge’ which 
‘marks an interesting departure from [his] early poetry’ or, as in The Waste Land, 
ends with an ‘appeal…to an outside source of authority’ and ‘deference to tradition’ 
(37; 38). The implication here is that this later work seeks for meaning outside its own 
‘site of meaning-making’, that is, outside the language in its use. In Perloff’s 
argument, Stein’s work, on the other hand, maintains an approach to language which 
deals in ‘the play of signifiers rather than the pointing relation of signifier to signified’ 
and ‘allows for no distinction between something called “language” and something 
                                                           
24 The question of Stein’s relation to modernist ideas about genius is examined in detail in Barbara 
Will’s Gertrude Stein, Modernism and the Problem of ‘Genius’. 
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called “thought”’ (54; 55). It is this approach to language, therefore, that makes her 
avant-garde, just as it did the ‘early’ Eliot. 
 
In this distinction between Stein and late Eliot, the suppression of the earlier ‘poetic 
breakthrough or rupture’ represented by Eliot’s later turn to authoritative sources of 
meaning or knowledge is therefore correlated to the act of turning away from a view 
of language as a site in which meaning is constructed to a view of language as a 
vehicle which simply transmits authoritative meanings or external ‘knowledge’. 
Perloff’s later assertion that ‘Stein’s composition cannot be paraphrased’ therefore 
sees Stein’s work as an exemplification of the view of language Eliot seems to reject. 
It presents Stein’s texts as showing the process of meaning-making in action and thus 
refusing to engage with authorised meanings or established forms of knowing. 
Significantly, it also indicates that Stein’s texts, in the nature of their composition, 
cannot themselves ever represent an authoritative or transferable example of meaning 
or knowledge. If their content cannot be paraphrased, then what they mean can never 
be detached and passed on in another form. Perloff adds a quotation taken from the 
Tender Buttons poem ‘Glazed Glitter’, to support this view: ‘“There is,” as she says 
herself a few sentences later, “no programme”’ (69). In reading Stein’s commitment 
to this understanding of language as anti-authoritarian, Perloff directly correlates the 
resistance to interpretation or translation with the resistance to cultural assimilation – 
to institutionalisation. This has a strong parallel with the argument made both by the 
Language poets and by Quartermain: that the resistance to cultural synthesis or 
institutionalisation is a factor inherent in Stein’s texts. 
 
Perloff ends the chapter on Stein with an answer to her question: ‘How does this 
difference play itself out in the twenty-first century?’. The difference she refers to is 
the difference between Stein’s syntactical ‘language-game’ and Eliot’s tendency, after 
he has moved out of his avant-garde phase, to ‘poeticize specific topoi’. In a 
discussion of an excerpt from Darren Wershler-Henry’s 2000 text the tapeworm 
foundry andor the dangerous prevalence of imagination, she identifies evidence of 
both influences, finding that, ‘Wershler-Henry’s prose…markedly recalls the 
locutions and rhythms of Steinian prose’ but that his ‘parodic “roadside glyphs” are 
primarily loaded and allusive nouns, more fully in the Eliot than in the Stein tradition’ 
(76). This dissolves the value of the difference between Stein and Eliot in a way 
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which makes it difficult to see what it is that makes Stein avant-garde and Eliot an 
example of the failure of the ‘revolution’ and the triumph of a conservative 
hegemony. Perloff’s claims for Stein as avant-garde because of her ‘differential 
syntax’ in the end do seem to be reduced to a minor matter of aesthetic choice – just 
one example of what is available to the contemporary poet seeking avant-garde 
precursors. If the difference in fundamental views of language can be seen as just two 
equally meaningful strands from which the contemporary avant-garde can draw 
technical influence, then the ‘avant-garde’ strain of modernism is no more significant 
for them than the ‘authorised’ version.  
 
These contradictions show us that if there is a meaningful difference between avant-
garde modernism and the modernism of the New Critics, it must be defined 
historically as more than simply an epistemological view of language which can float 
free of that history. The clue lies perhaps in the way in which Perloff herself defines 
the later Eliot: in terms of his editorship of the Criterion a ‘new journal’ which ‘gives 
little hint that there had been, on both sides of the Channel and in Dada New York, a 
vibrant utopian avant-garde’ (41). I would argue that this offers a glimpse of the kind 
of contextual detail which can open up an understanding of the period and Stein’s 
place in it. Such contextualisation, far from subsuming Stein into a hegemonic version 
of literary history, can help us to reframe that literary history around her in order to 
explore the relative functions of different modes of literary production not just in 
terms of technique and epistemology but in terms of their position and their activity 
on the cultural field.  
 
As we have seen, Perloff’s argument is more historically grounded than the 
approaches offered by the Language poets and by Quartermain. It also presents a 
resolution to the problem of the postmodern position and enables a future for the 
avant-garde in its notion of deferral. The distinction drawn between late Eliot and 
Stein, however, returns us to some of the problems thrown up in those previous 
approaches. The historical origin that Stein provides is still defined by Perloff in a 
fundamentally abstract account of the processes which appear to be inherent in Stein’s 
work, approaching it once again as a sealed autonomous entity and thus at the expense 
of a contextualised reading of each piece of work and its gestural functions and 
valences. This means that once again the text slips the anchors of the historical 
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location in which it made its meaning. Rather, it defines the avant-garde in terms of a 
set of techniques which, as I have argued, in the end returns us to the problem in 
Quartermain’s argument of a perpetual avant-garde which seems to escape history. 
This way of reading Stein also contains the related problem that, as the authentic 
originator of the contemporary literary avant-garde, it makes of her an exceptional 
figure detached from the historical context in which and for which her work was 
produced and so does not engage with the historical specificity of her position in 
relation to the literary scene. The force of Perloff’s argument is, therefore, as with 
Quartermain and Bernstein, compromised by the lack of a fully contextualised reading 
of the writer it claims as progenitor for a contemporary avant-garde.   
 
High-modernist Stein: the original ‘closed’ text 
 
Perloff’s reading of Stein’s work as emphasising the ‘materiality of the text’ and 
presenting a ‘large-scale indeterminacy’ which makes it resistant to interpretation has 
engendered a debate amongst scholars and poets which has focused its attention solely 
on the question of the validity of different characterisations of Stein’s oeuvre (6; 63). 
This debate has taken on an internal logic of its own which has once again moved the 
argument further away from the historical groundedness we began to see in Perloff’s 
book. In response to Perloff’s ‘manifesto’ for a twenty-first Century avant-garde 
modernist poetic, Jennifer Ashton’s 2006 book From Modernism to Postmodernism 
contests the arguments which situate Stein as the precursor for experimental 
innovative poetry. Firstly, Ashton argues that Stein’s aesthetic and epistemological 
concerns in fact mark her as belonging to a modernist genealogy which includes Eliot 
and those other ‘high’ modernists. Secondly she contends that, rather than repudiating 
what Bernstein, Williams, Quartermain and Perloff see as the New Critical 
‘establishment’ version of modernism, the work of the Language poets ‘derive[s] 
more from the New Critical “mainstream” …than from the marginalized 
experimentation they claim to embrace’.
25
 Moreover, Ashton reinstates the category 
of the postmodern which Perloff’s book seeks to dissolve, arguing that ‘those 
differences, far from being merely apparent, are real’ and that ‘the 
modern/postmodern divide remains intact, both historically and theoretically’ (2).  
                                                           
25 Jennifer Ashton, From Modernism to Postmodernism, p.11. Further references are given after 




I would argue, however, that Ashton’s claim to present a historical and theoretical 
argument is, perhaps even more than Perloff’s, grounded in generalisations about the 
intrinsic nature of the poem rather than on the historical situation of its emergence or 
its immediate theoretical context. Moreover, Ashton also tends to see Stein’s texts 
simply in terms of their relation to her oeuvre as a whole, once again envisioning 
Stein’s work as a hermetically sealed corpus which refers only to itself. As set out in 
her introduction, Ashton’s contention hinges on some fine distinctions between two 
categories she proposes: the modernist ‘closed’ text and the postmodern ‘open’ text. 
In her reading of twenty-first-Century Modernism, Ashton paraphrases Perloff’s 
argument on these terms, claiming that for Perloff the reason that some modernist 
works can be claimed as precursors of the ‘new’ poetics is because they are open 
rather than closed. Ashton argues that this category of the ‘open’ text best describes 
Language poetry’s participatory practice. This seems a meaningful description of 
those practices because, as we have seen in Bernstein and Andrews’ introduction the 
The L=A=N=G=U=A=G=E Book, the Language poets seek to resist the 
commodification of language by ‘repossessing the sign through close attention to, and 
active participation in, its production’. In relation to the arguments I have examined 
so far, the open text also has a parallel with Quartermain’s ‘disjunctive’ poetic and, as 
Ashton suggests, with Perloff’s characterisation of Stein’s work as ‘indeterminate’ 
because it foregrounds language as the site of meaning-making. In Ashton’s 
argument, these writers believe that the poetry exemplified by Stein’s work and, for 
them, continued in the late-twentieth and early-twenty-first century experimental 
poets Perloff extols is ‘open’ because it interests itself in the process of signification 
rather than trying to signify something fixed and determinate.  
 
After outlining the distinction between these two modes, however, Ashton goes on to 
use that distinction in order to dispute Perloff’s claim for Stein as a precursor to the 
contemporary avant-garde modernism she hypothesises in Twenty-First-Century 
Modernism. Ashton quotes Stein’s lecture ‘What Are Masterpieces and Why Are 
There So Few of Them’ in order to claim that Stein is in fact an adherent of the belief 
not in the open text of Language poetry but rather in the closed text of the high 
modernist ‘autonomous lyric’. For Ashton, Stein is a high modernist because she is 
committed ‘to the absolute autonomy of what [she] calls the work that “exists in and 
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of itself”’ (2). And it is this belief in the autonomy of the text which Ashton posits as 
the mark of the modernism she wants to distinguish from the post-modernism her 
argument seeks to reinstate. In her argument, Stein belongs to the high modernism of 
the autonomous closed text and Language poetry and its antecedents constitute a post-
modern poetry which has developed out of the New Critical understanding of the 
poem as open. The two strands Ashton identifies thus diverge very differently when 
compared to the trajectory we have seen traced in Bernstein, Quartermain and Perloff 
 and, indeed, in Williams. For Ashton, the high modernist strand which, in their 
arguments, has led to that ‘tepid and unambitious Establishment poetry’, in fact 
emerges out of Stein’s elitist closed text, and the postmodern strand is the legacy of 
the New Criticism and culminates in Language poetry’s open text. 
The argument Ashton forms is predicated upon the association she draws between the 
closed text and the autonomy of the text. Ashton interprets the open text as refusing 
autonomy and the closed text as autonomous, describing the latter relation as ‘a 
literature committed...to the irrelevance of the reader’ (2). In Ashton’s view, the work 
produced and valued by the Language poets, because it remains indeterminate, attains 
the status of the object and is, conversely, entirely dependent on the reader’s 
experience. In construing this distinction, Ashton can then claim that ‘the moment 
when the text becomes an object is precisely the moment when it can no longer be 
autonomous, since everything that constitutes the text’s objecthood – the “sound” and 
“feel” of its constitutive syllables – belongs entirely to the experience of someone’ 
(10). The open text of Language poetry cannot therefore be autonomous. In Ashton’s 
version of autonomy, which she attributes to Stein, the text is sufficient to itself and 
independent of either reader or writer. The open text, the text as object, on the other 
hand, is entirely dependent on each reader’s interaction. Quoting I.A. Richards’s 1926 
Science and Poetry, as a representation of the ‘critical principle behind’ Cleanth 
Brooks's later position in the Well-Wrought Urn (1946), she goes on to argue that the 
New Critical insistence that the text cannot be interpreted, but can only be 
‘experienced’ is tantamount to the same position. She argues that the ‘New Critical 
imperative’ is very much like the imperative expressed in Language poetry’s 
insistence on the ‘materiality’ or ‘objecthood’ of the text, that ‘in order for us to have 
the experience of its objecthood, the poem “must not mean but be,” or, to use 
Richards's words: “it is never what a poem says that matters but what it is”’. 
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Developing her argument from this congruence between the New Critical and 
Language poetry view of the relation between text and reader, Ashton argues that 
‘The New Critical poem becomes, in other words, the very kind of literalist text that 
Perloff says foregrounds the material form of language and impels our participation in 
its construction’ (10). 
Looking at the attitudes to autonomy in the arguments which see Stein as the 
precursor for Language poetry, however, reveals a more complicated picture than the 
simple identification of the closed text with the autonomous text upon which Ashton’s 
contention largely rests. The relation between objecthood and autonomy is explicitly 
dealt with in a rather different way by Quartermain in the introduction to Disjunctive 
Poetics. He conceptualises the disjunctiveness of the texts he valorises as the function 
which engenders their autonomy, claiming that ‘to call a poem an object is not to see 
it in the traditional art sense of “masterpiece”: aloof, irreproachable, transcendent, 
separate from our lives, but to see it as an autonomous object, an identifiable thing 
that we can look at out there in the world, and respond to’ (2). This argument offers a 
form of autonomy in which the poem is always ‘there’ and never subsumed or 
synthesised by the culture it inhabits, seen instead as a resistant object which, as we 
have seen, stands out starkly against that culture because it represents that ‘poetic 
fact’ which is distinct from the ‘historical (or economic or whatever) fact’ (16). As I 
suggested earlier, the position conferred by Quartermain on the disjunctive text-as-
object does indeed echo I.A .Richards, but, in direct contrast to Ashton’s view, this is 
because it does confer the status of autonomy on the poem. What the arguments 
offered by Quartermain and indeed by Perloff propose is that the avant-garde text is 
autonomous not because it has a ‘closed’ meaning which is utterly determined and 
authoritative, but, conversely, because its meaning cannot be fixed. It remains 
resistant because every reading is different and inconclusive, which means the text is 
never assimilated. In this argument, the avant-garde work is the work which 
continues, over time, to be experimental and challenging, just as the Language poets’ 
incomplete, precarious readings of Stein’s Tender Buttons poems suggest. It is 
therefore autonomous because it can never be fully claimed by any reading: it remains 




Indeed, the critique of New Criticism does not depend upon a critique of the notion of 
autonomy. Both Quartermain and Perloff claim autonomy as a function of Stein’s 
poetic, and as an important strand in their argument for a recurrent or deferred avant-
garde. This argument, rather than taking issue with autonomy as such, turns on the 
relation of the text to the institutions which determine attitudes to language and its 
use, drawing a distinction between those that do and those that do not depend for their 
meaning upon the received ideas and authoritative forms of knowing which stand 
outside the text, and on the related distinction between those texts which can and 
those that cannot in themselves become authoritative. The ‘open’ text therefore 
becomes the text which perpetually demands new readings but which is never finally 
read, the text which escapes institutionalisation to stand in a permanently resistant and 
therefore autonomous relation to authoritative forms of knowledge and meaning-
making. 
 
For Ashton, however, Stein cannot be invested in the idea that the meaning of the text 
is a result of the reader’s participation because she believes in the autonomous closed 
text which does not require the recognition of the reader but rather exists in and of 
itself. Therefore, Stein is modernist because of her commitment to the notion of 
autonomy and, moreover, in Ashton’s argument this distinguishes her from the New 
Critics who are, in fact, postmodern because they imagine meaning as ‘a function of 
the experiential effects of the poem’ (27). This use of the notion of autonomy means 
that Ashton can claim that the ‘avant-garde credentials of Perloff’s twenty-first-
century modernists derive more from the New Critical “mainstream” they claim to 
repudiate than from the marginalized experimentation they claim to embrace’ (11). 
For Ashton, therefore, ‘the legacy of the New Criticism is not modernism’s 
“autonomous lyric” but postmodernism’s “open text”’, and Stein is modernist rather 
than postmodern because she denies the relevance of the reader’s response and 
‘locates the value of art in its autonomy (with respect to anyone’s experience of it), 
and in its autonomy, the determinacy of its meaning’ (27; 28).  
 
Read as a trajectory for a literary history, Ashton’s argument has the schism identified 
by Bernstein, Quartermain and Perloff occuring between the closed autonomous texts 
of the pre-New Critical modernism of Gertrude Stein (and Laura Riding) and the 
nascent post-modernism represented by the New Critical rejection of authorial 
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intention which enables the open text to exist. The notion of autonomy, however, 
remains crucially unexamined in this conclusion. Ashton claims that the ‘hallmark of 
the New Criticism’ is ‘its commitment to the autonomy of the poem’ and that this 
represents ‘its modernism’ whilst simultaneously claiming that its rejection of 
authorial intention and therefore its emphasis on the ‘experiential effects’ of the poem 
makes it the progenitor of postmodernism (27). This contradicts both her earlier 
argument that a poem could not be simultaneously open to interpretation and 
autonomous, and her view that because Stein is committed to autonomy she is 
committed to the determinacy of meaning and not to the open text.  
 
The different emphases placed on the notion of autonomy by Ashton, and by Perloff 
and Quartermain have enabled them to sustain very different standpoints on Stein’s 
work which have led them to radically different conclusions. Quartermain has 
autonomy as the independence of the text created by its permanent resistance to 
authorised meanings and practices of meaning-making. The autonomous work he 
describes forms a perpetually disjunctive and resurgent poetic which stands outside 
the hegemonic cultural constructs of its era and therefore outside history. Perloff’s 
autonomy is ‘the rejection of instrumental value’ which she sees as ‘a cornerstone of 
modernism’, and this autonomy, read as the indeterminacy of meaning in Stein’s 
writing, signifies her adherence to modernism’s original impulse (50). This can 
without much effort be read as a version of the Language poets’ resistance to the 
commodification of language and is an aspect of Perloff’s argument that modernism 
has continued into the twenty-first century in that form. In that sense therefore this 
autonomy is also a challenge to the capitalist culture which has instrumentalisation as 
one of its cornerstones. Perloff thus reads Stein’s work as representing a mode, much 
like Quartermain’s, of resistance to hegemony. Ashton’s reading of Stein’s work as 
striving for a ‘mathematical independence from experience as such’, on the other 
hand, proposes the autonomy of a self-generating hermetic universe utterly divorced 
from either the reader’s response or the context in which the work is produced and 
thus, conversely, corresponds to Bürger’s ‘institutionalisation’ of art (28). 
 
Despite their opposing conclusions, all of these readings sustain the notion that 
Stein’s commitment to autonomy means her work can stand outside its historical 
moment. On Quartermain’s terms, this is because it has refused assimilation and 
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remains perpetually and meaningfully disjunctive. For Perloff, it offers a model of 
resistance to the instrumentalisation of language which means it has in an exceptional 
way also remained resistant to the hegemony represented by institutionalised 
modernism. Finally, as Ashton would have it, Stein sees her work as existing in an 
elitist metaphysical space beyond human life, determined for and by itself and 
existing only on its own terms. 
 
Autonomous Stein: ‘What Are Master-pieces and Why Are There so Few of 
Them’ 
 
Ashton’s argument, and indeed those with which she engages, rests on the belief in a 
resolution which will draw final distinctions between a set of apparent absolutes in 
apparently binary oppositions. In the discussion of the difference between the open 
and closed text, the engaged poem and the autonomous poem, the indeterminacy 
versus the determinacy of language, the dualisms take on a life of their own which 
moves the discussion into an abstract realm far removed from what constitutes the 
work in its own history. The very convolutions, contradictions and infra-thin 
differences which emerge in this debate point to the ultimately reductive nature of an 
approach which attempts to work out a history of twentieth century literary production 
on purely abstract and theoretical terms. 
 
Ashton’s introductory argument about Stein’s views on autonomy centres on her 
reading of Stein’s 1936 lecture ‘What Are Master-pieces and Why Are There So Few 
of Them’, which is also discussed by Perloff in order to support her claim that Stein’s 
aesthetic has important parallels with the aesthetic of prominent modernist writers. 
Ashton uses the lecture to show that Stein believes ‘a masterpiece can never be an 
“open text” because it can never “invite participation,”’ that the ‘responses and 
experiences’ of readers ‘have nothing to do with what makes it art’ and that this is 
therefore ‘nothing if not a commitment to the autonomy of the text’ (9). Perloff 
discusses this text in order to place Stein in the context of the other modernist writers 
around her by using it to exemplify her belief that ‘Art is by definition not earning 
anything, which is to say, disinterested’, a view which has characterised modernism 
‘from Baudelaire and Mallarme to Pound and Joyce’ (50). These readings coincide in 
seeing Stein’s position as defender of the autonomous text, but whereas for Perloff 
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this is an aspect of modernism’s theoretical approach, a way of situating Stein in her 
period, for Ashton it is the ground upon which the very category of modernism is 
defined. As she says of New Criticism’s commitment to autonomy: ‘this would be its 
modernism’ (27). 
 
The way Stein is situated in these readings leads to a problematic methodology in 
which her work is treated, as we have seen, as if it is a sealed and autonomous self-
reflexive entity. I would argue, however, that, in Stein’s discussion of what is read 
here as autonomy in ‘What are Master-pieces’, the relation between the text, the 
author, the reader and the cultural context in which the work is produced, rather than 
being rejected or elided, are dealt with very directly as important problems. I would 
suggest that whilst ostensibly reflecting a desire for the autonomous closed text, 
Stein’s lecture in fact represents the recognition that such a thing is literally 
impossible, and, moreover, that this impossibility is precisely the situation with which 
the ‘modern’ writer in particular engages. 
 
In this lecture, Stein, in working out what seems like a closed circuit, ‘the relation of 
the act of creation to the subject the creator uses to create that thing’, does apparently 
describe a sealing off of the work from those aspects external to it.
26
 Towards the end 
of the lecture, Stein argues that ‘time and identity is what you tell about as you create 
only while you create they do not exist. That is really what it is’ (361). Thus, creation 
is the act of taking a special position somehow beyond the consciously inhabited 
world of phenomena in order to be able to tell a story of that world. This does indeed 
seem to reflect a belief that the act of creation requires a detached or disinterested 
standpoint, but the arguments about Stein’s autonomy see the finished work itself as 
also occupying that position. The question of the status of the artwork itself, however, 
is not so clearly resolved in ‘What Are Master-pieces’. The readings of this lecture 
tend to focus on its very abstract theoretical moments, but Stein’s overt references to 
specific contexts of production and reception shed a different light on her discussion 
of the relation of the work to its subject matter and, moreover, reveal in important 
ways her own relation to this context. 
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Her opening premise that ‘there is something about what has been written having 
been printed which makes it no longer the property of the one who wrote it’ is a 
prominently placed and explicit engagement with the processes of cultural production. 
Stein makes a crucial distinction between writing and printing which recognises that 
once a work is in the public domain, it no longer belongs to the writer because it 
becomes a component of the culture which produces it as a printed text. The text once 
printed enters the sphere of public culture and becomes a cultural artefact. Stein seems 
to regret the passage of the work into the cultural sphere, however, explaining that she 
had originally decided not to read something prepared for fear of it being 
subsequently printed. Her opening remark, ‘I was almost going to talk this lecture’ 
because ‘all the lectures I have written and read in America have been printed’ does 
indeed appear to express a desire to keep her work out of the public realm (355).  
 
This is complicated, perhaps even contradicted, however, when Stein tells her 
audience that she has chosen nonetheless to write the lecture beforehand rather than 
relying on extemporisation. She explains ‘I was going to talk to you but actually it is 
impossible to talk about master-pieces and what they are because talking essentially 
has nothing to do with creation’ (355). For Stein, talking has nothing to do with 
creation because talking enacts what she categorises as the ‘identity’ of the speaker 
whereas creative writing – which she also later opposes to letter writing – enacts what 
Stein calls ‘entity’. Thus, the work cannot be an act of creation unless it is written  
she felt she had to write the lecture in order to engage with the idea of creation  and 
it also has to be written not for one identified individual, as a letter is, but for an 
audience who are not known to the writer. In arguing that neither an act of speech nor 
a letter are anything to do with ‘entity’, Stein implies that any expression which is 
addressed to a known and specific audience cannot be a creation. 
 
I would argue that, far from exemplifying a detachment from the contexts of its 
production and reception, Stein’s discussion of her theory of creation indicates that 
the status the publication of the work affords it is closer to the notion of ‘entity’ she 
outlines in the course of the lecture than her reluctance suggests. If talking and letter 
writing have nothing to do with creation, then what does have to do with creation is 
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the writing of a work for an unspecified audience. Indeed, Stein has to write the 
lecture and risk it being printed in order for it to have any relation to the creative act 
of entity at all. Seen on these terms, the act of creation carried out from the position of 
‘entity’ rather than the position of ‘identity’ is essentially the act of authorship – one 
would write a letter rather than author it – and, for Stein, the more detached from the 
identity of the writer that authorship is, the more likely it is that a masterpiece is being 
written.   
 
In Stein’s argument, the work produced by ‘entity’, the real creative force, is detached 
from its creator and has an audience beyond the individual reach and experience of 
that creator.  If the printed text is the mode which must be deployed in order to engage 
with creativity because ‘talking essentially has nothing to do with creation’, then the 
work of ‘entity’ is not meaningful as a personal engagement, it is meaningful as the 
product of an author. The artefact which is the result of creation is therefore the work 
which is no longer a private or intimate affair: it is the work which is released into 
public culture. I would argue that the notion of entity has everything to do with the 
release of the work into the public sphere, and that the act of relinquishing identity it 
entails is the act of authorship. Authorship is not an act of individual expression, but 
its opposite: the authored work is the work which is read, and the author designates 
not the individual who writes it, but the existence of their name and their work in the 
field of literary production.  In my interpretation, the work of entity only exists as a 
component of this field and as such is divorced from the identity of the creating 
subject. And, yet, Stein explicitly regrets the passage of her work into the cultural 
field. The ambivalence with which the lecture opens  that she wanted not to write the 
lecture in case it was printed but she had to, otherwise it could not engage with the 
idea of creation  reflects a preoccupation with the cultural status of the work which 
is the significant sub-plot of the lecture’s insistence on its metaphysical distance.  
 
Stein’s reluctance about the entry of her writing into the public sphere is paralleled in 
her regret about the reception of the work. In the final paragraphs of the lecture Stein 
offers this observation: 
 
When you are writing before there is an audience anything written is as important as any other thing 
and you cherish anything and everything that you have written. After the audience begins, naturally 
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they create something that is they create you, and so not everything is so important, something is more 
important than another thing, which was not true when you were you that is when you were not you as 
your little dog knows you (365). 
 
What Stein expresses here is an unease about the way in which, when it comes into 
contact with an audience, the text and its ‘author’ are defined by that contact. This is 
an anxiety about the way the work changes its meaning as a result, and a concern 
about the imposition of value judgements on the work that this engenders. What this 
shows us is that, rather than imagining the work can really exist permanently and 
perfectly in a separate sphere, Stein is profoundly conscious that the text, on entering 
the public domain, is inevitably changed by it. This is therefore not a dismissal of the 
relevance of the reader and the cultural context the text must inhabit if it is to be read, 
but, on the contrary, an acute awareness of their importance.  
 
Moreover, in her claim that ‘the detective story which is you might say the only really 
modern novel form that has come into existence gets rid of human nature by having 
the man dead to begin with the hero is dead to begin with and so you have so to speak 
got rid of the event before the book begins’, Stein chooses as her example of the 
potential masterpiece a popular form hardly associated with either high-modernist or 
disjunctive autonomy (358). For Stein the detective novel is ‘the only really modern 
novel form’ because, like the masterpiece, it does not concern itself with human 
nature or identity and presumably therefore draws its impulse from the entity of the 
creative masterpiece. The detective novel, however, a popular form produced on a 
large scale would seem, in its mass production and its engagement with a huge 
audience, to epitomise everything Stein fears in her anxieties about her work being 
printed by a publisher and read by an audience. This once again serves to show that 
the anxiety Stein articulates is the conscious expression of an understanding that the 
‘really modern’ literary text is formed in its interaction with its cultural context. 
 
Further, in discussing the actual creative output of her period, rather than sustaining 
the view that the text is created in a vacuum beyond its time, Stein draws the attention 
of her audience to the very specific historical realities which shape the cultural 




You can tell that so well in the difficulty of writing novels or poetry these days. The tradition has 
always been that you may more or less describe the things that happen you imagine them of course but 
you more or less describe the things that happen but nowadays everybody all day long knows what is 
happening and so what is happening is not really interesting, one knows it by radios cinemas 
newspapers biographies autobiographies until what is happening does not really thrill any one (357). 
 
Stein points out that technological advances of the first third of the twentieth century 
– the broad availability of radio and cinema, the acceleration of printing processes and 
the development of distribution methods – have enabled, indeed, have generated, the 
mass production of information. Because of this, the literary work must do something 
other than ‘describe the things that happen’. The task of the writer is therefore made 
more ‘difficult’ as a direct result of historical conditions. Thus, what Stein seeks to 
identify here, namely the ‘relation of the act of creation to the subject that creator uses 
to create that thing’ is to a significant extent determined by those conditions. As she 
says ‘this has something to do with master-pieces and why there are so few of them 
but not everything’. In suggesting that the task of the writer in her age is no longer, as 
it had been in ‘the tradition’, to ‘describe’, or rather, to represent the subject matter 
(what she calls earlier, the ‘things you see and…human beings and animal beings’), 
she identifies a specific way in which the relation between subject matter and creation 
is altered directly by these historical changes.  In this part of the lecture, therefore, the 
defining feature of the creative act is the direct response to its moment, and this is 
defined by material changes and the changes in the collective perception of the role of 
art they engender. 
 
These apparent contradictions in Stein’s lecture reflect a highly significant feature of 
the new kinds of cultural production which had emerged in her era: the emphasis is 
not simply on the act of making the work, but also, and crucially, it is on the creation 
and control of the contexts which determine the way in which that work is engaged 
with. Stein’s ambivalence signals a fundamental preoccupation with the relations 
between author, text, reader and the context in which the text is produced and 
received. And this preoccupation constitutes a defining aspect of the artistic and 
literary output in the period in which Stein worked. Indeed, the pressure Stein’s work 
and activity put on the concepts of the literary work, the author and the reader are 
crucial in an examination of her work, her period and their legacy, and in particular in 
working through the relative status of those terms – avant-garde, modernist, 
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postmodern – upon which a literary genealogy for contemporary poetry might be 
predicated. 
 
Marginalisation and canonisation are historical processes which have to do with much 
more than those internal debates about the nature of the writing in and of itself. In 
suggesting that the relative position of the work is determined purely by the work 
itself – is inherent to the work – Ashton takes the same route as Quartermain, Perloff 
and the Language poets. The relative position of the literary work is determined by a 
range of other factors – and they are particular to its time and change over time. In 
reading Stein’s texts out of context, all of these approaches presuppose the autonomy 
of the work before they begin. Their methodologies are therefore ultimately reductive. 
This is a conversation about the status of Stein’s writing which takes the abstract 
theoretical discussion of the work and its internal modes and functions as a way of 
ascertaining its place in the cultural phenomenon we now call ‘modernism’. Even if it 
is a negative relation – that Stein’s work is not like what became ‘mainstream’ 
modernism, that it is more like contemporary innovative poetry – this question cannot 
be resolved by arguments which limit their attention to the work alone. In wrenching 
it from its context, the activity of removing it from its relations to modernist culture 
has already been achieved.  
 
Thus, the problem with the positing of either an autonomous avant-garde or an 
autonomous high-modernist lyric as the basis for a literary history is revealed in the 
ways in which these concepts are simultaneously predicated on and construct a Stein 
who is outside history. This reading of Stein as hermetic and arcane precludes an 
examination of her texts in their context which would be the appropriate method for 
understanding the relation of ‘Stein’, the work,  the author and the persona, with the 
institutions and the institutionalising forces about which these arguments turn. Stein’s 
work is, as it must be, a response to a complex context, and I would argue that it is the 
kind of response it represents that, in fact, those late-twentieth and early-twenty-first 
century poets admire. It makes no sense, therefore, to read Stein’s work only in terms 
of itself and its relations to her corpus. As Bourdieu tells us, the field of cultural 
production is ‘a space of literary or artistic position-takings’, and if the literary work 
is produced in a space of position-takings, context means everything. It is therefore to 




Early Modernist Persona 
 
 
After all we are all modern.1  
 Gertrude Stein in a letter to Mabel Dodge, 1913 
 
 
Public or private? 
 
In this chapter I return to the early twentieth century in order to probe the arguments, 
discussed in Chapter 1, which see Stein as an exceptional figure in the history of 
literary modernism and which form the basis for the methodology which reads her 
work as a discrete and self-reflexive entity. In asking what position Stein and her 
work occupy in the literary and artistic scene of the 1900s and 1910s, I also want to 
put pressure on the related model of two parallel streams of literary history which 
underpins the claims for an avant-garde heritage. The history which the alternative 
strand wants to counter works Stein into modernism as a collector and as an 
interesting figure on the Paris art scene of the early twentieth Century. This is the 
public persona of the salon popularised after the 1930s success of The Autobiography 
of Alice B Toklas as exemplified by Ulla Dydo’s critique in A Stein Reader. The 
alternative history has its roots in what is seen as Stein’s more radical work, the 1912 
Stein of Tender Buttons taken up by the Language poets, and traces an avant-garde 
genealogy from the Stein of Perloff’s ‘experimentation of the early twentieth century’. 
This is the authentic Stein, the difficult early innovator, rejecting and rejected by the 
institutions which sanction artistic production and therefore never assimilated into 
literary history. The way in which I want to complicate this model is not in offering 
any real challenge to the fact of the sanctioned version of literary history: it has 
already been written, and it is inarguable that Stein’s work was left out of the New 
Critical canon. What I do want to confront, however, is the alternative narrative which 
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sustains the view that the ‘experimental’ Stein occupied a marginal position from 
which she originated a poetic divorced from its historical moment.  
 
The arguments which accompany the important work of recuperating those of Stein’s 
texts which have fallen out of print, have only been published in little magazines, or 
have never been printed, tend to use this distinction between the experimental Stein 
and the popular icon to claim the greater authenticity or integrity of those pieces. In 
the introduction to the 1993 A Stein Reader, Dydo offers The Autobiography of Alice 
B Toklas (1933) Everybody’s Autobiography (1936), and the book Picasso (1938) as 
examples of what she calls those ‘late public works’. The other side of this reading of 
Stein’s value is the notion that the early ‘innovative’ works included in A Stein 
Reader such as the portraits ‘Matisse’, (1909), ‘Orta, or One Dancing’, (1911-12) and 
the longer text ‘Miss Furr and Miss Skeene’ (1911) (which Marjorie Perloff also reads 
as the prime example of her ‘differential syntax’) are ‘private’ experiments which do 
not engage with what Dydo calls the ‘“outside”’ world of the ‘personality’. When 
Dydo claims she wants her collection to focus on ‘the years before she achieved 
popular success with The Autobiography of Alice B Toklas’, she consolidates the 
picture of the late Stein, the writer of the Autobiography, as the exemplar of the 
popular author-figure assimilated by the market.
2
  
The alternative literary history is therefore predicated on the division of ‘Stein’ into 
two separate entities. Of these entities, the accessible public persona belongs, in 
however a diminished form, within ‘institutionalized’ modernism, whereas for the 
Language poets, for Quartermain and for Perloff, the work of the early private radical 
by its very nature resists all institutional frameworks. This view of Stein runs parallel 
with the belief that her ‘innovative’ work sustains the avant-garde line precisely 
because it is inherently resistant to all institutions. The institutions at stake in the 
positing of this distinction are, first, the institution ‘modernism’, into which the late 
Stein persona is integrated, and, second, the institution of the market, which is bound 
up with her role as art collector and salon host and with the construction of that 
persona as an act of commodification.  The arguments which have her practice as the 
origin of a distinct line claim an early-twentieth-century exceptional Stein who resists 
both the institution ‘modernism’ and the institution of the market. In this chapter, I 
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want to position Stein firmly in her time as a writer who must be seen much more 
consistently as an active participant in a cultural milieu and whose work engages 
directly with a whole cultural apparatus. To use Stein’s own terms, this chapter looks 
at the ways in which, rather than writing for a time outside her time, ‘the progress of 




I would argue that the significance of Stein’s work in the 1900s and 1910s was not 
only in the internal workings of its experimental form and mode: it was also derived 
from her activity on the scene of what was already being called ‘modernism’ and from 
the status this conferred on her texts as the products of a recognisable persona. This 
complicates both the notion that Stein’s work can be divorced from its context as 
something special and distinct, and the idea that Stein’s work is entirely resistant to 
either the abstract logic or the material manifestation of commodity culture. The 
construction of a persona, as well as signifying her ‘modernist’ credibility, is a part of 
Stein’s complex and ambivalent engagement with the institution of the market. This 
chapter explores the complexities of Stein’s relationship to ‘modernism’ and to the 
market by examining a number of examples from what, in this early period, became 
her emblematic genre: the ‘portraits’ of the 1900s and 1910s. In exploring this 
dynamic, I will also draw out the ways in which Stein engages with those related and 
significant factors which are still very much her concern when she writes ‘What Are 
Masterpieces and Why Are There So Few of Them’: authorship, audience and 
twentieth Century print culture.  
 
An important strand of my discussion is that the arguments which posit an early 
authentic Stein impelled only by private integrity are also problematic because they 
do not take account of one of the significant and explicit functions of Stein’s work: to 
narrate her own period. The notion of the arcane private experiment of ‘early’ Stein 
versus her accessible popular accounts of the story of modernism in late works such 
as The Autobiography of Alice B Toklas is problematized when we take into account 
how much Stein is telling the story of her era throughout her career. The early works 
are depictions of their moments, and in rendering those scenes, the portraits in 
particular also map those networks of affiliation in which Stein explicitly embeds 
                                                           




herself. The arguments for her resistant poetic often uncouple her from these scenes 
and find the sources of her work in a private, intimate world, and in doing so, rather 
than salvaging her as an important writer for her time, they effectively write Stein out 
of modernism. I would argue that, on the contrary, Stein is always explicitly there, 
writing a historiography, mapping her field, and that her ‘experimental’ early work 
does this as much as her ‘popular’ late work.  
The texts under consideration in this chapter are the portraits ‘Matisse’ and ‘Picasso’, 
published together in 1912, the 1913 ‘Portrait of Mabel Dodge at the Villa Curonia’, 
and ‘M. Vollard and Cezanne’, published in 1915. I would argue that all of Stein’s 
texts, whether early or late, whether considered ‘experimental’ or ‘accessible’, engage 
in ambitious attempts to intervene in their cultural moment, participating in the 
project to create an audience for new kinds of literary and artistic production. Rather 
than producing her experimental texts outside the broader cultural scene and its 
associated institutions, Stein’s attention to the game of position-taking on the cultural 
field is a significant aspect of her work, something that is particularly evident in these 
portraits and their publication contexts. This is important because it is an essential 
feature of the whole period, perhaps even a defining feature, whether ‘emerging’ 
‘early’ or ‘late’, that many writers and artists are engaged not just in developing and 
promoting their practice, but in attempts to affect the cultural field as such. Bourdieu 
provides a meaningful framework for clarifying the forces on the field and their 
interactions, but I would go further and say that much of the activity in this period 
attempts to both disclose and actively influence the field of cultural production itself. 
Thus, these texts can be understood historically as efforts at transformation not just on 
the field but also of the field, reframing the roles and functions of text, author, reader 
and the institutions which mediate them. The chapter will show how, in remaking 
artists, audiences and modes of engagement, Stein’s work endeavours, like much of 
the literary and artistic production of her time, to make new positions available.  
Group identities 
 
Rather than operating as a separate individual or representing an anomaly, Stein was 
embedded in both the European and American cultural scenes because she worked 
together with other writers and artists as a member of a series of interconnecting 
groups. Indeed, Stein is not characterised in early-twentieth-century representations as 
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singular or exceptional figure, but rather as a member of a group and an actor on a 
scene. As Karen Leick tells us ‘Stein’s unusual writing was understood in the context 
of the much publicised work of Picasso, Matisse, Ezra Pound, Amy Lowell, and 
others’.
4
 Stein’s identity as part of a defined group is explicitly signified by Stein 
herself in her portraits, notably those of Picasso and Matisse, which were published 
together in 1912 in the photographer and gallery owner Alfred Stieglitz’s American 
journal Camera Work. The portraits, as well as emphasising the importance of the 
group, also problematize ideas of authorship, patronage and audience in significant 
ways. These aspects of Stein’s writing and activity are explicitly presented as a new 
kind of practice alongside and identified with a whole series of other practices which 
defined themselves as ‘modern’.  
 
Michael Levenson says in his introduction to The Cambridge Companion to 
Modernism: ‘The will to live out the risks of technical experiment … was 
characteristically nourished within small groups of mutually confirming artists…the 
circles forming around Stein, Woolf, Pound…were as much the condition of what we 
call Modernism as any set of formal gestures’.5 Group culture is a defining feature of 
the European artistic and literary scene in the 1900s and 1910s. In some examples, 
notably Futurism, the group is clearly defined, its members named and its theories 
published in manifesto form. There are many other configurations represented in this 
period, however, and over the last two decades scholarship has emphasised the variety 
in the nature and composition of groups.
6
 The complex of claims for theories, 
counter-theories and anti-theories in the struggle to form new bases for artistic 
production is a significant feature at this point, and it has already, by 1912 when 
Stein’s portraits of Matisse and Picasso are published, generated a fluorescence of 
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University Press, 2011), p.5. 
6 The introduction to Modernist Group Dynamics: The Politics and Poetics of Friendship, for example, 
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multiple, conflicting, yet often entangled group positions.
7
  The proliferation of 
groups as a characteristic of the 1900s and 1910s is explicitly recognised at the time 
and this reflects another significant aspect of these configurations. As Wulfman and 
Scholes point out in their discussion of the magazines which played such a significant 
role in the development of modernist groups, ‘modernism was a self-conscious 
movement’.
8
 This self-consciousness is clearly an attribute of declamatory manifesto-
led movements like Futurism and Vorticism, but this letter from the American painter 
Marsden Hartley to Alfred Stieglitz in 1912, the year Stieglitz publishes Stein’s 
portraits, suggests it is also true of other modernist assemblages: 
 
Here one finds more cliques and groups than could be imagined – and such groups for instance as the 
Fergusson-Estelle Rice group which exploits itself in Rhythm. In one of the last numbers of Rhythm is a 
treatise on Gaugin’s influence in which Kandinsky is talked of among others. He is evidently one of 
Gaugin’s pupils and is I believe a modern light in Berlin and Munich. He has lately brought out a new 
magazine called Der Blaue Reiter which I shall look up – very likely they talk of modernism – and God 
knows they talk much about everything here.9 
 
Visiting Paris from America for the first time, Hartley, like many other American 
artists interested in developments in the European art world, crossed the Atlantic in 
order to absorb its influences and develop his own work. During his stay he became 
friendly with Stein, to whom he had been introduced by Stieglitz, often visiting her at 
24 Rue de Fleurus, and his comments here help to contextualise Stein’s literary 
production in this period. As this letter to Stieglitz recognises, the new art at this point 
is characterised by the variety of ‘cliques and groups’ which appear to gather around 
the signifier ‘modernism’. Moreover, Hartley is also clearly aware of the networks 
created in the intersection of those groups, noting that the association of the British 
periodical Rhythm with Kandinsky leads him to the German Expressionist Blaue 
Reiter group and their magazine. Hartley’s presentation of the transnational modernist 
scene in 1912, from his position as relative outsider, reveals the contemporary 
consciousness of the category of ‘modernism’ as a distinct phenomenon which is 
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programmatic approach of Futurism, calling Imagism ‘the first anti-avant garde’ and a ‘movement to 
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programme. See Rainey p.30. 
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paradoxically defined by the plurality of the groups which engage with it. Hartley’s 
response reveals both the excitement and frustration which this condition generates, 
and reflects the tension between flux and stability which is reflected in its many 
configurations. Hartley’s presentation of ‘more cliques and groups than could be 
imagined’ evokes a sense of spectacle. It is a noisy, diverse scene of intersecting 
forces and forms, and one which, as suggested by all the ‘talk of modernism’, is 
indeed self-conscious. 
 
In this context, and like other writers in this period, Stein recognises the necessity of 
signalling her alliances in order to mark her position amongst a group of names and 
thus promote her own name. Rather than being, or indeed defining herself, as a 
distinctive, discrete figure, it is her identity as part of a group of the kind Marsden 
Hartley’s letter documents which gives her work meaning in this moment and beyond. 
It is significant therefore that Stein’s engagement in this early period in which 
modernism, as it were, first consciously recognises itself is marked by her production 
of a series of portraits. Rather than representing the ‘private’ Stein characterised in 
arguments for her early exceptionalism, they are public, and publicised, expressions 
of allegiance which make a claim for her modernist persona bound to a notion of 
group identity.  
 
The desire for a meaningful group identity is strongly linked to the desire for a new 
persona beyond existing categories and it accompanies both Stein’s move to Europe 
in 1904 and her move away from traditional literary forms in The Making of 
Americans. This is exemplified in a striking passage from the opening section of the 
novel, a text which which both performs and tracks the transformation of her work to 
an experimental writing practice:  
 
Brother singulars, we are misplaced in a generation that knows not Joseph. We flee before the 
disapproval of our cousins, the courageous condescension of our friends who gallantly sometimes 
agree to walk the streets with us, from all them who never in any way can understand why such ways 
and not the others are dear to us, we fly to the kindly comfort of an older world accustomed to take all 
manner of strange forms into its bosom.10 
 
This passage is from the section of the novel written in 1903 in the midst of a series of 
journeys between America and Europe, and it reflects the impulse which led to Stein’s 
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decision to move to Europe permanently in June 1904. It is an urgent act of self-
identification and reflects a keen sense of the necessity for the group as a context in 
which such ‘singular’ practice can be enabled. The narrative at this point has moved 
abruptly from a third-person contemplative digression on the notion of ‘vital 
singularity’ to a direct address to the reader. The rhetorical foregrounding of the 
interpellation ‘Brother singulars’ ascribes such a singularity to the reader as well, who 
is thus identified as a type who presents a ‘danger’ to the ‘bourgeois mind’ which has 
only ‘a little of the fervour for diversity’ and can only countenance ‘a strain of 
singularity that yet keeps within the limits of conventional respectability’. The reader 
is therefore unconventional, dangerous and ‘queer’, and is claimed in brotherhood 
with Stein.  
 
This insistence on a particular kind of engagement – essentially, of identification with 
the narrator – is also an insistence that Stein’s work requires not just a kind of 
reading, but also a kind of reader. In the emphasis on diversity and in the ostensibly 
paradoxical notion of the ‘brother singular’, Stein proposes a confederacy which is 
defined by difference.  As opposed to the ‘cousins’ and ‘friends’ of ordinary social 
intercourse, the alliance of those who do not conform is a brotherhood, a notion which 
indicates a monastic order or secret society and implies a meaningful and deliberate 
collective separation from their own ‘generation’. Stein’s allusion to the persecution 
of the Israelites reinforces the representation of a group rejected by an authoritative or 
dominant culture. In paralleling her exodus from America with that of the Israelites 
from Egypt Stein expresses a messianic urgency for self-identification whilst also 
heightening the representation of singularity as a group identity.  
 
The move from the USA to Europe and the various examples of artists escaping to the 
aesthetic freedom of Paris from other places in Europe is not just Stein’s: as we can 
see in Marsden Hartley’s journey 10 years later, it is a recurrent narrative in the 
development of Anglo-American and European modernism. This perhaps comes close 
to Jean-Michel Rabaté’s characterisation of modernist collaboration: ‘The dialectics 
of affiliation supposes the domination of a group mentality that finds its cohesion in a 
strange heterodox orthodoxy, reaching back to more ancient models so as to erase the 
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remnants of an inferior bourgeois culture while radically transforming the present’.
11
 
The ‘older world’ which enables ‘strange forms to exist’, is, in Stein’s image of the 
maternal ‘bosom’, a place of rebirth. It appears to offer an attitude of tolerance 
different from the conservative bourgeois hegemony of the States – not more 
‘developed’, but more complex. The matronly bosom and kindly comfort indicate the 
possibility of lateral spread rather than linear development: the old world is where 
Stein can open out. The necessity of group formation is partly a symptom of the 
conditions created by this kind of movement both in and into Europe, but, 
significantly, for Stein it is also impelled by a desire to establish a culture out of 
brotherhoods between those who feel themselves to be ‘singular’: those who respond 
to the dawn of the twentieth century with the rejection of what they perceive to be a 
stifling, oppressive and hidebound dominant culture.  
 
The portrait form and Stein’s early public persona 
 
In her essay on Picasso and Stein, Jane Bowers argues that Stein’s self-identification 
as a practitioner of a new kind of art is clarified in her experience of over 80 sittings 
for Picasso’s portrait of her, completed in 1906.
12
 It was during this time that Stein 
began writing her own portraits of artists and writers on the Paris scene.
13
 It is highly 
significant that after Picasso’s painting of her, Stein begins to use the portrait form to 
signify other practitioners she identifies with: not just ‘Picasso’ and ‘Matisse’, but 
also ‘Manguin: a painter’ (1909), ‘Nadelman’ (1911), ‘Guillaume Apollinaire’ (1913) 
and ‘Monsieur Vollard et Cezanne’ (written in 1913 and published 1915). Previous 
‘portraits’ had either attended to fictional figures, for example in an earlier form in 
Three Lives (begun in 1905), or had dealt with personal relationships, such as ‘Ada’ 
the portrait of Alice B Toklas ‘written in the winter of 1908-9’, which Janet Flanner 
claims ‘was her first’ true portrait.
14
 In the works written and published between 1909 
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and 1915, Stein develops a new genre which dramatizes her relationships with other 
practitioners and gestures towards their collective endeavour. Picasso’s portrait of 
Stein and her subsequent portrait of him complicate the roles of patron and 
practitioner by dislocating their positions and figuring as unstable components in a 
series of experiments which broaden questions of form out through genre and mode, 
and into experimentation with the whole apparatus of relations. This is further 
developed in her portrait of the wealthy American heiress Mabel Dodge. The 1913 
‘Portrait of Mabel Dodge at the Villa Curonia’ shifts the focus from artist to patron, 
and, as I will explain later, further emphasises and complicates those relations. 
 
Stein’s appropriation of the portrait genre from visual art into her literary production 
is significant. Sitting for Picasso’s portrait of her was an experience of collective 
meaning-making which seemed to enable Stein to begin the move away from the 
influence of her brother, and to begin writing in earnest. Michael Levenson argues 
that Picasso’s portrait of Stein and Stein’s Three Lives are ‘acts of portraiture’ which 
‘prepared a more focused stage in the relation between Modernism and its audiences’ 
and ‘prepared for a new spectacle in Modernism’.
15
 Stein is ostensibly, as the subject 
of Picasso’s portrait, an investor in the painter’s work, a patron, but the difficulty in 
the execution of the painting, the emphasis on process, the notion that the painting 
marks a crucial move away from representation and the uncomfortably mask-like 
quality of the image are all aspects which serve to overtly disrupt the painting’s 
function as patron portrait. This genre, a feature of visual art since the Renaissance, is 
complicated in Picasso’s painting in a way which Stein, as an art collector, must have 
been sensitive to.
16
 The painting stands, not as a representation of Stein, but as a 
marker of the dramatic problematizing of representation as such. Rather than being 
simply a patron, Stein becomes engaged in a practice of experimentation. In 
producing portraits of Picasso and Matisse three years later, Stein puts herself on the 
other side of the frame, further troubling the patron and practitioner roles and the 
places they occupy on the cultural field. Until that point, as Bowers shows us, Stein 
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Commemoration’, Mitteilungen des Kunsthistorischen Institutes in Florenz, 54 (2010), 133-154, and Jill 
Burke, Changing Patrons: Social Identity and the Visual Arts in Renaissance Florence (Philadelphia: 
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had been identified primarily alongside Leo as sponsor of and investor in the new 
art.
17
 Stein’s portraits of these artists are not just signifiers of her movement out of 
Leo’s shadow; they also enable her to radically problematize her role and her position 
in the art world. Thus, it appears that the breakthrough for both Picasso and Stein 
represented by Picasso’s portrait of her enabled Stein to perform a spectacular 
reassignment of her identity.  
 
Stein’s portraits in this period, rather than being private experiments, have a 
significant public function: to explicitly signal her engagement with these other 
figures and their practices. They enable Stein to declare a position, and they give her 
work validity and credibility. Indeed, the form of the portrait itself is a significant 
choice for these early works in that it engages as a mode in the construction and 
promotion of the persona of the sitter.  Moreover, the act of producing portraits is a 
way for Stein to assert and, later, to publicise her position as a practitioner, and 
therefore they also construct a persona for Stein the modernist writer. The portrait also 
signifies the relationship of Stein with these painters in the very act of naming them. 
In a gestural function beyond content or form, the portraits dramatize Stein’s 
relationship to key contemporary figures and create a recognisable public persona for 
her in relation to them. 
 
Stein’s portrait of Picasso reassigns the status of the portrait and therefore her own 
status as patron. Lawrence Rainey emphasises the necessity of patronage in creating a 
culture for the production and reception of modernist work, but I would suggest that 
Stein’s complication represents the desire to reimagine that paradigm.
18
 This is a 
collective experiment not just with technique but with cultural configurations: with 
the place and role of art and its relationship to social institutions. Stein’s portraits at 
this point are portraits of other artists and as such they mirror the practice of painters 
who began to use like-minded artists as models because their work was not accepted 
by the traditional patron. As Gemma Blackshaw says of modernist painting in the 
notes to the exhibition Facing the Modern at London’s National Gallery ‘Few patrons 
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were willing to give a public face to their private lives. Here, fellow artists, family and 
friends played a vital supporting role. Many of the most audacious experiments in 
portraiture were made using such sitters’.
19
 In writing portraits of other artists on the 
scene, Stein also positions herself as a writer within a group of experimental artists 
rather than simply as a patron investing in the art from outside the group. The portraits 
also achieve another very significant function: they fix Stein to a group identity, but 
one which is fluctuating and open to revision. They form a transient canon of ‘brother 
singulars’. The temporary status of this ‘canon’ is emphasised both by the portraits’ 
unfinished quality and by the genre itself, which presents individuals in a series, 
connected by Stein’s treatment of them in a self-conscious dramatization of their 
assembly. Echoing the arrangement and rearrangement of paintings on her atelier 
wall, the collection represented by her portraits is a composition – a creative act of 
curation which both effaces the distinction between patronage and practice and 
generates a fluid assembly.  
 
Stein’s portraits in Camera Work 1912-1913 
 
In August 1912, Alfred Stieglitz, recognising Stein as a significant American figure 
on the scene of the new art, produced a special edition of his magazine Camera Work 
dedicated entirely to Stein’s portraits of Matisse and Picasso as exemplary of ‘the 
Post-Impressionist spirit’.
20
 His use of the term ‘Post-Impressionist’ follows its 
coinage in Britain by Roger Fry – who had connections with the US, having held the 
position of curator at the Museum of Modern Art in New York from 1905 to 1907 – 
for his 1910 exhibition at the Grafton Galleries, Manet and the Post-Impressionists, 
and the subsequent 1912 Second Post-Impressionist Exhibition. The American heiress 
Mabel Dodge, who, as well as being the subject of the 1913 portrait, was involved in 
the promotion of Stein’s work at this point, also uses the term to describe the new art 
in her article on Stein in the 1913 edition of the journal Arts and Decoration, which 
she personally distributed at the ‘International Exhibition of Modern Art’ held in the 
New York Armory. The use of the term ‘Post-Impressionism’ here is 
contemporaneous with the use of ‘modernism’ in Marsden Hartley’s letter to Stieglitz, 
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20 Alfred Stieglitz, ‘Advertisement’, Camera Work no.13, (July 1912), p.1. 
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which suggests that ‘modernism’ and ‘Post-Impressionism’ were interchangeable or 
competing descriptions of the same activity. In June 1913 another special number of 
Camera Work, devoted to the New York Armory Show, emphasised Stein’s 
developing affiliations by opening with the ‘Portrait of Mabel Dodge at the Villa 
Curonia’, which had been promoted by Mabel Dodge herself to coincide with the 
Armory exhibition. Dodge had circulated the portrait amongst her New York 
acquaintances, as well as distributing her Arts and Decoration article at the show 
itself. In a further detail of this network of sponsorship, endorsement and promotion, 
the subject of Dodge’s article was, of course, Stein’s portrait of her. 
 
Disseminated in these contexts, Stein’s portraits signify a transatlantic modernist 
group and provide an American connection to the European modernist movements. 
This is not wholly a result of either Stieglitz’s composition, Dodge’s article, or her 
links to the Armory Show, however: Stein’s portraits represent a new genre which 
enables her to offer a portrait of herself as an artist working within a ‘modernist’ or 
‘Post-Impressionist’ group attempting to create and sustain a new context for the 
production and reception of their work. The 1913 portrait of Mabel Dodge, 
definitively a patron rather than a practitioner, is a way for Stein to further complicate 
her own role, capitalising on the promotion of Post-Impressionism in America in 
order to publicise her position as a practitioner under the patronage of a wealthy 
American.  
 
It is highly significant, therefore, that Picasso’s portrait of Stein was itself exhibited at 
the Armory Show shortly after Stieglitz’s New York based journal had published 
Stein’s portrait of Picasso, and whilst at the same time Dodge was distributing and 
publicising Stein’s portrait of her. This confluence both signifies and initiates a 
context in which, with Stein as figurehead, American radicals are directly engaged in 
the production and dissemination of the new art.  In the 1912 special number of 
Camera Work, the significance of Stein’s work and her role in the group of Post-




And it is precisely because, in these articles by Miss Stein, the Post-Impressionist spirit is found 
expressing itself in literary form that we thus lay them before the readers of CAMERA WORK in a 
specially prepared and supplemental number.21 
 
The emphasis on the presentation of her texts to Camera Work’s American audience – 
one which had begun to engage with the new visual art but had little experience of the 
literary works – has the quality of a gesture; a theatrical flourish. Reading the text 
becomes an experience of the ‘Post-Impressionist spirit’, and in this sense Stieglitz 
presents Stein’s portraits as manifestos for the movement he identifies. Spectacular, 
manifesto-led representations of groups proliferate in this period, exemplified perhaps 
in the ‘quintessential modernist little magazine’, Wyndham Lewis and Ezra Pound’s 
Blast, published 2 years later in 1914.
22
 The Vorticist manifesto which takes up 17 
pages of the first issue, despite claims made to ‘THE UNCONSCIOUSNESS OF 
HUMANITY’ and ‘an art of Individuals’, is in its very nature the representation of a 
self-conscious group.
23
 The manifesto itself is signed by a list of artists and writers 
representing the group, and a significant aspect of its message is formed by the ironic 
proclamations about who is in and who is out which bookend the ‘BLAST’ and 
‘BLESS’ sections. The sense of a conscious theoretical group position on the function 
of art in Blast is reasserted in a series of overtly theatrical gestures. Indeed, the second 
tenet of the ‘BLESS’ section of the manifesto is an exhortation to ‘BLESS the 
HAIRDRESSER’, who provides them ‘clean arched shapes’ and ‘angular plots’.
24
 
This reference to self-fashioning as such a prominent – if tongue-in-cheek – aspect of 
the manifesto signifies a meaningful knowingness about the construction of a group 
image. The declaration of allegiance to a group becomes a spectacle, a gesture 
designed to draw attention to the distinctiveness of this particular configuration of the 
new art. Just as the ‘organised disturbance’ of Blast’s two publications, alongside the 
1915 exhibition at the Dore Gallery, drew attention to the group as a collective 
intervention into the scene of modernism, so the 1912 special edition of Camera Work 
presented the grouping of Stein, Matisse and Picasso as a powerful collective entity 
                                                           
21 Stieglitz, Camera Work no.13, p.1 
22 Quotation taken from the Modernist Journals Project introductory page on Blast, 
http://dl.lib.brown.edu/mjp/render.php?id=1158591480633184&view=mjp_object 
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 BLAST: Review of the Great English Vortex, 1, ed. by Wyndham Lewis (London: John Lane, the 
Bodley Head) 1914, pp.7-8. 
24 BLAST, p.25. 
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intervening in the usual run of the magazine, in the scene of American culture and, 




With their inclusion in Stieglitz’s magazine the portraits of Matisse and Picasso 
become aspects of another composition which affords another set of meanings, 
engaged in signifying the work of group activity. The advertisement in the July 
edition of Stieglitz’s Camera Work announces the August magazine as a ‘special 
number of Camera Work devoted to the essays of Miss Gertrude Stein on Matisse and 
Picasso’.
26
 This places Stein’s texts in a privileged position in relation to the works of 
art: the special edition sees her as the centre of this alliance. Stein’s prominence in the 
group is further promoted by the characterisation of the reproductions of the Picasso 
and Matisse paintings as illustrations rather than as the subjects of Stein’s texts. The 
advertisement presents the special edition as a showcase for Stein’s ‘essays’ which is 
‘illustrated with fourteen full-page plates of the work of these artists’.
27
 This 
presentation of the portraits reinforces the effectiveness of their function in situating 
Stein publically as a key figure in a contemporary group. It also draws a direct parallel 
between her texts and visual art, hinting at some essential identification between them 
which offers a way in to the new art.   
 
Following this, the ‘Editorial’ in the August special edition which prefaces the essays 
and paintings is unequivocal about Stein’s centrality: 
 
But while it so happens that one of these articles treats of Henri Matisse and the other of Pablo Picasso; 
and while the text is accompanied by fourteen reproductions of representative paintings and sculptures 
by these artists; the fact is that these articles themselves, and not either the subjects with which they 
deal or the illustrations that accompany them, are the true raison d’etre of this special issue.28 
 
In a development of the representation in the ‘advertisement’, Stein comes to signify 
more intensely an essential quality of ‘Post-Impressionism’. Stieglitz, however, also 
reveals something significant about the nature of her texts themselves. The 
advertisement refers to them as ‘essays’, the Editorial calls them ‘articles’, and yet he 
explicitly draws our attention away from their referential function in relation either to 
                                                           
25 Wyndham Lewis, Blasting & Bombardiering (London: Eyre & Spottiswoode, 1937), p.32. 
26 Stieglitz, Camera Work no.13, p.1 
27
 Ibid. 
28 Alfred Stieglitz, ‘Editorial’ in Camera Work Special Edition (August 1912), p.1. Further references to 
the Editorial are given after quotations in the text. 
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their subject matter or to the paintings with which he juxtaposes them. He wants to 
assign a stable and identifiable genre to the texts, but this attempt fails in its very 
articulation. It is ‘the articles themselves’ which demand our attention, not as 
theoretical or critical explanations which stand outside the practice, but as examples 
of that practice. Stieglitz also claims that: 
 
These articles bear, to current interpretative criticism, a relation exactly analogous to that borne by the 
work of the men of whom they treat to the painting and sculpture of the older schools. 
So close, indeed, is this analogy that they will doubtless be regarded by many as no less absurd, 
unintelligible, radical or revolutionary than the so-called vagaries of the painters whom they seek to 
interpret (1). 
 
In the world of ‘Post-Impressionism’, described as analogous to the hegemonic world 
of ‘current interpretive criticism’ and the ‘older schools’, Stein occupies the role of 
‘interpretive’ critic. In this representation, the group to which Stein belongs is a self-
contained alternative to mainstream culture, and the critic of mainstream culture has 
an ‘other’ in Stein. Yet, as his earlier declaration shows, Stein’s writing does not fulfil 
the function of interpretation. Stieglitz’s uncertainty about the discourse mode the 
portraits present reflects the instability generated by the form, content and 
indeterminate genre of the texts. At the same time as offering this direct comparison 
with the establishment art and its critics, Stieglitz himself complicates the analogy by 
emphasising the ambiguous function of Stein’s pieces: they resemble mainstream 
critical writing, but in an alternative paradigm which enables them to play a very 
different role. For Stieglitz, they are: 
 
a Rosetta stone of comparison; a decipherable clew to that intellectual and esthetic attitude which 
underlies and inspires the movement upon one phase of which they are comments and of the extending 
development of which they are themselves an integral part (1). 
 
In the comparison to the Rosetta stone, they offer not an explanation but a decryption 
key to the way in which Post-Impressionist art makes meaning.
29
 The reference to her 
work as ‘a decipherable clew’, in its archaic spelling of ‘clue’, alludes to the ball of 
thread used by Theseus to trace his own path through the labyrinth: the portraits will 
lead us safely into the world of Post-Impressionism. These comparisons function to 
present a developed and complex culture, echoing as they do the discovery of the 
                                                           
29 For a detailed discussion of this metaphor in the context of genre, see Ulla Haselstein, ‘Gertrude 
Stein's Portraits of Matisse and Picasso’ in New Literary History, 34: 4, (2003), 723-743. 
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remains of the ancient Egyptian and Greek cultures whose complexity can be seen in 
the fragments they have left behind. The images of myth and artefact appear to offer 
glimpses of a total and self-sufficient universe of meaning which Stieglitz encourages 
his readers to enter, using Stein’s texts as both example and guide. In encountering 
Stein’s texts, Stieglitz’s readers arrive in the culture of ‘Post-Impressionism’.  
 
Stieglitz’s descriptions of Stein’s portraits of Matisse and Picasso as ‘a Rosetta stone’ 
and ‘a decipherable clew’ are in some ways apposite. Like the Rosetta stone, they are 
a fragment of a culture and represent metonymically a larger field of meaning, and 
like Theseus’s thread, the long repetitive sentences lead overlapping formations in the 
looping motions of a path in a labyrinth. The labyrinth, however, does not lead us into 
an arcane ‘other’ culture as separate from the mainstream scene as an ancient culture 
seen from the distance of a thousand years, nor do they reflect, like the Rosetta stone, 
a culture that is only accessible through a process of decoding. Indeed, I would argue 
that the portraits explicitly resist both of the concepts these metaphors propose. They 
do not offer a way in to a distinct unified culture and nor do they function, like the 
Rosetta stone, as a code which can be mapped across genres to reveal a definitive 
formula for understanding a separate ‘other’ culture outside the cultural field as it is 
understood. Rather than showing us a discrete cultural formation which sustains a 
position outside or on the margins of the established cultural field, they replicate and 
enact the processes involved in attempt to enter, appropriate and transform that field. 
 
Reading Stein’s portraits of Picasso and Matisse   
 
Both ‘Picasso’ and ‘Matisse’ appear at first to be portraits of two individuals and 
representations of their behaviour or being. ‘Picasso’ opens with the lines: 
 
One whom some were certainly following was one who was completely charming. One whom some 
were certainly following was one who was charming. One whom some were following was one who 
was completely charming. One whom some were following was one who was certainly completely 
charming.30  
 
The repeated references to Picasso’s charm and the emphasis on his followers reflect 
his characteristics as an individual and his effect on those around him. Rather than 
                                                           
30 All references to this text are from Gertrude Stein, ‘Picasso’, in Camera Work Special Edition 
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representing his work and its importance, it seems to be a portrait of Picasso’s general 
character and his personal potency. The repetition of ‘charming’ identifies the most 
striking feature of his character and offers a sense of the experience of being in his 
company. An insistence on his individuality is created by the repeated grammatical 
foregrounding of ‘one’ and the repetition of ‘who’. The first paragraph of ‘Matisse’ is 
also intent on his personal qualities and experiences, using the repetition of ‘one’ and 
‘he’ but evoking a more hesitant and sensitive personality and presenting a more 
introverted and isolated character. The sentences replicate an internal process in 
which Matisse personally comes to an acceptance of himself, characterised simply as 
the development of certainty about ‘what he was doing’ and contrasting with 
Picasso’s confidence and popularity: 
 
One was quite certain that for a long part of his being one being living he had been trying to be certain 
that he was wrong in doing what he was doing and then when he could not come to be certain that he 
had been wrong in doing what he had been doing, when he had completely convinced himself that he 
would not come to be certain that he had been wrong in doing what he had been doing he was really 
certain then that he was a great one and he certainly was a great one. Certainly every one could be 
certain of this thing that this one is a great one.31 
 
Matisse’s personal development is embodied in Stein’s text as an oscillating drift, a 
gradual coming to terms with his own value. The paragraph is made up of two 
sentences, the first of which is long and repetitive, figuring the gradual change in the 
artist’s consciousness, from ‘trying to be certain that he was wrong in what he was 
doing’, to being ‘really certain then that he was a great one’. The second is rather 
shorter, clarifying the position reached at the end of this part of the process as one in 
which ‘Certainly everyone could be certain of this thing that this one is a great one’.  
 
The second sentence in ‘Matisse’ however marks a shift in emphasis. With its 
reference to ‘everyone’, it suggests that these judgements about value are made not by 
the individual but by others around him. In this second sentence, in which ‘everyone 
could be certain’, the gathering of the group around this conviction has a crucial role.  
The movement into certainty is engendered by the coordination of a set of related 
positions which validate the individual’s activity, and this appears to be a necessary 
condition for ‘what he was doing’ to take on its full meaning. The second sentence 
                                                           




therefore looks much more like the representation of a response to Matisse’s art and 
the formation of a consensus about the artist’s activity and its value. Similarly, the 
second paragraph in ‘Picasso’ shifts the emphasis from the personal qualities of the 
subject of the portrait to a group’s response to the subject’s activity: ‘Some were 
certainly following and were certain that the one they were then following was one 
working and was one bringing out of himself then something’. Picasso is ‘working’ 
and, rather than being something, he is bringing something ‘out of himself’. Shifting 
from the grammatical foregrounding in the first paragraph of of the individual subject 
of the portrait (‘one’) to the foregrounding in the second paragraph of the group 
(‘some’) who were following him, the emphasis moves, as it does in ‘Matisse’, from 
an image of the artist to a representation of the responses to his work.  
 
The second paragraph of ‘Matisse’, clarifying the reference to ‘everybody’ in the first 
paragraph, develops the representation of the group around Matisse’s work: ‘Some 
said of him, when anybody believed in him they did not then believe in any other one. 
Certainly some said this of him’. The first sentence performs two functions. First, it 
indicates the division of opinion on Matisse’s art into those who are grouped around it 
and those who are not; and second, it proposes that accepting the kind of art it 
represents is an act of faith which rejects other forms, a narrative of rupture and 
opposition familiar in manifestos of this period. What Stein signifies here is a 
conscious recognition of the necessity for the new art to generate new contexts in 
which it can be meaningfully received. In ‘Matisse’, however, Stein complicates this 
because she uses the notion of certainty ironically to figure a new understanding of all 
these cultural values as in fact unstable and shifting. The continued repetition of  the 
adjective ‘certain’ and the adverb ‘certainly’ from the opening passage and 
throughout the text draws the attention again and again to the instability of such 
convictions about the value of a work of art and emphasises the contingent nature of 
these judgements. Certainty becomes a transitory position, a provisional conviction 
around which consensus gathers. This foregrounds the role of the group in defining 
and holding a set of attitudes on a shifting cultural field. Rather than representing a 
fixed and separate culture which exists in a self-contained space outside the 




The portrait of Picasso also places emphasis on the role of the group in establishing 
consensus for cultural values. In both the portraits, certainty merely signifies a 
position around which consensus has gathered. The modulations represented by the 
repetitive, oscillating and accretive uses of language and syntax in ‘Matisse’ are also 
present in ‘Picasso’ and come to embody the processes through which groups are 
assembling around these new ideas about art. ‘Picasso’, like ‘Matisse’, uses references 
to certainty in order to represent a scene of fluctuation and instability in which the 
group – the ‘some’ who were ‘following’ Picasso – gather and shift around his work, 
that which he is ‘bringing out of himself’.  
 
Some were certainly following and were certain that the one they were then following was one working 
and was one bringing out of himself then something. Some were certainly following and were certain 
that the one they were then following was one bringing out of himself then something that was coming 
to be a heavy thing, a solid thing and a complete thing.  
 
One whom some were certainly following was one working and certainly was one bringing something 
out of himself then and was one who had been all his living had been one having something coming out 
of him. 
 
Something had been coming out of him, certainly it had been coming out of him, certainly it was 
something, certainly it had been coming out of him and it had meaning, a charming meaning, a solid 
meaning, a struggling meaning, a clear meaning. 
 
The repetition of ‘certainly’ and ‘completely’ to describe both Picasso and his 
followers in the opening paragraphs at first appears to offer a sense of that which is 
reliable and constant, particularly in combination with the other signifiers of stability 
and fixedness used to describe Picasso’s work such as ‘heavy’ and ‘solid’. This is 
complicated, however, by the indeterminacy of both the ‘something’ these adjectives 
describe and the references to less stable qualities such as ‘charming’ and ‘struggling’ 
in the description of Picasso’s work as having contradictory qualities ‘a charming 
meaning, a solid meaning, a struggling meaning, a clear meaning’. The instability of 
these adjectives is also a function of the fact that they are formed from the present 
participle and therefore associate with movement and transience. The alternation 
between clarity and solidity, charm and struggle suggests that this kind of oscillation 
and the ambiguity it throws up is, in itself, what characterises both Picasso’s work and 
cultural responses to it.  
 
This shifting or drifting of the group from one unstable certainty to another is clearly 




Some were certainly wanting to be doing what this one was doing that is were wanting to be ones 
clearly expressing something. Some of such of them did not go on in being ones wanting to be doing 
what this one was doing that is in being ones clearly expressing something. Some went on being ones 
wanting to be doing what this one was doing that is, being ones clearly expressing something. Certainly 
this one was one who was a great man. Any one could be certain of this thing. Every one would come 
to be certain of this thing. This one was one, some were quite certain, one greatly expressing something 
being struggling. This one was one, some were quite certain, one not greatly expressing something 
being struggling. 
 
The repetition of the the nebulous pronoun ‘some’ and the references to ‘Any one’ 
and ‘Every one’ has individual subjectivity and group culture inextricably bound 
together. Moreover, the mode of the text itself with its weblike form and its shifting 
accretions and definitions defies the linearity of the labyrinth and emphasises instead 
the convolutions in the process of moving from A to B. Indeed, the final sentences do 
not constitute an arrival. In closing the portrait with opposing positions, Stein 
suspends Matisse himself in the drift. This sustains the oscillating rhythms of the 
syntax without allowing a conclusion, emphasising the tension generated by Matisse’s 
work.  This final inconclusive wrangle places Matisse’s work in a persistent equivocal 
position, not fully accepted but accepted by some, an expression of the status of his 
work at that very moment in history. 
 
In both portraits, the ambiguity of these artists’ work and the attendant ambivalence of 
its reception are articulated in the word ‘struggling’. Ostensibly, this proposes an 
image of the struggling artist – a marginal figure denied entry to the pantheon and 
whose work is yet to be valued for its true worth. Stein’s use of this word, however, 
complicates the picture of the artist’s struggle from the margins into the mainstream, 
instead emphasising the meaningful complexity of the act of intervention itself. In 
‘Matisse’ she repeatedly uses the present participle ‘struggling’ either as a gerund or 
to modify a noun rather than in conjunction with an auxiliary verb to indicate action. 
In repeating such phrases as ‘the greatness of struggling’, and ‘he was greatly 
expressing something struggling’, Stein denies the potential of the word ‘struggling’ 
to participate in the formation of a verb – to denote action. This, however, is 
counteracted by the image the word conjures up: that of unceasing movement. What 
we are presented with is a static image of continuous action. The implication here is 
that the struggle is a necessary feature of Matisse’s work, an idea which is also 
articulated in the repeated insistence that he is ‘expressing something being 
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struggling’ (with ‘being’ and ‘struggling’ as adjectival participles modifying the noun 
‘something’). He is not struggling to express, he is expressing the existence of the 
struggle itself. The context in which the work of art intervenes is not fixed, and this 
proposes a vision of the cultural field as inherently unstable and the status of the work 
as shifting and both defined by and defining the cultural context in its fluctuations. 
 
These portraits do not reflect a desire for a unified alternative culture outside the field 
to replace what Stieglitz calls the ‘older schools’ and their ‘current interpretive 
criticism’. Rather, they suggest that these groups form the activity of a multiple, 
heterogeneous and unstable field. Stein’s portraits provide an active and live 
conceptualisation of these individual artists as moving nodes in a cultural field 
continually assembled and disassembled, both forming and formed by the consensus 
which gives them meaning. These early portraits, rather than representing either a 
series of private experiments located outside the public sphere, or a sealed and self-
reflexive entity divorced from the existing cultural context, or a total rejection of the 
institutions which form the context for the reception of works of art, in fact offer a 
profound engagement with that sphere, with those institutions and with that context. 
Indeed, those engagements form the subject matter of these texts and largely 
determine their form, their mode and the method of their dissemination. 
 
The 1913 Armory Show and Stein’s ‘Portrait of Mabel Dodge at the Villa 
Curonia’ 
 
The 1913 portrait of Mabel Dodge further complicates Stein’s role as patron. Neither 
a personal rendering of an intimate relationship, nor a fictional or unidentified subject, 
nor a portrait of another artist, the ‘Portrait of Mabel Dodge’ ostensibly appears to 
operate more along the lines of artists’ portraits of Ambroise Vollard. Vollard, the 
Parisian art dealer whose patronage was crucial for the dissemination of French Post-
impressionist works, was depicted in portraits by, among others, Cezanne (1899), 
Bonnard (1904), Renoir (1908), and Picasso (1910). The portraits of this figure are 
clearly opportunities to express respect, even homage, but they also often typify the 
painters’ work at that moment, subjecting the image of the patron to radical formal 
experimentation in a way which emphasises his support for their endeavours as 
‘refusés’. The Steins knew Vollard well and bought paintings from him  indeed, 
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Stein’s portrait of him, which I will discuss shortly, attests to this  and, with her 
interest in Cezanne’s work and her friendship with Picasso, Stein must have been 
aware of these representations of Vollard as representations of dealer, promoter and 
patron. Although Dodge in many ways performs the same role for Stein, there are 
differences in the execution of Stein’s portrait, in the role it confers on Mabel Dodge 
and in the function it is assigned which make it once again an example of her 
complication of the relative status and institutional roles of the artist, the patron and 
the work of art. Alex Goody argues that, although ‘The “Portrait of Mabel Dodge” is 
neither a typical nor exceptional “example” of Stein’s modernist becoming’, it is ‘as 
an event’ in fact ‘incredibly productive’.
32
 The portrait is indeed productive because 
of the way in which it promotes Stein’s image as a practitioner of the new art. I would 
also identify a much more significant role for this portrait, however: this text in fact 
problematizes the relationship between author, portrait, subject and patron in a way 
which performs a fruitful destabilising of those categories. I would also argue that this 
destabilisation is expressed again in the way in which the text is disseminated.  
 
Firstly, it is significant that, as Goody suggests, the portrait is not ‘exceptional’. 
Unlike the portraits of Vollard – Cezanne’s extraordinary mask-like face, Picasso’s 
extreme deconstruction of the image – Stein’s portrait of Dodge in many ways seems 
less ‘experimental’ than any of her other portraits of this period. The portrait can be 
read, as Dodge suggests in her article on the portrait, as ‘a series of impressions’ 
which produce ‘a coherent totality’.
33
 The opening sentence ‘The days are wonderful 
and the nights are wonderful and the life is pleasant’, presents in conventional terms 
the experience of a holiday in a beautiful place, suggesting directly Stein’s own 
experience of staying at the Villa Curonia.
34
 The repetition of the phrase ‘So much 
breathing’ in the third paragraph gives the impression of a meditative space, the 
references to objects and spaces in the Villa such as ‘the hall’, ‘blankets’, ‘A bottle’, 
‘the bed’, ‘a garden’, ‘the vase’, provide a drifting sense of place, and the distinctive 
line ‘This is this bliss’ expresses the sensual pleasure of a restful holiday (465-467). 
Read like this, the text is much more denotational than Stein’s other portraits, offering 
                                                           
32 Alex Goody, Modernist Articulations, p.54 
33 Mabel Dodge, ‘Speculations’, in Camera Work Special Number (June 1913), 6-9 (p.8). 
34
Gertrude Stein, Selected Writings, ed. by Carl Van Vechten (New York: Random House, 1946), 
pp.465-468 (p.465). Further references to the edition are given after quotations in the text. Stein and 
Toklas visited the Villa in autumn 1912. See Everett, p.60. 
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an example of what Dodge calls ‘impressionistic writing’.
35
 This portrait, then, is 
rather pretty and pleasing, a portrait of Dodge as a dispersed and languid influence 
who does not urge innovative experimentation and instead prompts a response more 
reminiscent of Impressionism than of Post-Impressionism.  
 
So, unlike the experimentation which appears to be prompted in the various 
depictions of Vollard, in the ‘Portrait of Mabel Dodge’ the subject is not represented 
in the work as a figure who cultivates a radical response. The portrait of Dodge also 
lacks the urgent driving repetitions of Stein’s portraits of Matisse and Picasso. She 
does not appear as a substantial force in the text, contrasting sharply both with the 
radical treatment of the subject in the artists’ portraits of Vollard and with the shifting 
and gathering of forces around Matisse and Picasso in Stein’s portraits of them. 
Indeed, the text is as much a portrait of the Villa Curonia as it is of Mabel Dodge. A 
fifteenth-century Medici palace, the Villa is a signifier of Dodge’s position as patron, 
locating her in the space inhabited by the wealthiest and most influential patrons of 
the Renaissance. The portrait, however, appears to diminish the power this position 
might confer: the text depicts a rather bland space filled with gentle distractions. 
There is an emphasis on expressions of lack which occurs in the continual use of 
negations that characterise the text: ‘They did not darken’, ‘It had not all the 
meaning’, ‘This is not heartening’, ‘It is not inundated’, ‘There is the climate which is 
not existing’ (465). The association of Mabel Dodge and the Villa with lack and loss 
is also signified more explicitly in the lines, ‘There can be that lack of any quivering’, 
and ‘An open object is establishing the loss that there was when the vase was not 
inside the place’, and in references to reduction and nothingness such as ‘vanishing’, 
‘evaporating’, ‘lessening’, ‘disappearing’, and ‘absence’ (466; 467; 465-466). 
Similarly, the disembodied narrative seems to offer observations but these appear 
generalised and indiscriminate, recording a state of affairs in a disjointed series of 
indeterminate declaratives. Most of the sentences in the text are existential, very often 
beginning with the phrase ‘There is’. This phrase denotes a static condition, 
expressing simply the notion of existence or, in the negative examples, non-existence. 
Moreover, it is a device for leaving the subject position vacant of content. The 
existential ‘there’ – and the empty ‘it’ which Stein also uses in this text – do not refer 
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to any object or entity: they represent dummy subject forms which enable Stein as 
observer to disappear. They also suggest a condition or state in time and space which, 
repeated throughout the text, provides a focus on the Villa and on the state of things 
as they are. This gathers iteration in the final paragraph: ‘There is all there is when 
there has all there has where there is what there is’ (468). In this sentence, the 
existential ‘there’ repeats to emptiness because the corresponding state or condition is 
not named. The Villa becomes a space of empty nothingness observed from nowhere.  
 
In a letter inviting her to return to the Villa in July 1913, Dodge encourages Stein to 
take up the position of writer-in-residence at the Villa, her function to document the 
kind of transgressive activity Dodge finds so thrilling: ‘Please come down here soon – 
the house is full of pianists, painters, pederasts, prostitutes, and peasants. Great 
material’.
36
 Dodge wants Stein to observe the bohemian goings-on at the Villa and to 
record them for a breathless posterity. Dodge’s letter imagines fixed roles for herself, 
Stein, the subjects of Stein’s art and the audience for it. Stein’s portrait of Dodge, 
however, has already resisted these categories and challenged the very paradigm 
which constructs them. In its execution the subject of the portrait herself disappears, 
replaced by generalised activity, and rather than having Dodge as a central figure 
around which energy gathers, the portrait suggests instead a dispersal of energies. An 
uncertainty about the relative status of the artist and the patron is also generated by 
the absence of the artist’s own observing subject-position. This plurality denies the 
homage to an individual patron whose actions have a definitive effect on the value 
and reception of the modernist artwork. The figures of patron, artist and audience are 
dissolved in a series of generalised states and activities. The patron, therefore, does 
not have a special status, and the roles of patron, artist, subject and audience are not 
fixed or determined.  
 
The blurring of these distinctions is also reflected in the way in which the text is 
produced, promoted and distributed. Dodge had 300 copies of the text printed and 
bound in Florentine wallpaper with a lavish floral pattern of large and colourful 
blooms, and she personally touted them around New York at the time of the Armory 
Show in February 1913. This action at once performs two opposing functions. 
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Dodge’s manifestation of the text presents Stein’s work as a decorative object in a 
way which makes it more acceptable and emphasises Dodge’s connection to Florence, 
to art history and perhaps even to a Renaissance notion of the patron.  The portrait’s 
distribution to coincide with the Armory Show, however, which, as Dodge put it in a 
letter to Stein was the ‘wonderful great show’ to which ‘All the moderns [are] sending 
over’, is a signifier of its modernity.
37
 Dodge’s letters to Stein reveal the activity of 
her patronage: ‘Already people tell me that everywhere, on account of my judicious 
scattering of the Portrait everyone is saying “Who is Gertrude Stein? Who is Mabel 
Dodge at the Villa Curonia?”’
38
 Dodge’s ‘judicious’ activity places Stein’s text firmly 
in the context of the controversial works of art on display in order to identify both 
Stein – and Dodge herself – with the explosion of modernism onto the American 
scene. The function of the portrait as a method for displaying a group identity is here 
clearly fulfilled: Stein and Dodge have become ‘names’. Indeed, the association of 
Stein with modern artworks is evident in responses to the show in the press, whose 
mockery often took the form of doggerels such as this example from the Chicago 
Tribune column ‘A line o’ type or two:’ 
 
I called the canvas Cow with cud 
And hung it on the line, 
Although to me ‘twas clear as mud, 
‘Twas clear to Gertrude Stein.39 
 
The text is also given further status by Dodge’s article, which was published in the 
March edition of the magazine Arts and Decoration and sold at the Armory Show 
itself.
40
 The article emphasises the difficulty of the text, both reflecting and 
encouraging the kind of response articulated by the tabloid doggerel in the assertion 
of its status in its association with modernist artworks and in Stein’s association with 
modernist artists. This is exemplified by Dodge’s claim, early in the article, that: 
 
She has taken the English language and, according to many people, has misused it, or has used it 
roughly, uncouthly and brutally, or madly, stupidly and hideously, but by her method she is finding the 
hidden and inner nature of nature.41 
                                                           
37 Dodge to Stein, c. January 1913. Everett, p.152. 
38 Dodge to Stein, January 27th 1913. Everett, p.163. 
39 February 8th 1913, quoted in Milton Brown The Story of the Armory Show (New York: The Joseph H 
Hirshhorn Foundation, 1964) p.111. 
40
 The article was reprinted in the June 1913 Special Number of Stieglitz’s magazine Camera Work. 
References to the text are taken from this publication. See n.32. 




The controversy surrounding Stein’s work is given emphasis because it is potentially 
productive, and her association with other artists becomes very much an aspect of the 
work in its distribution and promotion. The clamour caused by Duchamp’s Nude 
Descending a Staircase – which drew the most comment and derision in the press – 
did more to promote than to condemn the work, which sold for $324, more than any 
of his previous works had. Indeed, all four of Duchamp’s paintings sold, making him 
one of the most successful artists in the show.
42
 It is Stein’s association with these 
groups and their controversial experiments which is promoted by Dodge’s activities, 
and Stein’s practice is therefore meaningful because of this context. Dodge’s article 
aligns the portrait directly with the works of art in the show, asserting that ‘Gertrude 
Stein is doing with words what Picasso is doing with paint’, her work representing the 
‘new manifestation in esthetics’. As in Stieglitz’s presentation, Stein’s work 
exemplifies the ‘Post-Impressionist spirit’, the realisation of a spontaneous aesthetic 
activity unattributable to individual agency.  
 
Stein’s text, however, is not simply the literary equivalent of visual art’s experiments 
in technique. The construction by Dodge of the text as an object, its distribution 
around the Armory Show and the promotion of its association with Picasso’s portrait 
of Stein make it a result of all these activities. It is made by Stein, by Dodge, by 
Picasso and by the Armory Show. The significance of dispersed activity embodied 
and reflected in the portrait itself is therefore reiterated in its modes of production and 
distribution. Stein’s response to Dodge’s promotion: ‘I am completely delighted with 
your performances’, is telling in that it presents Dodge as an actor in the spectacle of 
modernism.
43
 It is a response to the way in which Dodge represents her own 
involvement in a highly dramatized form which seems to suggest make-believe or 
fabrication. In her account of a conversation with the editor of Arts and Decoration, 
for example, she tells Stein ‘Then I said “Of course Miss Stein is a professional & you 
must pay her for the article even if it is a nominal sum otherwise I cannot consider 
it.”’ Her use of quotation and her rhetorical emphasis (‘of course’; ‘you must’; ‘I 
cannot’) suggests a scripted performance of the role of a professional’s representative, 
made all the more theatrical because Stein’s status was so much more tenuous and 
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uncertain than Dodge’s language suggests. What is also reflected in these letters, 
however, is Dodge’s belief that her performances create something real. Her assertion 
‘I have made all NY and the suburbs talk about you. Now is the time for the 
publishers and they know it’ shows the move from ephemeral talk to actual 
publication.
44
  Dodge has an active role in the construction of a cultural context for 
the reception of Stein’s work, and it is a construction which relies upon the backdrop 
of the Armory Show, on the spectacle of the shocking works of art, on the portrait as 
gesture, and on Dodge’s performance in the social circles of New York. These 
performances become actions in the cultural sphere as fabrication takes a material 
form. In its distribution, ‘The Portrait of Mabel Dodge’ becomes an intermedial text. 
It is a work of literature which replicates the modes of visual art in its newly acquired 
status as a beautiful, ‘authentic’ object and in its appropriation of the portrait genre. 
Its role as gesture or spectacle and its method of distribution as performance, 
however, also have the properties of theatre.  
 
The serial production of the ‘Portrait of Mabel Dodge’ and its refashioning as a 
material object which is reproducible and can be distributed as part of the spectacle of 
modernism provided by the Armory show means that it is a modernist event 
collectively produced, one which destabilises the categories of artist, patron, subject, 
audience and media. This belies the image of Stein as an exceptional or disjunctive 
writer the meaning of whose works can be traced to an arcane project carried out in a 
private sphere divorced from public culture. The significance of Stein’s portraits is as 
much in their status as events as in their complex and unusual forms. Both these 
aspects form the meaning of Stein’s practice, and both aspects must be read as 
conscious engagements with their moment in literary history. 
 
Stein in the market: ‘M. Vollard et Cézanne’ 
 
Stein is therefore practitioner and patron, experimental writer and ‘name’ at the same 
time, and this reading of her activity challenges the notion of the early private 
experimenter versus the later commodified icon. Rather than existing in a disjunctive 
space outside the logic of commodification as the Language poets, and both 
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Quartermain and Dydo claim, I would argue that, instead, Stein as artist, as promoter 
and as investor, inhabits the institution of the market itself both in conventional ways 
and as a space of experimentation. The culture of acquisition is ready-made when she 
arrives in Paris in 1902, exemplified by the figure of the art dealer Vollard, the subject 
of her ‘M. Vollard and Cézanne’, and she engages directly and meaningfully with this 
context, as this portrait itself shows us. Written in 1913 and published in order to 
promote Vollard’s 1914 biography of Cézanne, the portrait was included by the art 
critic Henry McBride in his section of the Sunday edition of the New York Sun in 
October 1915.
45
 McBride, a friend of  Stein’s who had visited her in Paris earlier that 
year, often used the review section of the Sun to discuss and publicise the new art 
forms, was involved in the promotion of Alfred Stieglitz’s 291 gallery, and remained 
a champion of Stein throughout her career. In McBride’s 1915 article, the poem and 
its publication in the Sun are explicitly framed as acts of promotion for Vollard’s 
book, for Stein’s writing, for McBride’s reputation as an American critic of the new 
art, and for the paper itself: ‘nothing less than a wonderful new poem by Miss 
Gertrude Stein that now appears for the first time anywhere in the world! It is apropos 
of the new volume and is entitled “M. Vollard et Cézanne.”’
46
 Adding that ‘Doubtless 
collectors will desire copies of the poem to paste in their Cézanne volumes’ and ‘M. 
Vollard may now consider himself immortalised’, McBride presents the poem as an 
act of immortalisation for Vollard not just because it has been written by Stein but 
also because it has been published in the paper  it is only ‘now’ that Vollard is 
immortalised, and the poem, being made available in the Sun, becomes a collector’s 
item which can be added to the book to preserve the moment of Vollard’s exaltation 
and to give his volume more value. 
 
The article also promotes Stein’s image as an uncompromisingly modern personality 
on the Paris scene and a difficult experimental writer and, by association, promotes 
McBride’s own modernity and the cutting-edge credentials of the paper in printing the 
poem. When Mc Bride says ‘Dull people may sigh for an explanation of this 
delightful little compound of satire and realism but Miss Stein doesn’t write for dull 
people’, he frames the unsympathetic audience  as ‘dull’ and his own response and 
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 Ambroise Vollard, Paul Cézanne (Paris: Vollard, 1914). 
46 Henry McBride, ‘Art News and Comment’, New York Sun, 10 October 1915, Fifth Section Special 
Feature Magazine, p.12. All references to the article from this page. 
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therefore that of the paper  the poem is actually ‘delightful’  as enlightened. 
McBride also quotes ‘one of Miss Stein’s letters of last May’, written to him, ‘telling 
the pleasure she took in Vollard’s visit when he arrived in a cab piled high with his 
Cézannes’, another indication of  McBride’s relationship to Stein which also serves to 
portray his own place on the transatlantic art scene. Framing the letter as ‘a 
companion piece to the poem’ which is ‘not to be regarded as an explanation of the 
poem, but as an accompaniment’, McBride also effectively uses the letter to offer his 
audience a translation of the poem whilst repeatedly insisting that it cannot be 
translated. This enables the unsure reader to get a grip on the work and thus 
potentially expands Stein’s audience without seeming to damage the integrity of the 
text, the ‘explanation’ of which he considers a ‘sin’.    
 
The letter McBride quotes does indeed provide details which illuminate the text. What 
it reveals most significantly for this discussion is a picture of Vollard’s complex 
position as dealer, promoter and, now, as writer. Stein’s letter reflects the anxiety 
involved in the complication of these roles: ‘“he wants some public recognition of his 
literary efforts…he comes in great haste…with original paintings and drawings and 
reproductions and a page of the text and asks to be admired, and you do.”’ There is 
discomfort in this desire for ‘public recognition’ and in the direct appeal for Stein’s 
appreciation - he ‘asks to be admired’. Stein’s note that this is accompanied by ‘great 
haste’ evokes both the frenetic activity, even the feigned exclusivity, of Vollard the 
salesman, and a kind of embarrassment, a fear of rejection, felt by Vollard the writer. 
‘He wants’ and ‘[he] asks’ also suggest a measure of desperation. The letter is 
interesting as a discourse on the shifting and unstable positions and roles engendered 
and necessitated by the new art forms and their relations to the contemporary context. 
It is about more than Vollard, however. Stein says ‘“I have done rather a nice sketch 
of him”’ but the poem is also a sketch of Stein’s own multiple and often contradictory 




The poem presents fragments of the encounter from the position of Stein the 
appreciative host, expressing how careful she is to give him the ‘recognition’ and 
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 Gertrude Stein, letter to Henry McBride, in Henry McBride, ‘Art News and Comment’, New York 
Sun, 10 October 1915, Fifth Section Special Feature Magazine, p.12. All references to the letter are 
from this page. 
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admiration which, as she indicates in the letter, he desires and she bestows (‘[he] asks 
to be admired, and you do’). The sense of Vollard’s rather embarrassed haste is also 
reflected in Stein’s hostly courtesies, ‘Please me/By staying’, ‘Please do be seated’ 
and in the final line’s amused summation: ‘That’s the end of that’.
48
 It is also 
coloured, however, by the role of Stein the investor. The line, ‘Its pretty, its nice’, 
towards the end of the text, evokes the repeated assurances Stein offers, and, in its 
phatic emptiness, reflects the mode both of reassuring friend and politely reluctant 
buyer. This comes after a representation of the flurry of exhibits, of the paintings and 
reproductions and presumably the ‘page of the text’ from Vollard’s book on Cézanne, 
proffered for both a friend’s admiration and a buyer’s investment. Snatches of this 






M. Vollard et Cézanne. 
Histoires des bonnes. 
Histoires des femmes. 
 
The form of short, minor or truncated sentences and end-stopped lines seen here and 
used throughout the poem, also reflect the ‘great haste’ Stein comments on in her 
letter, conveying Vollard’s rushed flourishing of objects and ideas for Stein’s 
recognition and appreciation. It is unclear whether the first person speaker of ‘I talk’ 
is Stein or Vollard, so it can be read either as Stein’s tactful politesse, a background 
murmur to smooth Vollard’s way, or perhaps as Vollard’s uncouth blurting. 
‘Pigeon./Stream’. is almost certainly a reference to the paintings or reproductions 
Vollard hurriedly displays: Cézanne’s 1890 Le Pigeonnier à Bellevue (The Pigeon 
Tower at Bellevue) and the 1872 Le Ruisseau (The Stream). The line ’M. Vollard et 
Cézanne’ repeats the title of the portrait and refers to his book on Cézanne, stressing 
the significance of this relationship for artist and dealer, and now, for artist and writer. 
The shift in roles from dealer to writer to some extent parallels Stein’s own, and the 
following lines ‘Histoires des bonnes./Histories des femmes’ with the surreptitious 
reference to old wives tales (‘histoires des bonnes femmes’) both exercises the same 
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kind of snobbery she later expresses about Picasso’s poetry and wryly recognises the 




The poem speaks of the complexity of these roles and the relationships they engender.  
Vollard is a salesman, Stein a consumer: the phrase ‘We came to give it away for very 
little/Less’ uses the language of haggling, and the poem is secretly peppered with 
covert references to trade in the overuse of the preposition ‘by’, a homonym of ‘buy’. 
These numerous references, ‘I was pleased by a smile’ ‘By that time I was certain all 
in did it’ ‘By that time sun’ ‘By this I mean by this I mean am I in it’ ‘I was very 
much amused by something’ ‘By that time’ and ‘By staying’ speak of the intrinsic 
function of the conversation and engage with the fact that art as commodity is the 
significant underlying logic of the cultural context in which Stein operates as 
salonniere, as investor and as writer. Perhaps the most telling construction is ‘Please 
me by this’, which emphasises the homonym by drawing it into a sentence which 
could be read very clearly as ‘Please me: buy this’ and thus gets to the heart of the 
complication. Vollard wants to sell his commodities, but he also wants them to be 
appreciated for a value other than cash, and, with the added complication that he is 
now selling himself because he has written a book on Cézanne, that appreciation now 
becomes much more personal. This short clause throws up important tensions in the 
notion of art as commodity: the relation between aesthetic value and monetary value, 
between valuing or ‘pleasing’ the artist as the appreciative audience for whom the 
work is produced and valuing the commodity as an investor driven by the profit 
motive.   
 
Vollard’s visit also calls upon Stein in her other position as a successful writer.  Early 
in the text, Vollard seems to elicit Stein’s advice about what to include in his 
publication. The lines: 
 
Famous stories or stores. 
Famous stores or blinds. 
Famous sons or leaves. 
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Famous leaves then 
 
indicate the solicitation of her advice - this or that, what to include - and the final line 
here suggests her judgement on the suitability of the content. The repetition of 
‘famous’ reflects the role of reputation and myth in the mutual promotion of 
Cézanne’s work and Vollard’s book. The line ‘Famous stories or stores’ implies both 
the need to construct ‘stories’ for this new art and these new artists in order to create 
the fame which will increase the value of the work, and Vollard’s need to include 
famous stories and famous paintings (with ‘sons or leaves’ perhaps relating to a 
choice between two artworks for inclusion) in his biography of Cézanne in order for it 
to sell.  
 
The complexity of these overlapping roles and the slippage of their positions is 
reflected in the final lines: 
 
Please do be seated. 
A watch. 
Yes I have gotten a new form. That isn’t the word. Yes I have gotten a new form. That isn’t the word. 
Please please. 
Please be good. 
That’s the end of that. 
 
The repeated pleading here indicates the interchangeability of their roles - each must 
please the other, each must be pleased by the other. Both are in the odd position of 
promoter and practitioner, engaged on either side of a business transaction but also 
themselves players on the scene and therefore engaged in the creation of the 
commodities for sale out of that practice and that promotion. Stein must please 
Vollard by admiring his wares and by supporting his creative endeavour in offering 
her advice as a writer. Vollard must please Stein by offering her the commodities she 
values and by himself producing a good piece of writing which makes her advice 
meaningful and successfully promotes the work she has acquired. Vollard must please 
Stein by enquiring about her writing and by seeking her expertise. The line ‘Please be 
good’, which is again unattributed, indicates the desire on all sides for the work to 
have value: the artworks, Vollard’s biography, Stein’s writing. This last is referenced 
in the longest line in the poem: ‘Yes I have gotten a new form. That isn’t the word. 
Yes, I have gotten a new form. That isn’t the word’. Here, Stein seems to be telling 
Vollard, at the last moment before he leaves, of the developments in her own work in 
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a way which reflects her own need for recognition. The length of the line manifests a 
call for attention, the repetition conveys the desire to be heard, and the uncertainty of 
‘That isn’t the word’ elicits the engagement of the listener in the search for the 
definition of her new work - is it a shift in form, or some other quality which defines 
its newness? Here, Stein shifts her own role from reader to writer, swapping positions 
with Vollard so that he is, at the last, her audience. 
 
Extending from Stein’s activity as collector  what to buy, what to sell when, how to 
hang the pieces  the promotion and dissemination of her own writing and the work 
of others on the scene is an intrinsic aspect of Stein’s authorship. Intervening in the 
institution of the market, staking a claim on its territory, Stein’s portraits and the 
activity around them endeavour to make this modern work valuable. The portraits 
promote both her name and those of the artists whose work she is acquiring. Far from 
carving out a decommodified, disjunctive or rarefied space, she wants these works to 
be appreciated by the market in their own time.  
 
The isolation of Stein which accompanies contemporary arguments for an avant-garde 
genealogy is just as problematic as the canonisation of modernist writers in the New 
Critical literary history. Stein makes no sense in isolation, and, rather than 
recuperating her as an important writer of and for her period, the narratives which 
have Stein as disjunctive and exceptional continue to write her out of modernism by 
isolating her. The portraits, viewed in their contexts, problematize these narratives by 
showing that, rather than resisting either an identity within the cultural landscape of 
her epoch or an engagement with the institutional apparatus in which works of art 
necessarily accrue meaning, Stein was actively seeking that identification, 
successfully constructing a modernist persona, and intervening in a direct and 
conscious way in the institutions which frame the artwork. The following chapter 
continues the investigation of the ways in which Stein engages with the whole 
complex of her contemporary cultural apparatus by considering her relationship to the 
academy, which is, as we have seen in Chapter 1, a key institution in the perceived 




Stein in the Academy 
 
This historical sense, which is a sense of the timeless and of the temporal together, is what makes a 
writer traditional. And it is at the same time what makes a writer most acutely conscious of his place in 
time, of his contemporaneity.1  
 T.S. Eliot, ‘Tradition and the Individual Talent’, 1919 
 
 
It is so very much more exciting and satisfactory if one can have contemporaries, if all one’s 
contemporaries could be one’s contemporaries.2  
 Gertrude Stein, ‘Composition as Explanation’, 1926 
 
Modernism’s academic institutionalization 
 
Chapter 2 has explored some of the ways in which Stein’s work and the methods of its 
dissemination can be seen as more than marginal, dissident practices. I have argued 
that they are interventions in the formation of the modernist cultural scene and 
represent a series of conscious engagements with the art market. This chapter 
continues the examination of Stein’s relationships to the institutions which the 
arguments for her exceptionalism claim she resists. I now turn to the academy, that 
other institution which is crucial to the arguments which see Stein as having escaped 
the reification of literary modernism into the establishment canon.  
The narratives that claim Stein as the origin for a contemporary avant-garde very 
often identify the academic institutionalization of modernism as the main suppressor 
of the experimental radicalism of the pre-war era. This view of modernism’s subdual 
is also largely accepted in modernism studies, as is evident in Allison Pease’s 
assessment in the latest edition of The Cambridge Companion to Modernism:  
Modernist critics formed the first generation of professionalised literary critics speaking from the 
institutional vantage point of established universities…At Cambridge, I.A. Richards, F.R. Leavis and 
William Empson, together with T.S. Eliot, created the intellectual basis that English Literature studies 
followed in Britain and its former colonies for the greater part of the twentieth century. Not only were 
they the first, Modernist critical practices were the formative practices of English literary criticism 
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(New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1921) pp.42-53 (p.44). Further references to this essay are given after 
quotations in the text. 
2 Gertrude Stein, ‘Composition as Explanation’, in Gertrude Stein: Selections ed. by Joan Retallack 
pp.215-226 (p.217). Further references to this lecture are given after quotations in the text. 
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produced within the university…Leavis’s own typically Modernist self-characterisation as in 
opposition to the academic establishment belies the fact that by the 1950s, if not before, Leavis was the 
new establishment’ 3 
 
The story of modernism’s academic institutionalisation which Pease’s recent 
representation exemplifies has long been the basis of the arguments which situate 
Stein as both more consistently anti-establishment than the figures Pease lists, and a 
victim of exclusion from the institution of modernism they form. In these arguments, 
it is the ‘academy’ which is both a major instrument of the establishment Stein resists 
and a key agent in her exclusion. This is signified by the way in which, in the 
narratives outlined in Chapter 1, the New Critics consistently form the reference point 
for what is viewed as the final closing down of modernism’s challenge to the 
establishment.  In these arguments, the New Critical approach shaped literature 
studies in American colleges and followed the orthodoxy which was originated in 
British universities by T.S. Eliot and I.A. Richards. Thus, the New Critics, for them, 
signify the assimilation of modernism into those academies and its absorption by the 
‘establishment’ into a tradition which has as its legacy the kind of writing and the 
kind of cultural landscape they critique, one in which, as Marjorie Perloff puts it 
‘Language poetry and other related avant-garde practices’ are seen as ‘aberrations 
from the true lyric impulse’ (4). 
Charles Bernstein’s 1983 essay, ‘Words and Pictures’, for example, attributes what he 
sees as modernism’s diminution into ‘tradition-bound forms and decorous ideas’ to 
‘Eliot’s influence… and the rise of the New Criticism’.
4
 When Bernstein says ‘While 
a dominant practice in painting eventually followed in directions related to the work 
of [Kandinsky and Picasso], this is not as true for writing in respect to the work of 
Stein’, he suggests Stein’s exclusion from dominant practice.
5
 When he describes ‘the 
vapid intellectualisation of the academic verse of the period’, he posits a modernist 
‘academic’, turn led, for him, by T.S. Eliot, as the cause of this marginalisation of 
Stein’s practice.
6
 Bernstein therefore suggests that Stein was written out of the story 
of modernism in this form; that the more ‘intellectual’ and ‘academic’ values imposed 
                                                           
3 Allison Pease, ‘Modernism and Mass Culture’ in The Cambridge Companion to Modernism ed. 
Levenson 2nd edn. (CUP 2011), pp.197-211, pp.201-202. 
4 Charles Bernstein, ‘Words and Pictures’, in Content’s Dream: Essays 1975-1984, pp.114-165 (p.155).  
5
 Charles Bernstein, ‘The Academy in Peril: William Carlos Williams Meets the MLA’, in Content’s 
Dream: Essays 1975-1984, pp.244-252. 
6 Bernstein, ‘Words and Pictures’, pp.132-33. 
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on modernism validated practices and norms which meant that Stein’s work was 
excluded from serious consideration.  
The tradition and ‘cultural baggage’ Quartermain rejects in Disjunctive Poetics is also 
strongly associated with Eliot’s perceived conservatism and with the reliance on 
knowledge passed down through formal education which Eliot seems to represent.
7
 
Quartermain calls Stein’s work ‘completely antiauthoritarian’ because it ‘radically 
undermines our notions of knowledge’, and contrasts her work with Eliot’s as the 
originating example of ‘an oppositional poetics which embraces as energy source and 
material, the very subversion and deracination which so distressed writers like T.S. 
Eliot’ (Quartermain, 23; 5). Quartermain also sets Eliot in opposition to the ‘cultural 
breakdown’ which he suggests the writers in the more experimental ‘line’ embrace, 
quoting ‘Malcolm Cowley and Slater Brown’s remark in a 1924 issue of Broom that 
“Eliot believes in tradition, form, everything dead.”’ He describes this remark as ‘both 
poignant and urgent’, and suggests that ‘such cultural breakdown redefines ignorance 
as it redefines “education” and alters their value’ (15). Here, ‘“tradition, form, 
everything dead”’ are signifiers of the elitist forms of language and education which 
Quartermain sets against the vernacular and the more informal ways of learning which 
result in the kind of cultural freedom and desire for innovation he attributes to the 
modern immigrant population. Indeed, for Quartermain, the reliance on a cultural 
tradition and on learned forms opposes the mode of poetry he favours, which is able 
to ‘enact immediacies of perception’, the significance of which he clarifies early in his 
introduction: 
The predilection for rules that the notion of masterpiece fosters separates the poem from the outside 
world, demands it conform to abstract criteria. In separating the work of art from the work of nature the 
artist separates the self from the work, and the work from the life: Art is seen as immutable, even 
absolute. Further, such a view fetishizes and commoditises the work of art, so that it becomes subject to 
possession, and the act of “understanding” the poem is identified with the comprehensive act of taking 
something in order to put it away. This is what the writers discussed in this book eschew, virtually at 
any cost’ (7). 
Quartermain’s binary therefore equates formal education with tradition, form, 
imitation and with ‘empowered cultural patterns’, the elitism of the masterpiece and 
the removal of art from life, and opposes that with the poem which is ‘transgressive of 
traditional and normative modes’, ‘true to its own history’, ‘multilinear’, 
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modernist period, Quartermain reminds us that, ‘the New Criticism, Anglophile as it was, [had] close 
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‘heterogeneous’ and returns art to the praxis of life (9; 19; 8; 9). For Quartermain, as 
for the other critics, the legacy of Eliot’s formal, traditionalist modernism is what he 
calls the ‘collision’ in contemporary poetry between the ‘semantic singularity’ of the 
mainstream and the ‘multiplicity’ of experimental poetics (9). 
Indeed, Bernstein argues that the ‘academic’ form of modernism has left a legacy in 
which, in his own period, the 1980s, those who are interested in ‘“making it new”’ are 
‘displaced from the academy’.
8
 Bernstein’s use of Pound’s phrase to describe the kind 
of practice he feels is rejected by the actual institutions of his own time reflects the 
belief that the academic institutionalisation of modernism has, since the New 
Criticism, suppressed the very innovation Pound’s edict had encouraged. It also 
anticipates Perloff’s twenty-first Century argument that modernism is an unfinished 
project different from the ‘orthodoxy’ which is, once again, represented by the New 
Critics. This is made clear in Perloff’s statement: ‘Of course, “Prufrock” was soon to 
become a celebrated modern poem, but the New Critical classic of the 1950s, when 
“Prufrock” was studied in college classrooms across the country, is not ours’ (Perloff, 
27). This claim embodies the view that the universities (‘college classrooms’) dealt 
the death-blow to modernism’s avant-garde potential, re-configuring the avant-garde 
work as a ‘classic’ and  by ensuring Eliot’s poem is studied ‘across the country’  as 
orthodoxy. Perloff’s assertion that the ‘classic’ ‘Prufrock’ of the New Critical 
approach is ‘not ours’, reflects the belief that in order to revivify the avant-garde 
modernism of the pre-war era, contemporary experimental writing has to somehow 
reach back to the pre-history of the work before its historical assimilation into the 
academy. Because Stein was, indeed, for so long excluded from scholarly accounts of 
modernism, her work can therefore be read as untainted by that compromise and, as a 
result, escape the deradicalized status of the ‘classic’ modernist text studied in the 
college classrooms of the 1950s. 
These critical constructions of the academy and the concepts assigned to it  tradition, 
the classic, cultural elitism and a resistance to innovation  form the basis for the 
contrast between the modernism in which experimental poetry finds its heritage and 
the modernism it believes has created the conditions for that ‘tepid and unambitious 
Establishment poetry’ Perloff condemns. It is Eliot, in particular, who is posited again 
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and again in opposition to Stein as the signifier of the establishment form of 
modernism she both resists and is oppressed by, and as the figure who stands behind 
and stands in for the new modernist academic institution. None of the histories I have 
discussed in Chapter 1, however, examine in any detail either Eliot’s or Stein’s 
understanding of or relation to the academy, whether it be, to use Allison Pease’s 
words, the ‘academic establishment’ which these modernist writers and critics 
originally claimed to oppose, or the academy they ‘created’.  In order to explore how 
far it can be said that Stein represented a modernism resistant to the academy, and in 
order to ascertain how far Eliot is her antithesis in this regard, I want to try to gain a 
picture of both Eliot’s and Stein’s positions in relation to the academy and to the 
modernism which became ‘academic’.  
To focus this discussion, I will examine and contextualise two texts, one written by 
T.S. Eliot, and one written by Gertrude Stein, where the relationship between literary 
innovation and the academy is at stake. Eliot’s 1919 essay, ‘Tradition and the 
Individual Talent’ and Stein’s 1926 lecture, ‘Composition as Explanation’, each 
attempt to set the terms for a new literary tradition and thus, I will argue, to engage in 
the imagining of a new discipline of literary studies. These two texts are also pertinent 
to the discussion because they both deal very explicitly with the concepts associated 
with the academy in the late-twentieth and early-twenty-first-century arguments I 
have outlined: the nature and function of tradition, the concept of the classic, the 
designation of cultural value, and the relation of literary innovation to literary history. 
Eliot and Stein: attitudes to the academy 
As a starting point, it is important to point out that, although Eliot and Stein are 
ascribed very different attitudes to the academy, the views they express about 
American colleges are in fact remarkably similar. Gail McDonald outlines Eliot’s 
relationship to the university establishment and his rejection of a life in the academic 
institution in her book Learning to Be Modern: Pound, Eliot and the American 
University. This is exemplified by his conclusion in a 1915 letter to Isabella Gardner: 
‘“I felt the work at Harvard was deadening me”’,  and his assertion to Conrad Aiken 
in December 1914 ‘“As you know I hate university towns and university people”’.
 9
  
                                                           
9 Gail McDonald, Learning to be Modern: Pound, Eliot and the American University (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1993), p.60; p.54. Further references are given after quotations in the text. 
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Eliot’s ‘decision to remain outside the academy’ well beyond the First World War 
suggests dissatisfaction with the limits of the type of academic discourse offered there 
(60). Indeed, he articulates this dissatisfaction in his characterisation of Harvard as a 
‘“deadening”’ place in which those who taught, such as his friend Shef, lost any sense 
of ‘“wildness”’ or ‘“liberty”’ (61). I will argue in this chapter that this ambivalence is 
reflected in ‘Tradition and the Individual Talent’, in that Eliot’s essay, like the avant-
garde manifestoes which form its context, represents a direct expression of resistance 
to a set of establishment views which offer a limited mode of discourse that serves 
only to stifle and deaden artistic production. 
 
Like Eliot, Stein rejected the academy in her early life. She later claims she was, 
‘frankly, openly bored’ at Radcliffe, and had a relationship to the academy which was 
often expressed in highly charged terms, ranging from discomfort and anxiety through 
resistance to open hostility.
10
 A radical expression of this can be seen in a note she 
made whilst writing her first novel, The Making of Americans (completed in 1911). 
Framed in bizarrely colloquial terms – a kind of cowboy slang, the language of a 
literary gunslinger, an outlaw – the note represents an antagonistic vernacular resistant 
to the formal modes of the academic institution:  
 
Eastern colleges too dam anxious to be safe. They needn’t be so afraid it ain’t so easy to be hurt as they 
seem to think least at least not by getting hit hard on the head. They needn’t be so scared of any of us 
got any chance of real stuff in us just because we are made different ... They needn’t be so afraid of 
their damn culture, it’d take more than a man like me to hurt it.11 
 
Here, Stein presents herself as an alien outsider who is ‘made different’. She 
transgresses the boundaries of gender (‘a man like me’) in a direct challenge to 
convention. By association, she conflates the academic institution with establishment 
norms. She characterises the college as a repository and bastion of legitimate culture, 
shoring itself up against the insurgent difference which challenges its authority. Her 
violent, aggressive language suggests a chaotic battlefield and presents her difference, 
and that of those who are like her, as a challenge to the fortresses of academia. 
Significantly, her attitude reflects a denial of the very relevance of the academy: the 
fortresses are not actually being stormed because, in fact, the real forces are 
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 Gertrude Stein, The Autobiography of Alice B Toklas (1933; Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1966), 
p.90. 
11 Quoted in Ulla Dydo, A Stein Reader, p.1. 
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consolidating elsewhere. This seems to reflect the view that the culture of the 
academy is not under direct threat because it is simply obsolete. This does indeed 
suggest that Stein wants a literary practice which carves out a space outside the 
academy, but it is important to note that, rather than offering a different, more 
conciliatory position, Eliot expresses the very same desire. 
 
Both Stein and Eliot, therefore, remove themselves from the college context and stay 
out of it, and for each of them this is because they experience these institutions as 
stifling artistic freedom and innovation. The critical stances on the academy 
documented here also reflect an equal impatience with the sameness of university life 
and ideas, perceiving them as places where the ‘real’ difference of the present is 
smoothed out and made ‘safe’. It is significant that both Eliot and Stein are frustrated 
with these institutions because they deny access to the ‘real’: in both of these views 
one can detect the desire to meet modern experience in all its sharp reality, the sense 
that academia offers only a distant experience of contemporary life muffled by the 
dead hand of a complacent establishment culture. As I will show, Eliot’s ‘Tradition 
and the Individual Talent’ and Stein’s ‘Composition as Explanation’ engage critically 
with this complacency, and on very similar terms, but they appear at different 
moments in the story of modernist literary production, and this means they act upon 
different contexts and, in doing so, provide different answers to the question of the 
relations between artistic production and the academy. What is also significant about 
these two texts in particular, therefore, is their place in those histories of the modernist 
academy.  
 
Eliot’s essay appears a year after the First World War, after the point at which, in 
Marjorie Perloff’s argument, he had begun to repress his ‘avant-garde’ origins and 
move towards what was to become the conservatism of the New Critical academy. 
The essay was first published in the periodical The Egoist, and presents a theoretical 
system of the contemporary in which it is possible to examine his relations to the 
other theories and to the practices which were emerging around him. Eliot’s attention 
to tradition is a response to the context of a fashion for manifestos which equate the 
academy with the tradition they oppose. ‘Tradition and the Individual Talent’ must be 
viewed in relation to the provocative and anti-establishment stances taken by those 
overtly ‘avant-garde’ positionings which characterise the academy as the custodian of 
105 
 
the hidebound traditions which stifle innovation. I would argue that, although it takes 
a more conciliatory position, it is, like those manifestos, a critical response to the 
conservatism of his period and a challenge to received opinion and unexamined 
concepts, and therefore not straightforwardly an example of the ‘deference to 
traditional and external authority’ which Perloff ascribes to his post-First World War 
work (38).  
 
Stein’s lecture, presented 7 years later, comes at a point when modernism, according 
to the arguments about its institutionalisation, has emerged from the early radical 
period and is setting the terms upon which it will become the new establishment.
12
 
The lecture was written as the result of an invitation, orchestrated by Edith Sitwell 
and Harold Acton, for Stein to speak at Oxford and Cambridge. It represents a 
complex response to the invitation to speak at these universities and to the university 
as such. In the lecture itself, Stein does indeed express an unequivocally negative 
stance on what she describes as ‘academic’ thinking. Delivered in the context of the 
Oxford and Cambridge lecture theatre, however, it nonetheless represents a direct 
engagement with the academy. And, as I will show, Oxford and Cambridge were 
institutions in which modernist literary practice was beginning to be recognised. 
Stein’s lecture reveals a keen awareness of that context and, as a response to the 
attention given to modernism in those universities, presents for them a theory of 
literary history which accepts the difference represented by contemporary innovation 
without deadening it. I will argue that, in this way, Stein proposes a philosophical and 
theoretical framework in which modernism can be sustained. In doing so, therefore, 
rather than rejecting academia as such, her model offers the basis for a new kind of 
academy which turns its face toward modernity and enables a meaningful attention to 
the contemporary.  
 
I will also argue that Stein’s lecture, whilst overtly critical of academic thinking 
because it hands down traditional modes rather than responding to contemporary 
difference, is much closer to Eliot’s ostensibly pro-tradition hypothesis in ‘Tradition 
and the Individual Talent’ than those arguments which oppose these two writers 
would suggest. The difference between Eliot and Stein as expressed in these two texts 
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in their contexts is not the difference of a culturally hidebound Eliot and an 
ahistorically disjunctive Stein, and their arguments are much closer in many respects 
than is suggested by the perceived dichotomy between the two writers. Indeed, Eliot’s 
essay, rather than relying on received ideas, is an explicit challenge to establishment 
norms and ‘external authority’. Moreover, my reading of Stein’s lecture challenges 
the view that her work represents a resistant mode which stands outside literary 
history and therefore resists authority and established forms of knowledge. What I 
will suggest is that, rather than escaping literary history, it places modernist practice 
firmly in the context of that history because it sees the modernist emphasis on 
innovation itself as symptomatic of the material conditions of the early twentieth 
century, and thus explicitly historicises its own moment as the moment of modernism 
in 1926.  
 
1919: the manifesto scene and ‘Tradition and the Individual Talent’ in The 
Egoist  
 
Eliot’s 1919 essay reflects his impatience with the deadening culture of academic and 
literary discourse, and this is in keeping with much of the theoretical discussion taking 
place in the periodicals and manifestos of the first two decades of the twentieth 
century. It appears in the context of the emergence and development of theoretical and 
critical texts alongside modernist practice, which takes place outside and explicitly in 
opposition to the idea of the ‘academy’. In the battle for territory during the period 
before, during and after the First World War, essays and manifestos whose aim is to 
prepare the ground for the new forms of artistic and literary practice proliferate. These 
new forms, as they overtly reject tradition, simultaneously reject the ‘academy’ as the 
perceived repository of outdated traditional ideas. They act as a means through which 
to establish positions in what Jason Harding, in his essay ‘Tradition and egoism: T.S. 
Eliot and The Egoist’, calls ‘the welter of avant-garde movements’.
13
 William Carlos 
Williams’s characterisation of this period: ‘There had been a break somewhere, we 
were streaming through’ speaks of the context of an open field in which authority has 
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dispersed and meaning is in flux.
14
  This ‘welter’, is made up of the competing 
theories which rush in to fill the vacuum created by what is often expressed at the 
time as a loss of faith in the traditional order. Williams, who himself contributed to 
The Egoist when it was under Eliot’s editorship, also says of this moment, ‘the 
traditional order of things had indeed been breached’.
15
 This period is an era of 
emergence, in which voices in little magazines, manifestos, poetry, and visual art 
compete to fill the vacuum and take the field of meaning by force. The overt 
iconoclasm of, for example, the Futurist and Vorticist movements relies heavily on 
the manifesto and the essay which explicitly claim an avant-garde position. Such 
proclamations carve out new principles for artistic practice and in doing so propose 
new theoretical positions in which the contemporary practice of art takes place. They 
also, crucially, attempt to control, indeed, to form the conditions of production and 
reception these works require in order to be accepted.  
 
In order to proclaim their absolute difference, and their complete divorce from 
tradition, these emerging movements must provide a new notion of art, a new theory, 
in opposition to the establishment norms which the traditional academy, for them, 
exemplifies. The publication contexts for these attacks on academic institutions are, 
however, also highly significant for this project. This is exemplified by the English 
‘Futurist Manifesto’, produced by Marinetti and Nevinson in 1914, which proclaims 
as its first principle, a ‘VITAL ENGLISH ART’ which is against ‘The worship of 
tradition and the conservatism of the Academies’.
16
 This manifesto directly engages in 
a theoretical critique of tradition and the academy as manifestations of the same 
forces of conservatism, resistance to change and irrelevance to modern life. Because it 
is placed in the Observer, a British national newspaper, like the original ‘Founding 
and Manifesto of Futurism’, which was published by Marinetti on the front page of 
the Paris newspaper Le Figaro in 1909, the English manifesto also sets itself 
deliberately in a context outside academia. It is therefore both theoretically and 
literally in opposition to and outside the academy and the ‘tradition’ associated with 
it. Theory and production context become inextricably linked in the debunking of the 
academy, because the avant-garde attack on convention needs to claim both a 
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theoretical and a practical position from which to assert the difference of their 
expression of the new and stake a claim on the contemporary.   
 
As I have suggested, Eliot’s essay is produced in the context of these theoretical 
pronouncements, and, indeed, amongst the new production contexts which are being 
created or co-opted in the first quarter of the twentieth century. The essay was first 
published in two parts in the September and December 1919 editions of the 
individualist anarchist magazine The Egoist which had emerged from its feminist 
precursors The Freewoman and The New Freewoman in 1914. The essay is the 
culmination of ideas developed in his ‘Reflections on Contemporary Poetry’ which 
run through preceding issues, and in the context of that open field of debate outside 
established institutions amongst little magazines and in avant-garde manifestos.  
Eliot’s essay therefore appears as an actor in a metaphorical battleground, in a 
struggle between competing positions played out across a changing cultural field. 
Jason Harding suggests that ‘Eliot’s doctrine of tradition attempted to discriminate 
among the incipient modernisms emerging from a welter of avant-garde movements 
and magazines’. In this context, of ‘the difficult task of repossessing the fragments of 
a disintegrating “mind of Europe”’, the development of Eliot’s essay in The Egoist 
represents the consolidation of a position on the role and nature of poetry and of 
modernity itself in a situation of uncertainty, instability and flux, and in which the 





In the project represented by Eliot’s essay, the context of the struggle over meaning 
outside of and against established modes of expression and interpretation is clearly 
reflected. In a critique of unexamined habits of mind and language, representations of 
conventional meanings and modes of discourse around tradition are offered up and 
discredited just as they are in those ‘avant-garde’ manifestos and polemics which 
form its context. Although Eliot’s register is less overtly iconoclastic, he is indeed 
explicitly attacking the establishment worldview in his critique of received attitudes to 
tradition. The opening line ‘In English writing we seldom speak of tradition’ is a 
criticism of the unexamined use of the term which is further developed in his 
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references to ‘approbative’ uses of the adjective ‘traditional’, to ‘tendency’, and to 
‘prejudice’, and in the underlying rhetoric of the continual use of the pronoun ‘we’ to 
suggest a generalised consensual position. This all expresses an appraisal of the 
general, establishment view, and represents this view as complacent and unexamined. 
It is significant, however, that what Eliot deplores is not the way in which tradition is 
actively used to support a set of principles, but rather the fact that the notion of 
tradition is not deployed meaningfully at all. He is critical of the vague and inexact 
way in which the term ‘tradition’ is used, characterising its use as ‘vaguely 
approbative’, and derides the way in which it is made ‘agreeable’, ‘comfortable’ and 
‘reassuring’ (42). The power of Eliot’s presentation of tradition is that it gives an 
impression of the semantic weakening of the term through its undisciplined and 
unexamined usage. He is simultaneously calling for and performing the examination 
of a category which has, in English writing, become meaningless.  
 
As well as challenging the unexamined use of ‘tradition’ as a term, however, Eliot is 
critical of literary culture because the category of tradition is not used enough. The 
opening line ‘In English writing we seldom speak of tradition’ makes this point 
central from the outset. What is important is that the culture of ‘English writing’ has 
failed to take a position on tradition. It is not simply that the category is unexamined, 
it is that it is not utilised in the service of a set of declared principles. This is very 
much in line with the manifestos and essays engaged in the struggle to define 
theoretical frameworks for new and distinctive artistic practices outside and in 
opposition to existing forms of authority.  Eliot was familiar with the range of 
manifestos which had emerged in the pre-war period, and I would argue that, rather 
than seeking authorisation from existing frames of reference and from sources of 
external authority as Perloff suggests, ‘Tradition and the Individual Talent’ is a 
radical challenge to established views. Indeed, in a 1920 letter to Sidney Schiff, Eliot 
uses the aggressive language of the manifesto to describe this contribution to English 
letters as a ‘distinct blow’.
18
 ‘Tradition and the Individual Talent’ is an attempt to 
construct a coherent ‘programme for the metier of poetry’ (46) which will make a 
radical difference in the production and reception of literature.  
 
                                                           
18 Quoted in McDonald, p.59.  
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It is true that Eliot does not reject tradition as such, but a further understanding of the 
essay in its context gives us an insight into the ways in which this is a radical 
rethinking of tradition akin to that seen elsewhere. Rather than seeking a turn  or a 
return  to established ideas, the essay engages directly with the current debates about 
those relations. The ideas which emerge in Eliot’s 1919 essay have already been 
significant for much of the material in The Egoist during its 5 year existence from 
1914, often with explicit reference to the very terms with which Eliot later engages in 
1919 – the nature of tradition, the role of the artist and the issue of contemporaneity.  
 
In the 15 July 1914 number of the magazine, Remy De Gourmont’s ‘Tradition and 
Other Things’, presents a Nietzschean response to Williams’s ‘breach’. He suggests, 
like many do in this period, that the customary relationship between the present and 
the past has previously stifled contemporary forces. The attack on the established 
order centres on the academy, which he argues emphasises the past over the present 
and offers outdated models rather than encouraging innovation. He suggests that, in 
order to assert the significance of the present over the past, we need to reject the 
academy and the traditions it imposes. This is expressed in dramatic rhetoric: ‘They 
bind me. They suffocate me. Far from drawing tighter the bonds of tradition we 
should release the brains which it binds. Bend your branches, great tree’.
19
 The 
metaphor shows us an image of the human mind in bondage to the past: the struggle is 
in and for the minds of individual subjects. The tradition of the institutions, here, is a 
stifling force which compromises creative thought. It ‘is a great power opposing the 
originality of writers’. In a series of often contradictory aphorisms which in 
themselves therefore challenge fixed ideas, he condemns ‘School habits’ and an 
understanding of tradition which ‘savours too much of the fools who put it into your 
head’ in favour of tradition as ‘a choice not a fact’, an individual relationship to the 
literature of the past in which ‘You are, then you are also a tradition’ (261; 262). 
 
It is in this context that the possibility of a new relationship to the past emerges: if an 
individual is tradition, then the struggle over the field of meaning is in the minds of 
individuals. The existing academic institution, the ‘tribe of professors’, the ‘teaching 
at the Sorbonne’, the ‘docility’ engendered in ‘the young men’ who ‘learn what is 
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Further references are given after quotations in the text.   
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taught them’ is rendered obsolete (262). If individual choice governs the reader’s or 
writer’s relationship to the works of the past, then these institutions are irrelevant. 
Here, the new field of contest is over the human mind. Gail McDonald reminds us 
that Remy De Gourmont was for Eliot ‘the perfect critic’, but
 
his views should not be 
conflated with Eliot’s.
 20
 What is significant here is the intellectual context his 
declarations represent: a challenge to the authority and relevance of the institution, a 
desire for a new configuration of tradition and a reworking of the relationship to the 
past, and a focus on individual consciousness as the site of the struggle over meaning.   
 
The debate represented in the Egoist, however, is also informed by the desire amongst 
some contributors to consolidate a position in opposition to Futurism and other radical 
movements, the desire to keep a relationship with the past which is not defined by 
antagonism.
21
 Many of these writers do not wish to see contemporaneity as break or 
rupture, despite the strong condemnation of the old academies exemplified by De 
Gourmont. In the previous number of  The Egoist, Huntly Carter’s article ‘The New 
Driving Force’, an explicit attack on Futurism, stakes out a position amongst ‘some of 
us who are not Futurists’ and claims that, ‘to futurise is to make a future by 
devitalising the eternal present’.
22
 In his discussion, the present becomes a precious 
vessel which must be protected from ‘immoderate and immoral use’ and through 
which ‘the way and motion of the eternal’ passes (258).
 
In suggesting that his 
‘continuous, unending present’ has become, in Futurist discourse, ‘a kind of fetish 
that besots the human soul’, Carter articulates an anxiety about modernity and its 
detachment from the flux of time (257).
 
He attempts to find a resolution which holds 
simultaneously the specificity of the present and its role in service to the ‘eternal’. In 
Carter’s argument, the present is made particular by virtue of its place in this flux, and 
the validity of action in the present is achieved through its representation of the 
eternal. His essay is a rejection of Futurism because Futurism does not engage the 
present in its relationship to the past. In Carter’s essay, the paradigm of modernity, 
electricity, is used as an analogy. He argues that ‘electricity is not new. It is, in fact, as 
old as the universe itself’, and that ‘what is new is the scientific conception of the 
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utility of electricity’ (258). He privileges what is ‘old’ over what is ‘new’: the present 
is only ever a reworking of the past – a new composition of the same elements. 
Electricity, the prime example of the rapid and bewildering technological change 
which characterised the era, is here made safe, something already known, familiar and 
stable in its perpetuity.  
 
This wariness about the radical position exemplified by Futurism is also clearly 
articulated by John Cournos in the January 1917 edition of The Egoist. Cournos offers 
a critique of Futurism and Vorticism which represents explicitly a context in which 
rival representations of art, time and meaning are struggled over. He vigorously 
condemns the two groups, critical of their timeliness in promoting and aestheticising 
violence, war, and aggressive masculinity, presenting them with mocking contempt as 
those ‘whose masculomaniac spokesmen spoke glibly in their green-red-and-yellow 
becushioned boudoirs of “the glory of war” and “contempt for women” of the 
necessity of “draughts,” “blasts” and “blizzards,” of “maximum energy” and 
“dispersed energy” etc. etc’.
23
 Later Cournos claims: ‘The fact is, the artists, like the 
rest of the world, had hardly realised that the true exponents of modern art were the 
men on the German General Staff, holding periodical meetings at Potsdam’. His 
argument is that those artists who represent their own time ‘too slavishly’ relinquish 
critical distance and therefore offer nothing (6).
 
The Futurists and Vorticists, who, he 
argues, simply reflect their time, have less agency and significance, in fact, than those 
who shape the world through action. If art is no different from life, then life is art and 
we are all artists: the greatest exponents are those who have the most force.  
 
In his consideration of the role of the artist in relation to contemporary life, Cournos 
proposes Da Vinci as a model because he was ‘a true Futurist, in that he forestalled 
modernity, and at the same time a great artist in that he reacted from it in his art with 
an oppositeness that was like the swing of a pendulum’ (7). This suggests that ‘great 
artists’ need to take an explicit position on the ‘now’ in order to both distinguish 
themselves from the establishment (to ‘react’ against the normative assimilation of the 
modern) and to proclaim a particular relationship to reality (to ‘forestall’, to anticipate 
the nature of modernity and take a critical position rather than being swept along by 
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it). Art, then, must be separate from life in order to sustain a critical position. It must 
take hold of modernity from a critical distance rather than passively reflecting it. 
Cournos’s conclusion is a forceful assertion of the necessity of a distance between art 
and life, which he characterises as the necessity of a ‘formula’. In order to take a 
critical position, the artist must offer theoretical mediation:  
 
Great artists, ‘spokesmen of their time’, will always evolve individual formulae, without knuckling 
down too slavishly to life. After all, the Futurists themselves, by forming a group and adopting a 
formula based on the mechanical and industrial nature of our age, were drifting dangerously toward an 
academy on new lines (7). 
 
This is a highly significant view for an understanding of the depth of the resistance to 
the academy in any form. For Cournos, art must be critical, and in order to be critical 
it must be separate from life – indeed, in order to be art it must be separate. But it 
must also be the work of individuals working to those ‘individual formulae’. Art must 
occur in the context of individual endeavour and a personal, explicit ‘formula’ which 
represents the terms of that distance. In Cournos’s configuration, the academy, that 
which must be avoided at all costs, is not a physical institution with a history, an 
official position, an established bureaucracy, and so on, but simply a group rather than 
an individual, and a group whose formula does not enable a critical distance from the 
modernity with which it engages.  
 
Eliot’s essay engages with these various positions on tradition and the outdated 
academy which is regarded as sustaining it by dealing directly with tradition as a 
concept. This provides the basis for a new and flexible theory of art which echoes 
Huntly Carter’s desire for a modernity which resolves the past. Indeed, he endows the 
artist with that very specific role: of responding to the art of the past in order to 
express its cumulative meaning for the present. What Eliot also emphasises, however, 
like Cournos, is both the significance of the ‘individual talent’ and the requirement to 
present and declare a theoretical position as such: for a fully formulated theory of art 
in which the artist has an overtly acknowledged role. Indeed, this emphasis becomes 
an explicitly expressed aim toward the end of the first article. Eliot refers to the model 
he has proposed as a ‘programme’ and ‘the doctrine’ (46). Significantly, Eliot’s essay 
is not a challenge to an existing set of principles – an existing theory – it is a 
challenge to the absence of theory. His concept of tradition is constructed against 
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claims of its contemporary emptiness, and this enables Eliot to develop a set of 
principles, to form a doctrine and to found a theoretical position.  
 
What is crucial here is the overt nature of this declaration. Eliot is direct about the 
need to clarify terms and stake a claim on a declared position, but he is also open 
about the constructedness of that position. This is clear precisely because he is explicit 
about the status of the model as a ‘doctrine’ and a ‘programme’, because he defends 
his doctrine as something ‘we persist in believing’, and because he is aware of 
‘objection[s]’ and of the fact that he is ‘struggling to attack’ a ‘point of view’ (47; 46; 
50).  The notion of tradition, openly examined, is explicitly reimagined, much in the 
same vein as Remy De Gourmont’s polemic, as a way of choosing a position on the 
past and its relationship to the present. Eliot’s reinvention, like De Gourmont’s, offers 
a tradition which is fluid and acknowledges itself as a creative critical process as an 
alternative to the unquestioning adherence to the received systems of meaning 
represented by the academy. At this stage Eliot’s formulation foregrounds the effort 
of choosing and arranging in order precisely to avoid the adherence to an invisible 
authorising system and the lack of self-awareness that this involves. The post-war 
Eliot, therefore, is still very much concerned with the project of making new systems 
of meaning rather than following established or authoritative ones. 
 
Eliot’s essay offers a coherent formulation which responds to his context and presents 
a consolidation of the range of positions articulated throughout The Egoist. His 
configuration is a careful balance between a resistance to the authority of the past in 
favour of an emphasis on the contemporary moment and the need to preserve a 
meaningful relationship to history. This can be understood in the context of a tension 
between the need to remain outside the established academy and the desire for an 
authoritative location from which a new aesthetic sensibility can be established. This 
tension is articulated throughout the magazine in these preceding years as one 
between the desire for radical change, a sweeping away of the ‘deadening’ effects of 
established institutions, and the fear about what is associated with radicalism: namely, 
the overtly revolutionary positions represented by the self-proclaimed avant-garde 
movements which glorify war and rupture as forces for radical and total change. As 
Jason Harding argues, Eliot’s essay does not want to identify with this extremism 
because ‘the problem with extremist modernism was that it was “deficient in 
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tradition.”’ The result of this is a delicate dialectic which holds at once a grasp of the 
particularity of the present in its difference and the simultaneous role of the present as 
a continuously culminating result of the past, of tradition; ‘a creative dialectic 
between individual talents and a tradition’.
24
 The academic version of tradition is 
characterised, by Remy De Gourmont as much as by the Futurists, as an unquestioned 
and unquestioning adherence to habit and conservatism. Eliot’s explicit theoretical 
framework thus provides a stable alternative which, by declaring its position, rejects 
blind conformity and resists unquestioning adherence to an external authority not just 
in its theoretical content but in its very mode.  
 
Stein versus Eliot: reassessing the dichotomy 
 
In June 1926, Stein directly addresses the issue of the relation of modern art to the 
academy in the lecture which she later entitled ‘Composition as Explanation’. Stein’s 
lecture, delivered at Cambridge and Oxford 7 years after Eliot’s essay was published 
in The Egoist, has many parallels with it, belying the arguments which posit Stein and 
Eliot on opposite poles. Significantly for the arguments which differentiate between 
Stein and Eliot in terms of their modes of engagement with establishment culture, the 
lecture is similar to the essay in this respect in particular. As Eliot does, Stein deals in 
abstract notions and in the nature of cultural consciousness, presenting a critique of 
contemporary discourse and unexamined attitudes to art and artistic production rather 
than directly challenging the institutions which may have constructed those attitudes. 
As Eliot parodies the complacent ‘we’, Stein emphasises the collective consensus in 
her repetitive use of her pronouns ‘everybody’ and ‘everyone’ to characterise the 
complacency of ‘the majority’ who are the ‘acceptors’ of received ideas about the 
meaning and value of a work of art. She also presents and critiques unexamined 
abstract categories just as Eliot does. His critique of ‘tradition’ as a flabby category is 
paralleled in Stein’s impatience with the ways in which the categories of the 
‘classical’, and the ‘beautiful’ are deployed to close down thinking and dull or deaden 
responses to the work and therefore make the work itself ‘go dead’ (216; 217).  
 
                                                           
24 Harding, ‘Tradition and Egoism’, p.97. 
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Stein’s representation of the ‘classic’ as an unexamined and meaningless category 
which serves to deaden meaning reinforces her location of herself in a critical position 
in relation to the establishment and its norms. This is remarkably similar to Eliot’s 
representation of tradition, which he also uses to challenge a deadening establishment. 
Eliot’s claim that, ‘we seldom speak of tradition’, but are more likely to speak of the 
‘traditional’, with its ‘comfortable reference to the reassuring science of archaeology’ 
expresses the view that the problem with the term is that it is only used to reproduce 
and sustain fossilised academic opinions (42).  Stein’s view of the ‘classic’ occupies 
the same position for her critique of contemporary opinion. It is introduced early on, 
in the third paragraph: ‘those who are creating the modern composition authentically 
are naturally only of importance when they are dead because by that time the modern 
composition having become past is classified and the description of it is classical’ 
(216). In these lines the concept of the ‘classical’ is paralleled with the act of 
‘classification’, a (to use Eliot’s word) ‘comfortable’ process which puts the work 
safely into the past. Stein draws out the semantic echo between ‘classical’ and 
‘classification’ and in doing so she ascribes to the classic the function of 
categorisation, the subsuming of the work of art into a taxonomic range of prepared 
meanings and significances. In this story of the classic the ‘modern composition’ has 
its moment of controversy, but then is accepted and, ‘when the acceptance comes, by 
that acceptance the thing created becomes a classic’. The status of the classic is for 
Stein equivalent to the acceptance of the ‘majority’ who are ‘indolent’ (217). The 
designation of the classic marks the blind and unquestioning subsuming of the 
contemporary into the habituated categories which are prepared to receive it, and, 
again like Eliot’s ‘science of archaeology’, with its connotations of ossified remains 
which belong in the past, it is this that makes the work ‘go dead’. 
 
Like Eliot, Stein wishes to find a way of receiving a work of art, and of creating a 
work of art, which does not fail under the equalising pressure of blind conformity, and 
which is able to act upon the cultural scene to form new meanings, rather than being 
acted upon by a set of conventions which stifle and deaden meaning. This problem is 
articulated by Stein in the idea that ‘once the beauty is accepted the beauty never fails 
any one’ (218). In being accepted, the meaning of the work of art reifies: it now 
occupies a fixed place, and will always have the same meaning and value. What the 
‘acceptors’ see is simply the idea that the work is beautiful in a conventional sense. 
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No longer ‘stimulating’, or ‘irritating’, the work has lost its power to challenge 
convention. This is clear in Stein’s contention that, ‘the trouble is that when that first 
rate work of art becomes a classic because it is accepted the only thing that is 
important…is that it is so wonderfully beautiful’. Because the ‘characteristic quality 
of a classic is that it is beautiful’, the practice of classification is the practice of 
rendering an object beautiful. The conventional beauty of the object obscures its 
contemporary meaning and dilutes its impact. When a work is a classic it has been 
measured and understood in terms of an established ideal of beauty, and therefore can 
no longer be said to represent modernity in its difference. In arguing that, ‘if everyone 
were not so indolent they would realise that beauty is beauty even when it is irritating 
and stimulating not only when it is accepted and a classic’, Stein identifies a need for 
contemporary culture to see modernity in terms of that difference, to find another 
beauty which is not the measurement of a work of art against an eternal ideal (217).   
 
Eliot’s essay and Stein’s lecture both present critiques of established paradigms. They 
identify the notions of tradition and the classic as concepts rather than referring to 
their use in particular schools of thought or in particular institutions. In 
conceptualising tradition and the classic, Eliot and Stein offer resistance to the 
conventional and unexamined. Importantly, both Eliot and Stein want to generate a 
firmer conceptual object so that the ideas can be used in meaningful ways. They both 
attempt to establish what is problematic about the way these terms are deployed and 
to expose the ways in which they are exploited. Both these texts, therefore, can be 
read as interventions which offer a fully worked out theory of the contemporary in 
order to critique the absence of a disciplined academic approach to literary history 
and to the reception of the contemporary literary work. 
 
The theories presented by these two texts, far from representing a binary opposite of 
traditional versus modern which means that Eliot is in the academy and Stein is out, 
have much in common. Modernity as an issue is central for both of them, and this is 
bound up for both writers with the notion of innovation. For Eliot, the focus is on 
‘what happens when a new work of art is created’ and ‘what makes a writer most 
acutely conscious of his place in time, of his contemporaneity’ (44). Stein considers 
the artist in ‘the particular variety of creating his own time’, is concerned with 
‘creating the modern composition authentically’ and articulates the desire for a state 
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in which, ‘all of one’s contemporaries could be one’s contemporaries’ (216; 217). 
Both writers identify the driving force of their ‘metier’ as a search for 
‘contemporaneity’. There is a critical focus on the ‘now’ as a theoretical difficulty 
calling for a resolution which is not offered by established attitudes and concepts: as a 
crisis or state of emergency which requires – and precipitates – radical change.  
 
Eliot’s ‘conscious present’ and Stein’s ‘continuous present’ 
 
Eliot’s essay formulates a dynamic relationship to the past which offers an alternative 
to the deadening tradition represented by the established academy. He resolves the 
problem of the present by constructing for it a dialectical relationship with the past, 
asserting that his reader should ‘not find it preposterous that the past should be altered 
by the present as much as the present is directed by the past’ (45). This dialectic turns 
the artist’s face to the past, and the present becomes a creative working out of what 
the artist sees there: ‘the conscious present is an awareness of the past in a way and to 
an extent which the past’s awareness of itself cannot show’ (46). Thus, the 
‘conscious’ experience of being in the present is a continual coming into an 
understanding of the past and what it means for the temporary culmination of the 
now. Following this logic, Eliot’s argument is that one cannot be aware of the present 
beyond the kind of awareness which ‘cannot show’ itself. To show is to cause or 
allow to be seen; to exhibit, to display, or perform; to explain or make clear; to make 
known. In this way, the past, and so also the present, is not aware enough of itself to 
be able to see, display or make itself known. This crucial point is the element upon 
which Stein’s and Eliot’s arguments coincide: that, in general terms, the present 
cannot be grasped until it is in the past, and so the present cannot make itself known 
in its present moment. 
 
In the first half of Stein’s lecture, in which she deals with ‘the history of the refused in 
the arts’, the barrier to a full grasp of the present which is discussed in Eliot’s theory 
is articulated in a much more abstract meditation on time and consciousness:  
 
The only thing that is different from one time to another is what is seen and what is seen depends upon 
how everybody is doing everything. This makes the thing we are looking at very different and this 
makes what those who describe it make of it, it makes a composition, it confuses, it shows, it is, it 




In these complex lines, Stein problematises the present (what is ‘different from one 
time to another’) by characterising that difference as a difference in ‘what is seen’. 
The use of the passive voice in that repeated phrase ‘what is seen’ provides the key to 
Stein’s characterisation of modernity. Firstly, the repetition of the phrase and the 
emphasis on ideas associated with it directs the attention away from the material 
conditions which might characterise the present as different from the past. This is 
reduced to the form of a simple phrase ‘how everybody is doing everything’ relegated 
to the end of the first sentence and buried in a paragraph which is much more about 
what is seen and how things are seen. The movement in attention away from what 
might be the material content of the present and towards the act of seeing it is also 
emphasised by the absence of specificity about the things that are seen, which are 
denoted by empty pronouns such as ‘it’ ‘thing’ and, in this repeated phrase, ‘what’. 
The passive voice, however, means that the subject, who might be able to see the ‘it’ 
the ‘thing’ or the ‘what’, is also erased by Stein’s syntax. Rather than the emphasis 
therefore moving its location from the seen object to the seeing subject who does or 
does not grasp this materiality, the meaning of the sentence and the focus of the whole 
paragraph  and this is sustained throughout the text  is located in the act of seeing.  
 
Stein’s grammatical formulation privileges the act of seeing over both the seeing 
subject and the seen object, and thus she collapses the distinction between the ‘what’ 
that is seen and the subject who sees it. In this way, the notion of ‘composition’ which 
is the central signifier in the text takes on a whole new value because composition is 
here made equivalent to the act of seeing: it is what seeing ‘makes’, and, in a 
circularity which again erases that distinction between seer and seen, it also makes 
‘what is seen’. To further elaborate the elision, Stein makes it unclear in the second 
sentence whether the phrase ‘it makes a composition’ refers to the ‘thing we are 
looking at’ or what is created by ‘those who describe it’. This ambiguity reveals the 
central point: that the experience of the present is so determined by the act of seeing 
and by the way things are seen that its material content is only ever grasped as a 
composition. It is so much mediated by ways of seeing that it is composed as it is 
seen. As Stein puts it: ‘The composition is the thing seen by every one living in the 
living they are doing, they are the composing of the composition that at the time they 
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are living in the composition of the time in which they are living’ (218). It is here that 
Stein’s discussion presents a more fully delineated parallel to Eliot’s argument that 
the past ‘cannot show’ itself in its own time, but can only be seen from the vantage 
point of the present which looks back at it. In Stein’s argument, this is true because it 
is impossible to step outside the process of composing the present in order to show 
that composition as composition. It is only by looking back that the composition can 
be identified.   
 
Stein’s argument therefore converges with Eliot’s in the first part of her lecture. Like 
Eliot, she presents the view that we are always behind the times, arguing that between 
the present as it is composed in the act of seeing and the consciousness of the way that 
present is composed there is always a gap, a time-lag which means that the present 
can never fully comprehend how it sees itself. As in Eliot’s hypothesis, the present 
can only be understood when it is in the past. This is articulated in Stein’s assertion 
‘Those who are creating the modern composition authentically are naturally only of 
importance when they are dead because by that time the modern composition having 
become past is classified and the description of it is classical’ (216). Stein’s view is 
that the work of art which represents its time in its own time is rejected until what it 
represents is in the past and can then be comprehended.  The present composition is 
so difficult to really see, that its representation, by the ‘authentic’ work of art, is 
always refused. To put it on Eliot’s terms, the ‘past’s awareness of itself’ which 
‘cannot show’ is for Stein what ‘refused’ art represents. In Stein’s argument, the 
present might show itself in art but its contemporaries cannot grasp it, therefore it, 
too, cannot be seen. Stein’s and Eliot’s arguments therefore coincide in the view that 
the conception of the present can never be comprehended until it is in the past.  
 
Two theories of the contemporary 
 
The point at which Stein and Eliot diverge is significant, but not because the 
difference puts Stein outside the academy, not because it divorces her from Anglo-
European culture and not because it removes her from literary history. This 
difference, I would argue, binds Stein into the literary history she theorises, 
legitimises her work, and posits it as the inheritance of a history of literary culture in a 
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competing theory of literary history intended as an intervention in the potential 
emergence of literary studies in the academy.  
 
For Stein in ‘Composition as Explanation’, the role of art  and she uses art to mean 
writing as well as visual art, as Eliot does  is to provide a full awareness of the 
composition of the present as it happens; that is, to make us fully conscious of that 
composition in real time. The ‘refused in the arts’, what Stein calls ‘authentic’ art, 
therefore, should enable a sharp consciousness of the present as it is composed. For 
Stein, therefore, this ‘authentic’ work is not, as in Eliot’s argument, the ‘really new’ 
work which enables a consciousness of the past as a cumulative manifestation in the 
present, but one which represents its own time in its own time: the present’s 
consciousness of itself, which for Eliot is impossible. In Stein’s argument, the grasp 
of the material content of contemporary life is determined by the way it is seen, and 
that, for her, is determined by the ‘everyone’ the ‘everybody’ and the ‘majority’: that 
is, by cultural consensus. As I have shown in my reading of her 1925 text ‘Business in 
Baltimore’, Stein believes consciousness is formed by enculturated systems of 
meaning. In ‘Composition as Explanation’, Stein reveals her belief about the role of 
‘authentic’ art in this paradigm: it provides the conditions for the recognition of those 
systems of meaning and the ways in which they mediate every experience of the 
world. In a conscious ‘seeing’ of what is ‘shown’ the authentic work provides an 
understanding of the ways in which experience is composed. Reading ‘Business in 
Baltimore’ in this way reveals its function to show how a world is composed in the 
system of small-town mercantile capitalism.  As Eliot’s argument shows, however, it 
is only usually in retrospect that one can achieve a grasp of those systems of meaning. 
Because culture frames the very construction of the world, this cannot be grasped at 
the moment of ‘seeing’ and so the ‘authentic’ work of art which shows us what 
‘makes what is seen as it is seen’ has thus far been refused in its own time.  
 
Like Eliot, then, Stein argues that, in the history of the (to use Eliot’s phrase), ‘really 
new’, or (to use Stein’s) ‘authentically’ ‘modern’ work of art, the viewer is not able to 
see the work in the present because that viewer is unable to fully comprehend the 
truth it shows. Stein and Eliot express a common desire to render clear delineations of 
the relationship between past and present in an attempt to grasp the nature of the 
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‘now’. In order to address the difficulty of grasping the contemporary moment, 
however, both Eliot and Stein deal with the notion of the ‘now’ in different ways. 
Eliot sees the ‘conscious present’ as a consciousness of what has passed. The present, 
in his configuration, is a contemporary understanding of history, and so his 
contemporaneity is the development of the sacred wood of the past. It orders and 
modifies the ‘existing monuments’ which provide a stability, certainty and order of 
value and meaning which the unknown present, shown but not seen, does not. Stein, 
on the other hand, expresses the desire to fully know the present itself, to achieve a 
state in which ‘all of one’s contemporaries could be one’s contemporaries’. In 
‘Composition as Explanation’ Stein wishes to hold on to the moment when the work 
of art ‘is still a thing irritating annoying stimulating’ before it is ‘accepted and a 
classic’, before it is made to ‘go dead’ (217).  
 
In developing her theory of the contemporary, Stein incorporates into the talk a brief 
history of her own work, and in the middle section of the lecture she makes this claim: 
 
So far then the progress of my conceptions was the natural progress entirely in accordance with my 
epoch as I am sure is to be quite easily realised if you think over the scene that was before us all from 
year to year (222). 
 
Not only does Stein’s lecture represent a fully worked-out theory of the contemporary 
and a version of literary history to sustain it, her argument also provides the 
foundation for a literary history which can have her as its inheritor. It describes what 
Stein attempts to do with her writing, which she defines in the lecture as ‘the 
continuous present’, as the aim of contemporary art (220). Just as Eliot’s theory paves 
the way for his own practice of a contemporary writing, The Waste Land, which 
works itself out on a curation of literary history, so Stein, even more overtly, theorises 
a history which has her as its culmination. This theoretical divergence therefore 
nonetheless takes on a very similar function as action on the field of cultural 
production. ‘Tradition and the Individual Talent’ and ‘Composition as Explanation’ 
each provide a theoretical framework and a version of literary history, significant 
elements necessary to establish literary studies as an academic discipline, in order to 
validate and authorise their own literary practice and bind them firmly to a literary 




There is a distinction between Eliot and Stein, but it is not that Eliot is more engaged 
with establishment culture and Stein is more radically outside it. On the contrary, 
Stein’s urgent desire that ‘all one’s contemporaries could be one’s contemporaries’ is 
a desire for a full meeting of contemporary art with the existing academic context, a 
radical transformation of culture in order that contemporary art can achieve its 
significance for ‘everyone’. In this way, it makes much more sense to see Stein’s 
work as an intervention into that culture rather than a separation from it or a 
bypassing of it in order to somehow achieve a more authentic relationship with ‘life’, 
which, to put it baldly, Stein does not believe we can have first-hand access to 
anyway. In this sense, the difference is not that Eliot’s text assimilated modernism 
into the existing tradition and so paved the way for the new academic establishment 
whereas Stein disengaged herself from literary history and from tradition and so 
forever stands outside the academy. Indeed, Stein is as engaged with the project of 
cultural transformation as Eliot, and this is something which I think is clearly 
reflected if we examine the way in which this lecture actually engages with the 
existing cultural context of the academy. 
 
1926: modernism, the academy and ‘Composition as Explanation’ at Oxford and 
Cambridge 
 
Stein’s lecture is also as much a response to context as is Eliot’s essay. In much 
modernism scholarship, the moments at which these two texts enter the public sphere 
signify distinctively different points in the development of literary modernism: the 
1919 moment in which a dominant configuration of modernism is still emerging, and 
the 1926 period, by which time it has achieved legitimacy. The 1926 moment is 
characterised by Rod Rosenquist as the high point of ‘high modernism’, the end of the 
period during which ‘the early revolutionary spirit was for the first time formalised 
and brought into cultural prominence’.
25
 For Michael Levenson, this is the ‘accession 
to cultural legitimacy’.
26
 This cultural legitimacy was, in many arguments, largely 
achieved for literary modernism in its entry into the academy. Pound’s assessment of 
Eliot as ‘that rare thing among modern poets, a scholar’ and Joyce’s desire to ‘keep 
                                                           
25 Rod Rosenquist, Modernism, the Market and the Institution of the New (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2009), p.2. 
26 Michael Levenson, A Genealogy of Modernism: A Study of English Literary Doctrine 1908-1922 
(Cambridge:  Cambridge University Press, 1984), p.213. 
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the professors busy’ are often used to suggest the overt nature of the modernist claim 
on academia as its preferred institution.
27
  Rosenquist also points out that ‘F.R Leavis 
proposed as early as 1926 to make the banned Ulysses a textbook for an unspecified 
undergraduate class’.
28
 Lawrence Rainey characterises the relationship as the ‘fateful 
association between modernism and the academy’, and Eliot’s critical theoretical texts 
are often seen as paving the way for modernist practice in the academic world.
29
 Gail 
McDonald, for example, records the entry of The Sacred Wood into the university in 
the memoirs of an Oxford alumnus: ‘Of the reception of the work at Oxford during 
his undergraduate years (1920-24), F.W. Bateson recalled “The Sacred Wood was 
almost our sacred book. It was Eliot the critic who prepared us to welcome Eliot the 
poet.”’
30
 The very fact that Stein was encouraged to lecture at Oxford and Cambridge 
is also an indication that by 1926 modernism had become common currency inside 
the academic institution. This is further hinted at in the casually familiar mention in 
the review of her lecture by the student paper The Oxford Magazine of the opinions of 




The site for Stein’s lecture, at Cambridge and Oxford Universities respectively, is 
therefore highly significant. She enters the academic institution at the point at which 
modernism is beginning to gain recognition, an institution populated by students who 
are perhaps absorbing Eliot’s ideas and academics who are on a small scale beginning 
to accept modernist ‘masterworks’. Also significantly, according to the Oxford 
student papers, on a sweltering summer’s day in June, the lecture hall was packed. 
Stein’s lecture is a modernist event in an academic context in which modernism is all 
the rage.  
 
The very excitement generated by Stein’s visit, however, indicates that modernism is 
still perceived as radical and not by any means as representative of the establishment. 
The uncertain state of relations between modernism and the academy in 1926 is 
signified by that frisson surrounding Stein’s visit, which, as I will show, dramatizes 
both the intense interest and the doubt, perhaps even the fear that modernism, as 
                                                           
27 Quoted in McDonald, p.43; quoted in Rosenquist, p.7. 
28 Rosenquist, p.7. 
29
 Lawrence Rainey, Institutions of Modernism, p.105. 
30 McDonald, p.59. 
31 Anonymous, ‘Miss Gertrude Stein’, Oxford Magazine, 10 June 1926, p.564. 
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perceived by students at the two universities, engenders. Indeed, this uncertainty 
suggests that modernism is, at this point, far from representing the new establishment. 
This tension is also indicated on the other side, in Stein’s provocative stance, which in 
turn, rather than indicating a radical rejection of the academy, reflects a complex 
blend of resistance and fascination.  
 
Stein’s ostensible resistance is evident in the lecture itself in her characterisation of 
the academy: 
 
Lord Grey remarked that when the generals before the war talked about the war they talked about it as 
a nineteenth century war although to be fought with twentieth century weapons. That is because war is 
a thing that decides how it is to be when it is to be done. It is prepared and to that degree it is like all 
academies it is not a thing made by being made it is a thing prepared (215).  
 
Stein overtly critiques the established academy and what she characterises as 
academic thinking. Her use of Lord Grey’s description of the First World War as an 
example of that which is academic presents the academy as offering a way of 
understanding the world which will always be out of date. Her argument parallels the 
disconnect between the technological reality of that war and the behindhand 
(‘prepared’) thinking of the past which framed it with the way in which modern art 
cannot be grasped by the academic concepts of the classical and the beautiful, also 
examples of ‘prepared’ thinking because they are ready-made and eternal categories. 
The war could not grasp its own modernity, just as the ‘majority’ refuses the 
authentically modern composition because it cannot recognize how it sees. The 
academy, like war, is ‘a thing prepared’ because it hands down the model of previous 
wars rather than offering a strategy which takes account of the present (which it 
cannot see). In presenting a closed system of meaning, something which is ‘prepared’, 
the academy, or what, like war, ‘is academic’, closes down meaning and assimilates 
what is different into a neutralized similitude which cannot account for the difference 
represented by the contemporary (215). For Stein, academic thinking assimilates 
works of art into a system of meaning that already exists. It is the thinking through 
which the work of art becomes ‘a classic’ and no longer ‘irritating annoying 
stimulating’. Stein sees this systematic classification as the function of the academy. 
 
Stein enters the academy in order to critique, and in order to provoke, and she is 
successful in doing so, as the student reviews will show us. It is in the nature of 
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provocation, however, that it reflects interest as well as critique, because it is also of 
course an attempt to goad or provide stimulus for action. Unlike the Stein of 1911, 
who thought that the American college was not the real field of battle, the Stein of 
1926 engages directly with the British university in a way which, I would argue, 
reflects a desire, however nebulous, to transform it rather than to either destroy or 
ignore it. In the very act of crossing into that space, Stein admits its significance. It is 
an overt performance which reflects her desire to signal and, indeed, to broadcast a 
position. Once again, the context of its enactment is therefore all-important. The 
meanings it conveys are not inherent to the text in the way Quartermain and those 
other readings suggest: its meaning is bound up with its activity as performance. Stein 
may critique academic thinking, but her performance, situated as it is in the university 
itself, is an engagement with it. She is entering the fray, and in doing so she expresses 
the desire to transform, to influence the academy rather than to reject it. The reception 
of her lecture in the academy itself is therefore crucial in an understanding of its 
impact.  
 
‘Composition as Explanation’ which was then entitled simply ‘An Address’, was 




 of June 1926, and was responded to directly in the student 
papers and magazines for that week. At Cambridge, it was reviewed in The Granta, 
and at Oxford, The Isis, The Oxford Magazine, The Oxford University Review, and 
The Cherwell. The reviews are characterized markedly by admissions of a lack of 
understanding. In The Granta, this is expressed in the assertion that ‘she merely states 
what are to her facts; and to make these facts more difficult she has couched them in 
her personal idiom, which is very hard to understand’;
 
The Isis refers to ‘the obscurer 
portions of her thesis’, and the reviewer admits that he ‘Frankly…could scarcely 
understand a quarter of what she said’; The Oxford University Review compares the 
experience to that which he ‘used to obtain as a child by pressing my knuckles hard 
against my eyes’;
 
and The Cherwell states the view that, ‘the matter of the discourse 
was unintelligible to the ears of an ordinary mortal man’.
 32
 The drama of this 
unintelligibility is a significant aspect of the lecture’s performance, in that it 
articulates an understanding that this text offers a challenge to established ways of 
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thinking. Rather than causing the reviewers to dismiss the lecture, it encourages them 
to feel inadequate, that they need to change something in their mode of engagement to 
grasp what it means. There is also a strong sense in these reviews that the very 
unintelligibility in itself is thrilling and moving. In these ways, it seems that the 
lecture offers a direct challenge to the individual minds in the room. 
 
There is also a tendency to react to the lecture by overtly claiming a position on it. 
The most timid is The Granta, which describes Stein as ‘an enigmatic figure’, and 
presents the equivocal phrase, ‘What her value may be is unguessable’.
33
 Others  in 
fact, the bulk of the reviews  respond with passionate advocacy couched in 
belligerent terms. The Isis enters the fray and takes her side against the ‘sheep’ who 
have ‘come there because they thought it would be correct and fashionable’, and 
dismisses Stein’s hecklers as ‘two stupid young men’ whose arguments are 
‘prepubescent’.
34
 The Oxford Magazine also takes her side on the imaginary 
battleground against the same hecklers’ ‘ignorance and bad manners’ but it also 
recognizes and defends her against the broader public opposition to her represented by 
‘Messrs. Clive Bell and Wyndham Lewis’ who have presented her as ‘a freak and a 
humbug’.
35
 The Oxford University Review defends her from ‘the ranks of the 
highbrows’, who ‘were at first inclined to laugh at her’ and attacks the hecklers in a 
prolonged rhetorical diatribe.
36
 In a longer review the following week, The Oxford 
Magazine thinks that she is ‘as important as she is neglected’.
37
 The language of 
battle, struggle and conflict is deployed throughout many of the reviews: in The Isis, 
‘battled’, and ‘defeated’, and The Oxford University Review describes an ‘advance 
into the enemy’s territory’. The event appears to have engendered the feeling that 
there is a battle over ideas, forms and meanings around which positions must be 
established. This is not simply to say that Stein is a controversial figure: what she 
awakens in the audience is the recognition that art, theory and ideology still need to be 
struggled over, and that forms, modes of expression and meanings are being put under 
pressure in a way that is still new and unresolved.  
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The lecture also functions as an event which engenders in the audience a profound 
communion with the present moment. This is acknowledged in various ways in the 
reviews. JBF in The Isis admits that although he could not understand much of what 
she was saying, ‘I could understand the motive that made her say it, and throughout 
her lecture I kept on thinking that, if only I could be allowed to read instead of listen, I 
could catch at least a little of that amazing driving force’.
 38
 The language here 
suggests an engagement with the present in its movement, both in the desire to arrest 
time (‘if only’, the repeated use of the modal ‘I could’, and the frustrated desire to 
‘catch’) and in the exhilarating force of its forward movement (‘the motive that made 
her say it’; ‘I kept on thinking’; ‘amazing driving force’).  The review in The Oxford 
Magazine describes the lecture as an ‘experience’, and The Oxford University Review, 
in language which once again reveals a heightened awareness of the present moment, 
declares, ‘the striving for the continuous present held us all the afternoon’. Like JFB 
in The Isis, this reviewer reflects an intense forward motion (‘striving’) and a 





The reviews reflect a bewildering sense of experiencing something only ‘knowable’ at 
its moment. As well as being met with a heroic exhilaration, however, this is also 
responded to with a struggle to assimilate often manifested as a desire to fall back on 
habit and on the known, the set of established conventions and constructions.  
Significantly, Stein herself is often represented in conventional terms which directly 
belie the nature and force of her address. The Isis calls her ‘this delightful old lady’, 
and the reviewer of The Cherwell – who couldn’t get into the lecture room and makes 
do with ‘looking in at the window from without’– interprets the glimpse he has of her 
as ‘little more than a lace collar, which was reminiscent of those Eminent 
Victorians’.
40
 Both reveal a strong desire to associate the experience with what is 
known and expected: Stein, born in 1874 and unmarried, is an elderly spinster. The 
Oxford University Review, in particular, seems to allay the shock of this experience by 
resorting to language, structures and images which refer to what is known, 
conventional and comfortable. The representation of Stein’s defence against a heckler 
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 Isis, p.8. 
39 Oxford Magazine, 10 June, p.564; Oxford University Review, p.332. 
40 Isis, p.8; Cherwell, p.248. 
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uses familiar terms: he is ‘rebuked by that decision and assurance which one so often 
finds in maiden ladies’. The image of the maiden aunt and the comfortable, well-worn 
authority of the rebuke suggest an experience which is recognisable and assimilable. 
What is also interesting in this review, however, is the frequency of references which 
are suggestive of childhood: the maiden lady rebuking the naughty boy; the memory 
the reviewer has of ‘pressing my knuckles hard against my eyes’ ‘as a child’; the 
reference to the complaint which ‘has had attractions for most of us since childhood’; 
the reporting of a heckler’s ‘advance…on the conception of children’; and the 
childlike, public-schoolboy rhetoric of ‘evidently he has not tried unripe 
gooseberries’.
41
 It is almost as if the reviewer has been reduced to the status of a child 
by the experience, and now finds himself vulnerable, falling back on schoolboy ideas 
and comforting images.  
 
These common aspects expressed in the student magazines – a lack of ‘understanding’ 
of Stein’s lecture and yet the desire to defend her, the language of struggle and 
conflict, the intense feeling of the present, even the fear and anxiety it engenders – 
indicate the feeling that something profoundly meaningful and convincing has 
happened, but that this is something which cannot be named or understood in ready-
made terms. This provides a significant insight into the performative possibility of 
Stein’s text. Just as she seems to intend, the lecture begins to achieve its 
transformative function  it encourages its ‘academic’ audience to change the way 
they think.  
 
Stein and Eliot: writing histories 
 
The reception of Stein’s lecture suggests an important experience which has a 
profound effect on its audience. The title of the lecture (on publication), ‘Composition 
as Explanation’, presents us with a key to its nature: its explanation is its composition 
in that it performs its ideas. The lecture remains, like the authentically modern work 
of art Stein says is rejected, ‘irritating annoying stimulating’ as the student reviews 
indicate: it is the conscious enactment of time passing – of the present. Somewhere 
around the mid-point, the lecture signifies the ‘continuous present’ as ‘beginning 
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again and again’, and the lecture itself does begin again and again, composing the 
process of ‘beginning again and again’ (218). In saying, Stein creates and grasps 
simultaneously, and draws attention to this process, and so in enacting the formal 
presentation of the present, Stein forces her audience to experience the present. The 
lecture is indeed a direct action on the minds of her audience. This is highly 
significant. Firstly, it means Stein’s lecture is concerned with the possibility of a 
transformation of the academy, in the way it offers a new conceptual frame and a new 
literary history to validate the contemporary artwork, and in the way it wants to do 
direct work on the minds of its academic audience. Secondly, it reflects and elaborates 
the crucial difference between the models of literary history offered by Eliot and Stein 
which is initially signified in Stein’s desire that ‘all one’s contemporaries could be 
one’s contemporaries’ as a desire for a full meeting of contemporary art with the 
existing cultural context, a transformation of culture in order that contemporary art 
can achieve its significance for ‘everyone’. 
 
It is this difference between Eliot’s essay and Stein’s lecture which is the most 
profound. It is also of great significance for those arguments, outlined in Chapter 1, 
which see Stein either as detached from her immediate cultural context or as existing 
in a permanently resistant relation to the history which unfolded around her. These 
arguments have her left behind in a time which never had its fruition and which waits 
to be recuperated to evolve its true meaning in the twenty-first century. This 
detachment from or resistance to history is belied in Stein’s lecture, and this is clearly 
revealed if we examine more closely the difference between the historical models 
with which Eliot and Stein work. This is bound up with the contrast I have already 
drawn, between Stein’s view that the ‘modern’ work of art shows its contemporary 
audience how it sees the present and Eliot’s idea that the ‘really new’ work curates the 
past to illuminate contemporary life as a culmination of that past. In elaborating these 
theories, their arguments take more significantly divergent paths, locating Eliot in a 
historical space detached from his context, and engaging Stein in direct contact with 
history as it moves.   
 
In Eliot’s model, the key metaphor and its related ideas provides a conception of the 
new work of art which enables the contemporary to be different whilst sustaining a 




The existing monuments form an ideal order among themselves, which is modified by the introduction 
of the new (the really new) work of art among them. The existing order is complete before the new 
work arrives; for order to persist after the supervention of novelty, the whole existing order must be, if 
ever so slightly, altered; and so the relations, proportions, values of each work of art toward the whole 
are readjusted; and this is conformity between the old and the new (44). 
 
This is Harding’s ‘delicate dialectic’, and it reflects the consolidation of a position for 
Eliot which reconciles the various strands and tensions in its immediate milieu. What 
happens here, however, is that the reconciliation of those elements results in a version 
of novelty which, paradoxically, is not new. Innovation in this conceptualisation is an 
eternally recurring process, and this is affirmed in his assertion that the work which 
conformed too much to the past ’would not be new, and would therefore not be a 
work of art’ (45). His attempt to establish a ‘new’ institution which has also always 
been is a reaction to his era’s very specific material conditions. He claims art as an 
autonomous realm which can never escape from itself in a hermetically sealed 
imaginary institution which cannot be ruptured. It becomes eternal again, a return to 
the classical conception of eternal beauty. In presenting a closed system that 
assimilates works of art which threaten to destabilize the relationship to the past, Eliot 
prepares the way for his own work. In doing so, the system he creates functions as a 
way of neutralizing the difference and challenge his own poetry represents. 
Innovation becomes tradition. 
 
‘Tradition and the Individual Talent’ therefore denies modernism the force of its 
historical specificity by positing an ahistorical situation which deals with time through 
the same eternally recurring process and is therefore ‘outside’ time. Stein, on the other 
hand, historicises very precisely her own moment, to the point of the precise moment 
in which she speaks, and she draws out of this a profound inference for literary 
history. This is revealed most forcefully towards the end of the talk. Stein argues that, 
rather than remaining in the situation which she has described throughout the lecture, 
in which the authentically contemporary work is refused by its contemporaries, the 
current modern consciousness has now been brought up to date with itself and is 
uniquely able to see what contemporary art shows to it. Her argument is that the 
modern consciousness is up to date with itself because of the impact of the First 
World War. She asserts that ‘because of the academic thing known as war having 
been forced to become contemporary made every one not only contemporary in 
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thought but contemporary in self-consciousness made every one contemporary with 
the modern composition’ (224). In Stein’s argument, the war has made humanity 
keenly aware of its own modernity because ‘twentieth-century weapons’ met the 
nineteenth-century consciousness, and so, by the end of the war, ‘everyone’ has been 
‘forced to become contemporary’ (215). The cognitive dissonance engendered in the 
meeting of ‘twentieth-century weapons’ with nineteenth-century thinking, in Stein’s 
argument, has forced human consciousness to see what is shown to it, to become 
‘contemporary in self-consciousness’. The consciousness of the present moment 
which it is the lecture’s function to create is therefore also its subject. Stein is telling 
her audience that they have been brought up to date, and the time-lag which means the 
modern composition has thus far been refused in its own time is now collapsed. 
 
It is in the distinction between the ways in which they view the role of art in relation 
to their different conceptions of the present that Stein and Eliot diverge, and it is here 
that the role and function of the academy is in dispute. An academy founded on 
Eliot’s theory of tradition would become the repository of the works and ideas of the 
past and the place in which new works can be assimilated in order to modify ‘the 
existing monuments’. Gail McDonald’s discussion of the reception in British 
universities of Eliot’s The Sacred Wood suggests that it did indeed begin to shape the 
established academy, and there is certainly and unequivocally a long legacy which 
stems from ‘Tradition and the Individual Talent’. Not only was Eliot’s theoretical 
representation of the nature and role of poetry and the poet influential, McDonald 
argues, it was designed explicitly to shape the academy in order to legitimise his work 
and to prepare the way for its reception – to create a position from which his poetry 
would be authorised. The danger of this, from the perspective of Stein’s argument, is 
that it enables the work of art to be ‘classified’. In the terms of Stein’s lecture, Eliot’s 
essay is ‘a thing prepared’ and, in preparing the way for the shock of the new in his 
work, the essay ‘makes it go dead’. Indeed, it could be argued that Eliot’s essay 
succeeds in creating the formula for a group, the very thing Cournos is anxious about 
in 1917. Under pressure to assign his position authority in the context of a theoretical, 
artistic and pedagogical battleground, he presents this system as an eternal one, a set 




In contrast, Stein’s assertion that ‘at present composition is time that is the reason that 
at present the time-sense is troubling that is the reason why at present the time-sense 
in the composition is the composition that is making what there is in composition’ 
(225-226) has a critical implication which identifies what Stein thinks of as authentic 
art with an art we might call ‘modernism’. The art Stein sees as authentic has as its 
content a consciousness of modernity, and that is why the ‘composition’ of her own 
time is fixated on the awareness of its own modernity, on what is new. In other words, 
in Stein’s contemporary moment, ‘composition is time’: modern consciousness and 
the authentic art which represents it are preoccupied with the consciousness of the 
present, with modernity.  
 
This is highly significant because, in recognising the emphasis on the contemporary 
as a historically specific phenomenon, Stein’s argument historicises Eliot’s emphasis 
on contemporaneity as the significant factor in determining the value of a literary 
work. The crucial move Stein’s argument makes therefore also historicises the 
category which Eliot’s argument has made general. In terms of Stein’s historical 
account, Eliot has only seen newness as the defining feature of a work of art because 
he is in a moment when this has become the case, not because this has always been 
the case. Eliot, in suggesting that art has always been preoccupied with innovation, 
creates a closed system in which the emphasis on newness is the eternally defining 
function of the work of art (‘it would not be new, and would therefore not be a work 
of art’). In Eliot’s paradigm, the emphasis on innovation, which for Stein is a specific 
phenomenon of her moment, is dehistoricised (45). Eliot’s doctrine of newness 
paradoxically denies the possibility of innovation because innovation becomes 
normative and therefore is no longer new. Read through Stein’s theory, this does not 
allow a grasp of what is different about the present because the closed system and the 
absolute category deny the historical specificity of that emphasis on the new. Stein’s 
critique of the history of the refused in the arts is a critique of a theory such as this 
which, like the theories of the classic and the beautiful, judges the literary work 
against criteria which cannot comprehend its historical specificity. 
 
What Stein is suggesting, therefore, is that at this moment in history the idea of 
modernity has become the defining matter of art. The lecture and its performance both 
show us and tell us very forcefully that Stein neither works in a historical vacuum nor 
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tries to create one. On the contrary, the function of the lecture is to exemplify a 
literary history which has culminated in her present in an art for which, as distinct 
from the work of the past, a self-consciousness about historical specificity determines 
its form, content and function.  
 
Linda Voris, in a 1998 article on Stein’s lecture, suggests that 
 
The public lectures and experimental compositions are very different texts in their claims and style: in 
its experiments with the relation of examples and precepts, ‘An Elucidation’, for instance, is an 
experimental text much more faithful in its working articulation of Stein's anti-substitutive theory of 
explanation than her lecture, ‘Composition as Explanation’, where composition cannot entirely replace 
explanation because Stein has to use her own work as examples.42 
 
I would argue, however, that Stein’s discussion of her own work is compositionally 
part of the explanation she puts forward. Stein’s reference to her work represents the 
historical specificity she proposes in the lecture. If composition is explanation, then 
the formal decision to use herself as the prime example of her epoch in itself explains, 
firstly that she is being historically specific, secondly that the consciousness of the 
individual is bound to the consciousness of the epoch, and thirdly that as a 
consequence of this she cannot be general. Stein insists on the historical specificity of 
her moment, and the act of referring to her own work performs this insistence. Indeed, 
she does not use her own work as an example as such; rather, her work is presented as 
specific to itself, representing its own moment and its particular mode. She, in fact, 
traces the development of her work by revealing how it responds to the particular 
stimulus of its conditions. She must discuss her work in the lecture because the state 
of affairs she represents has not pertained at any other point. Thus, this element of her 
composition in itself forms the content of the lecture: the contemporary state is not an 
eternal state and cannot form the basis of a general category.  
 
Stein presents the established academic thinking as a mode of conceptualisation 
which will always be out of date because it is ‘a thing prepared’ and presents a closed 
system of meaning which assimilates and in doing so neutralises what is different. 
What Stein’s lecture offers to modernism is not a separate resistant sphere  which 
simply becomes another closed system to replace the one it deplores  but a keen 
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awareness of itself as a historical phenomenon bound to the history of western 
consciousness she tells. What it offers to academia is a historical account of western 
literature which enables it to confront both the past and the present in their specificity 
without the deadening effect of the universal ahistorical category. When Stein enters 
the academy she is, in whatever equivocal form, also engaging in a battle over the 
literary history it might accept, and this is evidently communicated in its performance 
if we note the significance of the language of battle and struggle in all the student 
responses to it. Stein is therefore not aloof from the range of cultural practices, 
whether hegemonic or counter-hegemonic, which form the broad context for her 
work, nor is her work separate from the rest of modernism’s complex 1926 scene, nor 
is it hermetic, arcane or exceptional. It is embedded in those contexts and represents a 
response to them and, in this example, as in many others, it is a manifest attempt to 
shape them. Indeed, the lecture represents a pivotal move in the struggle to determine 
the meaning and value of ‘modernism’ in the late 1920s. In the following chapter, I 
will show how Stein’s talk initiates a significant conversation whose participants 
engage overtly with the concept and history of ‘modernism’ in a protracted wrangle 
over the figure of Gertrude Stein.  
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Chapter 4  
Stein and the Death of Modernism 
 
The beginning and the end of ‘modernism’ 
  
As discussed in Chapter 1, the claims for an avant-garde legacy out of early 
modernism tend to posit an aberrant Stein who stands outside history. In all of these 
arguments, Stein’s experimental work resists the institutionalisation of modernism 
accomplished by its definition as a concept and as a literary period. Stein provides the 
origin for an avant-garde that can deny the periodization of a linear historical account, 
and that can circumvent the phase which saw the congealing of modernism into an 
institution. In this way, Stein becomes the origin of a future which comes to pass in 
the late-twentieth and early-twenty-first-century literature which these arguments 
valorise. This late avant-garde is derived out of Stein’s resistance to 
institutionalisation, a resistance which they see as inherent to her work. Further, Stein 
is exemplary of the early-twentieth-century avant-garde impulse but she is also 
exceptional because her work wrenches itself free from its historical time. In this 
hypothesis, Stein so radically decontextualized herself that she alone continues a line 
beyond history and so provides the basis for an alternative post-historical genealogy.  
 
This anomalous Stein, I would argue, is an inherited figure. Rather than offering an 
alternative to counter what they see as the hegemonic literary history which excludes 
her, the contemporary arguments reiterate its logic by continuing to displace Stein 
from the history of modernism. I will show in this chapter that Stein’s original 
displacement from that history is not simply a function of her work itself in terms of 
its inherent difference  whether of disjunctiveness (Quartermain) or resistance to 
authoritative modes of meaning making (Perloff). I would argue that, instead, it is the 
result of a struggle over the meaning, history and future of early-twentieth-century art 
and literature that began in the late 1920s, and which is a continuation of the early 
century interventions on the cultural field, but with a new element in play which is 
shaped by this battle. The new component which begins to reconfigure the field in the 
later 1920s is an institution which is beginning to be called modernism; that is, a 
single defined movement with a canon and a literary history. These conditions had not 
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pertained before because a single movement had not been demarcated, because the 
field had been articulated in terms of the dynamics of diverse groups rather than by a 
canon, and because the early century work under discussion had generally been 
claimed by its producers to be without precedent, without a literary history. When the 
idea of a historical movement begins to emerge, the battle of position-taking becomes 
a struggle over relative positions plotted around the new institution. In a significant 
number of texts produced in 1926, 1927 and 1928, the battle over ‘modernism’ is 
manifested as a battle over the meaning, history and future of ‘Gertrude Stein’. And 
that ‘Gertrude Stein’, I would argue, is, much like the new institution which comes 
into play, also constructed in its deployment on the field of forces.  
 
The new positions I am identifying, those which chart the outline of a period and a 
movement and simultaneously delineate a ‘Gertrude Stein’, emerge in a conversation 
which occurs through a series of texts in the short period following Stein’s lectures at 
Oxford and Cambridge. This conversation is a direct consequence of Stein’s lecture 
and its publication in 1926 by Leonard and Virginia Woolf’s Hogarth Press, in which 
she offers her vision of a literary history for modernity.
1
 This is significant because it 
shows that it is Stein herself who begins this debate about how the new art could be 
assimilated. As I have argued in Chapter 3, in ‘Composition as Explanation’, Stein 
contends that the new art should be allowed to transform the institutions in which it 
intervenes: the academy, the institutions of art and literature themselves, in fact the 
whole apparatus of cultural values, so that instead of becoming ‘accepted and a 
classic’ it can be ‘irritating annoying stimulating’ without being ‘refused’. Thus, she 
herself imagines a movement with a history (‘the history of the refused in the arts’), 
and she imagines a possible future for that movement in a cultural scene it has 
transformed and continues to transform. 
 
The conversation begins in January 1927 when the New Criterion publishes an 
anonymous and generally favourable review of ‘Composition as Explanation’ in the 
‘Short Reviews’ section of ‘Books of the Quarter’.
2
 Around the same time, the first 
edition of Wyndham Lewis’s journal The Enemy prints Book 1 of what will become 
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 Gertrude Stein Composition as Explanation (London: Hogarth Press, 1926). 




his monograph Time and Western Man, in which he unequivocally presents Stein as 
the element that should be excised from the contemporary scene.
3
 Shortly after this, 
T.S. Eliot offers a damning review, in accord with Lewis, of ‘Composition as 
Explanation’ in The Nation and Athenaeum.
4
 In the same year, three monographs 
appear in close succession: John Rodker’s The Future of Futurism (which Eliot 
reviews alongside ‘Composition as Explanation’ in The Nation and Athenaeum), 
Wyndham Lewis’s Time and Western Man itself, and Laura Riding and Robert 
Graves’s A Survey of Modernist Poetry.
5
 These monographs all evoke and to varying 
degrees dismiss the figure of Stein as they seek to conceptualise the period they call 
either ‘“revolution”’ (Lewis), ‘Futurism’ (Rodker) or ‘modernism’ (Riding and 
Graves).
6
 In the same year, and in the midst of this heated discussion about the future 
of literature and Stein’s place in it, Mina Loy delivers a speech at Natalie Barney’s 
salon in Paris.
7
 Following a series of enthusiastic essays in The New Criterion through 
1926  under Eliot’s editorship  on the value of Stein’s work, Loy, in a contradictory 
move, gently sends Stein and with it the whole field of early-twentieth-century 
endeavour into the past. In 1928, Eliot writes an article in The Dial which rejects the 
notion of an early-twentieth-century revolutionary movement hypothesised in Lewis’s 
monograph and posits the arrival of the genius Ezra Pound, in opposition to the 
invalid practice of Stein, as the only meaningful event of this time.
8
 A closer 
examination of this short period shows us that a discussion about Stein’s relevance is 
played out in a number of scholarly critical revisions as a substantial feature of their 
examination of the nature and significance of that early-twentieth-century activity. 
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These texts represent vectors in a conversation about the recent past and long term 
future of literature, and they all include Stein as a significant component of the recent 
literature under discussion.   
 
The practices of the 1900s and 1910s, as we have seen, are not simply a number of 
theories or a series of texts; they are also a range of social practices and actions which 
intervene in and challenge the cultural field itself. Stein’s work and the activity 
surrounding it are examples of those artistic and social practices. The fashioning of 
group identities, the construction of personae whose meaning depends upon those 
groups, and the exploratory and critical engagement with the institutions which 
provide a context for the production and reception of art and literature, are all 
significant aspects of that praxis. This conversation in the 1920s shows us how a 
series of new positions emerge which attempt to secure the outcome of those 
interventions and consolidate the challenges they offer. All these writers take a 
position outside the ‘movement’ as if standing ahead of it and looking back across a 
fixed temporal domain. The three monographs in particular propose competing 
theories about the nature and significance of the artistic changes of the early twentieth 
century as a totality, identifying the phenomenon as a revolution in cultural and 
artistic practice. Shifting from the explication of theory in manifesto form as a way of 
establishing a context for the production and validation of discrete experimental 
practices, and adopting the apparent standpoint of literary history, these monographs 
move toward a theoretical account of these practices as a whole – toward a unified 
concept. In doing so, the consolidations also begin to see this movement as a 
completed event, effectively consigning it to literary history. And in that process, as I 
will show in this chapter, they all isolate Stein as exemplary of the movement which 
has ended or must end. 
 
An appraisal of the publication status of these texts provides an understanding of the 
1920s as a transitional period in a broader move towards cultural legitimisation. 
Lewis’s Time and Western Man, although a polemical and idiosyncratic work, is 
published by Chatto and Windus, an established house dating from 1855. Rodker’s 
essay appears in the series To-day and To-morrow, which published speculative 
pieces by a range of authors and was produced by the established publisher Kegan 
Paul. Riding and Graves’s A Survey of Modernist Poetry is published by Heinemann, 
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an imprint of the parent company Doubleday Doran, which by 1927 was the biggest 
publishing house in the English-speaking world.
9
 Loy’s essays on Stein appear in The 
New Criterion through 1926, which at this point is a significant vehicle for a range of 
writers, but does not command the kind of mass audience assumed for the 
monographs, and her speech is given to a small and exclusive audience at Natalie 
Barney’s Paris salon in 1927. The Nation and Athenaeum, owned at this point by John 
Maynard Keynes, was a weekly newspaper which, with Leonard Woolf as literary 
editor from 1923 until 1930, often published reviews and articles by authors involved 
with the Hogarth Press. The range of publication contexts for these works indicates a 
movement towards legitimisation, with more established magazines and larger 
publishing houses beginning to replace the little magazine and the small press. 
Rodker’s essay, Lewis’s polemic and Riding and Graves’s Survey in particular are 
aimed at a broad ‘cultured’ audience rather than the coterie or subscription. Yet, the 
small press and the little magazine are still important publication contexts in the latter 
half of the decade: although, for example, Riding and Graves’s text emerges under the 
aegis of a vast international publishing enterprise, their own small Seizin Press is 
producing hand-printed texts out of their home – in Hammersmith and subsequently 
in a small village in Majorca – until 1937.
10
 Indeed, this press publishes Stein’s An 
Acquaintance with Description in 1929.  
 
The problems Stein had getting her work into print have been well documented.
11
 In 
this moment, the mid to late 1920s, however, a number of her texts were published in 
a variety of contexts. In 1924, Ford Madox Ford’s Transatlantic Review published 
excerpts from The Making of Americans, and, in 1925, a limited run of the full text 
was published by Robert McAlmon’s Paris-based Contact Press.
12
 In 1926, after the 
tour of Oxford and Cambridge, Stein’s lecture was published by the Hogarth Press 
along with some examples of her work, and, in the same year, her text ‘The Fifteenth 
of November’ was printed in Eliot’s The New Criterion. In 1928, Useful Knowledge, a 
selection of texts with a distinctly American theme, was published by the New York 
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company Payson and Clarke.
13
 What this shows is that, far from representing the very 
marginal practice of Ulla Dydo’s description of her work (‘she did not know how 
much resistance her work provoked by refusing the accepted ways’) until the 
popularity of what Dydo calls her ‘public’ 1930s texts, Stein’s work was in fact 
gaining credibility and acceptance in this moment in the mid-1920s.
14
 This range also 
reflects the multifarious publication scene, and indicates again the complex relation 
between coterie cultures, the more established institutions, and what might be called 
the developing modernist institution being framed in the attempts to develop and 
sustain more stable publication contexts. Stein’s place in this scene reveals the 
intricacies of the whole publication scene at this point; the fragility, the moves toward 
stability, and the uneven transition from the small press towards the less marginal 
publishing houses. It is at this point, however, that these 1920s writers engage in overt 
attempts to configure both Stein’s work and the kind of authorship they take her to 
represent as a mistake: indeed, as the mistake of the movement per se.  
 
The texts under discussion can therefore be seen to represent a transitional moment in 
the ‘accession to cultural legitimacy’ outlined by Levenson.
15
 What I want to suggest 
in this chapter is that these revisions make their claims to legitimacy by reconstituting 
the products of a group culture, that is, of a range of collective projects to transform 
the cultural field, as a series of masterworks by individual creative geniuses. In these 
representations, the movement ended on or around 1927, leaving a series of isolated 
figures unbound either to each other or to any collective ideas about culture, art, the 
role of the artist or the nature of the engagement with the artwork. And this sets the 
terms upon which the figure of Gertrude Stein can be isolated as the example of the 
literary history which must be finished. Indeed, in many ways, the ‘Stein’ they 
dismiss is constituted in these critical terminations: these representations construct a 
                                                           
13 This American press might be thought of as somewhere between the small press and the larger 
publishing houses. Through the late 1920s it published around 30 titles, an esoteric range including 
Blaise Cendrars’s The African Saga, crime and mystery novels (Dorothy L Sayers, Maurice Dekobra), 
works on art and architecture (Le Courbusier, Paul T Frankl) and other titles representing a range of 
interests such as The diary of a Communist Undergraduate by Nikolai Ognev. Many of the publications 
are translations from European writers into English for the American market. Sources:  
https://books.bibliopolis.com 
https://openlibrary.org/publishers/Payson_&_Clarke. 
14 Dydo, A Stein Reader pp.3-4; p5. 
15 Levenson, A Genealogy of Modernism, p.213.  
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Stein who is a cypher for the illegitimate, the liminal and the heretical. In short, Stein 
becomes modernism’s abject. 
 
Stein and the ‘plain reader’ 
 
The critical studies written and published in 1927 by Rodker, Lewis and Riding and 
Graves possess strikingly similar foundational tropes in the construction of Stein as 
abject, but, before we turn to these tropes, it is important to consider why these writers 
felt the necessity to take their positions on Stein. A key motive for this necessity, I 
would argue, comes in the shape of what Riding and Graves call the ‘plain reader’: 
these monographs are positioned as guides for the ‘general’ reader, separate and 
distinct in form from the difficult masterworks with which they believe their audience 
is to some extent familiar.
16
 They establish a register which is both critical and 
didactic, situating themselves as demystifying elucidations for a confused, ill-
informed and misled reader. In line with the publication context of the large 
publishing house, the audience they construct is the general public, those who are not 
experts and not of the coterie, spectators rather than part of the scene. In Lewis’s 
terms, they are the ‘the general reader’, or the ‘Plain Man’, and, for Rodker ‘the 
popular mind’.
17
 They are also expected by all of the writers to have read some of 
those difficult texts, to be engaged with contemporary literature, but baffled or 
alienated by it. In each of these monographs, it is Stein who stands in as the locus of 
the difficulty and mystification that the ‘plain reader’ is assumed to feel.  
 
Although the ‘plain reader’ is expected to find the poetry difficult, to encounter, in the 
words of Riding and Graves, a ‘breach’ between their sensibility and ‘the 
sophistications of advanced modern poetry’, this audience is not quite the audience of 
the tabloid press, yet nor is it either the practitioners of ‘advanced poetry’ or the art 
‘establishment’.
18
 In the Survey, the audience is figured as the man who will ‘return to 
his newspapers and his Shakespeare’ if the modernist project fails to engage him (5). 
                                                           
16 Riding and Graves, A Survey of Modernist Poetry, p.5. Further references are given after quotations 
in the text. 
17 Lewis, Time and Western Man, p.xi; pxii; Rodker, The Future of Futurism, p.6. Further references are 
given after quotations in the text. 
18 Lewis also uses the term ‘advanced’ to describe ‘the only significant…contemporary literature’. See 
Time and Western Man, p22. 
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The reader Lewis imagines is the man who ‘knows more about Relativity physics than 
any layman has ever known about the newtonian cosmology’ (136-137). Educated 
and literate, this audience is able to take advantage of the availability of popular 
accounts of advances in human thought indicated by Lewis’s reference to the 
‘enormous Relativity literature from which anyone who cares can acquaint himself 
with the main bearing of these theories’ (137).  Indeed, these texts are themselves 
positioned as examples of this emerging genre, with Riding and Graves’s appeal to 
the ‘plain reader’s rights’, Lewis’s intention to ‘present my argument in the plainest 
manner that I could’, and in the publication of Rodker’s essay as one of a series on 
such diverse subjects as sport and leisure, the role of birth control and the future of the 
wireless (Riding and Graves, 5; Lewis, xix).
19
 These texts, then, are layman’s guides 
to the difficult science of advanced poetry just as other guides offer the layman an 
insight into Einstein’s theories. Rodker exemplifies the position this audience 
occupies in his definition of Futurism as that which is ‘called revolutionary by the 
academies, incomprehensible by the man in the street’ (8). Rodker’s reader is placed 
outside these two positions as neither the art establishment nor the uncomprehending 
majority. Lewis takes a position with his reader as opposed to ‘the majority’ who live 
in ‘the world of cheap art, education and publicity, or else the feudal world of half 
their ordinary speech’ and as opposed to the ‘highly-intellectualised High-Bohemia’ 
(5; 47). The reader is expected to disdain the activities of the masses, exemplified in 
Rodker’s claim that ‘to-day, in the general slackening of all standards, truth, however 
much understood, has less moral force than it ever had’ because ‘the mass has no use 
for it’, but also to mistrust the over-intellectual and that which threatens the social 
order (23-24). Their audience is popular but not ‘mass’, intelligent but not 
‘intellectual’, educated but not expert, and essentially conservative. This is perhaps 
the emergent and indeterminate middlebrow, and the uncertainty about its constitution 
certainly reflects this indeterminacy.
20
 In all these accounts Stein occurs, in a series of 
contradictory figurings, as representative of on the one hand the ‘high-brow’ and on 
the other hand the ‘mass’ and the ‘slackening of standards’ (Riding and Graves, 5). As 
                                                           
19 For example, v.25 is on Sport and Leisure; v.3 contains an essay ‘Birth Control and the State’ by C.P. 
Blacker; v. 12 contains the essay ‘Wireless Possibilities’ by A.M. Low. 
20 For discussions of the middlebrow audience, see for example Joan Shelley Rubin, The Making of 
Middlebrow Culture (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1992); Middlebrow Literary 
Cultures: The Battle of the Brows, 1920-1960, ed. by Erica Brown and Mary Grover (Basingstoke: 
Palgrave Macmillan, 2012) and Lise Jaillant, Modernism, Middlebrow and the Literary Canon: The 
Modern Library Series, 1917–1955 (London: Pickering & Chatto, 2014). 
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a set of negative values at work in the construction of this audience, Stein becomes 
embodied as everything it is not and everything it disdains or fears. The othering of 
Stein thus carves out the identity of the middlebrow audience. 
 
Lewis chooses ‘to open the discussion among books such as those of Proust or Joyce’, 
because they ‘have been widely read’, and are ‘popularly accessible’, which suggests 
a reader of the most prominent contemporary works. His aim, however, to criticise 
‘the Time-mind’ in order to clear up the ‘particular conceptions upon the popular, the 
concrete plane’, which this new writing has created, imagines a reader who has been 
misled by contemporary culture (xix).  Lewis’s popular audience has been duped by a 
conspiracy in which Stein is a central actor and fraud, the ‘faux-naif’, the ‘sham’ who 
is ‘one of the most eminent writers of …the highly-intellectualised High-Bohemia’ 
and who, having contaminated Joyce with her ‘habit of speech’, ‘romps along’, ‘hand-
in-hand’ with him ‘at the head of the fashionable literary world’ (49; 47; 50). This 
caricature places Stein at the forefront of this world, and Lewis’s identification of the 
popular with the ‘concrete’ indicates a practical, ‘real’ reader who is in danger of 
being taken in by the abstract conceptions generated by Stein’s work and the milieu it 
has produced. On the opening page of the preface, Lewis identifies his audience as the 
victims of contemporary thought, describing the public sphere as ‘the innocent plane 
of popularization’ (xviii). In Lewis’s construction, Stein becomes a cypher for his 
anxiety that, having been taken in by a fraudulent spectacle, the public sphere will be 
materially changed by it, that the Steinian ‘infection’ has also contaminated that 
‘innocent plane’, and that it is ‘imposing its values upon the impressionable material 
of life’ (xix).   
 
Rodker conceives of a public bewildered by the new forms in his claim to address the 
‘confusion in the popular mind’. For him, this is created by a problem in the 
conceptualisation of history, demonstrated in the seeming contradiction in 
‘Futurism’s’ emphasis on the ‘primitive and savage motifs’ which he embodies as 
Stein’s ‘mantrams’,and its simultaneous concern with the future rather than the past of 
art, and in the ‘menace of continuity implied by the word’ (6). In short, Rodker 
believes that in the ‘popular mind’ the concept of Futurism as such does not make 
sense. He, like the other critics, also evokes an audience with a general knowledge of 
contemporary literature, proposing to ‘confine myself to Literature about which 
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everyone knows something’ – for him, this is Cummings, Joyce, Dostoyevsky, 
Chekhov and Stein (14). Rodker conveys the belief that the ‘popular’ reader, the 
audience outside ‘Futurism’, has been thrown into bafflement and confusion because 
of the obfuscation of which Stein is the ultimate or absolute example which should 
now be excised. This is expressed in his call for his reader to find a way to accept 
each of those other difficult writers, but to ‘turn from the ungrateful method of Miss 
Stein, who means words to be words only and to mean nothing but what she would 
have them mean’ (85).  
 
Riding and Graves, in their opening chapter ‘Modernist Poetry and the Plain Reader’s 
Rights’ are concerned about the estrangement of the reader in the perceived ‘divorce 
of advanced contemporary poetry from the common-sense standards of ordinary 
intelligence’. For Riding and Graves, ‘advanced’ poetry must develop a more 
straightforward and reciprocal relationship with this public. In the Survey, ‘modernist 
poetry’ is problematic because as a type of writing it resists a direct, a plain-spoken 
engagement with a broader audience who are not members of the exceptional coterie 
which produces it.  Riding and Graves’s critique is that ‘such poetry seems to say: 
“Keep out. This is a private performance.”’ As in Lewis’s representation, the problem 
is that it constructs an autocratic distance from the general reader in dictating the 
terms upon which it is to be understood, that, although ‘even traditional poetry…has a 
tendency to withdraw itself from the plain reader’, the modernism they define, 
because of its ‘sophistications’, ‘seem[s] only to make the breach wider’ (5).
21
 In the 
Survey, as in Time and Western Man, the reader’s mind must also be changed, but not 
in order to resist the effects of this kind of writing: rather it is in order to adapt to its 
strangeness. Initially presented as a defence of modernism, the didactic function in the 
Survey extends to a project to teach the reader how to appreciate modernist poetry. 
Riding and Graves also present Stein as exemplary, but for them it is ostensibly in 
order to form a defence of rather than an attack on her work. In the final chapter, Stein 
is ascribed the condition of ultimate modernism, and Riding and Graves criticise the 
general reader’s unexamined response to modernist writing in their claim that Stein is 
misread. As they argue, ‘Everybody being unable to understand her thought that [she 
                                                           
21
 See also Lewis, p.xviii, ‘a sort of mystical time-cult’ and p.xix, ‘I, at the outset, unmask the will that is 




was]…trying hard to be original’, when in fact, ‘she was only divinely inspired in 
ordinariness’ (139). The genuine project of modernism is thus exemplified by Stein, 
who looks like a fraud (‘trying hard to be original’), who seems to be ‘part of the 
game of high-brow baiting low-brow’, but, who is, as in their defence of modernism 
in the opening chapter, in fact engaged in a sincere exercise which can be understood 
by the general reader if only they would put aside preconceptions and pay the right 
kind of attention (5). Stein is the exemplary modernist who arouses hostility and 
scepticism not because she is a fraud – as Lewis would have it – but because she has 
not been attended to with a serious critical rigour.  
 
In this sense, then, the Survey itself is the solution to the problem: this text is the way 
in which modernism has to change in order to accommodate the ‘plain’ reader. The 
Survey represents a demystification, a moving out of the separate sphere it assumes 
‘advanced’ poetry to occupy.  It establishes the serious intent of the project and 
attempts to open it up for the ‘reading public’. For Riding and Graves, the right to be 
given to the reader is the ability to understand and judge these apparently sealed and 
impermeable works, and as a corollary to this right the reader has a responsibility to 
embark on some significant intellectual modifications. Thus, ‘the plain reader must 
make certain important alterations in his critical attitude’ and accept ‘that poetry 
obviously demands a more vigorous imaginative effort than the plain reader has been 
willing to apply to it’ (5). Unlike in the other monographs, the reader is at first 
encouraged to enter into the project of modernism by engaging with Stein’s 
strangeness and taking it as a sincere endeavour rather than as a fraud or a game  to 
become modernism’s audience.  
 
In all these texts, the implication is that the new art – for good or ill – has been largely 
understood and accepted by the cultured elite, but that it has yet to be properly 
grasped in the broader social sphere. Like the 1927 trial of Constantin Brancusi’s 
‘Bird in Space’, in which the Romanian sculptor’s work was the subject of a US court 
case to determine, for customs purposes, whether it was a work of art or not, these 
monographs reflect both the significant presence of the new mode of art in the public 
domain and the continuing resistance to it. For these guides to contemporary 
literature, the narrative of modern shock is no longer convincing, and, like the trial, 
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which ultimately judged Brancusi’s work to be officially designated as a work of art 
rather than a ‘utensil’, their move is towards the institutional acceptance of the 
literature they identify as revolutionary, futurist, or modernist.
22
 In order to do so, 
these texts construct an audience which is decidedly modern. Lewis identifies his 
reader as, like him, distinct from ‘the victorian mind’ for whom the idea ‘That there 
could be anything “beautiful” about machinery, or anything “romantic” about 
industry, was never so much as entertained’ (3). Similarly, Riding and Graves 
distinguish themselves and their readers from ‘the Victorian poet and his reader’ who 
are bound by ‘an agreement between them of a common, though not an original, 
sentiment’, presupposing that this kind of relationship, because it is outdated, is no 
longer relevant to their modern reader (15). Rodker’s certainty about his reader’s 
sense of modernity is indicated in the plural pronouns of his appeal to that reader’s 
excitement about modern technological innovations, characterised as the ‘tremendous 
expansion which we feel the mechanical age has made flower in us’ (58). Excited by 
the advancements of the modern world and consciously distinct from the Victorian 
figure of the past, this audience by these accounts seems, theoretically, ready to 
engage with contemporary ‘advanced’ literature.  
 
The position taken by these texts is one of conciliation. For all of these writers, the 
spectacles and controversies have done their work: they have adjusted the relations 
and functions of art, and it what is now necessary is a coming to terms with these 
shifts. In order to end the controversy, and to make good those changes, the new 
status of art must now be assimilated into the broader public realm. The necessity of 
appealing to an educated general readership, these texts show us, is becoming more 
and more significant. In these attempts to now secure rather than alienate that broader 
audience, however, ‘modernism’ or ‘Futurism’ must move from the site of 
controversy and outrage. In their isolation of Stein, these appeals to that broader 
audience figure her as the extreme exemplar of that outrage, and thus, in their various 
                                                           
22The 1927-1928 trial Brancusi v United States was brought by Edward Steichen, who co-owned the 
291 gallery with Alfred Stieglitz. The trial was reported on by Henry Mc Bride in his column ‘Modern 
Art’, published in the January 1928 edition of The Dial, incidentally the same edition in which Eliot’s 
article ‘Isolated Superiority’ appeared. For fuller details of the trial including a partial transcript, see 




ways, ultimately use that figure of Stein to separate the other manifestations of the 
movement from controversy. 
 
The Survey of Modernist Poetry, Time and Western Man, and The Future of Futurism, 
seek a middlebrow ‘modern’ audience whom they wish to alter. In these stories of the 
relation between modernism and the ‘public’, Stein figures as the point at which 
modernism and that public chafe against each other. Thus, she exemplifies the 
difficulty with modernism which is taken to be the experience of the ordinary reader 
they evoke, and she stands in for the plain reader’s experience of modernism as such. 
It is in the figure of Stein that these writers embody the resistance of that audience to 
it, and, in doing so they can form a totemic representation of everything they must 
relinquish in return for the sincere attention of this reader. Constructed as the high-
priestess of modernist or futurist arcana, Stein is made  even, as we shall see, in The 
Survey of Modernist Poetry  to exemplify everything this audience does not or 
should not want out of it.   
 
Stein and the death of modernism: A Survey of Modernist Poetry, Time and 
Western Man and The Future of Futurism   
 
The critical enterprise of cultural intervention turns in this period to revisions of 
recent literary history which attempt to identify and end the story of a movement and 
look back at it as a phenomenon in the past. In consolidating those changes the writers 
feel have been wrought by the praxes of the early twentieth century, they mark the 
period off, constructing a finished narrative and, in doing so, pronouncing the death of 
modernism. The end of this period is achieved in the overt discrediting or historicising 
of the work of the group and in a turn to the figure of the individual author genius, 
which displaces or replaces the collective work which comprised the new works of art 
and the concomitant innovations on the field of production. This dialectical move that 
is at once identification and elimination is perhaps most marked and overt in the 
Survey of Modernist Poetry. For most of the book, Riding and Graves argue for 
‘modernism’ and for the conceptual irrelevance of the author which, for them, is its 
basis, but in the final chapter they use the figure of Stein to radically review and 




Initially, as we have seen, they defend modernist works and call for a new relationship 
between reader and poem in which the reader must work seriously with a set of 
critical tools and knowledge of literary history to understand the ways in which the 
text makes its meaning. The formal features of the poem and its relationship to other 
literary works are the central concerns and, therefore, in this conception of the 
modernist poem, the text is an autonomous entity that can be judged according to 
objective criteria. Chapter 6 of the Survey, ‘The Making of the Poem’ begins thus: 
 
A declaration of the independence of the poem naturally causes a change in the attitude of the poet 
towards himself. This does not mean that the poet ceases to be important; he merely acquires a new 
sense of privacy which his relation to the poem in the old regime made impossible. He shrinks from the 
strenuous publicity into which he might be dragged by the author-worship of traditional poetry or the 
abnormal sense of self-importance usually displayed in the official programmes of such dead 
movements as imagism (63). 
 
This declaration of the autonomy of the text is firmly predicated upon the suppression 
of the author. After the completion of the poem the poet retreats into privacy which is 
enabled because in the act of creation the poet has exercised what they describe in the 
previous chapter as ‘an enlightened withdrawal of the will’ which allows the poem to 
have an ‘independent form’ (61).
 
Riding and Graves call this the ‘creative will’, and 
ascribe to this will the ability to set the poem in motion and retreat from it. In a 
complex reconfiguring of genius, it is the act of making the poem and not the poet to 
which the quality of genius is assigned: the poetry which achieves the status of ‘real 
poetry’ is written by a poet who is able to ‘behave with genius’. Genius, then, is the 
act of exercising the ‘creative will’ in which the experiences and intentions of the 
author yield to an ‘experimental’ approach which is neither the giving up of will nor 
the concentrated exertion of will, but ‘a delicate and constantly alert state of 
expectancy directed towards the discovery of something of which some slight clue has 
been given’ (60).  
 
This relation of the author to the poem, for Riding and Graves, is what characterises 
‘modernist’ poetry. The concept they identify here, exemplified in an Anglo-
American canon including E.E. Cummings, T.S. Eliot, John Crowe Ransom, 
Marianne Moore and Edith Sitwell, is characterised by an idea of textual autonomy 
firmly bound to both authorial impersonality – the withdrawal of the writer’s will – 
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and to the disappearance of the author when the poem is complete – the new privacy 
and the avoidance of publicity. The retreat of the author from the public sphere and 
from a significant personal relation to the poem performs an intensification of the 
significance of the poem as the product of an anonymous act of withdrawal and the 
diminution of the significance of the canonical author figure characterised by Riding 
and Graves as ‘the author-worship of traditional poetry’. This enables an engagement 
with the poem as a separate and distinct entity divorced from any notion of authorial 
intention. As we can see, initially, their argument supports modernism because it 
enables this kind of engagement and because it has genius as an activity rather than a 
person, with the canonical genius associated with author-worship belonging not to 
modernism but to a traditional poetry now out of date. In a complex and contradictory 
series of turns, however, in the final chapter these poets reject the movement 
wholesale. Having constructed a modernism they can defend, in the final analysis they 
invoke the figure of Gertrude Stein in order to turn unambiguously against it.  
 
In the final chapter Riding and Graves explicitly announce the death of modernism, 
claiming in the opening paragraph: 
 
It is now possible to reach a position where the modernist movement itself can be looked at with 
historical (as opposed to contemporary) sympathy as a stage in poetry that is to pass in turn, or may 
have already passed… As nothing can remain contemporary for very long, we were obliged to assume 
this position if our criticism was to stand before rather than behind its subject (129).   
 
The statement ‘nothing can remain contemporary for very long’ parodies the 
modernist emphasis on the new and presents it as a dead end. In suggesting that it is 
over because it is no longer contemporary, Riding and Graves turn modernism against 
itself. The categorisation of the contemporary, which they argue is the founding 
principle of modernism, immediately sends it into the past. Their contention is that the 
poetry it demands is far too concerned with the question of what poetry is or should 
be at the moment it was written. The poem, therefore, can only ever be the expression 
of a theory about what ‘the art of poetry’ is at that instant. As they say later in the 
chapter ‘creation and critical judgement being made one act, a work has no future 
history with readers; it is ended when it is ended’ (131-132). Thus, the modernist 
poem is about itself, doing the work of criticism because its function is to express its 
own value and meaning in its contemporary moment in the history of poetry. At this 
late point in the monograph, they question the reliance of modernist poetry on the 
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‘objective’ measures of the historical value of the poem which they have supported 
through most of the text. The production and reception of modernist poetry, they 
argue, are governed by an autogenic theoretical taxonomy which reduces the poem to 
the expression of its ‘forced relation’ to the ‘historical period to which it accidentally 
belonged’ (132). For Riding and Graves, the modernism predicated upon a premise of 
autonomy and the concomitant irrelevance of the writer’s ‘personality’ has, by 1927, 
become impossible to sustain. 
  
It is at this point that Stein is identified as the exemplar of these modernist theories in 
practice:  
 
Gertrude Stein is perhaps the only artisan of language who has succeeded in practising scientific 
barbarism literally. Her words are primitive in the sense that they are bare, immobile, mathematically 
placed, abstract: so primitive indeed that the theorists of the new barbarism have repudiated her work 
as a romantic vulgar barbarism, expressing the personal crudeness of a mechanical age rather than a 
refined historical effort to restore a lost absolute to a community of co-ordinated poets (136).  
 
Stein’s work is the ultimate example of the intensely context-determined nature of 
modernist meaning-making – the meaning which the poem derives from its position 
on the cultural scene, its relations to other cultural artefacts, and its expression of 
those relations – which Riding and Graves now seek to resist. Misread even by 
modernists, they argue, Stein presents modernism with a vision of itself from which it 
recoils in horror. Her method is the ultimate expression of modernism because it only 
means anything in the context of the modernist project. As they see it, this is the task 
of defining absolutely the contemporary moment as the set of historical relations, 
‘mathematically placed’, which determine the act of writing in the present. The 
modernist work becomes a document which records that set of historical relations, 
and Stein’s work is the purest example of that recording process. 
 
As Jean-Michel Rabaté puts it:  
 
Graves and Riding, apparently intent on presenting modernism in its broadest sense, in fact attempt to 
bury it, to close off modernism as an active movement. In order to achieve this cunning sleight of hand, 
they have to identify the termination of modernism with what they see as its inception – namely, with 
the works of Gertrude Stein.23  
 
                                                           
23 Jean-Michel Rabaté, The Ghosts of Modernity, p.188-190. 
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The way in which Riding and Graves bind Stein to the death of modernism elaborates 
their dialectic by exemplifying how she can be figured at once as everything that 
modernism achieved and everything which means it has failed – a dialectic which 
imagines a modernism whose function is to resolve itself out of existence, leaving an 
‘embarrassed pause after an arduous and erudite stock-taking’ (132). Stein’s practice 
works out the end for modernism not because it ushers in an undesirable future for 
poetry, but because it has achieved the function of purifying poetry in order that it can 
be reactivated or re-originated. Graves and Riding’s descriptions of Stein’s work: ‘she 
used language automatically to record pure ultimate obviousness’ that she has 
succeeded in ‘purging it completely of its false experiences’ and that ‘these words 
have no history’, contend that Stein takes modernism to its logical conclusion by 
emptying language of meaning (139). For them, Stein’s work performs an absolute 
expression of modernism which clears history away by achieving such an excessive 
emphasis on time that it becomes a meaningless record of pure duration. And, 
particularly for Riding, who develops this theory further in her 1928 book 
Contemporaries and Snobs, poetry must begin again in the hands of the individual as 
opposed to the context of modernism, which for her is the context of collective 
meaning generated around abstract theoretical accounts of the function of art in 
modernity.
24
 Her contradictory desire to turn Stein into an individual, however, 
creates the same effect, as we shall see, as the other revisions of the period. Taken out 
of context and treated as an isolated phenomenon, Stein’s work does indeed lose its 
meaning.  
 
Lewis’s Time and Western Man reveals a similar preoccupation with the figure of the 
talented poet and the activity of writing real poetry stifled by a literary system which 
suppresses individual genius. Once again, the oppressiveness of the movement he 
delineates is exemplified by Stein’s practice. Lewis ascribes a revolutionary quality to 
early-twentieth-century art, which he defines as ‘a form of artistic expression that has 
attempted something definitely new; something that could not have come into 
existence in any age but this one’. As Riding and Graves eventually do, he explicitly 
separates the real innovations of the movement from the activity of the group and 
assigns the authentic revolutionary praxis to the individual. For Lewis, ‘Art of [the 
                                                           
24 Laura Riding, Contemporaries and Snobs (Garden City: Doubleday Doran & Company, 1928). 
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revolutionary] type is confined to a very small number of workers’, and he wishes ‘to 
mark this off distinctly from the much greater mass of work which…is in no way 
revolutionary’. Lewis’s description of the contemporary art scene provides an image 
of the proliferation of groups and the fluorescence of minority cultures: ‘The first 
thing that would be noticed by anyone entering the art world for the first time would 
be that it was discriminated into “movements” rather than into individuals’(24). 
Although Lewis wishes to have a modernism whose real value arises from the work of 
a few talented originals, rather than denying the group character of the revolution, he, 
like Riding, designates this character explicitly as its original defining feature. In 
Lewis’s argument, the collective form must come to an end because ‘The effect of 
that form of organisation, to start with, is, inevitably, to advertise the inferior artist at 
the expense of the better…Or else “the group” is more simply an organisation of 
nothing but inferior artists directed, sometimes by means of propaganda, against the 
idea of individual talent altogether’ (25). The echo of Eliot’s 1919 formulation 
reflects the desire for a new consensus around the figure of the individual set in 
opposition to group practice. Further, his description of his involvement with 
Vorticism as ‘my performances and those of my friends’ again reflects the significant 
property of the movements which the attempt to assert the sincere individual denies: 
that they are not just about the work but about the collective effort to remake culture 
through intervention, gesture, and spectacle (38). 
 
Significantly, for Lewis, the group – and, specifically, his own group around the 
magazine Blast – is also finished because it has achieved its function: ‘What [Blast] 
aimed at destroying in England – the ‘academic’ of the Royal Academy tradition – is 
now completely defunct. The freedom of expression, principally in the graphic and 
plastic arts, desired by it, is now attained…it is hard to realise the bulk of the 
traditional resistance that its bulk was invented to overpower. How cowed those 
forces are to-day, or how transformed!’ (38). The revolutionary purpose, therefore, to 
free art from tradition and from the academy, has by 1927 been achieved. For Lewis, 
it must come to an end both because its purpose had been fulfilled and because its 
group character had stifled and denied individual talent. In proclaiming, here, the 
force of Vorticism’s ‘bulk’ – that it was not and could not have been the work of an 
individual – and the necessity that it be ‘invented’ – that it had to construct a culture 
without precedent – Lewis’s representation of the collective enterprises becomes 
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rather contradictory. His assertion that the group formation as such will only ever 
produce the ‘inferior artist’ sits uneasily with this triumphalist narrative of 
Vorticism’s revolutionary success.  
 
In order to reconfigure the genuine revolution as the work of a few individuals, in 
Lewis’s narrative, the group must be reconfigured as the sect, and for these purposes 
he isolates Stein as exemplary of the power of this undesirable form, calling her ‘one 
of the most eminent writers of …our time-society’ (47). Indeed, he uses her to 
denounce the idea of cultural influence and exchange as such, implying that her status 
as exemplar in itself reflects the slavish lack of originality in the scene. This negative 
portrayal of artistic exchange is particularly marked in his representation of parallels 
between her work and that of Joyce. Describing her practice as a ‘stuttering infection’ 
which is so ‘contagious’ that ‘Mr Joyce even has caught it’, he attributes what he calls 
Joyce’s ‘vices of style’ to ‘his unorganized susceptibility to influences’, in particular 
the influence of Stein’s writing (50; 73). In his analysis of these ‘vices’ he compares 
the final paragraph of Ulysses to an excerpt from Stein’s ‘Saints in Seven’ in order to 
‘show a good material for a predatory time-philosophy bearing down upon it and 
claiming his pen as its natural servant’ (108). The comparison of Stein and Joyce 
provides Lewis with evidence that her influence has stifled and corrupted Joyce’s 
work, and this serves to reveal the fate of genius under the sway of the group. The 
metaphor of predator and prey presents the genius as the victim of collective ideas. In 
both of these monographs, A Survey of Modernist Poetry and Time and Western Man, 
‘modernism’ or the ‘revolutionary’ phase is indeed defined as a movement predicated 
on group activity and mutual influence, but only in order that these processes can be 
invalidated as threats to originality and individual talent.  
 
Rodker’s dismissal of Stein has much in common with that of Lewis, whom Rodker 
quotes, and is later echoed by Eliot whose critique of Stein is in the context of a 
review of Rodker’s essay. Rodker’s characterisation of her work in particular as 
having no ‘other motive than to grow and flower exactly as she wishes them to grow 
and flower’, ascribes to it an esoteric deadendedness which has nothing for the future.  
His concluding evaluation of Stein’s work in the field of possible futures for literature 
is also predicated on this characterisation in the explicit decision I have quoted earlier 
to ‘turn from the ungrateful method of Miss Stein’ (35-36). It is striking that, like the 
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other examples in this period, Rodker invokes Stein as a significant practitioner 
coherent with the general ‘Futurist’ project, only to – or, rather, in order to – remove 
her from the legacy of the movement. In his conclusion he names a number of authors 
within a range of very diverse practices, including Marinetti, Apollinaire, Cummings, 
Joyce, Dostoyevsky, and Chekhov, and, though he has objections to many of them, he 
accepts the work of each of them as valid inheritances for literary history. For Rodker, 
Marinetti’s method is ‘an important function of the mind’ which ‘does not deserve the 
scorn it has met’ and although Apollinaire’s calligrammes are an ‘unimportant’ 
development, ‘we like them and no doubt posterity will like them’ (85; 87). 
Cummings, whom he associates with Joyce’s work ‘seems infinitely more suitable a 
form for posterity’, and, even though Rodker has reservations about Dostoyevsky 
because of the ‘hysteria’ and the ‘sublimity of the bowels’ his work represents, he 
concludes ‘let us have our Dostoyevsky and with that everything’ (86; 88).  
 
Rodker’s discussion separates and excludes Stein from all the other authors he 
accepts. In this process, in presenting her as selfish and ungrateful, Rodker also 
evokes the person of Stein alongside her practice. The person of Stein, for Rodker and 
for the other monographs, is constructed as the avatar for the illegitimate, invalid 
aspects of the movement, namely its esoteric quality and its series of experimental 
collective cultural interventions. Rolled up, as it were, into the body of Stein – and, as 
we shall see, her body is a significant fetish in these figurings – the characteristics 
which trouble the desire for legitimacy are displaced onto the aberrant person of Stein 
in order to eliminate them from the literary history chosen for posterity. 
 
Stein in the future: The New Criterion, The Nation and Athenaeum, The Dial, and 
Mina Loy’s lecture 
 
These histories and their attendant positioning of Stein embody a definition of and a 
conversation about a movement, a wrangling over its genealogy and its legacy, which 
treats it as a finished thing. This conversation was also being had, alongside and in 
direct response to the 1927 monographs, in the magazines which still formed an 
important part of the immediate cultural production of that ‘movement’. These, too, 
speaking from the still-living body of the movement presented in the guides as a 
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corpse, reveal an anxiety over the future of literature bound into their representations 
of Stein.  
 
The complex of Stein’s more ‘live’ configurations is first expressed, rather simply, in 
that initial anonymous review of ‘Composition as Explanation’ in The New Criterion. 
The problem with Stein is outlined in the claim that ‘as a writer she is unquestionably 
sincere’, but that she is ‘like our grandparents’ because ‘as a person, on the other 
hand, Miss Stein equally resents agreement and curiosity, any attitude in fact except 
devotion and faith’.
25
 In a characterisation which, strikingly, is echoed in the late-
twentieth-century defences of her work, she is difficult and problematic because she is 
not as sincere as a ‘person’ as she is in the act of writing. This dissonance is linked to 
the representation of Stein as being out of her time, a view which again has a parallel 
with the ‘avant-garde’ arguments that her work will have its real place in the future  
in, for example, Language poetry. The assertion that there is ‘a gap of fifty years 
between herself and her creed’, suggests that she is out of time with herself, that the 
two parts of her identity, the writer and the figure who expects ‘devotion and faith’ 
are split across time, with the artist producing work that is ahead of its time, and the 
figure or icon  which commands worship  of Gertrude Stein existing in the previous 
generation. At this point, however, the criticism is tentative, and expresses a belief in 
the value of her work. Despite the reservations about her ‘person’, the article 
concludes that Stein’s work is innovative, worthy of careful study and of value for the 
future. Describing ‘Composition as Explanation’ as ‘original and obscure’, the 
reviewer advises that the ‘three clues’ she discloses: ‘the continuous 
present…beginning again and again; and using everything’ are ‘the heart of the essay’ 
and ‘should be studied with care’. Although it is positive about ‘Composition as 
Explanation’, this review lays out some of the principal components of Stein’s 
difference or difficulty, which, as we shall see, have more involved elaborations in the 
other texts.  
 
Lewis’s excoriating criticism of Stein in the January 1927 volume of The Enemy, and 
Rodker’s dismissal of her in To-day and To-morrow seem to encourage more 
unequivocal positions than that represented by the anonymous reviewer. It appears 
                                                           
25 Anonymous, ‘Composition as Explanation by Gertrude Stein’, p.162. All references to the text are 
from this page. 
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that Eliot in particular feels compelled, after the denunciations by Lewis and Rodker, 
to distance the art he values as far from Stein as possible. At the end of January 1927 
and presumably just a few weeks after the anonymous short review of ‘Composition 
as Explanation’, Eliot himself presents an unambiguous attack on Stein. Writing in 
The Nation and Athenaeum, he reviews ‘Composition as Explanation’, alongside 
Rodker’s ‘The Future of Futurism’ and two other texts. Stating directly that he 
‘entirely agree[s] with Mr. Rodker’s remarks about Miss Stein’, he presents a critique 
of Stein in which he aligns her work with that of ‘the author of “I’m Gona Charleston 
back to Charleston”’ and suggests ‘its rhythms have a peculiar hypnotic power not 
met with before’ which ‘has a kinship with the saxophone’.
26
 Here, she is associated 
with the debasements of popular culture in a direct comparison between her work and 
the rhythms of popular music. Eliot uses this comparison as a warning about Stein’s 
work ushering in a future which is ‘of the barbarians’, and, very clearly echoing 
Rodker’s sentiment, he asserts that this future is one, ‘in which we should not be 
interested’. In this way, Eliot aligns himself explicitly with Lewis’s and Rodker’s 
view of Stein, marshalling a position on the field with these other men in opposition 
to Stein as a signifier of the future they want to reject. 
 
In June 1927, in the midst of the argument about Stein, Loy gave her lecture at Natalie 
Barney’s rue Jacob salon. Stein attended with Virgil Thomson who sang two of the 
pieces he had set to music: ‘Preciosilla’ and ‘Susie Asado’.
27
 This followed a series of 
essays Loy had published in Eliot’s Criterion in which she explicates and defends 
Stein’s work. The talk, then, in the supportive context of Barney’s salon and Loy’s 
enthusiasm, like Riding’s account at the end of A Survey of Modernist Poetry, 
presents ostensibly an alternative position to the negative press that was building 
momentum in the conversation between Lewis, Rodker and Eliot. The lecture is 
indeed positive about Stein’s work and her contribution to contemporary literature, 
regretting the fact that this has been ‘unrecognised’ – a word Loy uses twice – until, 
                                                           
26 TS Eliot, ‘Charleston, Hey! Hey!’ p.595. All references to the text are from this page.  
27 See The Letters of Gertrude Stein and Virgil Thomson,ed. by Susan Holbrook and Thomas Dilworth 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010) p.35. Significantly, both of these texts deal with female 
performers; the Flamenco dancer, Susie Asado and the cupletista, Manuela Tejedor Clemente (stage 
name Preciosilla). The all-female context of Barney’s, ‘Academy of Women’, the performance of the 
lecture by Loy, Stein’s presence as audience, but also, presumably, as persona, the homage to female 
sensuality these texts present all suggest an atmosphere of mutual recognition and support. Barney’s 
dismissive response to Stein in her memoir, and the sense of closure implied in Loy’s lecture, 
however, suggest a much more complex picture. 
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significantly, ‘good old conservative England’ has begun to take note of her.28 
Presumably a reference to Stein’s 1926 lecture, the publication of ‘Composition as 
Explanation’ by the Hogarth Press, and the discussions about Stein’s work in The New 
Criterion, Loy’s characterisation reflects the context of that conversation about her 
significance.  
 
Alongside this emphasis on Stein’s recognition, however, Loy also places her firmly 
outside the contemporary scene at the end of an era, suggesting that: 
 
She has prodigiously broken to bits the raw material of style, and in a radical manner has swept the 
literary circus clear for future performances. This has given unheard-of courage to innumerable young 
people. 
 
The recognition of Stein’s work is understood, therefore, as the appreciation of her 
legacy, and what is important for Loy is what Stein means for the contemporary 
writers who are her inheritors. Loy presents her as a prodigal and a radical, as ahead 
of her time in her time, but now standing temporally behind the ‘young’ people 
among whom she can no longer be counted. Like the dismissals this argument might 
counter, Loy’s defence of Stein is predicated on her untimeliness, on her isolation. 
Loy identifies as her central concerns the meaning of contemporaneity and the value 
of innovation, and works those questions through to a resolution by positing Stein as 
the bearer of the problem. These representations situate Stein both as that which has 
passed and as that which has not yet come to pass. For The New Criterion reviewer, 
she is of the past because she is ‘like our grandparents’, and for Loy, it is because she 
has performed her function: she has ‘swept the literary circus clear’ for ‘young 
people’. Loy’s emphasis on her age and her use of the past tense – as if she is the 
previous generation – presents her as the radical who has freed art but whose function 
is now fulfilled and so is finished.
29
 In Eliot’s Nation and Athenaeum reading, the 
Steinian future is ‘likely’ yet ‘the future in which we should not be interested’, and for 
Loy, the ‘future performances’ of literature are not so much influenced by Stein as 
facilitated by the erasure, the emptiness her work has brought about. Stein is seen here 
not in terms of the value of her writing but the value of her action – as that which has 
prepared the ground for the art of the future. There is a violence in Loy’s account of 
                                                           
28 Natalie Barney, Adventures of the Mind p.172. All references to the text are from this page. 
29 In 1927, Stein is 53, Loy 45. Both moved to Paris in 1903. 
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Stein having ‘broken to bits the raw material of style’, a radical disruption which 
seems for Loy to be the function of Stein’s work. Using the metaphor of circus and 
performance, Loy’s theatre is now empty. As in Riding’s argument, Stein’s work has 
purified the literary scene so literature can return to year zero. Once again, rather than 
being either heralded or dismissed for her work in itself, Stein is significant because 
of what her legacy might mean for the future of literary culture.  
 
After the publication of Lewis’s Time and Western Man in book form late in 1927, 
and in a direct response to the parallels between Stein and Ezra Pound Lewis draws in 
it, Eliot’s 1928 article in The Dial seems to reflect a desire to draw a line under the 
debate and end the discussion of the movement at the same moment as it ends the 
discussion of Stein. Eliot rejects the notion of a revolutionary movement, sets up the 
individual in its place, and explicitly selects Pound as the valid exemplar in contrast to 
Stein, suggesting that, ‘We can now see that there was no movement, no revolution, 
and there is no formula. The only revolution was that Ezra Pound was born with a fine 
ear for verse’.
30
 In order to dismiss Stein as he dismisses the revolution, Eliot says of 
Lewis’s book ‘Mr Lewis is a little hasty, and might lead the inexperienced reader to 
believe that Pound’s rhythms spring from the same source as those of Miss Stein. And 
this is wholly untrue: they have nothing in common’ (6). In a development of the 
previous representation of Stein’s work as springing from the same source as jazz, 
Pound is presented as a fount of poetic genius in direct contrast to Stein. This gesture, 
of deliberately distinguishing Stein from Pound, is clearly designed to draw a line 
between the acceptable and the unacceptable. It is also significant that this distinction 
is presented as a definitive one, yet one which can only be understood by the expert. 
The view that the ‘inexperienced reader’ would be excused for drawing the 
conclusion, prompted by Lewis’s argument, that Stein and Pound share an aesthetic 
suggests that, to the untrained eye, they have qualities in common. This reader 
appears to correspond to Lewis’s ‘layman’, Rodker’s ‘popular mind’ and the ‘plain’ 
reader constructed in Graves and Riding’s Survey. Eliot is also clearly concerned with 
the representation of recent literary history for a broadening audience.
31
 It is also 
significant in that it assigns to Eliot the position of the expert whose special 
                                                           
30
 Eliot, ‘Isolated Superiority’, p.5. Further references are given after quotations in the text. 
31 Indeed, the Survey originated as a proposed collaboration between Eliot, Graves and Riding initially 
entitled Untraditional Elements in Poetry. 
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knowledge give him the authority to determine not just the value of a writer’s work 
but the definition of what a writer is. 
 
To this end, the question of whether or not Pound’s and Stein’s works share overt 
characteristics, how far their work has value, is not Eliot’s main concern. Rather, he is 
anxious to point out that they do not ‘spring from the same source’. The most 
important distinction for Eliot is that of origin, and his metaphor here proposes an 
ontological difference, not between Pound’s and Stein’s work, which may, to the 
inexperienced reader, seem to have something in common, but between the very bases 
of their practice. This is not therefore so much a defence of Pound’s fine ear for verse 
or his devotion to poetry, as an argument that what Pound writes, and what he has 
devoted himself to,  is ‘the art of verse’, and that what Stein is doing is something 
other than that (4). For Eliot, Stein is not a writer, and it is this use of Stein as a trope 
for what writing either is not, should not be or can no longer be, for the element which 
should now be excised, that is the characteristic activity of all these disavowals of the 
revolutionary experimental practices of the previous decades. Indeed, the isolation of 
individual figures means that the expert can determine, not just which writing has 
value and which writing does not, but who is a writer and who is not.  
 
Eliot’s isolation of Pound and Stein enables him simultaneously to dissolve the 
category of the ‘revolutionary’ period which Lewis constructs and to isolate Stein, as 
Rodker does, as an individual pursuing her own esoteric aims. Thus, in erasing the 
scene within which this writing made its meaning, Eliot brings the single writers 
forward into sharp relief. It is this move which enables him, as it does the other critics 
(in varying degrees), to detach Stein from the context in which her work generated 
meaning. Stein is both of the past and representative of the future in which, in the end 
for both Eliot and Loy, she should not feature. In Loy’s configuration, Stein is placed 
at the origins, a cypher for both an original radicalism and for its inevitable closure. 
She is also presented by both writers as an individual actor, rather than one embedded 
in the complex scene of the cultural field. For very different purposes, then, both Loy 
and Eliot, as do all the other writers, construct a Stein who is an exceptional 
individual in order to isolate and clarify the current of contemporary literature they 




The abject figure of Stein  
 
The consensus around Stein as an abject figure who can no longer be counted as a 
writer gains momentum from her 1926 lecture, its publication and its first review 
through Lewis, Rodker, Eliot, Loy and Riding and Graves. When we trace the 
dynamics of this conversation, we find a striking accord with the process Stein 
embodies in her 1912 portrait of Matisse. After a wrangling about the value and status 
of her work which almost replicates the argument about whether Matisse is a ‘great 
one’, the conversation seems to move to a position of certainty. However different 
their positions may seem to be, the final consensus is that Stein’s work does not 
belong in the contemporary moment from which these writers speak.  
 
The components which construct Stein as the failed, finished, or undesirable element 
of modernism gather through the series of position-takings and take on many related 
permutations.  Across these texts, a range of common motifs emerge which are used 
to figure her as the aberration from which literature must now move on. The 
prevailing configuration associates Stein with the barbaric, the primitive, the savage 
and the uncivilised, in order to have her as something distinct, not just from the 
culture the writers desire, but from culture as such. The barbaric provides a negative 
image of modernity in which the beginning again of the modern, which wipes the 
slate clean in its emphasis on the present and the unprecedented, becomes a new 
primal scene without a history. Images of the primitive also multiply into a range of 
related conceptual clusters which develop the presentation of Stein’s work as either an 
empty function which moves literature into the future rather than as a body of 
literature in itself, or as an illegitimate practice from which culture must turn away. 
These related ideas include the parallels drawn between her work and what is figured 
as a debased or barbaric popular culture, images of the child, the simpleton and the 
demented, and the many intimations of the unformed, ill-formed or sick self, figured 
as sexual deviance, gender ambiguity and racial otherness.  
 
Early in the conversation, in The New Criterion’s January 1927 review, the image of 
the primitive cult is hinted at in the references to Stein’s ‘creed’ and to the ‘devotion 
and faith’ she expects. As we have seen, the indication that Stein is primitive or 
barbaric becomes much more explicit in the subsequent texts and functions as a way 
162 
 
of defining her work as exemplary of a practice which is not art and therefore does not 
belong in a civilised culture. This is developed in all the critiques and forms the basic 
material from which many of the other abject configurations emerge. It begins in 
earnest with Lewis, who uses the trope in the section of Time and Western Man first 
printed in The Enemy. The image of Stein as the significant figure in a primitive cult 
is a significant aspect of his reconfiguration, as I have discussed, of the group as sect. 
The emphasis on the primitive which this representation requires is clear in his 
assertion that ‘she is working in the strictest conformity with all the other “time”-
doctrinaires, who have gathered in such disciplined numbers, so fanatically 
disciplined, as though to the beating of a ritualistic drum’ (49). His emphasis on 
discipline intimates the narrow confines of a crude doctrine which discourages 
individual expression, and the drumbeat and the reference to ritual evoke an image of 
barbaric paganism. This is picked up, as we have seen, in Rodker’s characterisation of 
her work as an extreme form of the ‘primitive and savage’ force of Futurism, and then 
developed in Eliot’s dismissal of her work as ‘of the barbarians’. Riding and Graves, 
in defence of Stein, quote Eliot’s article directly in A Survey of Modernist Poetry, and 
they then develop his notion of the ‘barbaric’ into a conceptualisation of the 
modernism Stein exemplifies. In their account, as I have mentioned, Stein is ascribed 
the status of the only modernist who is successful in ‘practising scientific barbarism 
literally’ so much so that her ‘words are primitive’ because they ‘have no history’ 
(136). The lack of civilised sophistication is also linked to the representation of Stein 
as outside her own time. As we have seen in the first review, as in the later 
monographs and articles, and even in Loy’s sympathetic lecture, Stein is always 
decontextualized as either behind her time in a savage primal realm or ahead of her 
time in a barbaric future. The trope of the primitive is developed through the 
conversation about Stein and it comes to have a number of resonances all of which 
function to remove her from the cultural scene of 1927. The construction of Stein as 
primitive rewrites her work as cult, not culture, displaces it from its contemporary 
context as pre- or post-historic, presents her as a barbaric totem rather than a writer, 
and, perhaps most potently, figures her as a primordial form of the human rather than 
as a fully achieved self.  
 
As I have pointed out, the concepts of primitivism and barbarism are also strongly 
associated with mass culture, and this seems to be one of the key anxieties expressed 
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about the direction of art in this conversation. Stein and the practices she exemplifies 
are represented as being too close to the modernity of mass culture, and this fear, and 
its connection with the trope of the primitive, are exemplified in Lewis’s description 
of her work as ‘the monstrous, desperate, soggy lengths of primitive mass-life’ (82). 
This view is also evident in Eliot’s review in The Nation and Athenaeum, in which he 
wonders ‘whether the omens are not with Miss Stein and the author of “I’m Gona 
Charleston Back to Charleston” rather than with Mr Cummings or Mr D.H. 
Lawrence’(595). Eliot’s binary, alongside his characterisation of both Stein and the 
newly popularised forms exemplified by jazz as barbaric, aligns Stein with popular 
culture and distinguishes her from other poets who, in this formulation, provide a 
civilised alternative to mass culture rather than being entangled with it. In many of the 
texts involved in this conversation, Stein’s association with popular culture is the 
dangerous result of the dissolution of the author and an argument for the reinstatement 
of the author as a special individual. 
 
For Lewis, the identification of Stein with popular culture is very explicit. In ‘There is 
all the craft of the Charlie Chaplin appeal, all those little dissimulated threads run 
cunningly to the great big silly heart of the innocent public, in the mannerism of Miss 
Stein and Miss Loos’ he associates the figure of Stein with mass culture production, 
fixing on the clearest examples of this moment, Anita Loos, whose 1926 Gentlemen 
Prefer Blondes was a bestseller, and Charlie Chaplin, whose 1925 The Gold Rush was 
the fifth highest grossing silent film in cinema history (57). Lewis provides the 
comparison in order to imply the fraudulence of Stein’s art, emphasised in his 
references to ‘craft’, to dissimulation, to cunning and Stein’s ‘mannerism’. A disgust 
for the ‘mass’, is evoked in the repetition of the term and variations upon it. Lewis 
alludes to Three Lives as ‘the simplicity, the illiterateness, of the mass-average of the 
Melancthas and Annas’ and describes Stein’s work as ‘undoubtedly intended as an 
epic contribution to the present mass-democracy’. The cheap tawdriness of 
consumerism is also ascribed to Stein’s work, described as ‘jumbled, cheap, slangy 
and thick to suit’ (60). The apparently unprocessed relation to modernity in Stein’s 
work is figured by Lewis in the image of a mass-produced object: ‘its life is a low-




The conception that Stein – and therefore the position she exemplifies – is bound up 
with mass culture is revealed more subtly and perhaps less consciously in A Survey of 
Modernist Poetry. Stein’s work is ‘divinely inspired in ordinariness’, ‘so grossly, so 
humanly, so all-inclusively ordinary’, and an example of ‘mass-automatism’ (139). 
Although not explicitly referencing it, the juxtaposition of the ordinary and the mass 
and the notion of inclusiveness allude to popular culture’s majority appeal and the 
global reach of its representations of the human condition. For Riding and Graves, 
Stein’s pure expression of modernism as ordinary, inclusive and human is tinged, 
despite their ostensibly supportive stance towards her work, with the disdain and fear, 
the disgust, shown in Eliot’s article. The adverb ‘grossly’ intimates this disgust, but it 
is also conveyed in the repetition of phrases such as ‘mass humanity’, ‘mass-
ordinariness’, and ‘mass-automatism’, which they use to define the ‘barbaric absolute’ 
that modernism, in their conception, appears to seek. The accumulation of these 
references has the effect of reinforcing, in their very repetition, the horror of the mass 
tide overwhelming the ‘talent of the artist to see things “as no one else sees them”’. 
There are parallels with Lewis’s portrayal of the modernism embodied in Stein’s work 
as too close to modernity, rather than standing in a defined position at a critical 
distance from it. For Riding and Graves, the problem with modernism is that it no 
longer enables the artist to be defined by difference from the time in which s/he 
stands: the ‘creative originality which is supposed to reveal the eccentricity latent in 
obviousness to this mass humanity equipped only to see the obvious’ (138). Thus, 
modernism is undifferentiated from the unprocessed modernity which makes up the 
mass culture they want it to stand beyond.  
 
In these 1927 examples, Lewis, Eliot, Riding and Graves all suggest that the practice 
and the position embodied for them in Stein is problematic because it cannot be 
differentiated from mass culture. Alongside the apprehension that the literature of the 
early twentieth century is too close to the modernity of mass culture runs another 
related current in these critiques: the association of Stein’s forms with racial 
otherness. The experience of racial difference in modernity for these writers is fused 
with the exotic and the ‘savage’ and becomes a significant trope in the othering of 
Stein. Perhaps the strangest example of this is Lewis’s characterisation, ‘Gertrude 
Stein’s prose-song is a cold, black, suet-pudding’, which imbues the reassuring food 
of an Empire childhood with a sinister difference imparted by blackness (59). More 
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straightforwardly, Eliot’s association of Stein’s work with jazz and Lewis’s 
description of her as ‘the jazz-sibyl’ suggest at once the modern ‘rhythms’ of the 
black music which has entered the mainstream and, in the notions of hypnosis and 
ancient oracles, an exoticism which once again evokes her otherness (50). Rodker also 
figures Stein in these terms, in his definition of her writings as ‘mantrams’ and by 
suggesting, as Eliot does in his review of Stein’s text alongside Rodker’s, that her 
repetitions have a ‘hypnotic value’(35; 38). Significantly, the mutual influence of 
these men and the currents of conceptualisation which pass between them are overtly 
displayed in Rodker’s quotation from Lewis’s opinions on Stein. Rodker’s citation of 
Lewis’s view that Stein ‘lyricises her utterances on the same principle as that of 
Hebrew poetry’, shows how far the depiction of Stein as racially other is the product 
of this kind of conversation (35, n1). Even Loy, however, identifies Stein as a 
‘prophetess’, and Riding later calls her ‘a large-scale mystic’, both of which evoke a 




The otherness connoted in these references is also manifested in images of physical 
difference. References to the sick, grotesque or ill-formed body proliferate in 
particular in Lewis’s account. Stein is imagined as an obese or disabled child ‘bloated, 
acromegalic, squinting and spectacled’ (47), suggesting an incompleteness, a sick self 
only marginally human. Her work is often envisaged as an obese body, as ‘slab after 
slab of this heavy, insensitive, common prose-song churns and lumbers by’ (59) 
which is ‘all fat, without nerve’, implying ill-health and weakness. She is also 
associated with ‘contemporary inverted-sex fashions’ (52), again portrayed as mental 
and physical sickness. Riding also figures Stein as vast and formless in her ‘gross 
automatism’ and ‘mass-originality’ which she describes as a ‘large-scale process’.
33
 
The lack of precision, the images of formlessness or malformation present Stein as an 
unformed, indeterminate, unbounded subject which resists the definition required of 
the isolated genius. Here, Stein is suspect, even horrifying, because she cannot be 
identified, once again reflecting the urge to isolate the genius, both from modernity 
and in literary history. 
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The conception of Stein as subhuman and therefore an incomplete self also gathers 
around her in associations with the simpleton, the idiot and the lunatic. Again, Lewis 
is most overt in this representation, aligning her refusal to explain her work as one of 
the ‘tricks…of the asylum patient’ (52) for which she ‘is heavily indebted to the poor 
honest lunatic’ (60) and in which, ‘she would roll her eyes, squint, point in a frenzy at 
some object, and, of course, stammer hard’ (48). This representation, however, is used 
to reinforce the portrayal of Stein as a fraud: she is simply ‘shamming’ madness, 
feigning the role of the lunatic in order to avoid being fully and personally called to 
account for her suspect practice. The role of the idiot is, for Lewis, another example 
of Stein’s charlatanry. Although she literally produces ‘monotonous, imbecile, 
endlessly-repeated words’, which seem to emanate from the brutish entity indicated in 
the caricature ‘it squats with a grunt’ (60), this is yet another example of her 
fraudulence. Lewis’s suggestion that, because she is a writer, the ‘massive silence of 
the full idiot is, unfortunately, out of her reach’ (61), implies that the pose of the idiot 
is another species of sham. In a further remove from the sincere and authentic self 
which Lewis categorises as the ‘individual talent’, Stein is not simply an imbecile: she 
is pretending to be an imbecile. Lewis’s grotesque satire clearly functions as an 
unequivocal dismissal of Stein, but the same kind of trope is also present in Riding’s 
defence in Contemporaries and Snobs. Her claim that ‘No one but Miss Stein has 
been willing to be as ordinary as simple, as primitive, as stupid, as barbaric as 
successful barbarism demands’ and her reference to the ‘perfect simplicity of her 
mind’ also construct Stein as – this time – a genuine simpleton, but one whose 




Bound up with the tropes of the simpleton and the ‘demented’, the association of 
Stein with the figure of the child creates a number of resonances. For Lewis, it is the 
figure of the child which most strongly features in his construction of Stein’s 
illegitimacy, though there is a flavour of this in Rodker’s connection of Stein with the 
primitive and his characterisation of her ingratitude – a charge associated with the 
image of the spoilt child. In the final chapter of A Survey of Modernist Poetry, Riding 
and Graves also evoke the figure of the child in order to identify the ways in which 
Stein exemplifies modernism and has carried out its project with what she calls ‘an 
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authentic barbarism’ (138). The child, in particular for Lewis and Riding, as well as 
standing in for the anxiety about the absence of the unified or fully developed 
individual, is also used to posit a reading of the contemporary emphasis on the present 
as that which precludes development and returns to first principles and the unformed, 
primitive state. This is explicit in Lewis’s claim that the ‘child-cult’ he identifies as 
exemplified by Stein ‘is connected with the cult of the primitive and the savage’ (51). 
Riding’s description of Stein’s work, in A Survey of Modernist Poetry, as the product 
of ‘an artificially assumed and regulated child-mentality’ also emphasises the 
immediacy of the child’s grasp of time: ‘the child’s time-sense is so vivid that an 
occurrence is always consecutive to itself, it goes on and on, it has been going on and 
on, it will be going on and on’ (Survey, 140). The child in these representations both 
lives in the present continuous flux of time conceived of as a series of single moments 
and is not yet formed as a full individual with a developed identity. The emphasis on 
the present in the figure of the child therefore serves to link the ‘primitive’ attention to 
the present explicitly with the incoherent subject. Thus, for these writers the coherent 
author these texts posit as the only intelligible unit of value cannot exist in the 
movement they conceptualise. 
 
All the texts use Stein as the central trope in their identification of the culture of the 
group, movement or artistic revolution as threats to individual greatness. These 
revisions achieve a number of things. They mean that these writers, particularly 
Lewis, Riding and Graves and Eliot, can dismiss the movements they identify as 
characterised by slavish faddishness. This in turn means they can deny the validity of 
mutual meaning-making and so assert the necessity for judgements of value 
predicated on the author’s individuality. Central to all the figurings of Stein as abject, 
therefore, is the concept of authorial identity. The critiques of Stein coalesce around 
the question of the author’s sincerity, connected to the resurgence in all these 
commentaries of the figure of the coherent genius.  On Eliot’s terms, this is the, 
‘isolated’ ‘devoted’, figure of the hermetic artist;  for Lewis it is ‘the individual 
talent’, stifled by group identity; and for Riding, the emphasis is on the  ‘personal 
authority’ of the ‘Genius’ excessively compromised by the professionalization of 
poetry. The question of Stein’s sincerity, therefore, is the question of authorship that 
these writers struggle with in their reframings, and this is expressed in the many and 
varied intimations, as I have outlined, that she is not a full, coherent or stable 
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‘person’. The desire to reinstate or insist upon the unity of the creative genius comes 
out of an anxiety about the relative status of the artist, the work and its audience, 
which was in itself created by the early problematizing of existing paradigms. This 
resurgence represents an urge to stabilise these relations in order to re-establish a firm 
set of criteria with which to judge the value and meaning of the work. Significantly, 
then, these constructions of Stein’s difference serve to map a landscape of anxieties 
about this history. The complex of tropes around Stein is generated in anxieties over 
the incomplete, split or contradictory self they use her to embody: Stein is a locus for 
the anxieties about the loss of the coherent author-figure. In order to isolate the author 
from the context into which many of these writers feel it has dissolved, Stein becomes 
the icon for what the author is not or should not be. She becomes the sacrificial object 
in the re-sacralisation of the author-figure. 
 
Importantly, and in another move which reveals much about the motives for these 
representations of Stein, the emphasis on the coherent author who must stand out from 
the group enables them to establish the necessity for the identification of the authentic 
genius as opposed to the charlatan. Lewis points out Stein’s distinctiveness but he is 
also careful to negate the legitimacy of any individuality this might assign to her. 
Once he has set her up as a powerful icon, he clearly feels it is necessary to neutralise 
any value this might confer. He makes this clear in a qualifying statement toward the 
end of Volume 1: ‘Miss Stein I have dealt with at length, but not because she seems to 
me a writer of any great importance; rather, living comfortably at the heart of things, 
and associated with all the main activities of the time, she is a rallying-point that it 
was convenient to take’ (111). Stein is noted but not recognised, a ‘rallying-point’, a 
locus or cypher for the practice of the group which signifies a lack of authenticity. 
Thus, the association with a group or a shared or interactive basis for artistic practice 
in itself becomes a marker of the mediocrity intimated by Lewis’s casual dismissal 
and the lazy fraudulence implied by his image of Stein ‘living comfortably at the heart 
of things’. The significance of Stein’s position for this revision, and indeed for the 
other claims for the death of the movement, is sharply outlined in this disclaimer. The 
identification of Stein as a cypher for group culture of modernism is claimed as the 
ground upon which she can be dismissed. This reinforces once again the emphasis on 
the value of the authenticity of the individual genius set up in opposition to the 
cultural interchange figured as either fraudulent or as the context in which the 
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fraudulent artist can flourish. The discrediting of the group per se and the emphasis on 
the identification of the real author among frauds are instrumental moves toward the 
logic of the canon.  
 
The authentic author and the fraud 
 
The attempts to fix historical parameters and to isolate individual practitioners and 
works, I would argue, has much to do with the urge to construct a canon for a 
legitimate movement which must define itself against the illegitimate forms which 
have been mocked, trivialised or demonised in the public sphere. Rodker’s essay 
opens with a conception of the history of Futurism as the site of public controversy: 
‘Of Futurism so much has been said in the past fifteen years that, with a country very 
much divided on the subject of Mr Epstein’s Rima, some belated definition seems 
necessary’ (5). Rodker’s reference to belatedness gives his discussion the quality of a 
retrospective elucidation, and yet his allusion to the controversy surrounding Jacob 
Epstein’s sculpture makes the debate a live issue. Erected in the Hyde Park Bird 
Sanctuary in1925 as a memorial to the novelist and naturalist W.H. Hudson, ‘Rima’ 
provides for Rodker a dramatization of the problematic position of the Futurist work 
in this period. Commissioned and supported by writers, artists, journalists and 
publishers, among whom were John Galsworthy, Joseph Conrad, G.K. Chesterton, 
Walter de la Mare, William Rothenstein (Principal of the Royal College of Art), and 
the publishers J.M. Dent and Gerald Duckworth, the sculpture was unveiled by the 
Prime Minister Stanley Baldwin in July 1925. Despite its apparently legitimate 
provenance, the response of the popular press was ‘unequalled in venom and spite and 
often delivered in provocative and brutal language’. The sculpture was characterised 
in the tabloid papers as ‘The Hyde Park Atrocity’, ‘A Travesty of Nature’, ‘A 
Nightmare in Stone’ and as a representation of the art of the ‘Bolshevik’, as ‘Socialist 
Taste’ or as ‘Anarchism’.
35
 Both belated and current, the controversy over Futurism, 
for Rodker, has gone on too long and now seems habitual or compulsive rather than 
meaningful, discrediting artistic production rather than modernising it.  
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Rodker’s attention to the Rima controversy reflects the desire to legitimise 
modernism, to move from that position of controversy. This very often expresses 
itself in the fear of accusations of fraud, and this fear, I would argue, lies at the heart 
of these retellings and of the denunciation of Stein. The works produced in the early 
twentieth century, as we have seen, had to make not just an audience and a market for 
their reception, but a whole new world in which they made sense: new methods of 
production and dissemination and new definitions of the artist, work, patron and 
audience. In these conditions fraud becomes a strange concept because the fear of 
being denounced as a fraud is complicated when authenticity is defined in ways which 
have no precedent. This ambivalence is heightened by the public mockery in popular 
responses. The uncertainty about the status of the artist and the work of art is a 
significant aspect of that early moment precisely because it challenged these notions 
at their very foundation. Indeed, contemporary popular criticism repeatedly levelled 
the accusation of cultishness, degeneration and fraudulence at the work in order to 
discredit it, as the title and subtitles of a Daily Sketch article on Roger Fry’s 1912 
second Post-Impressionist exhibition exemplifies: ‘Art Gone Mad. Queer Perversions 
of the Post-Impressionists. Paint box Freaks. Cult of the Crazily Ugly and its Childish 
Results’.
36
 More serious reviews of those early practices, for example of the 1913 
Armory Show, also present similar views. Milton W Brown’s record of responses in 
American newspapers finds that: 
 
Harriet Monroe [writing for the Chicago Tribune], still fighting off the inevitable conversion, wrote 
that Matisse seemed to her ‘fundamentally insincere’ and that he talked ‘blague in a loud voice’. The 
critic of the Boston Transcript found Matisse and the Cubists ‘playing a game of mystification’. 
Mather [the Nation] gave his readers a choice, Cubism was either ‘a clever hoax or a negligible 
pedantry’. Cox, [the New York Times] not to be outdone, offered ‘sheer insanity or triumphant 
charlatanry’.37 
 
These dismissals share a striking similarity with the later representations of Stein: of 
insincerity and charlatanry; of the blague of a fraudulent decadence; and of the 
Steinian primitive cult or sect. The early formations are discredited as primitive cults 
for a number of significant reasons: because they appear unintelligible on any terms 
other than their own; because they are practiced in the context of networks of small 
groups; because they do not engage with the broader cultural context in familiar or 
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established ways; and because, in challenging the very terms upon which art is 
predicated, they appear to go back to the beginning of representation. The small group 
with a theory about art is also open to accusations of fraud or hoax because, being 
predicated on a theory, the artwork can be judged by no criteria other than its own.  
 
The fact that the 1920’s reframings of the early period use the same figures – the 
primitive cult, the freak, the simpleton and the fraud – to dismiss Stein reveals a 
significant point about the ways in which the narratives attempt to construct a more 
acceptable form. The early mockeries in the popular press attempt to delegitimise the 
new art by using these tropes. The portrayals of Stein in the 1920s, in appropriating 
these same tropes in their disparagement of her, in one clean stroke distance them 
from that condemnation and the practices which drew it. Stein’s dismissal in these 
1920’s texts is, in essence, a necessary action in order to construct a legitimate form 
against which such accusations cannot be brought. Because they are the same as the 
mockeries and outrage of the popular reception of the 1910s, these claims against 
Stein’s legitimacy perform the same kind of activity: just as the early parodies, as 
Leonard Diepeveen argues in the introduction to his recent anthology Mock 
Modernism, ‘fenced things off by precluding serious, nuanced discussion’, so the 




Stein in The New Criterion 
 
Before 1927, Stein had already begun to recognise the ambivalent attitude to her 
practice and her position. There is clearly an interest in her work, a sense that it is 
significant, but there is also an uncertainty about its value. This is, for Stein, 
represented by Eliot’s hesitations about publishing her work in The New Criterion. As 
Ulla Dydo has shown, the communication between Stein and Eliot through 1925 and 
1926 represents a series of polite snubs which hold Stein in the awkward role of the 
supplicant.
39
 This is reflected in ‘The Fifteenth of November’, the piece Eliot did 
finally publish in The New Criterion in January 1926. This text identifies and works 
through these rejections and embodies a critique of the exclusion and marginalisation 
they represent. Stein inhabits the discourse of the rejection letter, contemplating the 
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register and mode of the genre from within in a series of ironized repetitions. She also 
explores the binary language of choice and selection, reflecting the processes of 
inclusion and exclusion which characterise the fluctuating responses to her work in 
this period.  
 
The first stanza ends with the stark minor sentences, ‘To deny twice. Once or twice’. 
This introduces the theme of rejection and implies, in its dismissive lack of precision, 
the coldly casual indifference of exclusion.
40
 This is represented through the first half 
of the text, not least in the fifth stanza: ‘The idea is that as for a very good reason 
anything can be chosen the choice the choice is included’. Here, a cynicism about the 
processes of choice and inclusion is indicated in the phrase ‘The idea is’ which 
implies an abstract intention which is never actually achieved, and in the ironic 
exaggeration of ‘for a very good reason’, which echoes the voice of the editor who 
protests too much. The second stanza represents a response to the feeling that the 
rejection of her work is based on little knowledge or understanding of it, that the 
denials in their indifference are a refusal to engage with Stein at all rather than a 
straightforward decision about the quality of the work itself: 
 
On the fifteenth of November in place of what was undoubtedly a reason for finding and in this way the 
best was found to be white or black and as the best was found out to be nearly as much so as was 
added. To be pleased with the result (71). 
 
References to editorial categorisations and choices or judgements of taste and value, 
introduced here in ‘white or black’, the repetition of ‘the best’, and the phrase 
‘pleased with the result’, proliferate in varying forms throughout the piece, for 
example in adjectival and adverbial phrases such as ‘too sweet’, ‘desirable’ and 
‘awfully well chosen’ (71; 72). Stein indicates in these lines, however, that her choice 
of subject matter for the text, simply of the date it was written, is chosen ‘in place of’ 
a serious decision about her own choice, her ‘reason for finding’ a suitable piece for 
The New Criterion. The title of the text therefore signifies a randomised choice, and 
this is made explicit in the repetition of the date ‘the fifteenth of November’ 
throughout. Stein’s critique of the processes of exclusion is embodied here in a refusal 
to engage with the process of selection at all.  
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There are also traces of anxiety about the uncertainty of Stein’s reception and of  her 
consciousness that the work must please the audience represented by Eliot – or be 
adjusted to suit it – in, for example, ‘Please please please them’, ‘less less and more’ 
and ‘it can be a pleasure’ (72; 73). The emphasis on taste and the many references to 
pleasing and pleasure show the difficulty of the supplicant position for Stein. In order 
to receive the recognition of The New Criterion, her work must be to its taste: she 
must ‘please’ it. When used as a verb, the word signifies the position of the one who 
must convince or gratify the other. Repeated contiguously in ‘Please please them. 
Please please please them’, and ‘Please please half of it’, ‘please’ works as both verb 
and adverb – pleasing and pleading – and overdetermines the position of the plaintiff 
(72). The many repetitions of ‘please’ and ‘pleasure’, however, also work as echoes of 
the etiquette of the letter. ‘Please’ as an adverb is phatic, empty of denotational 
meaning, and functions only to convey politeness.  
 
Writing out of and across the form and register of the formal letter, Stein’s text draws 
out the processes of cultural conformity the discourse enacts. The salutation, the 
valediction and the conventional phrasing of the formal letter, in particular the use of 
the passive voice, are spun out in repetitions and juxtapositions which begin to take 
on the ‘darker’ meanings suggested in the line ‘In any accidental case no incident no 
repetition no darker thoughts can be united again’ (71). In the rejection letter, the 
‘darker thoughts’ of the exclusion and erasure represented by that rejection are 
displaced by the detached passive voice and formal language of conventional 
politeness.  Stein’s text works through these conventions to reunite them with the dark 
thoughts they obscure – that is, the inherent violence of exclusion which the 
detachment and distance of politeness and formality, in a further act of violence, seeks 
to disclaim. The process of exclusion is identified in several forms in the text. The 
lines, ‘Entirely a different thing. Entirely a different thing when all of it has been 
awfully well chosen and thoughtfully corrected’, for example, evoke the journal 
editor’s justifications. The imposition of otherness on the rejected work in ‘entirely a 
different thing’ is connected to the affirmations of selection which serve simply to 
reassert the criteria of the selection itself (72). The self-congratulatory ‘awfully well 
chosen’ and ‘thoughtfully corrected’ point out the closed circuit of this process. The 
adverb, a feature of the formal letter which both intensifies and justifies the letter 
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writer’s actions, as shown throughout by Stein’s repetitions – ‘really’, ‘actually’, 
‘entirely’, ‘finally’, ‘surely’ – also serves here to soften the activities of choosing and 
correction, masking the processes of elimination and deletion they entail.  
 
Through the central section of the text, in a series of repetitions on the relations 
between ‘he’ and ‘we’, Stein locates the function of the passive voice she parodies: to 
construct the voice of the institution. Once again, Stein intervenes in a context which 
frames and regulates artistic production. The truncated lines and repetitive 
monosyllables separate this stanza from the rest of the text: 
 
He said we, and we. 
We said he. 
He said we. 
We said he, and he. 
He said. 
We said. 
We said it. As we said it (72). 
 
The distinctive form of this section also serves to link it with a stanza towards the end 
of the piece which contains many of the same formal features: 
 
He said enough. 
Enough said. 
He said enough. 
Enough said. 
Enough said. 
He said enough. 
He said enough. 
Enough said. 
He said enough (74-75). 
 
The first iteration shows how the individual as a functionary of the regulatory process 
comes to stand in for it – and vice versa. The declarations of the individual (‘he’) 
become the declarations of the regulating body (‘we’), meaning that the individual 
speaks for and as that body, appearing to abnegate any personal responsibility or 
subjective involvement. The individual and the context from which he speaks become 
interchangeable. Stein’s engagement with the contexts for artistic production thus far 
has been one of intervention. It has been a series of attempts to rethink or reshape 
functions and relations as an important aspect of her experimentation and in line with 
much of the activity around her. This poem reflects a response to what she clearly 
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perceives as an institution for the regulation of artistic production which wishes more 
and more explicitly to exclude her.   
 
This is developed in the second representation, which plays with the possibilities of 
the idiomatic ‘enough said’ to show once again the violence of exclusion and to link it 
more explicitly to the processes of the institution. The stanza begins with the phrase 
‘he said enough’ which indicates a functional speech act, the speaker who says 
enough to achieve his purpose. Communication here is a purposeful activity in which 
the speaker controls what is said, judging whether it is enough, saying just enough to 
be understood. In the context of the rejection letter this reflects the editor who politely 
and carefully makes the exclusion very clear without being explicit or direct – saying 
enough for the recipient to get the point. Read another way, with ‘he said’ as a 
reporting clause, and ‘enough’ as the utterance (He said, ‘Enough’), it also signifies a 
forceful termination of the speech of another and therefore presents the rejection as an 
aggressive silencing. The second line, ‘Enough said’ develops the implications of the 
first, drawing out the function of the idiom in the processes of exclusion and 
inclusion. ‘Enough said’ is a coded communication which activates an engagement in 
an implicit agreement and shared understanding. Like a wink of complicity, it both 
indicates and prompts an unspoken collusion. Again, in the context of the rejection, 
no more needs to be said because there is already an unspoken understanding about 
who is included and who is excluded. The editor therefore, rather than making an 
active choice, simply follows the established line in which the culture of the 
institution already colludes. ‘Enough said’ is a reassurance that what is presupposed 
still holds true, a reference to something so obvious it does not need to be said. 
 
The final stanza of the piece is made up of a single repetitive sentence which diverges 
significantly from the rest of the text and represents in a very simple form an 
alternative to the exclusion Stein sees in these rejections.  
 
Not only wool and woolen silk and silken not only silk and silken wool and woolen not only wool and 
woolen silk and silken not only silk and silken wool and woolen not only wool and woolen silk and 
silken not only silk and silken not only wool and woolen not only wool and woolen not only silk and 




Woven like the textiles which form its content, this sentence uses contrasting threads 
to represent ideas of value judgement. The exclusiveness and sophistication of silk is 
juxtaposed with the everyday homespun value of wool, representing in a simple form 
the distinction made in elitist selection criteria. In a negation of this kind of 
selectivity, Stein integrates the two potentially antithetical strands by including both 
of them in her sentence and giving them equal weight. This is achieved in both the 
repetition of ‘not only’ and in the form of their repetition, in which they are placed in 
interchangeable positions in the sentence. Rather than rejecting silk in favour of wool 
– so rather than rejecting the kinds of choices made by the institution – and rather than 
setting up another paradigm in which a different set of exclusive value judgements 
pertain, Stein maintains the openness of a refusal to select. This returns us to the 
theme of her initial refusal to select a meaningful title, and the text in its random 
chance-based subject matter therefore both speaks of and embodies a challenge to that 
exclusivity. Rather than expressing a rejection of the institution, Stein’s intervention 
represents once again an attempt to shape it, to challenge its processes of selection in 
order that her work is accepted by it. Her challenge to what one might call the 
developing institution of modernism reflects a desire to be included. 
 
Inheriting the abject 
 
Foucault, writing in 1969 from the other side of literary history’s reconstruction of the 
author, captures in his definition, I would suggest, the delimiting function this figure 
provides in the late 1920’s revisions of modernism:  
 
the author is not an indefinite source of significations that fill a work; the author does not precede the 
works; he is a certain functional principle by which, in our culture, one limits, excludes, and chooses; 
in short, by which one impedes the free circulation, the free manipulation, the free composition, 
decomposition, and recomposition of fiction.41 
 
The ‘free circulation’, manipulation, composition and so on which Foucault claims 
the author function impedes could well be a description of the network movement 
which is displaced in the late 1920’s narratives by the author figure. The early-
twentieth-century activities had complicated the concept of the author because its 
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works were, overtly, not ‘made’ in isolation. Indeed, these practices challenged the 
paradigm which takes authorship for granted. Stein is the locus of this fear about the 
uncertainty of authorship in the 1920s, and this uncertainty reflects the fear at the 
heart of these reconfigurations, in which ‘the author is therefore the ideological figure 
by which one marks the manner in which we fear the proliferation of meaning’. 
 
Riding’s view of Stein’s work, that her words are ‘so automatic that it is even inexact 
to speak of Miss Stein as their author: they create one another’, locates the anxiety out 
of which these late 1920’s reframings emerge.
42
 The banishment of Stein from the 
future is a way of marking a difference between the fraudulent and the authentic poet 
and between the empty persona and the genius author, but it is also a way of 
dismissing the multiple group culture in order to establish a canon of legitimised 
authors producing individual masterworks. In these revisions, modernism seeks a 
future for itself by reasserting the author function. The individual works however, 
have thus far only made sense in relation to the context of other works and the 
multiple cultural fields generated by the provisional institutions – magazines, groups, 
international networks, its own bodies of theory and scholarship, anthologies, 
collections – it throws up. Its texts have produced meaning through a process of 
reciprocity which means that the attempt to identify an author function which 
stabilises the identity of the author and conceives the work as a sincere expression of 
the individual is a highly contradictory move. The urge for the author to be a whole 
discrete thing is a mask to put over the riven and always incomplete subject, itself 
represented in early-twentieth-century works and in the network meanings of the 
cultural production of the period. Stein becomes the figure of the split, fragmented, 
unbounded subject in order that this can be excised and replaced with the whole self 
of the genius. 
 
The aberrant, illegitimate Stein put outside literary history, the Stein who is the 
exemplar of the finished project of early-twentieth-century literary innovation is 
assembled in these texts. By making Stein an exceptional figure who exemplifies the 
avant-garde impulse they wish to take up, the late-twentieth and early-twenty-first-
century arguments of Bernstein, Quartermain and Perloff, take up instead the story 
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told by the writers who have isolated her. This present-day detachment of Stein from 
her context, following the logic of the aberrant person of Stein excised from history, 
keeps her outside her time, making this a consequence of the disjunctive or resistant 
nature of her writing practice rather than situating it historically as a consequence of 
these late-1920’s position-takings which delegitimise Stein in order to both define and 
end ‘modernism’.  
 
Moreover, in the positing of a radical Stein more authentic than the public persona, 
the contemporary arguments reveal the same preoccupation as these 1920’s revisions 
 the preoccupation with the authentic author. The fraudulent persona of Stein 
displaces her practices in the1920’s accounts, and the arguments which have emerged 
over the last few decades in support of Stein have, paradoxically, continued this 
division as they attempt to reassert Stein the experimental writer.  The division of 
Stein’s work and her persona first emerges in the first review of ‘Composition as 
Explanation’ as the gap ‘between herself and her creed’. In constructing a ‘private’ 
Stein and dismissing the ‘public’ persona, the recent arguments follow the logic 
which originates in this literary history: that there is a split between persona and 
writer, that a persona is a sham and that therefore there is on the other side of this 
binary a real and legitimate author. The desire for an authentic author is the desire 
which has removed Stein from history, and it contradicts the very project that Stein 
was engaged in, alongside many other practitioners in her moment: to trouble the 
notion of authorship and the apparatus associated with it.  
 
Stein did not refuse to engage with institutions. Those early twentieth century 
practices, including Stein’s, were acts of intervention, moves to act upon institutions, 
real and conceptual, in order to transform them. Some writers in her period begin to 
feel the need to consolidate these interventions into a broader conceptualisation  to 
institutionalise them in turn  and Stein is also engaged in this process herself. Thus, 
Stein does not resist the institution or exist in a space outside it. She intervenes, and in 
her interventions she is also engaged in this later project of imagining a coherent 





Gertrude Stein, Conceptual Writer 
 
Conceptual writing as twenty-first century avant-garde 
 
The narrative which has Stein as the progenitor for an experimental anti-establishment 
poetic is now claimed by conceptual writing, a contemporary movement or, as 
Kenneth Goldsmith puts it, ‘an emerging tendency’, which sees itself as the literary 
equivalent of conceptual art but also finds its origins in that early phase of modernist 
literary production which Perloff narrates as the unfinished avant-garde.
1
 Goldsmith, a 
significant proponent of this new poetics, explicitly proposes Stein as a progenitor in 
his assertion that, ‘Conceptual Writing’s primary influences are Gertrude Stein’s 
densely unreadable texts, John Cage & Jackson Mac Low’s procedural compositions, 
and Andy Warhol’s epically unwatchable films’.2  The list he offers traces a selective 
genealogy out of modernism through abstract expressionism and pop-art to Language 
poetry. For Goldsmith, as for the Quartermain and Perloff of the 1992 and 2001 
studies, Stein is the survivor of an avant-garde modernism and features as key 
influence for a writing which wants to inherit its legacy. In Goldsmith’s formulation 
Stein is an originary figure for conceptual writing, with his term ‘primary’ evoking 
both significance and genesis. In the light of the shift in the theoretical framing of 
contemporary experimental poetry from ‘post-modern’ to ‘avant-garde’ accomplished 
by Perloff in 2001, Goldsmith and the other writers involved in the discourse of this 
new poetics, including Perloff herself, are now able to stake their own claim on the 
avant-garde position. Read in Perloff’s Twenty-first Century Modernism argument as 
an unfinished project, the signifier ‘avant-garde’, is now reworked in her more recent 
book on the conceptual writing movement, Unoriginal Genius (2012).
3
 Freed from its 
historical situation by the notion of deferral, the term is now attributable to this new 
contemporary movement. The concept of deferral also provides for conceptual writers 
                                                           
1 Kenneth Goldsmith, Uncreative Writing: Managing Language in the Digital Age (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 2011), p.1. Further references are given after quotations in the text. 
2 Kenneth Goldsmith, ‘Kenneth Goldsmith, Chelsea, Manhattan, Friday: 01.26.07 “I am sitting in a 
room”’, Dispatch 1: Monday, Dispatches: Journal (2007), 
http://www.poetryfoundation.org/harriet/2007/01/journal-day-one/ accessed 17 April 2014. 
Archived copy of webpage available, 
http://epc.buffalo.edu/authors/goldsmith/Goldsmith_ConceptualWriting.pdf. See p.2. 
3 Marjorie Perloff, Unoriginal Genius: Poetry by Other Means in the New Century (Chicago: University 
of Chicago Press, 2012). 
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the possibility of a genealogy of the avant-garde as a history of interruption, in which 
the notion of a disrupted genealogy paradoxically offers a coherent trajectory. This in 
turn means it can then be rehistoricised as the alternative literary history which exists 
outside the institutionalised version. 
 
Indeed, Goldsmith explicitly returns to Peter Bürger’s Theory of the Avant-Garde to 
establish a parallel between his contemporary moment in poetry and the move to the 
historical avant-garde phase in visual art. Goldsmith claims in ‘Why Conceptual 
Writing? Why Now?’ his preface to Against Expression: An Anthology of Conceptual 
Writing (2011), which he edited with Craig Dworkin, that, ‘with the rise of the Web, 
writing has met its photography’. His claim that there is an equivalence in historical 
conditions means he can then argue that the present moment in poetry is analogous, 
has a ‘perfect analog-to-analog correspondence’, to the transformation in the function 
of visual art of the late nineteenth century which, in Bürger’s narrative, created the 
conditions for the emergence of the avant-garde in the early twentieth century.
4
 
Goldsmith characterises the emergence of conceptual writing as reflecting the same 
kind of paradigm-shift as that attributed to visual art in the early twentieth century 
primarily by drawing a parallel between the effect of the internet on writing and that 
of photography on visual art: 
 
In 1974, Peter Bürger was still able to make the claim that, “because the advent of photography makes 
possible the precise mechanical reproduction of reality, the mimetic function of the fine arts withers. 
But the limits of this explanatory model become clear when one calls to mind that it cannot be 
transferred to literature. For in literature, there is no technical innovation that could have produced an 
effect comparable to that of photography in the fine arts.” Now there is. (xviii) 
 
There is a problem in Goldsmith’s conceptualisation of this contemporary poetic as 
avant-garde (which this declaration assuredly is), however, and that problem is 
contained in this claim. Bürger’s point is not that literature did not take the same route 
as visual art, but that the fact that it did suggests there is more to the change in the 
functions of art and literature than just the technological development of photography. 
Goldsmith shifts the emphasis of Bürger’s statement in order to make sense of the 
contention that his own contemporary poetic is the result of very specific historical 
conditions as massive in their scope as those which created the conditions for the 
rupture represented by the avant-garde in the early twentieth century. What Bürger 
                                                           
4 Kenneth Goldsmith, ‘Why Conceptual Writing? Why Now?’ in Against Expression: An Anthology of 
Conceptual Writing ed. by Craig Dworkin and Kenneth Goldsmith (Evanston: Northwestern University 
Press, 2011), pp.xvii-xxii (p.xvii). Further references are given after quotations in the text. 
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asserts in his statement, however, is, first, that the advent of photography was not the 
main cause of the change in the status of art in this period and, second, that literature 
did follow the same pattern as visual art in the move to l’art pour l’art and the 
subsequent unfolding of the avant-garde. Therefore, for Bürger, the fact that literature 
also changed as radically as visual art indicates that something other than the rise of 
photography lay behind that change.  
 
Goldsmith’s declaration rereads Bürger as an argument for the decisive significance 
of photography in the development of visual art in order to claim the same role for the 
internet in the development of literature now. The necessity of this reinterpretation 
reveals the problematic nature of a claim for the avant-garde status of a work of 
literature written in the early twenty-first century. First, if the conditions which led to 
the unfolding of the avant-garde one hundred years ago are specific socio-historical 
conditions – which is really Bürger’s point – then they cannot be repeated.
5
 Second, if 
literature, like visual art, was also subject to these conditions, and also changed as a 
result – again, Bürger’s contention here – then the changes claimed for literature now 
cannot be new in the same way as the historical avant-garde was new: that is, without 
precedent. Goldsmith must in fact misread Bürger in order to make this assertion. 
Indeed, Goldsmith’s own insistence on Stein as a modernist originator for the new 
poetic means that it cannot simply be a response to current changes in technology. 
Bürger’s avant-garde represents a total break from tradition and is therefore 
predicated on and determined by a lack of precedent. In other words, the avant-garde 
work cannot be new, the result of specific historical conditions, and also have a 
genealogy.  
 
This returns us to the same problem as that represented in Language poetry’s claims 
for Stein. Once again, Stein is displaced from her context as an exception to the 
historical trajectory of twentieth-century literature in order to make sense of a new 
avant-garde by putting it outside history. The answer to the question of precedent 
exemplified in the Language poets’ present-tense readings of Stein and in 
Quartermain’s concept of disjunction is to bring Stein forward into the present so as to 
short-circuit literary history in order to do away with the problem: Stein becomes a 
                                                           
5 See Bürger, p.lii: ‘Only because my point of departure was that today the avant-garde movements 
should be seen as historical could I bracket the value judgements that are central to the theories of 
Lukács and Adorno, and hope to pass beyond the theoretical  level they attained’. 
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contemporary, not a precursor. Goldsmith’s answer here is to posit a new avant-garde 
for writing by seeing historical conditions now as replicating the conditions which 
caused the unfolding of the original avant-garde in visual art, and thus, essentially, to 
see Stein as engaging with a set of conditions which had not yet occurred. This 
reading turns her into a prophetess of the type imagined by her contemporaries in 
1927: Stein is avant-garde in the sense that she is ahead of her time and so she cannot 
be of her time. Once again, Stein, rather than presenting, as we have seen, an 
integrated and meaningful set of practices and gestures which are absolutely engaged 
with her time and the other practices around her, is accorded value because she is out 
of joint with her time. As she has for Mina Loy and Laura Riding, for their own 
reasons, Stein for Kenneth Goldsmith has value only for the potential future of her 
practice, a future which Goldsmith says is happening now.  
 
This dislodging of Stein from history also has a value in the discourse of the other 
escape route from literary history: the characterisation of resistant poetry as a 
recurrent mechanism or mode. Deployed in the arguments of both Quartermain and 
Perloff in relation to Language poetry, this notion of mode becomes highly significant 
in the new poetic. For conceptual writing, the attention to the mode of a text is 
totalised as the movement’s main, and self-consciously realised, function. As 
conceptual writers Vanessa Place and Robert Fitterman note in their 2009 text Notes 
on Conceptualisms, ‘The primary focus moves from production to post-production. 
This may involve a shift from the material of production to the mode of production, or 
the production of a mode’.
6
 In conceptual writing, according to this definition, the 
attention of the author (and the reader) on the production of the content and form of a 
work – that is, the writing of a text – is supplanted by an attention to the contexts of 
production and reception within which the text is deployed. The function of the text is 
therefore to make explicit those relations and its expression and employment of them. 
In this activity, conceptual writing as defined by Place and Fitterman attempts to 
engage explicitly with those institutions which might mediate and contain the work. 
The action of the conceptual text in its relations with the institutions which mediate its 
production and reception therefore become its ‘meaning’. Conceptual writing is 
concerned only with the relation of the work to those institutions, and thus is 
predicated on an overt concern with the concept of mode: its subject matter is the idea 
                                                           
6 Vanessa Place and Robert Fitterman, Notes on Conceptualisms (New York: Ugly Duckling Presse, 
2009), p.16. Further references are given after quotations in the text. 
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of the place of the work in that system of relations. As Goldsmith explains in his 
recent book Uncreative Writing (2011), the innovation proposed by conceptual 
writing is in its potential for engaging with and intervening in ‘methods of 
distribution’, and ‘proposing new platforms of receivership and readership’ (15). This 
poetic therefore refines the characterisation by the Language poets and their theorists 
of Stein’s work as representing a resistant ‘mode’ because conceptual writing is 
ontologically defined by a scepticism about the authorised, hegemonic meanings 
prescribed and sustained by the ‘establishment’ and its intimate cultural institutions.   
 
Conceptual writing’s emphasis on mode transforms Bourdieu’s notion of the field of 
cultural production from a description of literary activity into a framework for literary 
practice. What conceptual writing lays bare is not its own devices but the literary field 
and its relations with the broader socio-economic landscape. In a further move, 
however, because of the overarching emphasis on mode, the movement can claim a 
new avant-garde position whose innovation is the knowledge of the structure of the 
field, and for whom the new function of the work is to articulate the field itself. In this 
way, conceptual writing occupies an old position in a new form, and can claim to 
inherit the position of the early-twentieth-century avant-garde and simultaneously to 
occupy it in an absolutely new way. It is therefore itself avant-garde because it 
ruptures the existing paradigm by drawing attention to it, thereby breaking the 
unspoken rule of collusion: the ‘forgetting’ of the truth of its constructedness which 
enables a writer to produce work within the paradigm. This forgetting is concisely 
characterised by Craig Dworkin’s description in ‘The Fate of Echo’, his own preface 
to Against Expression, of the typical contemporary work of poetry as ‘the hundred-
thousandth lyric published this decade in which a plainspoken persona realizes a small 
profundity about suburban bourgeois life’.
7
 In Dworkin’s caricature, the very act of 
writing upholds and obscures those social and cultural constructions the avant-garde 
seeks to challenge. The lyric form, in particular, is highly problematic for conceptual 
writing because it presupposes a stable subject position and an authentic voice which 
speaks of something genuinely felt. This is emphasised by Dworkin’s ironic 
alliterative overloading of the qualities of this position: ‘plainspoken;’ ‘persona;’ 
‘profundity’. His critique of contemporary poetry is a critique of the institutionalised 
                                                           
7 Craig Dworkin, ‘The Fate of Echo’, in Against Expression: An Anthology of Conceptual Writing ed. by 
Craig Dworkin and Kenneth Goldsmith (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 2011), pp.xxiii-liv (p. 




position it occupies, reflects and perpetuates, indicated here also by the reference to 
‘suburban bourgeois life’ which signifies the passive assimilation of poetry into the 
complacent acceptance of the bourgeois worldview and its attendant institutions. 
 
It also signifies, however, the failure of the historical avant-garde movements to 
successfully challenge the institutions which conceptual writing once again seeks to 
confront. Looking back to the ‘radical’ origins of early modernism, these writers have 
to choose their inheritance carefully, selecting writers or works which have not 
apparently become subsumed into the ‘establishment’ tradition they want to reject. 
The influences they must claim, therefore, must be those which can be read as 
standing outside the literary history which has culminated in the bourgeois lyric. The 
literary origins for this movement must be found in writers who have not been 
legitimised by the institutions within which that lyric functions. In order to make 
sense as a literary progenitor for a movement which claims a new position of 
autonomy from those institutions, therefore, it is important that Stein has not been 
legitimised either by the market or by the academy and the canon these institutions 
create. The importance of this reading of Stein for conceptual writing cannot be 
overstated: in order to be an originating influence, Stein’s work must occupy a 
different space to that of the ‘establishment’ modernism which perpetuates the system 
of social relations and colludes in its naturalisation. Thus, in order to make sense as a 
progenitor for this movement, Stein’s work must be read as resistant to those key 
institutions and their processes: the academy, the market, the legitimised literary 
history and the notions of tradition and canon upon which they rely. 
 
Conceptual writing’s claims for Stein, therefore, must be read in terms of the problem 
which is more or less the same as the problem identified in my discussion of 
Language poetry in Chapter 1: can conceptual writing have its avant-garde cake and 
eat it too? That is, can there be an avant-garde which has continued beyond the 
boundaries of the historical conditions upon which it is predicated? Can the avant-
garde be seen as mechanism or a mode of resistance to the institutionalisation of the 
arts, which resistance, in recurring through the twentieth and into the twenty-first 
century, has formed a robust alternative position? Can this alternative position be said 
to have escaped the institutionalising forces of the market, the traditional academy, of 
canonisation, of tradition and of a legitimate genealogy upon which a literary history 
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is founded, and which, indeed, these writers believe twenty-first century poetry has 
succumbed to? 
 
Stein as an origin for Conceptual Writing 
 
Conceptual writing restates the argument, proposed by Bernstein in the 1980s and 
again by Perloff in 2001, that writing in particular has not developed out of the avant-
garde origins of the early twentieth century in the same way as visual art. For 
Goldsmith and Dworkin, the narrative gap after the ‘death’ of avant-garde literature is 
partly filled in by the history of visual art, in which the move to conceptualism 
developed out of early modernist practice. Firmly established by the 1960s, 
conceptual art, according to Dworkin, has ‘continued to mine the seam opened in the 
mid-1910s by Marcel Duchamp’s readymades’ (xxv). Like Marjorie Perloff, Dworkin 
argues that the ‘establishment’ literary scene has not continued to mine this seam of 
modernism as visual art has. As he says  
 
There is no reason to believe that different institutions, even when inter-related like art and literature, 
would develop at the same pace, but one of the striking differences between these two spheres is the 
degree to which practices long unremarkable in the art world are still striking, controversial, or 
unacceptable in the literary arena  (xxxix-xl). 
 
This claims that, unlike art, literature has not evolved meaningfully from those radical 
avant-garde origins, that, indeed, it has forgotten its origins in favour of what 
Dworkin paraphrases as that ‘hundred-thousandth lyric’ I mentioned earlier. This 
contention is also echoed by Goldsmith in Uncreative Writing, in which he argues that 
‘in the art world, since impressionism, the avant-garde has been the mainstream. 
Innovation and risk taking have been consistently rewarded. But, in spite of the 
successes of modernism, literature has remained on two parallel tracks, the 
mainstream and the avant-garde, with the two rarely intersecting’ (13). In the early 
twenty-first century, then, the two claims set out by the Language poets in the late 
1970s are once more reasserted: that mainstream art has developed meaningfully out 
of modernism whereas literature has not, and that there are two conflicting strands of 
literary production, the mainstream and the avant-garde.  
 
Conceptual writing’s secondary texts: Vanessa Place and Robert Fittermann’s Notes 
on Conceptualisms, Marjorie Perloff’s Unoriginal Genius, Kenneth Goldsmith’s 
Uncreative Writing, and Goldsmith and Dworkin’s Anthology of Conceptual Writing, 
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all refer to Stein as a significant progenitor. In proposing Stein as an antecedent, they 
can, like the Language poets, return to the scene of the early twentieth century, stake a 
claim on what Kenneth Goldsmith calls ‘radical modernist ideas’ and trace a lineage 
which escapes the subsequent institutionalisation of modernist literature (UW 4). 
Positing Stein’s writing as distinct from modernism in its institutionalised form, much 
of the value of her work for these writers is founded on the notion that it has qualities 
which both enable it to resist institutionalisation and make it more appropriate to this 
moment in its future – the now – than to the unfolded future of ‘establishment’ 
modernism.  
 
This is a significant context for Place and Fitterman’s reference to Stein in note ‘2d’ 
from their Notes on Conceptualisms: 
 
Sophocles wanted a true language in which things were ontologically nominal. This is true in fiction 
and history. 
 
Fiction meaning poetry. 
 
Poetry meaning history. 
 
History meaning the future state of having been. 
 
This is the job of Gertrude Stein’s The Making of Americans (17). 
 
In this formulation, The Making of Americans writes a language which is 
‘ontologically nominal’ because the text creates a minute awareness of its own 
generation of its characters and their histories – its own ‘making’ of them. If the text 
is ontologically nominal, the only world that exists for the text is the one it has 
generated: therefore the world it constructs is the only world it knows or refers to, and 
so it speaks only to and of itself. The function of Stein’s text is to recognise the 
constitutive power of the history it makes as it makes it. Thus, it is the recognition of 
the ontologically nominal status of fiction and of history, rather than the truth of it, 
which it is the ‘job’ of The Making of Americans to express. This recognition is 
posited as part of the history of conceptual writing, displaying the development of the 
consciousness which has enabled it to be written. The future of Stein’s work is the 
kind of writing this view of the nature and function of the text engenders  that the 
text is a process which literally calls its own world into being  and it is Stein’s 




In Place and Fitterman’s notes, ‘all conceptual writing is allegorical writing’ and 
‘conceptual writing mediates between the written object (which may or may not be a 
text) and the meaning of the object by framing the writing as a figural object to be 
narrated’ (15). Conceptual writing is ‘allegorical’ because it calls up ideas or sets 
ideas in motion through kinds of embodiment, not expressing those ideas in the 
language itself but in its redeployment of instances of language with attention to their 
modes of engagement. What is suggested here is that this situation could not have 
been achieved without the view of the text engendered by Stein’s writing – that is, of 
the text as a self-referential self-constructing entity whose force comes not from its 
form or its content but from the mode of engagement of which it makes its reader 
aware. In the case of The Making of Americans, the reader is made aware of the 
process of attempting to construct a history of all the Americans who have ever lived. 
The text does not tell that impossible history: because it is impossible, it draws 
attention to the endeavour of telling, and so draws attention acutely to its own making 
and so to the acts of writing and reading themselves. Place and Fitterman’s note 
defines Stein’s text as an aspect of the history of conceptual writing. On these terms, 
her achievement is the construction of an awareness of what it means to write and to 
read as action in relation to the cultural constructs which determine writing and 
reading rather than as a discrete personal activity or metaphysical engagement with 
meaning. 
 
Place and Fitterman propose Stein as a precursor because of what they see as her 
exceptional theoretical shift toward the question of the function of writing in relation 
to established modes of meaning-production – what we might call ‘institutions’ – as 
constituting the content and form of the work. Kenneth Goldsmith’s claim, about The 
Making of Americans that ‘Stein, as usual, was prescient in predicting our reading 
habits’ also has Stein in the role of prophetess, and suggests that she has an 
exceptional grasp of modernity which means she has anticipated the future which 
must become conceptual writing.
8
 Goldsmith, in Uncreative Writing, also indicates 
that The Making of Americans is ahead of its time when he compares it to the internet: 
‘Trying to read Gertrude Stein’s The Making of Americans linearly is like trying to 
                                                           
8 Kenneth Goldsmith, ‘Kenneth Goldsmith, Chelsea, Manhattan, Friday: 01.26.07 “I am sitting in a 
room”’ Dispatch 4: Thursday. Dispatches: Journal (2007), 
http://www.poetryfoundation.org/harriet/2007/01/journal-day-four/ accessed 17 April 2014. 
Archived copy of webpage available, 
http://epc.buffalo.edu/authors/goldsmith/Goldsmith_ConceptualWriting.pdf. See p.7. 
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read the Web linearly’ (159). Without being explicit, this intimates that Stein’s work, 
as Goldsmith indicates in his introduction to the Anthology of Conceptual Writing, 
constructs the conditions of the twenty-first century before they have occurred.  
 
In anticipating those conditions, Stein then counts as a conceptual writer and her work 
is therefore a development out of the conditions it predates. Thus, Goldsmith can call 
Stein’s work ‘proto-conceptual’ (AE xx) and The Making of Americans in particular 
‘a conceptual work, a beautiful proposal that’s hard to fulfil’ (UW 159). Moreover he, 
again like the Language poets in the late 1970s, draws Stein into a network of writers 
by flattening the history which separates them. This is clear in his discussion of The 
Making of Americans alongside Zukofsky’s A and Craig Dworkin’s book Parse 
(again like the Language poets, Goldsmith includes Zukofsky in his lineage): ‘While 
Dworkin could merely have proposed the work – as could Zukofsky or Stein – the 
realisation of it, the fact of it, gives us something upon which to base our 
philosophical inquiries…It’s a wonderful and very powerful object’ (UW 169). 
Goldsmith confirms the conceptual nature of Stein and Zukofsky’s texts by 
suggesting that they need not have been written, indicating that their main force is as 
proposals, that is, as concepts. In this way, the three writers are bound together by the 
very specific category of conceptualism, replacing Language poetry’s more nebulous 
idea of the resistant text and providing a rationale for an account of the avant-garde, 
reframed as conceptual writing, as separate from mainstream literary history.  
  
The Stein name 
 
The basis for this valorisation of Stein as a trailblazing precursor, however, is very 
often something other than the form, content, mode or nature of Stein’s work. Simply 
naming or referring to her appears to be as meaningful as reading her work. More 
often than not conceptual writing’s references to Stein come in the form of citation 
rather than discussion or analysis. In Uncreative Writing, Goldsmith notes that 
‘Dworkin says’, of Edwin A Abbott’s How to Parse: An Attempt to apply the 
Principles of Scholarship to English Grammar, the source text for his book Parse 
‘“When I first came across the book I was reminded of a confession by Gertrude 
Stein…‘I really do not know that anything has ever been more exciting than 
diagramming sentences’”’ (163). This statement appears on the back cover of Parse, 
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connecting it with ‘Stein’ as a name or brand on the commodified surface of his text.
9
 
Stein is cited as a significant icon in Dworkin’s landscape, but not in the sense that 
her example and her work are instrumental in the genesis of the conceptual act of 
producing the text. The memory of Stein’s confession forms in part the impulse for 
the project, so she does figure in the origin of the text, but only as a rather arbitrary 
inspiration towards which the text gestures. Because it does not indicate an 
engagement either with her practice or with her theoretical concerns, the formulation 
serves to reflect the figure of Stein as something lodged in Dworkin’s mind, a 
background to his thinking but not an influence on the work itself in any active way. 
Thus, Stein is in his mind when he conceives of the idea of the text, but she is not an 
originator of the practice itself. The impulse to claim Stein as a progenitor, as we have 
seen in Quartermain and Perloff, comes as much from the ‘avant-garde’ aura of 
provocation and disobedience which surrounds her name as it does from her practice 
itself. 
 
Kenneth Goldsmith’s text Gertrude Stein on Punctuation also claims Stein in the form 
of citation, this time taking an extract from a text by Stein, her lecture Poetry and 
Grammar, to form the entire content of his own work.
10
 Stein’s original lecture, 
delivered in November 1934 to students at Chicago University, contains a section on 
punctuation which begins ‘There are some punctuations that are interesting and there 
are some punctuations that are not’.
11
 In this part of the lecture, Stein expresses a 
contempt for punctuation marks which is both playful and serious: a playful 
provocation about the function and necessity of punctuation, and a serious challenge 
to received ideas and unexamined practices. Goldsmith reproduces this section as a 
discrete text and follows it with a version submitted to a process of erasure, a typical 
conceptual writing technique, in which he removes all the words and leaves only the 
punctuation marks used in the printed version of Stein’s lecture. On his title page, 






    KENNETH GOLDSMITH.12 
                                                           
9 Craig Dworkin, Parse (Berkeley: Atelos, 2008). 
10 Kenneth Goldsmith, Gertrude Stein on Punctuation (Newton, N. J: Abaton Books, 1999). 
11 Goldsmith, Gertrude Stein on Punctuation, p.1.  




He then reproduces the extract from her lecture as his new text, re-titling and re-
authoring her work as his own. The work is therefore written now, and by Goldsmith, 
and this draws Stein into the present just as the Language poets do when they 
reproduce and discuss her work in The L=A=N=G=U=A=G=E Book as one of their 
own.  
 
In the erased version of the lecture which follows the extract from Stein’s text, the 
words are removed and the punctuation, rather than occurring in the same 
arrangement as it had in the original, appears scattered around the empty pages. In this 
form, it no longer functions as punctuation, instead becoming the elements of a 
pattern arranged by Goldsmith. Thus, in homage to Stein’s scepticism about 
punctuation (what David Crystal calls ‘loving-hate’) Goldsmith stops the punctuation 
marks from doing their work and creates out of them something abstract.
13
 The fact 
that his text has the appearance of the punctuation having been flung down on the 
page also reflects Stein’s ambivalence because it gives the impression that he is 
discarding it (whilst simultaneously retaining it). The commas are scattered amongst 
the periods, sometimes upside down, sometimes sideways, sometimes the right way 
up, as if thrown to the wind. This reflects Stein’s particular ambivalence about 
commas, about which in the lecture she says ‘I have refused them so often and left 
them out so much and did without them so continually that I have come finally to be 
indifferent to them. I do not now care whether you put them in or not’.
14
 Indeed, in his 
misaligned placing of them, Goldsmith is careless with commas just as Stein is, 
reproducing the sensibility she displays. Moreover, this effect cannot be created with 
periods, which have no right way up, and this aspect of the abstract pattern appears to 
reflect the greater respect she has for them. For Stein, periods ‘have a life of their own 
a necessity of their own a feeling of their own a time of their own. And that feeling 
that life that necessity that time can express itself in an infinite variety that is the 
reason that I have always remained true to periods’.
15
 The value and necessity of the 
period and what Stein later in the lecture calls the ‘enfeebling’ nature of the comma 
are therefore both reiterated in Goldsmith’s abstraction. Juxtaposed with the scattered 
commas in their random alignments, the periods seem more solid and consistent, 
                                                           
13 David Crystal, Making a Point: The Pernickity Story of English Punctuation (London: Profile Books, 
2015), p.349. 
14 Goldsmith, Gertrude Stein on Punctuation, p.5. 
15 Goldsmith, Gertrude Stein on Punctuation, p.4. 
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whereas the commas look arbitrary and frivolous. His text therefore repeats her 
scepticism in another form.  
 
In this way, Goldsmith abstracts from Stein’s work in order to create an echo of her 
intention and a restatement of her views. He has changed the text, but it still says the 
same thing. This presents the text as at some level ‘being’ what it speaks, and this 
reads Stein’s original remarks on punctuation as having a conceptual function by 
suggesting that as well as expressing its ideas it also embodies them. This once again 
draws Stein into a movement which has emerged decades after her death. It also, 
however, acts as an indication of pure allegiance, a silent reiteration of Stein’s text 
which gestures to her significance but does not attempt to elucidate or substantiate 
that claim.  
 
Indeed, at times the citation of Stein appears rather forced. In Uncreative Writing, 
Goldsmith offers a critique of contemporary creative-writing teaching practices and 
the literature associated with them. In the introduction he expresses the view that 
creative-writing guides ‘coerc[e] us to prioritise the theatrical over the mundane as the 
basis for our writings’ and gives an example from the Complete Idiot’s Guide to 
Creative Writing: “Using the first-person point of view, explain how a 55-year old 
man feels on his wedding day. It is his first marriage.”’ Goldsmith argues that he 
‘prefer[s] the ideas of Gertrude Stein, who…tells of her dissatisfaction with such 
techniques’. He then quotes The Autobiography of Alice B Toklas in order to show 
that her view of writing is very different from this: ‘“She experimented with 
everything in trying to describe. She tried a bit inventing words but she soon gave that 
up. The english language was her medium and with the english language the task was 
to be achieved, the problem solved. The use of fabricated words offended her, it was 
an escape into imitative emotionalism”’ (8). Whilst it is certainly true that Stein would 
not follow the advice of the creative writing guide he quotes, the evidence Goldsmith 
supplies to support his preference for Stein’s approach is entirely inappropriate. 
Stein’s comment is a dismissal of the use of invented or ‘fabricated’ words such as 
those employed for example in the Zaum poetry of Viktor Khlebnikov, and nothing to 





 This enthusiastic misreading of Stein reveals once more that the significance of 
the allegiance in itself is more important than its substance.  
 
Although it is only a detail, Goldsmith’s slip indicates something significant about 
what Stein represents for this movement and about how she figures in its construction 
of its own literary history. It suggests that Stein is important as an icon rather than as 
the example of an originary practice. As we have seen, Stein’s work, firmly embedded 
in the modernist scene of which she was a part, makes its meanings very much in the 
context of those other practices. The idea posited by Place and Fitterman that Stein’s 
work embodies a shift in modern consciousness of which they are the inheritors must 
be understood in the light of the embeddedness and inter-relatedness of Stein’s work 
with the other works, gestures and actions around it. That is to say, Stein’s practice is 
by no means exceptional, it is an aspect of a general mode, and therefore in claiming 
Stein they must claim all those other aspects in the context of which her work made 
sense. The fact that they consistently isolate Stein as the ‘avant-garde’ modernist 
rather than seeing her as the product of her moment reveals that, for them, she means 
something else, something other than an originating practitioner in whose work they 
can see the primary impulses of their own. In looking further at her presence in the 
Anthology of Conceptual Writing, it will become clear that Stein is for them not a 
precursor for a type of practice but, rather, a cypher for the avant-garde position as 
such. 
 
The Anthology of Conceptual Writing: the ‘production of a mode’ 
 
Although she is assigned a prominent position in much of the discourse of conceptual 
writing, Stein’s work does not appear in the Anthology, despite the inclusion of 
modernist writers who are not given such exceptional status. Notably, the Anthology 
includes work by Louis Aragon and Tristan Tzara, writers who fit more neatly into 
the category of historical avant-garde movements identified by Peter Bürger who, as 
we have seen, Goldsmith quotes in his introduction.  Stein’s name appears a number 
of times in the Anthology, however, in the introduction and in the preambles which 
introduce each writer’s work. In contrast to The L=A=N=G=U=A=G=E Book, the 
Anthology points to Stein without including or engaging with the work itself. This 
                                                           
16 It is interesting in the light of Stein’s dismissal of the techniques of Zaum to note that Marjorie 
Perloff cites Khlebnikov as, like Stein, an example of ‘avant-garde’ modernism.  
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represents once again an example of empty reference – Stein is there in name only. As 
in Foucault’s late 60’s formulation, Stein’s name comes to represent a pure ‘author 
function’ without even the content of the work her name would signify. This is 
problematic in that it has a version of Stein which is ideological and unexamined, and 
she becomes in this treatment a canonical figure, and therefore subject to one of the 
processes of institutionalisation which conceptual writing seeks to resist – or at least 
to complicate. Indeed, the canon is one of the primary forms of modernist 
institutionalisation which these late twentieth and early twenty-first century ‘post-
modern’ and ‘avant-garde’ movements identify and critique. 
 
The marking of Stein as a canonical figure is also achieved in the form of the 
references to her in the preambles. In the introduction to Christopher Knowles’s 1979 
‘Typings’ the work is described as ‘a pop-infused update to Steinian concerns’ (327). 
The adjective ‘Steinian’ in itself indicates the category of the canon. Using her name 
as an adjective ascribes to it the the status of denotation and therefore assumes for it a 
defined and permanent signification. Stein as an emptied ‘author function’ is also a set 
of expectations, a brand. At times the references seem particularly throwaway, 
indicating a ‘nod’ in Stein’s direction which appears to function solely to reinforce a 
shared sensibility. The preamble to the extract from Ariana Reines’s text ‘The Cow’, 
which intersperses quotations from a government review of carcass disposal with the 
poet’s exploration of the relations between language and violence, ends with a 
reference to Stein:  ‘As Gertrude Stein wrote in Tender Buttons (Paris: Claire Marie, 
1914): “out of an eye comes research, out of selection comes painful cattle”’ (508). 
The parallel drawn between Reines’s text and Stein’s is entirely arbitrary, predicated 
on a random semantic echo in the words ‘research’, ‘painful’ and ‘cattle’ which 
connects the texts in the mind of the editor. Devoid of any substantive comparison, 
this reference simply performs the function of an ‘in-joke’ which draws together those 
in the know. This serves to encourage an exclusive group mentality of the type 
explored by Stein in ‘The 15
th
 of November’, the text which critically inhabits the 
phrase ‘enough said’ in order to draw out the inherent violence of its inclusionary and 
therefore its exclusionary force.  
 
The discussion of the Wiener Gruppe, a small poetry movement in the Vienna of the 




the Vienna Group looked to the most radical prewar poets for inspiration: Gertrude Stein, Paul 
Scheerbart, and Kurt Schwitters, who, as Rhum states, “if known at all, were hardly taken note of and 
dismissed as outsiders who had been deservedly forgotten. For us they represented the rediscovered, 
true traditions with which our poetic linked up organically. From where else should we proceed if not 
from the so-called ‘end-points’?” (569)  
 
This is significant in its echo of conceptual writing’s position, and it is interesting 
firstly that Gerhard Rhum is quoted so fully in this respect and secondly that Stein is 
once again figured as ‘most radical’. The narrative that conceptual writing adopts has 
strong parallels with Rhum’s statement: the need to develop that which has lain 
undeveloped in twentieth century, that which has not become an aspect of mainstream 
culture, and to continue a history out of those read as marginalised or illegitimate 
works. This is important for conceptual writing because it wants, perhaps in all senses 
of the word, to occupy the position of the marginal, the illegitimate, in its desire to 
challenge hegemonic institutions and cultural mainstreaming.  
 
This is meaningful in the practice of conceptual writing if it is explicit, that is, if the 
lineage which includes Stein is explicitly selected from history as a conceptual 
project, and if the construction of a genealogy is foregrounded as a construction, a 
practice rather than the documentation of a natural process or the uncovering of a 
truth hitherto obscured. Indeed, the genealogy proposed by an anthology can in itself 
be seen as a conceptual work: the realising of a concept rather than the reification of a 
canon or the institutionalisation of a movement. Craig Dworkin’s 2012 A Handbook 
of Protocols for Literary Listening, for example, is a pamphlet which engages with 
the practice of the anthology in just such a manner.
17
 Composed of a selection of 
literary texts reflecting an engagement with sound, the anthology listens to the texts 
which listen, and in this self-reflexive practice it is a work in itself generated around 
the concept of listening. This self-reflexivity is reflected in the preface, in which 
Dworkin seeks to ‘re-imagine’ the practice of listening as a kind of ‘survey’ which 
transfers ‘the survey’s modes of attention  to the aural realm’. The Handbook is, 
therefore, as an attempt to map the ways in which the texts themselves ‘formally 
examine the sonic conditions’, a survey of texts which themselves are engaged in a 
survey: it listens to writers listening. Moreover, Dworkin’s caveat, that his survey is 
‘suggestive rather than exhaustive’ and ‘not an encyclopaedia of practices’ is 
emphatic about the status of the anthology as a temporary and contingent selection 
                                                           
17 Craig Dworkin, A Handbook of Protocols for Literary Listening (New York: Whitney Museum of 
American Art, 2012). 
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rather than a definitive one.
18
  The preface, therefore, lays bare the devices of 
selection and combination which have shaped the anthology and the principle upon 
which they are grounded, and insists upon the tentative nature of those choices. In this 
way, it is indeed a conceptual text in its own right, engaging explicitly with its own 
mode and foregrounding the conceptual basis of its own content, form and function. 
 
The production of an anthology which constructs a literary history and an attendant 
genealogy is a more problematic proposition, however, particularly if the 
foregrounding or laying bare of the element of choice and its contingency are 
compromised. In his preface to Against Expression, Goldsmith’s reversal of the 
notion of historical precedent, in which Stein is read as if she anticipated the future of 
conceptual writing and is therefore ahead of her time because that future was 
inevitable and the correct unfolding of history, already proposes a conception of an 
alternative literary history which occludes the element of choice. This conception is 
also reflected in Craig Dworkin’s assertion in his preface to the Anthology that 
literature has not developed meaningfully from its ‘radical’ modernist origins. These 
formulations belie Place and Fitterman’s careful note that history is a form of poetry, 
that is, a formal selection and placing of elements which generates meaning: a 
composition.  
 
Because an anthology, as just such a composition, is by definition selective, it is also 
an agent of the destructive practices of exclusion or elimination which are inevitable 
aspects of that selection process. In order to construct a story of literary inheritance – 
a genealogy – or to define a movement or a period, it must select and combine 
particular writers and legitimise particular poetic practices, and therefore it must 
exclude and marginalise others. The anthology has often functioned as the conduit 
through which a canon and a chronology are authorised in the construction of a 
dominant version of literary history. But it can also be a creative force, a medium for 
the productive possibilities of curation, composition, and assemblage. Indeed, one of 
the key functions of the anthology in recent times has been the recuperation of 
marginalised writers.
19
 As one of the major forces involved in the construction of a 
story of literary history, then, the anthology presents a significant tension. 
                                                           
18 Dworkin, Handbook, p.3. 
19 Prime examples of this are Bonnie Kime Scott’s The Gender of Modernism (see Introduction note 




This tension is, however, dealt with directly in the Anthology of Conceptual Writing. 
It explicitly attempts to resist the authorising, naturalising tendency whilst 
simultaneously attempting to draw what Dworkin calls ‘emerging literary tendencies 
today’ into a coherent category. In establishing the terms of this anthology, Dworkin’s 
introductory essay ‘The Fate of Echo’ engages overtly with the problem of the 
anthology per se. Recognising that ‘the paratext always suggests a perspective from 
which to read’, Dworkin explicitly takes hold of the paratextual apparatus of his own 
anthology and presents it as the embodiment of a self-conscious argument rather than 
as the record of an organic, natural occurrence (xxiv).
20
 He is also concerned that, in 
resistance to the reifying potential of the anthology, his anthology does not represent a 
definitive statement or a definitive canon. He makes it clear, therefore, that the 
emphasis is on the curatorial, compositional function rather than the authorising or 
legitimising function. As he explains, the Anthology is an extension of the online 
UbuWeb Anthology of Conceptual Writing, whose ‘curatorial premise’, is to ‘look 
beyond received histories’ (xxiv).
21
 This anthology is therefore particularly significant 
because it is presented as an overt attempt to construct a story for itself, in a self-
conscious engagement with both the problem of the anthology’s authority and the 
problem of the literary canon with which it is so often entangled.  
 
This claim to a curatorial function, as in Dworkin’s Handbook, appears to get around 
the problem of the anthology’s authority by treating it as a loose and temporary 
assemblage which is in itself a part of the emergence of the category, rather than a 
conclusive and legitimate record of this emergence after the fact. Indeed, Dworkin 
characterises his own activity as ‘assembling the present collection’ (xli). Moreover, 
in using the term ‘emerging’, as Goldsmith also does in Uncreative Writing, Dworkin 
                                                                                                                                                                       
Kime Scott (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 2007) which expands the remit further to enable the 
study of modernism’s ‘various neglected themes and questions’ and ‘demonstrate both the value and 
the complexity of gender as a locus for fielding issues of political activism, cultural production, 
performance and diverse identity formation on a global stage’. For a discussion of the anthology as 
vehicle for an ‘alternative’ poetics excluded from the modernist canon see Marjorie Perloff, ‘Whose 
New American Poetry? Anthologizing in the Nineties’, Diacritics 26: 3, 104-123 (1996). 
20 See Gerard Genette, Paratext: Thresholds of Interpretation (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1997), pp 1-2 ‘the paratext is what enables a text to become a book and to be offered as such to its 
readers and, more generally, to the public… It is… as Philippe Lejeune put it, "a fringe of the printed 
text which in reality controls one's whole reading of the text." Indeed, this fringe, always the conveyor 
of a commentary that is authorial or more or less legitimated by the author, constitutes a zone 
between text and off-text, a zone not only of transition but also of transaction: a privileged place of a 
pragmatics and a strategy’. 
21 See http://www.ubu.com/concept/ 
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denotes a mysterious, unpredictable, perhaps even ‘quasi-irrational’ process over 
which the anthology has no influence. As Dworkin says,  
 
This anthology documents the explosion of publications since the turn of the millennium under the sign 
of the conceptual…one of the reasons for this collection is to offer a snapshot of an instant in the midst 
of an energetic reformation, just before the mills of critical assessment and canonical formation have 
had a chance to complete their first revolutions (xliv).  
 
In other words, the anthology seeks to recognise the category without fixing it: that is, 
without contributing to its institutionalisation. Dworkin’s language here –‘Snapshot’ 
‘instant’ ‘midst’ ‘energetic’ – suggests it is not composed: rather, that it is an 
immediate, almost unmediated capture of a phenomenon as it moves. And it defines 
itself against the activity of canonisation in the image of the ‘mills’ which are in 
contrast weighty, destructive and inexorable, and which produce something different 
from the original practices which are ground in the revolution of their stones.  
 
The anthology as such is, however, defined by the activities of selection and 
combination which so inevitably create the kind of closed and authorising paradigm 
Dworkin wishes to reject. Because this is in the nature of the mode, Dworkin’s desire 
to present a seemingly unmediated record of these tendencies serves only to underplay 
the activity of selection and combination with which the anthologist must necessarily 
engage. Indeed, I would argue that rather than foregrounding and laying bare these 
choices and their implications, the composition of this anthology in fact serves only to 
obscure them.  
 
Paratext in Against Expression: An Anthology of Conceptual Writing 
 
These underlying patterns are obscured in the text in particular because of its 
deployment and foregrounding of a number of paratextual devices which are there to 
enact the argument offered in the introductory essays (that this anthology is an 
assemblage, is a temporary act of curation). First, each work is introduced with those 
preambles, each of which represents an argument for the work’s inclusion, a statement 
about why the text can be identified as belonging to the category ‘conceptual writing’. 
For example, the first preamble runs thus: ‘[Monica] Aasprong’s work takes a 
minimalist trajectory of concrete and visual poetry – from Stephane Mallarme to E.E. 
Cummings to Aram Saroyan – to new and extreme limits while at the same time 
taking concerns of visually based minimalism into the sphere of the page’ (3). This 
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follows the spirit of the anthology as an argument for an emerging movement, in that 
it describes Aasprong’s work by referring to some of conceptual writing’s practices 
and precedents, previously identified in the introductory essays. This presents the 
anthology and the inclusion of this example as simply a suggestion about how these 
practices might be drawn together; explicitly as a working hypothesis rather than a 
definitive statement. This is augmented by both the casual listing of other potentially 
‘conceptual’ writers and the fact that they are in parenthesis, which devices both 
provide the feeling of a temporary assembly of comparable practices. These 
techniques are employed in almost all the preambles, implying that the selections in 
the anthology are not fixed, definitive or authoritative. In this way, the Anthology 
seeks to resist the institutionalisation of both the canon and the academy, the two 
institutions evoked in Dworkin’s wish to evade ‘canonical formation’ and ‘critical 
assessment’.  
 
Along with the ‘curatorial premise’ proposed by the preambles, a number of other 
prominent paratextual devices are deployed in order to counteract other 
institutionalising forms or processes. First, the anthology is organised by author in 
alphabetical order. This creates a levelling effect because it randomises the process of 
combination. In this way, it appears to have been taken out of their hands, suggesting 
that they have not arranged the names in significant ways – either to canonise 
particular authors, or to suggest any prominent coteries or significant relationships. 
Second, there is no indication in the contents page of the dates on which the texts 
were published or when the authors were – or are – writing. As anthologies are often 
organised chronologically, the absence of even an indication of chronological 
relationship becomes an overt declaration of resistance to the logic of development 
and the related activity of periodisation. In other words, it is a refusal to offer a 
genealogical account of the category. In the baldest interpretation, the contents page 
embodies a refusal to engage with literary history at all, providing instead a 
decontextualized field of works connected only by their relevance to the category of 
‘conceptual writing’. Because these authors are presented in a vacuum, stateless, 
timeless, divested of any other means of determination, we are left with only with 
their names.  
 
This seems therefore to corroborate Dworkin’s intention to offer a loose and 
unmediated assemblage, presenting a collection of undifferentiated texts not subject to 
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the institutionalising processes of periodisation or canonisation. There are so many 
writers here, and so many more are mentioned in the preambles, that the initial 
impression is of a levelling inclusiveness determined only by a general category. This 
looks like an equalising field constructed – or deconstructed – out of a flattening of 
both history and hierarchy. These compositional devices, however, serve in effect to 
hide the other rationales and processes involved in the selection and combination of 
texts, and these are revealed in other ways of reading the text which looks both 
beneath and beyond those devices which are foregrounded.  Despite these devices and 
the argument they support, the Anthology does have a literary genealogy grounded in 
the notions of period and canon it seeks to resist.  
 
Turning to some of the newer methodologies, made possible by the development and 
availability of digital quantitative data processing, it is possible to examine those 
other, less overt paratextual features which mediate the reader’s engagement with the 
writers and the texts in the anthology and which in more oblique ways construct a 
representation of conceptual writing as a movement. Methods involving data analysis 
for the study of literary texts first emerged in the 1960s at Cambridge and have since 
then grown much – though very gradually – in their scope and popularity.
22
 These 
quantitative methods have been deployed in modernist studies in many forms, for 
example in Bonnie Kime Scott’s 1990 The Gender of Modernism, and more recently 





Figure 2: Bonnie Kime Scott, ‘A Tangled Mesh of Modernists’.
24
 
                                                           
22 For a concise historiography, see Kenneth M. Price and Ray Siemens, ‘Introduction’, in Literary 
Studies in the Digital Age: An Evolving Anthology (New York: Modern Languages Association: 2013), 
https://dlsanthology.commons.mla.org/introduction/. See Franco Moretti, Graphs, Maps, Trees 
(London: Verso, 2005), pp.67-92 for an influential example of this method for literary studies. 
23 http://modjourn.org/, a joint project of Brown University and The University of Tulsa.  
24 Kime Scott, The Gender of Modernism, p.10. 
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Such analysis is most often used either to trace the underlying patterns in individual 
texts, as in Antonia and McKenna’s study of interior monologue in Joyce’s Ulysses, 
or alternatively on a broader scale to trace the changes in a particular genre or journal 
over time, or to map the networks of relations – between writers or of texts – in a 
given period.
25
 Kime Scott’s network of modernist relations, for example, in which 
Stein figures prominently, served to underscore the significant roles of women on the 
modernist scene (fig. 2). More recently, Tanya E Clement’s work on The Making of 
Americans used data plotting tools to investigate the nature and function of repetition 









In considering the role of Against Expression in shaping the representation of 
conceptual writing as a literary mode with a literary history, both these functions of 
data analysis are relevant. Against Expression is a text, and so a dataset can be 
gathered from the paratextual apparatus – the introductory essays and the preambles 
to each text – in order to capture the underlying patterns created by the frequency, 
placing and juxtaposition of author’s names, which are not available at a single 
reading but would rather emerge more gradually over repeated and variable 
engagements with the text. Put simply, the more times an author’s name is mentioned, 
the more likely it is the reader will come across that name, and so the more significant 
that author will seem to be. Further, the more names with which that name is 
associated, the more they will be read as a prominent influence, nodal point, or typical 
                                                           
25 Wayne McKenna and Alexis Antonia, ‘“A Few Simple Words” of Interior Monologue in Ulysses: 
Reconfiguring the Evidence’, Lit Linguist Computing 11: 2 (1996), 55-66. 
26 Tanya E. Clement, ‘A thing not beginning and not ending’: using digital tools to distant-read 
Gertrude Stein's The Making of Americans’, Lit Linguist Computing 23: 3 (2008), 361-381. 
27 Clement, p.372. 
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practice – given that the preambles draw together references to ‘like’ practices. Thus, 
the analysis works at the level of the text, just as the studies of Joyce’s Ulysses and 
Stein’s The Making of Americans do. This form of analysis really replicates the 
function of techniques of close reading by revealing what the reader might grasp but 
not ‘know’. This is the function of enabling an understanding of how the text creates 
its effects by reading with a closer and more methodical attention than the narrative or 
form of the text at first seems to encourage. In the case of quantitative analysis, the 
close attention of the individual reader is replaced by the digital attention of a reading 
machine. Both, nonetheless, perform the same function: to read the text in a way 
which provides evidence of how it works at the level of reading it seems to require the 
reader to access it at, something which cannot fully be known at that level. In the 
analysis of the Anthology of Conceptual Writing, the patterns of repetition and 
juxtaposition of author’s names creates an effect – that the reader is encouraged to 
‘know’ that some writers are more influential or significant than others, but without 
being made explicitly aware of this effect or its techniques.  
 
More than simply providing data for how the text works, however, this method can 
also be used, in this instance, on the broader scale represented by Kime Scott’s plot of 
modernist associations.
28
 Because the Anthology constructs a series of associations 
between authors, and because it seeks to represent the emergence of a literary 
movement over time, the data can also be used to draw a map of the history and the 
literary network it constructs. Plotting the frequency of names mentioned can form a 
picture of the relative significance of individual authors for this movement, assuming 
that the authors which are mentioned most are signified as most important or 
influential, and plotting the patterns formed by the conjunctions or intersections of 
author’s names can provide a picture of the network of relations the Anthology 
creates. This addresses the problem of positivism associated with the collection of 
empirical data: this method, rather than representing the objective ‘truth’ of the 
emergence of this movement, seeks, rather,  to quantify how this movement sees 
itself, how it wishes to be understood, what it values, how it operates. 
 
Visualising the hidden paratext 
 
                                                           
28 And in the instance of any anthology which contains preambles like these. 
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First, it is possible, by reinstating the chronology the Anthology avoids, to trace the 
ways in which this new avant-garde attaches itself to a quite traditional reading of 
literary periods. In visualising the data gathered from the introductory essays and 
preambles as a graph which has a timeline as the x axis, it becomes clear that there is 
a pattern generated by the clustering of inclusions (fig.4). Looking at the spread of the 
works included as examples of conceptual writing over 10 year blocks from 1900 to 
2010, we can see that the anthology expresses an underlying periodization in the 
clusters of associations around particular moments in a chronology. With the 
inclusions proliferating around the 1910s and 20s, again around the 1960s, and with 
another surge in the late 1970s and into the 1980s, it restates the boundaries of 
modernism, of pop art, and of post-modernism, and so the examples of conceptual 
writing gather around literary moments already considered significant in the 
genealogy of the avant-garde posited by the Language poets and by Marjorie Perloff. 
In this way, the anthology serves to reinforce the narrative of an interrupted or 
resurgent avant-garde already proposed, and presents a literary genealogy in order to 
assert the legitimacy of the movement.  
 
It also reveals that, in the construction represented by the Anthology, whilst the 
literary history of conceptual writing manifests as fluctuation or interruption, the 
general trajectory is that of growth. The sense of a bourgeoning movement is implied 
because, with each example of ‘resurgence’, the number of works included increases, 
indicating an increase in the number of writers engaged in conceptual writing over 
time. In the contemporary resurgence, the number of writers occupying the same 
positon is so great that on the graph it appears as a tangled knot of names. Despite its 
interrupted trajectory, therefore, it provides a developmental model of evolutionary 
proliferation from a limited primary manifestation: from, as it were, an original 
‘parent’. The movement’s avant-garde credentials are provided by legitimising 
historical figures, among whom Stein is prominent. This underlying formation 
legitimises the movement through a pattern of precedent and heredity and suggests an 
evolutionary model of proliferation in which a successful ‘species’ multiplies over 
time from a single base.
 29
 
                                                           
29 In order to provide a picture of as much of the data as possible on a single chart, in Figure 4, 
Mallarme (1874) and Diderot (1796), the two earlier authors, are not included. Moreover, because 
they are single representatives of their own moments, they appear more as rogue elements, originals 
rather than originators, and so not drawn into a literary genealogy as precursors in the same way as 








                                                           
30 Produced in collaboration with Amy Macdougall, PhD student, Medical Statistics, National Heart 
and Lung Institute, Imperial College University of London. 
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What is problematic here is that, because it is only an underlying aspect of the text’s 
composition, obscured as it is by the alphabetical order of the author’s names rather 
than the chronological order of the works themselves, it is not attended to directly, 
meaning that the assertion is taken as read rather than presented as an active and 
conscious choice. It is also important to note that the cluster around modernism 
reflects only its early phase, and so this narrative also reflects Marjorie Perloff’s 
history of a modernist avant-garde repressed early in the twentieth century only to 
resurface in the form of select ‘postmodern’ inheritors. What is added here is a greater 
emphasis on the history of conceptual art with the inclusion of artworks which use 
language as their medium and which had not hitherto been considered as poetry or as 
the inheritance of a modernist poetic – notably the work of Warhol and Cage. This 
plot also reveals the function of the term ‘conceptual’ in the retelling of literary 
history: as a stand-in for the troublesome, either too precise or too nebulous category 
‘avant-garde’. If all these works and the names associated with them can be re-
categorised as conceptual, then the history of avant-garde writing is in this 
representation the history of conceptual writing. 
 
This construction of an alternative strain of literary history is also further obscured by 
the suggestion that the editors have looked back at the whole history of writing and 
found a unifying category which differentiates some texts from others. This 
categorisation of the conceptual, because it is both abstract and general, means that in 
this reading the texts appear to escape all other categories and are no longer defined 
by literary periodisation or by their place in a canon. This is most apparent when, 
towards the end of his introductory essay, Dworkin claims that ‘particular techniques 
and devices – such as appropriation or transcription, however novel they may seem – 
have always had precedents’ and that ‘the figure of the uncreative writer is hardly 
new’. Citing Ovid, the Bible, Cervantes, Flaubert and Gogol, Dworkin proposes 
conceptual writing as a neutral category which stands outside time and so can apply to 
any time. For him, this means that it provides a way of understanding how the text 
reflects its time because each use of the mode can be read in relation to its moment, 
and ‘their meaning simply changes with the cultural moment in which they are 
deployed (context, again, is all to the point)’ (xlv). 
 
Dworkin’s claim for conceptual writing requires once again the problematic narrative 
of a disrupted literary history: Dworkin effectively replaces Quartermain’s category of 
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recurring resistance or disjunctiveness and Perloff’s revised category of the deferred 
avant-garde with the category of the conceptual. Indeed, Dworkin’s elaboration of the 
conceptual here means it comes very close to Eliot’s 1919 notion of innovation: a 
recurrent mode which replaces the previous eternal classification of the beautiful with 
another timeless category which can transcend time and is therefore relevant for all 
times. Thus, in the same manner in which Eliot’s category of innovation can be seen 
as an aspect of the institutionalisation of modernism, the category of the conceptual, 
proposed in this way, seems potentially much compromised in its resistance to the 
institutionalisation it seeks to avoid.  
 
A closer look at the ways in which the names are deployed also provides another 
understanding of the way in which the hidden paratext creates an underlying 
genealogy. On the same chart, the y axis indicates the number of times the author is 
referred to in the anthology as a whole (fig. 4). This means that the higher the point is, 
the greater the number of references to the author in the anthology. Thus, Andy 
Warhol and John Cage are the highest points on the chart, having 10 and 9 mentions 
respectively. In addition to this, the size of the point on the chart reflects the number 
of other authors referred to in the particular writer’s preamble.
31
 David Melnick’s 
preamble, for example, mentions David Antin, Walter Benjamin, Andy Warhol, 
Steve, McCaffery, Charles Bernstein and Ron Silliman. In these other details, which 
reflect two different kinds of significance accorded by the way the names occur in the 
anthology, a further indicator of the evolutionary logic of the Anthology can be 
discerned. The number of times an author is mentioned (their level on the y axis) 
suggests the level of influence they exert, and the relative size of the points (denoting 
the number of other writers associated with that author) suggests their role as a 
conduit or connector of like practices, a drawing in rather than a handing down. These 
two kinds of relations come very close to notions of kinship, with the influencers 
ascending the y axis reflecting a ‘parental’ role as originals whose traces appear on 
                                                           
31 Stein’s name is in the introductory essays rather than in a preamble (because her work is itself is 
not included in the anthology), so it appears here in a form which reflects that. Each author included 
in the introductory essays is given two extra ‘points’ to reflect the ‘fraternal’ connection this provides 
to all the other authors in the introductions and the significance this affords them. Stein, Pound and 
Duchamp are all mentioned in the introductory essays. Neither Stein nor Pound feature in the 
anthology itself, so they do not have preambles, and although an excerpt from Duchamp’s ‘notes’ is 
included, no other author is mentioned in his preamble. The names of these three writers, therefore, 
are the same size. This reflects the fact that they are all included in the introductions whilst not being 
directly linked with other authors through their own preambles. 
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many other works, and the bigger connector figures ascribed a ‘fraternal’ function in 
drawing together like practices.  
 
A closer look at the twenty-first century corner of the chart reveals a proliferation of 
connecting figures over time (fig. 5).  
 
 
Figure 5: Twenty-first century positions on the field. 
 
This part of the chart, with its greater number of larger, ‘fraternal’ points, for example 
K. Silem Mohammad, whose preamble mentions 9 other authors, shows that the 
anthology, in presenting the contemporary movement it identifies, also ratifies that 
movement by connecting the twenty-first century writers it names to each other and to 
the other authors in the literary genealogy it constructs. Most of the recent figures are 
situated low in the field, a reflection of the fact that many of them are mentioned only 
once or twice in the anthology as a whole. Two figures emerge from this scrum, 
however, distinguished by height and size and so being both mentioned more than 
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other contemporary writers and connected to more of them: Kenneth Goldsmith and 
Craig Dworkin.  In Dworkin and Goldsmith’s underlying genealogy, Stein is located 
as the literary originator of conceptual writing in earnest and the beginning of its 
proliferation, and they are its significant inheritors.    
 
What the charting of this data shows is an underlying evolutionary logic in conceptual 
writing’s literary history, and this is a logic which is also implicit in the prefatory 
essays themselves. This principle, in fact, hails us in the opening paragraph of the 
Anthology. Kenneth Goldsmith’s introductory essay begins with this observation: 
 
There is a room in the Musée d’Orsay that I call the room of possibilities. The museum is roughly set 
up chronologically, and you happily wend your way through the nineteenth century until you hit this 
one room that is a group of about a half a dozen painterly responses to the invention of the camera. One 
that sticks in my mind is a trompe l’oeil solution in which a painted figure reaches out of the frame into 
the viewer’s space. Another incorporates three-dimensional objects into the canvas. Great attempts, but 
as we all know, impressionism won out (xvii). 
 
This narrative figures the history of visual art as an evolutionary struggle in which  
 
 




some species fail and some succeed. The failed ‘solution[s]’ in Goldsmith’s 
representation take on the quality of alternative evolutionary strains – the unfulfilled 
‘possibilities’, as ‘attempts’ which have not been meaningfully incorporated into the 
living culture. This follows the branching model of Darwin’s tree diagram explicating 
the theory of the ‘Divergence of character’, in which failed mutations halt here and 
there as dead ends along the trajectory of species adaptation (fig.6).  
                                                           




Indeed, the examples Goldsmith describes are assigned the static quality of fossilised 
specimens, arrested in time: the figure which ‘reaches out’ and the objects painted 
‘into the canvas’. Significantly, the fact that the painters are not named condemns 
them further into extinction. They are relevant only as examples of what no longer 
exists: we would never have heard of them, and so their names mean nothing. 
Goldsmith’s story also transposes a Darwinian logic of adaptation: these examples 
could not adapt to the environmental changes, failed to respond successfully to 
conditions and so died out. Impressionism, on the other hand, is the right adaptation 
and so in ‘won out’. The story of what fails and what succeeds also naturalises a 
narrative of capitalist competition as the way things fall out if left to develop 
naturally, but it belies – even denies –the issue of the power of those very institutions 
this anthology seeks to challenge in shaping and mediating what survives and what 
goes extinct in literary history.  
 
This story about visual art reflects the anthology’s preoccupation with chronology, 
with the writing of its own literary history, and with the evolutionary logic which both 
legitimises its practices and naturalises its claim as the appropriate form for twenty-
first-century literary production. Indeed, in the discussion of contemporary literature 
this narrative sets up, the Darwinian model of adaptation is taken as read in 
Goldsmith’s assertion that ‘writing needs to redefine itself to adapt to the new 
environment of textual abundance’ (xvii). Not only does this model naturalise a 
version of literary history and claim it as the inevitable result of unmediated 
processes, it also contradicts the practice of recuperation for which Raymond 
Williams called, and to which the Language poets’ recuperation of Stein responded. 
Following the Darwinian model, practices which die out do so because they have not 
successfully adapted, and their extinction is the result of their unfitness for purpose. 
Understood in terms of this rationale, Stein’s work, like the work of the failed 
nineteenth-century painters, went extinct in the mid-twentieth century because it did 
not represent a successful response to the conditions of her era. This makes Stein a 
failed mutation, which in Darwin’s diagram means her work is the end of a genetic 
line and thus irrecoverable. The very fact that a work of art or literature can be 
recovered in the way Stein’s has, and in the way in which, for example, the activity of 
Bonnie Kime Scott recovers the work of other women modernists, shows us that 




Opening as it does with a reference to its logic: ‘this book has its origins in the 
UbuWeb Anthology of Conceptual Writing’, the narrative of evolution and adaptation 
also underlies Dworkin’s prefatory argument that ‘there is no reason to believe that 
different institutions, even when interrelated like art and literature, would develop at 
the same pace’ (xxiii; xl). The narrative of development is here taken as read, and the 
presupposition that development is an unambiguous model for literary history is used 
to support the view that the literary world’s failure to embrace conceptualism is 
evidence of its lack of development. Moreover, Dworkin deploys the imagery of 
procreation in his definition of the anthology’s remit:  ‘this anthology documents the 
explosion of publications since the turn of the millennium under the sign of the 
conceptual, and it attests to the literary energy of uncreative practices currently 
orbiting in swarms about these two terms’ (xliv). This language evokes narratives of 
species ‘explosion’, and of genetic reproduction, figured in the image of egg and 
sperm cells, contributing to the sense of an underlying evolutionary logic. Whilst 
Dworkin claims to be presenting an unmediated and temporary ‘snapshot’ of a 
contemporary movement in action, what the Anthology provides is much more a 
literary history for an established and significant movement in twentieth- and twenty-
first-century writing, a legitimising genealogy and a model of development.  
 
The problem with an evolutionary model for the avant-garde is not just that it sits very 
uncomfortably alongside the key notions – of rupture, disjunction and resistance to 
tradition – with which it is identified. It is also problematic because it legitimises a 
particular movement by making it seem like the natural and inevitable end-point of a 
progression. This is an organic, naturalising narrative of the kind Leonard Diepeveen, 
in his 2004 essay on modernist anthologies, ‘When did modernism begin? 
Formulating boundaries in the modern anthology’, ascribes to the most conservative 
examples. Diepeveen points out that the process of reification is particularly allied to 
those representations which offer an organic narrative in order to naturalise a story of 
modernism. Diepeveen suggests that ‘One major way of understanding modernism as 
a narrative was to think organically, a mode of conceptualising which would enable 
the boundaries of this book [i.e. the anthology] to seem natural’.
33
 He also points out 
that this technique is ‘used much more aggressively by conservatives than by 
                                                           
33 Leonard Diepeveen ‘When Did Modernism Begin? Formulating Boundaries in the Modern 




radicals’, in order to represent a particular version of modernism as emerging from 
‘unselfconscious processes of cause and effect that result in states of affairs that could 
not be any other than what they are’ (150-151). Thus, the conservative modernist 
anthology uses an organic representation of literary development – as evolution or 
growth – to legitimise a particular form of modernism and canonise a particular set of 
authors which then seem to represent a natural genealogy for modernism and 
therefore the genealogy.  
 
Understood like this, the evolutionary model which can be drawn out of the history 
the Anthology of Conceptual Writing assembles replicates one of the processes of 
institutionalisation which constructed the form of modernism Goldsmith and Dworkin 
explicitly reject. Indeed, this kind of naturalisation can also be read in both Goldsmith 
and Dworkin’s characterisation of conceptual writing as an ‘emerging tendency’, 
(Goldsmith UW 1) as ‘emerging literary tendencies today’ (Dworkin AE xxiv) or  as 
an ‘explosion’ of which the anthology simply provides a ‘snapshot’ (Dworkin AE 
xliv). These characterisations present the movement as a natural unmediated event, 
one which has come to pass as the result of the untrammelled processes of pseudo-
Darwinian selection. And in a related form of legitimisation, this narrative of 
proliferation also makes conceptual writing look like the result of its fitness for 
purpose, and it becomes in this narrative the most successful mode in which to 
respond to modernity.  
 
Troubling evolution: Stein and Rosenfield 
 
This history therefore follows an evolutionary model of development in which the 
‘genetic’ strain of conceptualism progressed successfully in visual art but atrophied 
for literature in the first quarter of the twentieth century. This narrative and the 
concepts of origin and genealogy necessary to it are used to endorse conceptual 
writing’s place in the histories of literature and visual art, offering a theoretical 
taxonomy which authenticates conceptual writing as the real legacy of an early-
twentieth-century avant-garde poetic. This evolutionary model is, however, 
problematized in the very practices it endorses: both in the work of Kim Rosenfield, a 
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contemporary poet included in the Anthology, and in the work of Gertrude Stein.
34
 In 
examining the ways in which this narrative is troubled in the literary practices the 
anthology seeks to validate, one can gain a fuller understanding of the contradictions 





As I have suggested, these related concepts of evolution, origin and genealogy are as 
problematic for modernism as they are for conceptual writing. Stein’s 1926 
unpublished work ‘Natural Phenomena’ and conceptual poet Kim Rosenfield’s 2008 
re:evolution both engage with this logic in ways which draw attention to its problems 
and limitations as a model for literary history. In Rosenfield’s text, the problem with 
the transposition of the principles of genetics and natural selection onto a narrative of 
literary history is indicated in the opening section: ‘Each copy of this book came 
along exactly during the day of publication. A second edition was ready to go and 
stamped and circulated in 30 languages. It became the first of its kind and a classic’.
36
 
Here, Rosenfield references both childbirth (euphemistically implied by ‘came along’)  
and literary publication: ‘each copy’ signifies both literary and genetic reproduction, 
‘stamped’ alludes simultaneously to genetic imprint and mode of production and 
‘circulated’ suggests dissemination – again, of both kinds. The claim that the text 
arrived ‘exactly on the day of publication’ suggests a tautology of timeliness which 
questions the notions of period and development – it arrived exactly when it arrived – 
therefore it was on time. The finality inherent in both the identification of origin (‘the 
first of its kind’) and in categorisation (‘a classic’) draws a salient parallel between the 
reifications of species classification and literary history. Tracing a literary tradition 
and identifying a canon is a finalising of forms, specifying a genetic strain, compiling 
a genealogy and cataloguing its development. In this sentence, Rosenfield collapses 
the moment of originality into the act of classification, using the past tense ‘became’ 
to intensify the pace at which the work is subsumed into a system and to emphasise 
the paradox that the classification of originality represents. The status of the classic 
                                                           
34 Kim Rosenfield’s work ‘The Other Me’ (2007), a composition made up of lines taken from 
psychologist Carl Rogers’s book Person to Person: The Problem of Being Human (1967) is included in 
the anthology. See Against Expression: An Anthology of Conceptual Writing, pp.516-518. 
35 For a defence of the evolutionary model of literary history, see Franco Moretti, Graphs, Maps, 
Trees, pp.67-92. 
36 Kim Rosenfield, re:evolution (Los Angeles: Les Figues Press, 2008), p.5. Further references are given 
after quotations in the text. 
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transforms the text into a model for literary production and the text is frozen at origin 
and reified by categorisation.  
 
This bears a direct relationship to Stein’s ‘Natural Phenomena’ and to her 1926 
lecture ‘Composition as Explanation’ for which ‘Natural Phenomena’, written at the 
same time, is an originating or ur-text. As we have seen in Chapter 3, in ‘Composition 
as Explanation’, the concept of the classic is highly problematic. Stein explicitly 
associates the classic with the process of classification: ‘the modern composition 
having become past is classified and the description of it is classical’, and the problem 
of classification, for Stein, is that it makes the work of art ‘go dead’ rather than being 
‘irritating annoying stimulating’.
37
 Classification draws the work into a system, 
subsuming it into a taxonomy, a range of what she calls ‘prepared’ meanings and 
significances. Rosenfield also signifies the problem of reification in her playful 
footnote to the opening lines of re:evolution: ‘Creation finalized plants through a 
stressed out Man-At-The-Top’ (5, n.1). In Rosenfield’s note, God appears as a 
company director and the finalising narrative of genetic classification is merged with 
those other reifying patriarchal stories of Western civilisation: Christianity and 
capitalism.  
 
An answer to this problem of the finalization of systems and their categories lies in 
the close study of Stein’s text and Rosenfield’s book and is hinted at in Sianne Ngai’s 
Introduction to Rosenfield’s text: ‘Though at moments re: evolution satirises the ugly 
history of scientific taxonomy … Rosenfield like Gertrude Stein refuses to let go 
entirely of its progressive promise and/or pleasures’.
38
 In both these texts, the 
structures and modes of evolutionary theory and its classifications are written through 
beyond their own logic to achieve a grasp of the constructedness of all histories. 
The fact that, as Ulla Dydo points out in her 2003 book Gertrude Stein: The Language 
That Rises, ‘Natural Phenomena’ is a close companion to ‘Composition as 
Explanation’, is significant for a discussion of literary history because it is in that 
lecture that Stein proposes her history for ‘the arts’.
39
 In ‘Composition as 
Explanation’, Stein places the work of her modernist contemporaries in a self-
reflexive relationship to the past which suggests that the defining feature of 
                                                           
37 Stein, ‘Composition as Explanation’, in Retallack Selections, p. 216; p.217. 
38 Sianne Ngai, ‘Introduction’, in Rosenfield re:evolution, pp.ix-xiv (p.xiv, n.4). 
39 See Ulla Dydo, Gertrude Stein: the Language that Rises, p.82. 
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modernism is that it is preoccupied with the question of its place in that history.
 
She 
ostensibly offers an evolutionary model in which human thought progresses in a 
developmental relation to what has gone before, forming definite periods which, in 
retrospect (but increasingly quickly), can be clearly categorised, traced back through a 
coherent genealogy to their origins. In order to illustrate this logic, Stein presents her 
own practice as exemplary, as having developed in a seemingly inevitable linear 
evolution from one form to another. As we have seen, in ‘Composition as 
Explanation’, Stein makes the claim: ‘the progress of my conceptions was the natural 
progress entirely in accordance with my epoch’ (222). Her argument suggests that 
Western art in its development has moved through successively sophisticated stages 
away from its origin in experience to a point of absolute self-reflexivity in which art is 
about itself. Stein’s lecture and its counterpart, however, offer an immanent challenge 
to the logic of Stein’s own argument in the complicated status of the word ‘natural’. 
Used often in the lecture and forming the basis of the meditation represented by 
‘Natural Phenomena’, the word ‘natural’ is radically problematized.  
 
As the title would suggest, ‘Natural Phenomena’ deals with the problem of empirical 
reality. The text opens with a representation of the role of consensus in the 
interpretation of sense data: ‘It is natural that in daylight they agree agree to natural 
phenomena’.
40
 In this opening line, the pronoun ‘they’ appears to signify a collective 
engagement with agreed norms, with ‘daylight’ suggesting at once the public and the 
rational. The repetition of ‘agree’, as well as foregrounding the role of agreement in 
seeing, also acknowledges the consensus involved in the act of perception: seeing as 
an agreed medium, understanding as a cultural act. The first usage of the word 
‘natural’ takes it in its colloquial sense to mean ‘commonly accepted’, and signifies 
the custom and practice of human culture rather than its primary – and opposing – 
definition as something not caused or made by mankind. The second use of the word 
in the phrase ‘natural phenomena’, however, does evoke the primary denotation, 
signifying that which occurs in nature. The phrase ‘It is natural’ therefore, in the 
context of the second usage, draws out the irony of these two opposing meanings. 
This paradox foregrounds the reliance of agreement in language for the making of 
meaning and for a grasp of the natural. Thus, it problematizes very directly the 
                                                           
40Gertrude Stein, ‘Natural Phenomena’, in The Yale Edition of the Unpublished Writings of Gertrude 
Stein, Volume 5: Painted Lace and Other Pieces (1914-37) (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1955), 
pp.167-233 (p.167). Further references are given after quotations in the text. 
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relationship between cultural meaning and natural phenomena. There is no distinction 
between the two here, suggesting that one cannot divide the cultural and consensual 
from the real, that the only access we have to the ‘natural’ is through culturally agreed 
meanings. 
 
Stein also considers the role of consensus in establishing meaning by exploring the 
phrase ‘natural phenomena’ and the idea of what is ‘natural’ in ‘Composition as 
Explanation’. This strongly suggests the function of ‘Natural Phenomena’ in 
developing the ideas which appear in the lecture. This intertextual reference also 
points to the centrality of the notion of natural phenomena and the significance for 
Stein of the paradox manifested in the adjective ‘natural’ and the adverb ‘naturally’. 
The adverb is particularly useful to Stein because it is sentential – i.e. it is used to 
modify the whole sentence – and thus reflects the tendency of consensus to produce 
unexamined attitudes, positions or, indeed, systems. Examples of the phrase ‘natural 
phenomena’ and the words ‘natural’ and ‘naturally’ gradually accumulate toward the 
middle of ‘Composition as Explanation’ until the central section. In the lines 
‘Naturally I would then begin again. I would begin again I would naturally begin. I 
did naturally begin’ and ‘I very completely began naturally since everything is alike 
making it as simply different naturally as simply different as possible’ the repetition 
of ‘naturally’ begins to take on an insistent rhythm (CE 221; 222). The effect of this 
reiteration is that the word continually loses and regains its impact. It replicates the 
continual loss of understanding that what is natural is constructed, the continual return 
to the feeling that one is having an authentic experience, that one is living naturally; 
that there is truth, or reality, or objectivity. The feeling that things are happening 
‘naturally’ is the state of unselfconsciousness – which is a false state that, as it were, 
authentically occurs.  
 
Written alongside the lecture, ‘Natural Phenomena’ is an unpublished counterpart to 
the public speech which deals with the same questions and follows the same 
evolutionary periodizing logic but expands into a broader meditation, linking the 
discussion of art history in the lecture to the images of natural phenomena on the 
covers of the French children’s notebooks she used for her writing. Taking these 
images alongside the ostensibly more unmediated phenomenon of the French 
countryside around Belley, where she and Alice were staying, Stein embodies the 
argument she constructs about art history as a lived experience of time. And it is in 
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this broader meditation that the problems of the ‘natural’ logic of origin, evolution 
and taxonomy involved in the lecture’s argument are engaged.  
 
The text progresses through three phases, tracing the evolution of human 
consciousness from the unmediated sense perception of real objects in real time to the 
self-reflexive acute sense of human time described in the lecture as the point at which 
‘the time-sense in the composition is the composition’ (CE 226). The first phase, 
called simply ‘NATURAL PHENOMENA’, opens with ‘daylight’:  
 
It is natural that in daylight they agree agree to natural phenomena. It is natural that in daylight they 
agree to natural phenomena. It is natural that in daylight it is natural that in daylight that they agree to 
natural phenomena in daylight (167). 
 
The opening lines of this text deal in the genesis of first things, in origin – which, as 
we have seen, Rosenfield’s also does – offering a presentation of light without artifice 
– the beginning; the simplest properties; the first grasp. Suggestive of the biblical 
Genesis (‘Let there be light’), it is characterised by the process of simple naming, 
which is the straightforward agreement between names and forms and the consensus 
in language about that agreement. This is a presentation of an act of sense perception 
followed by the most direct form of conscious grasp. Significantly, this suggests the 
‘original’ activity of human consciousness. The remainder of this phase in the text is 
characterised by duration – it is 40 pages long – and by the proliferation of references 
to enduring geological forms (‘Volcano’, ‘meteor’ ‘Mountains’, ‘Rivers’, ‘ocean’, 
‘earthquakes’), meteorological occurrences (‘rain’ ‘sun’ ‘ cloud’ ‘wind’  ‘rainbow’) 
and by scattered catalogues of species (‘pigeons’ ‘oriole’ ‘cuckoo’ ‘pheasant’ ‘hens 
roosters and ducks’ ‘oxen cows and bulls’ ‘roses pansies peonies and hawthorn’) 
(167; 181; 170; 174; 182; 172; 194; 175). The profusion of these references suggests 
an immersion in a welter of ‘natural phenomena’, a simple denotation of forms: a 
natural history. The language of natural history, the references to prehistoric forms 
and the simple reiteration of variations on the phrase ‘Natural Phenomena’ suggests 
first things, genetic origin and the distance of deep time. Indeed, this is explicit in the 
line ‘Let us consider chances and distance and origin’ (168). The effect of a primal 
scene is heightened by the simple quantifications and categorisations of forms, 
emphasised in the proliferation of lists, the most common syntactical form in this 
section. The groupings and classifications in this phase also suggest the logic of 
evolutionary theory, and this is particularly evident in Stein’s references to the 
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division and categorisation of objects or sets (as in ‘hens, roosters and ducks’, for 
example). This kind of logic is also evoked in ‘it is admired as to color size and 
insistence. As to whether it is different’ which presents an unnamed phenomenon in 
terms of the classification of qualities through which it might be differentiated (185). 
The language of natural history, therefore, leads us to ideas of origin, evolution, and 
classification.  
 
The evolutionary logic of the adaptation and consequent refinement of genetic strains 
is reflected in the way the text narrows in its second phase, which is denoted by the 
heading ‘PART TWO’ and the subheading ‘Partially Natural Phenomena’ (207). This 
section is much shorter – three pages, and, here, ‘Partially’ suggests a movement 
away from a full experience of the natural. Indeed the text deals with a narrower and 
more specific range of references, and is not flooded with the images of the natural 
world which characterise phase 1, moving into a more formal discourse different from 
the open looseness of the first phase with its lists and references to multiple forms. 
This is embodied in the repeated allusions to the more constructed forms of narrative 
such as ‘telling’, ‘prepared’, ‘reproduction’, ‘arranged’, ‘arrangement’, and indicated 
explicitly in the line ‘There is a difference between Phenomena of Nature and a 
Novel’(208; 209). This section introduces concepts of preparation and arrangement – 
the elements of human artifice which move consciousness away from the perception 
of phenomena to the representation of phenomena in narrative or other compositional 
forms.  
 
In the final phase of the text, the title ‘PART III’, with its use of the Roman numerals 
associated with formal writing, suggests from the outset an emphasis on self-
conscious discourse forms. Early in the section, this scenario deals explicitly with the 
development of a greater sophistication prompted by the engagement with a 
representation as opposed to an object: ‘When they looked upon and on and at a 
picture of a phenomena of nature and moved and it moved and away away and to-day 
to-day prepared for organisation organisation naturally of natural phenomena to be 
sure’ (211). Here, the text deals not with the first phase’s perception of phenomena, 
nor with the second phase’s representation of phenomena, but with the contemplation 
of that representation itself. Stein’s complex of prepositions ‘upon’ ‘on’ and ‘at’ 
emphasise the surface of the representation and this, alongside the repetition of 
‘organisation’,  places the focus not upon the object represented in the picture, but on 
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the composition of the representing surface. Stein, in suggesting that when ‘they [the 
observer]…moved…it [the picture] moved’ also draws attention to the self-
consciousness inherent in the contemplation of a human composition. ‘Natural 
Phenomena’ as a whole, then, presents us with a history of human consciousness, an 
evolution from its origins in the first simple grasp of phenomena to the sophisticated 
self-consciousness of modernism, which contemplates its own representations. 
 
This is evolutionary theory, however, with a difference, because Stein provides not an 
abstract ‘objective’ discourse but an experience of the human position in time and 
space. Mixing references to deep time with references to the quotidian – to Stein’s 
summer in Belley, visitors, small dramas – ‘we go to Belley an attractive place where 
we hope to be as well situated as ever’ or ‘To-day at the exposition there was 
bought…a little pitcher made of luster …’ – she finds the origins of being, meaning 
and language in the now (168; 201). The littering of enduring forms alongside the 
references to the continuity of lived experience in the present suggests that multiple 
forms and multiple times exist simultaneously. The key to this is in the sentence, ‘In 
the midst of it all the time’. This sentence directly glosses a previous line ‘Phenomena 
of nature all around. I was watching’ which has the subject, caught in the singular yet 
multiple flux of experience, perceiving from a single position (189). Dropped as it is 
on a separate line in the midst of two longer swathes of repetition, ‘In the midst of it 
all the time’ both performs and bespeaks the quality of experience embodied by the 
text.  We are in the midst of phenomena and in the midst of time as it moves, and this 
is emphasised here by the use of the empty ‘it’ which holds the whole flux in a single 
indeterminate pronoun. This directly challenges the possibility of finding an 
authoritative position outside time from which to tell a history. In ‘Natural 
Phenomena’ the perceiving self is a continually reconstructed subject in the midst of a 
field of meaning. The viewpoint from which history is told, therefore, is always part 
of its content.  As it is expressed in ‘Natural Phenomena’ ‘Everything I hear and say 
is everything I hear and say’ (178). 
 
Moreover, ‘Natural Phenomena’ itself, an intertext which contains residual traces of 
the 1926 lecture, is the divergent strain of ‘Composition as Explanation’. It exists 
alongside it as the two texts divide into the lecture and its ‘other’. But it is not 
discarded, just as the vestigial forms of natural history jostle alongside the lived 
experience of phenomena in the text itself. In ‘Natural Phenomena’, one cannot go 
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back, yet nothing has been lost. Instead, time moves by a process of accretion and 
accumulation in which the traces, the fossils of the past are contained in the mutations 
of the present. Yet one can never grasp them in their ‘pure’ original form both 
because they have mutated and because the observer’s experience is part of the 
history it composes. Throughout her 40 or so years of experimentation, Stein 
discarded nothing, rewrote nothing, a forward motion, also performed in this text, in 
which all traces remain. Neither usurped nor subsumed, each mutation remains. The 
durational nature of many of her texts and the very intertextuality evident in ‘Natural 
Phenomena’ emphasises process, multiplicity and simultaneity. The forward motion 
in which nothing is discarded and yet nothing can be wholly recuperated resists the 
reifications of taxonomy. This idea is central to an understanding of ‘Natural 
Phenomena’ but it is also meaningful in Kim Rosenfield’s text and offers a key to a 
concept of literary history which avoids the reductive rigidity associated with 
evolutionary taxonomy. 
 
Rosenfield more explicitly critiques the Darwinian model, but her text also indicates 
in the ‘pleasure’ of its logic the possibility of a dialectic in which evolutionary theory 
foregrounds multiplicity and that which is unfinished. Like Stein, Rosenfield offers 
equivalences between the grand world of the universe, with its eternal ‘natural’ 
biology and geology, and quotidian human landscapes – material objects, interiors, 
social constructs, discourses. And like Stein’s text, re: evolution is littered with such 
forms, often achieving a greater sense of the fusion Stein indicates through 
juxtaposition by more directly merging objects, concepts and the discourse forms 
which hold them in place. In re: evolution, ‘A splendid neck of the dinosaur but now 
the same sequence of fossils embrace a certain “let’s go” quality’, ‘Very old rocks are 
privatised’ and ‘extinction could be like a grand room full of sunlight’ (5). This 
merging of human constructions – material or abstract –with ‘natural’ forms 
emphasises the inextricability of human consciousness and that which it grasps.  
 
In Rosenfield’s text the frameworks imposed upon the world by humanity have a 
taxonomy of their own: ‘We’ve tried to furnish sustaining questions with different 
types of information: from the erudite nature of variety, to the distribution of 
geography, embroidery and taxidermy’ (9). The fields of meaning divide the world 
and in each category ‘natural’ forms mean something utterly different. Her text 
expresses multiple unnamed perspectives, a continual switching and merging of 
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position and discourse, from genetics – the chemical structure of DNA ‘(A, T, G, C)’ 
to showtunes – ‘So many beings I know I could be me in’ – from the excessively 
subjective to the coldly objective (10; 27). The human gaze, whether in the guise of 
the objective or the subjective, and constructed in whichever discourse, always gets in 
the way. The reification inherent in the categorising tendency of human frameworks is 
critiqued in these lines from Chapter 9 of re:evolution, which imagine the 
classification of instinct in its relationship to habit: 
 
Each instinct varies 
A little, then, we have no 
Difficulty in making a natural  
Selection committee and accumulating 
The variations of instinct (18). 
 
Here, ‘varies’ becomes ‘variations’ and the move from verb to noun points up the 
cultural activity of reification. The noun holds the fluid motion of the verb in 
suspension – freezing time, ending mutation, constructing a taxonomy. The practices 
of the ‘natural selection committee’ – a representation which again fuses Darwin’s 
description of evolutionary processes with the activity of the boardroom – assume the 
past is finished.  
 
Like Stein’s, Rosenfield’s text suggests, however, that we are in the midst of it all the 
time. Theories are proposed throughout the text which melt and disintegrate as they 
are articulated, and the book is strewn with surreal ambiguities and deliberate errors – 
even in spelling. The theoretical positions appear to seek closure, but they are 
continually mutating, serving only to emphasise the incommensurability of that which 
they grasp. Indeed, this is also true of the text as a whole, and this is indicated at the 
end of the book in an ironic reflection on the finality it usurps. The last chapter is 
entitled ‘Denouement’ and the closing page is stamped with the decisive block 
capitals ‘THE END’ (67; 71). In a striking parallel, Stein’s ‘Natural Phenomena’, 
ends with an acute emphasis on the passage of time ‘After a little while it has been by 
that time by that time when by that time and when by that time and when by that time’ 
followed by the equally emphatic ‘FINIS’ (233). Both of these conclusions emphasise 
the formal boundaries of the text – it is a composition – and serve to ironically 
underscore both the futile, arbitrary character of such definitive closures and their 




‘Natural Phenomena’ and re:evolution are accounts that show us, firstly, that human 
experience and human history are bound up with their own enculturated telling, and, 
secondly, that in the movement of culture through time, all forms still exist and it is 
therefore possible to reach back, to recuperate, to decide on a history. Thus, if 
chronology is necessary but imagined, if all forms still exist, and if the narrative of 
human history is all we have of history, what we are left with is a horticultural model 
of genetic engineering in which forms are subjected to continual intervention and a 
make-believe evolution whose fabrication is the only thing that is ‘natural’. 
 
Both these texts point to the problems involved in the critical enterprise of writing a 
literary history, and both also show the necessity for writing such a literary history, 
engendered by the changes wrought by and reflected in literature around the turn of 
the twentieth century. As Leonard Diepeveen recognises in his study of modernist 
anthologies,  ‘in the modern anthology the nature of the archive would change, for the 
modern anthology became the archive of evidence for a particular kind of argument, 
an argument about what made for culturally valid works of art at the beginning of the 
twentieth century’ (140). A literary history, when it moves ‘towards ideology and 
chronology’ as it did in this period, becomes an argument rather than a statement, an 
agent rather than a document (141). The history of conceptual writing, therefore, in its 
claim to avoid the reifying processes of canonisation, must be conceived and 
sustained explicitly as an argument rather than as the record of a natural occurrence. 
Moreover, the ideology and the chronology which modernist anthologies defined 
functioned together as a means of validation. If, as Diepeveen suggests, the difference 
at the turn of the century was that modernist anthologies ‘conceived of their 
boundaries both conceptually and temporally’ and thus ‘constructed modernism as a 
narrative’, then in order to inherit the avant-garde difference modernism represents for 
them, the theorists of conceptual writing must also inherit the task of constructing a 
history and writing a narrative for their movement (144). They must also, however, in 
order to keep hold of the constructedness which makes it modern, maintain a position 
of scepticism about that history and that narrative. Ostensibly, that is what the 
Anthology of Conceptual Writing wants to do, but the reliance on received histories 
and the underlying evolutionary model belie this intention. Further, the apparent 
refusal to engage with chronology in the exclusion of dates and in the suggestion that 
conceptual writing goes back as far as Ovid enables the category of the concept to 
overwhelm the insistence on chronology which is so important for modernism 
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precisely because its emphasis is on the validity of its response to its contemporary 
context – a position which conceptual writing now seeks to inherit in suggesting that 
mainstream contemporary poetry is behind the times. Moreover, the emphasis in this 
anthology on the idea without the chronology comes dangerously close to the 
imposition of a universal atemporal category and thus undermines their claim to 
contemporary validity or contextual specificity. 
 
The question of origin – the first – is as problematic as the question of the final, which 
is what a literary history attempts: to provide a finished story, with a beginning and an 
end, about the changes in literary production over time. Tracing a literary genealogy 
is a finalisation, a classification of forms, naming a strain and showing its 
development, and this is the danger of reification inherent in all histories. Reflected in 
Rosenfield’s paradoxical ‘first of its kind and a classic’ and Stein’s understanding of 
the classic as ‘the quality that makes it go dead’, the problem of classification is the 
problem of literary history from modernism onwards. What Diepeveen says of high 
modernism, that its ‘victory, putting in place as it did a single form of correct 
modernism, was also the occasion for modernism’s demise’ and thus ‘high 
modernism’s validity carried its own death within itself’ is important for an 
understanding of the problem of the methods through which validity and 
legitimisation are achieved for a movement which stakes a claim on an avant-garde 
heritage (151). The danger is that once a movement is legitimised, it becomes 
assimilated and no longer represents a challenge to ‘received histories’ (Dworkin AE 
xxiv), a ‘literary revolution’ (Goldsmith AE xvii) or even ‘an argument’ (Dworkin AE 
xxiii). The position ascribed to Stein by many of the theorists of conceptual writing is 
that of a precursor for a movement which wants to find its origins in the modernism 
perceived as the illegitimate avant-garde alternative to high modernism. Conceptual 
writing wants to resist the institutionalisation seen as the fate of modernism by 
bypassing that strain: Stein’s legitimacy for them is conferred by her illegitimacy for 
high modernism. This claim on Stein reflects their desire to occupy an illegitimate 
position in order to avoid the type of validation Diepeveen describes. The way in 
which conceptual writing is validated in the Anthology is therefore telling. The 
apparent levelling of the names and practices of individual practitioners and the 
emphasis on their connections with each other is a way of resisting hierarchy, creating 
a flat structure and thus overtly avoiding the institutionalising process most associated 




Canon and network in the Anthology of Conceptual Writing 
 
As well as showing the extent to which the Anthology deploys the institutionalising 
processes of historical periodisation, the evolutionary model and the imposition of a 
general category, however, a further examination of the preambles and the 
introductory essays does indeed also reveal the working of this other, related process 
the movement seeks to resist. The compositional elements of the Anthology 
emphasised on the contents page – the alphabetical order, the absence of dates – 
attempt to present the unadorned names of the writers rather than signalling any 
historical or cultural value they may have already been assigned. This seems to strip 
them of their weight and present them in an equalising or democratic light as 
individual examples of a general phenomenon. Reconfigured through the plotting of 
the underlying patterns of influence and hierarchy created in the preambles and 
essays, however, a canon certainly does materialise (fig. 7). Examining further the 
ways in which the preambles and introductions use names, a series of underlying 
patterns emerge which mean that particular writers are figured as more prominent and 
more influential than others. This simple visualisation of the most referenced authors 
reveals conceptual writing’s canonical figures and the genealogy they trace.  
 
In comprehensively tracking the patterns: who is named, in relation to whom, and 
how often, it is also possible to look in more detail at the form this canonisation takes 
by seeing these relations as a network of names in the text as a whole (fig.8). This 
visualisation reflects the aim of the anthology in going beyond the contemporary 
moment and, as Dworkin puts it ‘extending our own network of affiliations to include 
the writings of canonical figures from much earlier generations’ (xliv-xlv). The 
visualisation follows the flattening of history the anthology achieves when it decides 
not to date the authors, and presents us with the network of associations created by the 
references to those authors throughout the text. The refusal to engage with the 
paradigms of chronology and literary history signified in the contexts page is in part 
an attempt to reconfigure canonical writers from other periods in order to change our 
view of them. By deploying ‘a simple act of reframing’ like that through which he 
composed the online UbuWeb Anthology of Conceptual Writing, Dworkin wants us to 
see them not as part of an established canon, but as engaging in less legitimate 









                                                           














                                                           
42 Produced in collaboration with Amy Macdougall. Shapes represent gender, with circles=male and 
triangles=female. See Afterword for a discussion of gender. Colours are randomised. 
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In its function of representing a deterritorialised flat network, the anthology has the 
authors engaged in a system which is signified by patterns of combination. As we 
have seen in fig. 4, a particular writer’s prominence is signalled both through the 
frequency with which their name is mentioned in the preambles introducing other 
writers, and in the number of other writers with whom they are associated in their own 
preamble. In the network plot above, the data is visualised as a network plot in which 
direction of the arrows reflects each of these processes. Arrows ‘out’ denote which 
names are associated with those writers in their own preambles, and arrows ‘in’ 
denote references made to them in the preambles of other writers.
43
 Viewed like this, 
the way in which names are selected and combined through cross reference and 
association reflects the processes of mutual identification the anthology signals.  
 
These writers are drawn into a category but also into a system, a network of 
association and recognition in which they are legitimised by their connection with 
other writers. Some figures are prominent, some more marginal, and small ‘coteries’ 
emerge. The French late 19
th
 century symbolist Stephane Mallarme, 60’s conceptual 
artists Andy Warhol and John Cage, Language poets Charles Bernstein and Ron 
Silliman, with lots of arrows ‘in’ are given greater prominence as central influences 
often recognised in other writers, whereas more recent contemporary writers Nathan 
Austin and K. Silem Mohammad – with many arrows ‘out’ – have other writers 
drawn into clusters around them which presents them as conduits or networking 
figures. Significantly, the editors of the Anthology, Dworkin and Goldsmith are both 
central to the cluster in which other names gather, revealing the way in which the 
placing of names in the Anthology serves to promote particular authors rather than 
presenting the equalised field the contents page indicates. This hierarchy of influence 
and connection radically revises the ‘levelling’ enacted in the contents page, designed 
to resist the processes of canonisation and exclusion, and reasserts those processes 
through other paratextual means.  
                                                           
43 The algorithm which determines the layout of the nodes is called 'Fruchterman Reingold' and is an 
instance of 'Force directed graph drawing'. Nodes are conceptualised as objects in space. Typically, 
spring-like attractive forces based on Hooke's law are used to attract pairs of endpoints of the graph's 
edges (the nodes) towards each other, while simultaneously repulsive forces like those of electrically 
charged particles are used to separate all pairs of nodes. So if two nodes are linked (in this case, if an 
author’s preamble makes reference to another author) it is as if they are joined by a spring. The 
strength of the spring is greater if they have both been mutually referenced. Nodes therefore attract 
each other (if they are linked via 'springs'), and repel each other via imagined electro-magnetic force. 
The algorithm simulates a physical system using these predefined attraction/repulsions, and finds a 
state of equilibrium. This is how the positions of the nodes are defined. The eventual positions 




In this visualisation Stein occupies a position equivalent to that of Duchamp, 
replicating the parallel drawn between them in Marjorie Perloff’s 2001 argument. For 
Perloff, they are the modernists who did not succumb to the institutionalisation that 
was the result of a return to conservatism in the interwar era. Thus, Stein provides for 
poetry an untainted basis for a resurgent avant-garde conceived of as an unfinished 
project. In the Anthology of Conceptual Writing, however, although Stein is 
mentioned as often as Duchamp, making her as significant a precursor, her work, 
unlike his, does not appear. This reflects once again her function for conceptual 
writing as a signifier of the avant-garde literary position as such.   
 
This argument for Stein’s avant-garde credentials is, of course, first proposed by the 
Language poets and explicitly by Charles Bernstein in the late 1970s. It is therefore 
interesting that Charles Bernstein is significantly engaged on this field, placed as he is 
in the tangled midst of the main cluster. This is because many of the preambles for 
other writers mention his work, and also because many of the figures whose 
preambles name him are also themselves connected in either direction to lots of other 
writers. This difference accounts for the relative isolation of Cage and Warhol in the 
cluster, who, although influential, are not presented as being active on the field in the 
same way because their influence is quantified as wide ranging, but less connected. 
The data as visualised here indicates that Bernstein is assigned a greater and more 
active role in the creation of the network itself. Bernstein is therefore overall accorded 
a greater prominence than any other writer in the system, being both influential and 
central. This is interesting in the light of the fact that Bernstein’s 1970’s argument for 
Language poetry, that visual art had developed whilst poetry stagnated, and that 
Language poetry finds a way out for poetry, is being more or less rehearsed in the 
arguments offered by Goldsmith and Dworkin in their introductory essays.
44
 By 
including the work of modernists and Language poets in the Anthology, Dworkin and 
Goldsmith draw Language poetry and its relation to Stein into the new category of the 
conceptual.  
 
Dworkin’s characterisation of conceptual writing’s ‘realisation that one does not need 
to generate new material to be a poet’ as the ‘great break with even the most artificial, 
                                                           
44 This action is also apparent in the prominent positioning of David Melnick and Ron Silliman, both 
significant Language poets whose 1980’s work is included in the Anthology of Conceptual Writing. 
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ironic or asemantic work of other avant-gardes’ echoes Marjorie Perloff’s claim, in 
her 2010 book on conceptual writing, Unoriginal Genius: Poetry by Other Means in 
the New Century, that: 
 
Language poetry had as its explicit aim to oppose such “natural” expressivist speech, such individual 
voicing and accessible syntax [as the lyric of the 60s and 70s they apparently resisted]. But for the most 
part – and this has been insufficiently recognised – the poets represented in, say, Ron Silliman’s In the 
American Tree did accept their predecessors’ trust in invention.... In the climate of the new century, 
however, we seem to be witnessing a poetic turn…Inventio is giving way to appropriation, elaborate 
constraint, visual and sound composition, and reliance on intertextuality. Thus we are witnessing a new 
poetry, more conceptual than directly expressive…45 
 
With this claim, that conceptual writing is a real ‘poetic turn’ and the true ‘new 
poetry’, Language poetry becomes a failed attempt to break with the past. In this 
representation, we return once again to the problem of literary history for the avant-
garde: that in order to be avant-garde, a practice must be without precedent, and so 
conceptual writing must be seen as a break from Language poetry as well as being its 
inheritor. Conceptual writing needs to represent a rupture from the past but it also 
desires the legitimacy of a literary genealogy which includes both Stein’s ‘avant-
garde’ modernism and Language poetry. The positioning of Bernstein’s name, 
however, seems to enable conceptual writing to avoid the problem of literary history 
by appropriating the argument about Stein’s modernism put forward to validate 
Language poetry and reassigning it as the argument for conceptual writing. Thus, the 
argument about Stein does not require an examination of her work or the historical 
context in which it made its meanings: it is taken as read, reflecting the very type of 
‘received’ history Dworkin explicitly seeks to avoid. Moreover, in order to make 
sense for conceptual writing, the theories, practices and practitioners of this select 
modernism and of Language poetry must become something else. Assimilated into the 
conceptual writing category by their inclusion in the Anthology, both ‘avant-garde’ 
modernism and Language poetry become conceptual writing.  
 
Conceptual writing and Bourdieu’s ‘space of position-takings’ 
 
The most significant thing this visualisation reveals, however, is the very fact that the 
way these names are afforded value is through their place in a network of mutual 
validation. Within the category of conceptual writing, the Anthology constructs a 
paradigm which can be understood in terms of Bourdieu’s model of the cultural field 
                                                           
45 Dworkin, p.xliv; Perloff, Unoriginal Genius, p.11. 
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as a ‘space of artistic or literary position-takings’ as inseparable from the ‘space of 
literary or artistic positions’. The Anthology of Conceptual Writing claims for 
conceptual writing a position on the field as an aspect of its taking hold of the set of 
relations which construct the literary scene. The function of the ‘mode’ as the primary 
factor in the practice of conceptual writing is at work in the Anthology just as it is in 
the individual texts within it. In its engagement with the field of cultural production as 
a ‘field of forces’ and a ‘field of struggles’, the Anthology explicitly claims a position 
on the field in the same way that its texts draw attention not only to their content and 
their form but also to their mode, the way in which they position themselves in 
relation to that field of forces.
46 
 In particular, the Anthology as a network of mutual 
validation corresponds to the position described by Bourdieu as defined by ‘the 
autonomous principle of hierarchization’:  
 
The autonomous principle of hierarchization, which would reign unchallenged if the field of production 
were to achieve total autonomy with respect to the laws of the market, is degree specific consecration 
(literary or artistic prestige), i.e. the degree of recognition accorded by those who recognize no other 
criterion of legitimacy than recognition by those whom they recognize (38). 
 
Bourdieu’s formulation corresponds precisely to the underlying structure of the 
Anthology: Dworkin and Goldsmith construct a network of legitimacy founded on the 
mutual recognition Bourdieu describes. Their claim on the position of autonomy, 
therefore, represents a rejection of any other form of validation outside the mutual 
recognition which is the primary compositional principle of the Anthology. When the 
Anthology draws in writers from other periods, however, Bourdieu’s model, which 
serves to describe a synchronic field, is extended diachronically to include names seen 
to have previously occupied that space. In this way, the principle of autonomy 
becomes a historical struggle against the institutionalising forces of the bourgeois 
worldview which, for Dworkin and Goldsmith, produces cultural artefacts which 
serve only to replicate and obscure their logic.  
 
Seen in terms of its emphasis on mode, the practice of conceptual writing is a practice 
of position-taking. Conceptual writing figures Stein in a network of mutual validation 
in order to stake a claim on the illegitimate and marginal position she occupies in 
literary history. Stein’s position is read as an alternative which exists because it is 
resistant to institutionalisation and therefore has not engendered a tradition or a canon. 
                                                           
46 Bourdieu, The Field of Cultural Production: Essays on Art and Literature, p.30. Further references 
are given after quotations in the text. 
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What conceptual writing inherits from Stein, therefore, is her position in that ‘space of 
literary or artistic position-takings’ identified by Bourdieu as the organising principle 
of the field of cultural production. This is possible because of the category of the 
conceptual itself, which is by definition always about the function of an act of writing 
in the socio-economic field in relation to which the field of cultural production 
articulates itself. Stein is not a model for practice, she is a model of position-taking. 
This makes sense for conceptual writing because its practice is the practice of 
position-taking. The name ‘Stein’ signifies a position, and Stein is therefore not a 
model for imitation in the way that the avant-garde’s negative concept of tradition 
would have it. She names a conceptual position, a position in relation to tradition; a 
place in literary history; she marks a division between the mainstream and the avant-
garde.  
 
In this sense, Stein is recuperated precisely because she was made modernism’s 
abject. The very act of challenging the paradigms within which art, writing, and 
language are understood is what makes Stein a progenitor, but this is because she was 
framed as the exemplary, exceptional version of this by other modernists. Stein is 
there and not there because she is a cypher, a function, an action of the challenge to 
paradigms first ascribed in her ejection from modernism and construed further each 
time she is reworked as avant-garde. The weight of this history-making successively 
accrues to the author-function her name drags with it. 
 
Conceptual writing therefore makes itself avant-garde by constructing a genealogy 
which ends with itself, but this is the nature of the avant-garde because it is a 
conscious position-taking, and this is what is valuable for them about Stein. It is 
important to note, however, that the Stein of the first half of the twentieth century 
positioned herself as much in relations and gestures as she did in writing and in being 
read. Gesture and action are part of her practice, and just as Quartermain, Ashton and 
Perloff err in missing this out, so conceptual writing does not recognise that her place 
in her own period was constructed as much by and in the other works, actions and 
gestures, the other position-takings in which her work and her gestures functioned. 
Naming Stein is naming a position: the marginal, the outlaw, the unfulfilled future of 
writing. But the position she names is a result of a complex set of factors: her 
practice; her action; her networks; the position she is ascribed by other modernists in 
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1927; and the successive accretions of the literary histories which gather around the 





1. The sentence, “conceptualism is feminism” has a mathematical syntax, that is to 
say, like that where a = b. The equivalency in this case is easily proved: 
conceptualism is, as I practice it, writing that is not self-reflexive, that is to say, 
writing whose (essential) meaning is not determined by its text, but by its context. 
In this way, the text’s surface often remains entirely the same, even as it moves 
from one context to another, that is to say, even as it changes the slightest bit, 
such as the change in a view when one moves from one window to the next, 
which is to say, completely. 
Thus: 
 
2. A = A1
1 
 
In moving Stein from one context to another, conceptual writing and its precursors 
write her into a discourse for which she can mean something other than her 
elimination from literary modernism. This recuperation makes its own history by 
including Stein in a new paradigm in which she can become an author and so 
redesignate authorship.  Stein’s recuperation has long been a feminist project, and the 
activity of contextualising her as a valid author and the originator of an alternative 
tradition can be seen as a continuation of that undertaking. I want to conclude by 
saying how my thesis, in questioning this endeavour, can itself be construed as a 
feminist project. 
 
In her piece ‘Conceptualism is Feminism’, quoted above, Vanessa Place identifies her 
practice as feminism by determining her conceptual works as feminist acts. In moving 
a text from ‘one context to another’, her practice draws that text into a feminist 
discourse which accords it a different value. This process has a parallel with the 
recontextualisation of Stein I have described. Taken out of the context of 
institutionalised modernist literary history and drawn into the new context of a 
resistant avant-garde literary history, Stein is given a different value in a paradigm 
which, in its very existence, embodies a critique of the other history. Stein’s work, in 
this new context, comes to stand for a critique of literary hegemony. ‘Conceptualism 
is Feminism’ includes a number of examples of Place’s feminist practice which show 
how, in her work, the new context for the text translates it into feminist critique. One 
                                                           
1
 Vanessa Place, ‘Conceptualism is Feminism’, 
https://www.academia.edu/2778773/Conceptualism_is_feminism, p1, accessed 5 September 2016. 
Further references are given after quotations in the text. 
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of the most striking examples Place gives is from her text Tragodía 1: Statement of 
Facts (2010), in which she reproduces in their entirety a series of appellate briefs 
from sexual offence cases she has been involved in as a defence lawyer:  
 
EXAMPLE: POEM: Joncey 
Joncey did not remember if she went to a motel with appellant, or whether 
appellant told her he was a pimp and the women in the pictures were his 
whores. Joncey testified she didn’t know appellant as a pimp. She did not 
remember appellant asking if she would whore for him, or promising her 
pretty clothes, or saying her parents didn’t care for her, or letting her call 
them, and when there was no answer, saying that if they were worried, 
they would have been there, or that she then agreed to work for him. She 
did not remember telling the detective appellant said never take less than 
$50 for “head,” explained “head” meant oral sex, or that a customer should 
touch her breasts or she should fondle the customer’s penis to make sure 
the person was not a police officer. Or that if she was going to a hotel with 
a customer, she should first call appellant, or bring the money to appellant 
right after sex, or that if she did all this she would be rewarded with pretty 
clothes and appellant would take care of her. (RT 4:692- 695) (2) 
 
In its recontextualisation as Statement of Facts, a book-length ‘epic poem’, this text is 
a feminist text because it draws attention to the relentlessness of the social 
reproduction of male sexual violence and female victimhood. Another text Place 
includes in ‘Conceptualism is Feminism’, ‘Minn. Man Accused of Dismembering 
Wife With Saw’, which is a recontextualisation of an internet news report, also 
presents an example of male violence as an iconic act which stands in for all the 
examples of violence against women (3). As Place puts it, when the text is 
appropriated as poetry, whether it is ‘an isolated newspaper article, a single facebook 
status update, a couple of laundry soaps sitting on a shelf’ it ‘must make a claim to 
some sort of universality’ and so ‘this newspaper article stands for our contemporary 
history’ (6). The feminist critique, then, lies in the capacity of the text in its new 
context to represent something exemplary or universal. These two texts, the appellate 
brief and the news report, moved to the context of poetry, demonstrate most 
immediately the universality of the state of gender relations as characterised by the 
violent oppression and abuse of women by men.  
 
These two examples, like the others she includes, however, represent something more 
than that truth. They are exemplary of the ontological problem of gender as such 
which Place articulates later in her piece. This is a problem to do with exclusion, and 
the issue of exclusion, as I will show, is relevant to my problematizing of the way in 
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which the new avant-garde context recuperates Stein. Place formulates the difficulty 
as follows: 
 
woman only exists contextually—one can only be woman 
relative to man. As everyone knows by now, the woman is what the man is not, as 
such, she is defined—and must be defined—by man, because, as Lacan famously 
put it, “la femme n’existe pas.” Therefore, a woman is woman because she (alone) 
has a gender context (8). 
 
In this conception, ‘woman’ only exists as the negative of ‘man’, or, as Place puts it 
later, ‘W = {~M}’ (9). The tilde ‘~’ in Place’s equation, originally used by medieval 
scribes as a symbol for abbreviation, ‘a mark of suspension’, and later deployed in 
dictionaries to indicate the omission of the entry word, here translates as a signifier of 
the omission of ‘woman’ from the category ‘man’ as woman’s defining characteristic. 
Thus, ‘woman’ is the omission or suspension of ‘man’, or to put it more simply, 
‘woman’ is ‘not man’. ‘Woman’ is included in the paradigm only as that which is not, 
and so the signifier ‘woman’ denotes a position of negation or lack. The inclusion of 
‘woman’ is, in this way, always an exclusion. Included in ‘Conceptualism is 
Feminism’, and so considered through this lens, the examples which Place provides, 
as well as articulating universals about the particular state of gender relations, also 
reflect the overarching conceptual matter of her piece: that of the negative signifier 
‘woman’, as a linguistic, philosophical and material bind.  
 
In the example from Statement of Facts, Joncey is overtly not telling of her abuse and 
victimisation. She repeatedly ‘did not remember’ and ‘didn’t know’ the details which, 
explicated with such particularity, could only be information she had previously 
given. In recording Joncey’s refusal to tell her own story, the extract shows the 
complicity of the victim’s silence and reveals her self-exclusion. Joncey speaks purely 
in order to renounce her will to speak and so her utterance asserts, as an inclusion in 
the discourse of testimony, only her exclusion from that discourse. Moreover, in 
denying her own experiences, her memory, her knowledge, she negates herself, 
leaving only a story of not-being. What the poem ‘Joncey’ demonstrates, in the 
context of Place’s ‘Feminism is Conceptualism’ and her equation ‘W = {~M}’, is the 




An image of the being as not-being of ‘woman’ is also invoked in the other example, 
‘Minn. Man Accused of Dismembering Wife With Saw’. In this text, the 
dismembered body of the wife in the news report stands in for ‘woman’ as an icon of 
the inclusion-as-exclusion it signifies. Place contextualises the text as ‘the miniature 
or personal portrait’ which is ‘the lyric, the thing we squint at and recognize as the 
beloved lovingly looked at’ (3). For the murderer, the ‘beloved lovingly looked at’ is 
the dismembered body of his wife, whom he murdered ‘after she said she was leaving 
him and taking their son’ (4). This marks the presence as absence of ‘woman’, in that 
as a lyric poem the text situates a mutilated corpse in the place of the love object and 
so has as that object an absence, not just the absence of death, but also the annihilation 
of dismemberment. The fact that the victim is killed for threatening to leave her 
husband enables a further unfolding of the concept. The husband kills and 
dismembers her in order to prevent her departure. In doing so, he annihilates her. She 
still disappears, but her disappearance is an act of his will, and so he kills her purely 
in order that her elimination happens on his terms and not on hers. Thus, the exclusion 
of this woman sustains her inclusion in a male-dominated paradigm, in which her own 
willed departure from that paradigm is not an option. Rather than standing simply as 
an example of the (often romanticised) obsessive lover (if he can’t have her, no-one 
can), in the context of Place’s text the story becomes emblematic of the structuring of 
gender as such.  
 
Kenneth Allott’s 1950 Penguin Book of Contemporary Verse, for Peter Quartermain 
the exemplar of the post-war settlement and a codification of the modernist canon, in 
writing its history of the contemporary, enacts in its reference to Gertrude Stein the 
very process of exclusionary inclusion Place identifies. This occurs in Allott’s 
introduction, in a footnote to a quotation from T.S. Eliot’s review of Metaphysical 
Lyrics and Poems of the Seventeenth Century (1921). In order to dismiss Eliot’s 
assertion that the contemporary poet must ‘dislocate if necessary, language into his 
meaning’, Allott glosses Eliot in the footnote by identifying ‘some of these 
“dislocations,”’ as ‘Joyce’s polyglot word-coinages, the Stein stutter (to use 
Wyndham Lewis’s phrase)’, and ‘the lingua franca of Transition’.
2
 This dismissal is 
the only reference to Stein in the text, and her work does not appear in the anthology, 
                                                           
2 The Penguin Book of Contemporary Verse, ed. by Kenneth Allott (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 
1950), p.17; p.17, n.1. 
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which includes just two women writers, Kathleen Raine and Anne Ridler, amongst the 
61 poets it presents as exemplary of the verse of the 1920s, 30s and 40s. Stein is 
included, literally in the margins of the text, in order to mark her exclusion as a 
conscious act. Thus, the text takes hold of Stein in order to exclude her, enacting the 
inclusion as exclusion of ‘woman’ in the paradigm in which, as Vanessa Place 
intimates, the woman as such only exists contextually as the negated product of 
‘man’.  
 
Allott’s choice of Wyndham Lewis’s phrase ‘the Stein stutter’ includes Stein as sub-
verbal, speechless and therefore excluded from poetry and from authorship. She 
stands for saying nothing, for the lack of speech. This has a striking parallel in 
Vanessa Place’s example of Joncey, in that Stein is also included in this discourse  
here, the discourse which authorises ‘contemporary verse’  as mute and therefore as 
excluded. The ‘Stein stutter’ also returns us to the related issue of the designation of 
the author. As we have seen, in the 1920s denunciations, particularly those of Lewis 
and Eliot, the central function of the representations of Stein is to imply that she is not 
an author. Her exclusion from this category actuates her exclusion from literary 
modernism. The mute stutter Allott invokes to stand for Stein reiterates this exclusion 
in a casual and minimal form which indicates that this is the consensus: it is taken as 
read. 
 
Allott’s use of Lewis’s caricature, written over 20 years earlier, shows us the 
influential nature of Lewis’s representation of Stein, and his approving citation of 
Lewis exemplifies the necessary closing of ranks, the necessary consensus among 
these men, who cannot countenance a woman, as Lewis puts it, ‘living comfortably at 
the heart of things’.
3
  In insisting on her otherness, the marking of Stein as marginal 
has a parallel with Place’s understanding of ‘the woman as being the product, and 
sadly, often the only product, of man. (Product as in purpose, as the Jew is to the 
Anti-Semite)’ (9). The 1920s constructions of the author make Stein the product  
that is, the purpose  of the ‘author’. In other words, she is only recognised as 
something at all in order to distinguish her from the real ‘author’, and the author, at 
                                                           
3 Lewis, Time and Western Man, p.111. 
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the same time, is designated in order to exclude her. Allott’s 1950 reiteration ratifies 
that paradigm in which she is identified as the excluded.   
 
Place defines conceptual poetry as poetry because it is ‘not not poetry’, expressed as 
the equation {‘P = ~[~P]}’. Thus, in taking conceptual poetry as a model for a 
feminist rewriting of gender, she imagines an ‘infra-mince’ situation in which woman 
could not not be man, or, following her other formulation, [W = ~[~M]} (5; 9).
4
 In 
positing this parallel, she intimates that the space of conceptual poetry could be the 
locus of this translation of ‘woman’. When Language poetry, when Bernstein, 
Quartermain, Perloff and, later, conceptual writing, imagine Stein as the central figure 
in a separate and antagonistic paradigm in which she is included as the originary 
author (and, for Allott, as we have seen, author = man), they carve out this space. In 
redesignating Stein as the ‘real’ author, the proper origin for poetry as opposed to the 
canonical modernism which has spawned the tepid bourgeois mainstream, the new 
context for Stein does indeed appear to be a location in which she can  to use Place’s 
formula  not not be an author.   
 
There is a problem with this resolution, however. In writing Stein into another 
paradigm, the avant-garde genealogy also takes as read, as Allott does, the story of 
Stein as a separate thing. The new genealogy, in fact, validates and systematises her 
exclusion. When Stein’s work is read as inherently resistant to the paradigm in which 
it is produced, her exclusion, rather than being identified as a historical act and an act 
of historiography, is made into a function of her work. Thus, in their reading, Stein’s 
work only speaks of her exclusion. The designation of her work as a speechless 
‘stutter’, the warrant that authorises her exclusion, is raised to the level of a virtue. 
Rather than locating Stein, therefore, in an alternative paradigm which includes her as 
the positive outcome of two negatives, the avant-garde narrative makes a fetish of her 
exclusion and so she comes to stand as an icon of that negation. 
 
This thesis has explored other ways out of the bind, both of which are also intimated 
in Place’s discussion. First, I have attempted, as Place puts it, to ‘consider the “=,”’ 
that is, to consider the question, ‘how “does A become equivalent to B”?’ (9). For the 
                                                           
4 Duchamp’s infra-thin difference which makes all the difference, for example between the latrine and 
the latrine as work of art. 
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story of Stein’s exclusion, this is the question of how she came to be defined as 
invalid, and this is a question which refuses the naturalisation of her illegitimacy as 
author. In seeking the history of Stein’s designation as aberrant, I have attended to the 
processes of her exclusion as real action on the cultural field, rather than accepting her 
aberration as truth. Finding that history is asking the question of how Stein came to be 
negated and it demystifies the exclusion which is fetishized in the stories of her avant-
garde resistance.  
 
Second, my study attempts to achieve the state ‘la femme n’existe pas’ as a positive 
state by returning Stein to the ‘heart of things’. This attempt is valid, I would argue, 
because when Stein lives at the heart of things she does not exist as something 
designated. When Stein is designated at all  as such  by Lewis, Eliot and Rodker, 
and, later, in Allott’s echo of Lewis, the only function of this designation is to mark 
her as marginal. Indeed, it is purely because she is at the heart of things that Lewis 
needs to marginalise her: that is, to move her from centre to periphery. It is, therefore, 
only at the heart of things, I would argue, that Stein ‘signals the capacity to be 
otherwise, i.e., to ~[~B]’ (9). Returning Stein to her context is a feminist act because 
it is an act of attention which neither includes nor excludes her. It gives her agency as 
an actor on the field herself engaged, as we have seen, in the configuration of 
authorship. At the same time, this approach recognises the other, (symbolic and 
material) forces which construct her position as a complex of intersections and as a 
struggle to achieve consensus.  
 
Place’s final inclusion is a quotation from Gertrude Stein: ‘as Gertrude Stein said, 
“Let me recite what history teaches. History teaches”’ (12). The histories which enact 
Stein’s initial exclusion and her later recuperation teach us, as Stein intimates, about 
themselves: that is, about the processes and mechanisms which are brought into play 
in their making. In attending to the ways in which these histories are made, rather than 
attending to the achieved outcome of the struggle for consensus, the mechanisms by 
which consensus is achieved and through which it is sustained can be understood. To 
attend to the Stein who speaks from the centre rather than valorising the Stein who 
stutters at the margins is to understand the complex processes of institutionalisation 
rather than to see the results of institutionalisation as the inevitable and permanent 
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state of things. Indeed, the principle that one must pay attention to those processes as 
a feminist project is also relevant to the present moment of conceptual writing. A 
second (feminist) glance at the ‘canon’ chart (fig. 7) and the ‘network’ plot (fig. 8) 
which log the shaping of consensus in the Anthology of Conceptual Writing yields 
amongst much else two significant details: firstly, that Gertrude Stein is the only 
woman in the canon and, secondly, that along with many other women, not least Kim 
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